Mass mobilization sounds good -- but do any of you really believe
that it was / is necessary for this effort? Or, more importantly that it could have been done with over 30% of the voters opposed to invading Iraq before the fact? Or would / could have been sustained with over 60% opposed to it at one point?
Slap, one thing you might want to consider about 'declared war' is that we've been in several since the last that had an actual Congressional Declaration of War and that during that war and its concomitant full mobilization a number of laws were passed that gave the Federal Government some truly awesome and draconian powers during a 'state of war' i.e., a declared war IAW the Constitution. Avoidance of triggering those laws is one significant thing has driven Congress to deliberately avoid declaring war since 1945...
I'd further suggest that your theory of declared versus undeclared wars has merit with respect to the intent of the founders but have to question whether a literal interpretation along your lines affords the flexibility needed today. While there is no question that the Armed forces could be restructured to operate within your parameters, I suggest you'd be confronted with an Army that sat stateside and trained along with an Air force that was minimally employed and a Navy an Marine Corps that were overworked.
Obviously, the Navy and Marines could be enlarged and better funded but this would have to be at the expense of the CONUS based Army and AF which would impact their size, equipping and training. Those services would wither. Not a big deal to me but some would get ferociously upset at that -- the more important issue is not the politics, it's the practicality of such an eventuality.
An item to note is that the current system has produced the most combat experienced armed forces in the world today and most other nations Ministers of Defense are well aware of that and don't want to consider a couple of million combat experienced Americans anywhere near their nation. I doubt they'd be that concerned if we were talking about just a few hundred thou Marines and an Army that had been sitting at home training marginally -- and peacetime training is ALL marginal, CTCs or no.
You also have USSOCOM to deal with. Whatcha going to do with them? :D
He's got some good points...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
slapout9
However he also has some flawed ideas -- and an agenda:
Michael Mcclintock.
Criticism of Rupert Smith
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By the way - does anyone know of any criticism of Smith's book? I thought he had it right, but I'm curious if there are any opposing views.
Schmedlap, here are a few I found. I keep bumping the book down my to read list, but now I think I will crack it open.
http://www.d-n-i.net/dni_reviews/the...y_of_force.htm
http://johntreed.com/utilityofforce.html
I offer these two not as a endorsement, but rather because they offered some good fodder.
I read it when it came out; I was still wroking then
Quote:
Originally Posted by
slapout9
and mobilization was one of my core tasks. What does that have to do with declared versus undeclared war or to do with the forays into Afghanistan or Iraq?
Not trying to be difficult, I just don't understand the connection... :confused:
Er, you did note that it confirmed what I said -- most of the mobilization planning took place before the Declaration of War (and that Pamphlet Gordy Sullivan put out before his Louisiana Maneuvers refreshed my memory on that score back in '92.
WWII vs. Tonkin Gulf vs Today
The difference in language between these two acts by Congress evidences a difference in national strategic policy.
Quote:
WWII Declaration of War (link by Ken)
.... the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.
The language is very specific in ratifying an armed conflict with a single nation, to bring that conflict to a successful termination, and all the nation's resources were pledged.
On the other hand, we have the Tonkin Gulf resolution, which is here.
Quote:
Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.
The language is specific in ratifying armed force; but does not focus on a single nation; does not focus on a specific armed conflict, or in bringing that conflict to a successful termination; and certainly does not pledge all of the nation's resources.
What was going on here ? The resolution is area-focused - on SE Asia and maintenance of peace and security in that area - read that as limitation of communism in that region, and as a rejection of an agressive roll-back policy. The termination condition was when "the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions".
That portion of the resolution does not mention Indochina (or its then four component parts), except indirectly (Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam were "protocol states" under SEATO). That evidences the continued primary focus on SE Asia as a whole - of which, South Vietnam was but a component part - and, individually, not a very important part.
-------------------------------------------
Now, my point is not to debate the relative merits of these two acts of Congress - or what speculative alternatives any of us might draft as being "better". My point is that the two different national strategy approaches resulted in different approaches by the "National Command Authorities" in military strategy, operations and tactics in each conflict.
The result of our military action in Vietnam (no matter how flawed or unflawed you want to make it) was consistent with the termination condition set in the national strategy evidenced by Tonkin Gulf (and other NSC statements, as well). Ran into the following by GEN Westmorland in Infantry Magazine (Garland), A Distant Challenge, which is available here:
Quote:
A Distant Challenge: The U.S. Infantryman in Vietnam, 1967-1972
Infantry Magazine
LTC Albert N. Garland, USA (Ret.)
Foreward
Indeed, history may judge that American aid to South Vietnam constituted one of man's more noble crusades, one that had less to do with the domino theory and a strategic interest for the United States than with the simple equation of a strong nation helping an aspiring nation to reach a point where it had some reasonable chance to achieve and keep a degree of freedom and humanv dignity. It remains a fact that few countries have ever engaged in such idealistic magnanimity; and no gain or attempted gain for human freedom can be discounted.
Although in the end a political default, it is now clearly evident that there was an ironic strategic dividend to our presence in Vietnam; namely the impact of the American military "holding the line" for ten years against communist pressures on Southeast Asia thus provided for the Asian countries (Philippines, Malasia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand) a shield and hence a breathing spell toward development of greater political matrurity and self confidence as nations. It encouraged Indonesia in 1966 to throw out the Russians and, as time passed, unhappy events in Indochina showed to the people of Southeast Asia the real ugly face of communism and the inadequacy of the communist system. Consequently, the countries of Southeast Asia now seem to be staunchly a part of the non-communist world.
William C. Westmorland
April 1983
The salient point is that, regardless of the technical form of the Congressional act, the national strategic policy and the resultant military plans must mesh. Otherwise, we do get mired in dogma - and disputes about what should or should have been done in the past (e.g., Summers vs. Krepinevich).
Since we don't have a single nation to declare war against, what is our area national strategic policy for South Asia in 2009 ? I haven't the foggiest idea beyond killing Bin Ladin, Zawahiri and AQ there.
Nope, under traditional I Law,
only nations and some international organizations are recognized.
However, that being said, GC III Art. 2 recognizes "Powers" to an armed conflict - they do not have to be nation-states or recognized governments of nation-states (e.g., the Taliban, and possibly AQ). If such a "Power" accepts and applies the GCs, its combatants flow into Art. 4 (PW/POW status) provided they meet its requirements. Otherwise, their status is governed by Art. 3 (the non-international armed conflict provisions),
I see nothing problematic about declaring an armed conflict to exist between a nation-state and such a "Power"; but it would not be a formal declaration of war. In fact, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was aimed at communism and a region, SE Asia. Similarly, the AUMF was aimed at terrorism and was global - as they say in other contexts, overly broad and vague.
From the standpoint of US Con Law, the use of both formal declarations of war and joint resolutions was recognized early on - with both coming under the Congressional power to declare war. However, as Ken points out, a number of statutes and executive orders are best interpreted as requiring a formal declaration of war.
That's the law as I see it. Others will disagree.
PS: we might have "lost" the Vietnam War - Let the Summers-Krepinevich disciples argue that one out. We won the Southeast Asia Armed Conflict and that's where I count the guys and gals on the Wall - that one's an emotional issue to me which I don't like to argue.
Great COIN discussion over at AM
I'm sure a lot of people here are regular readers at Abu Muqawama's site - I know I am. I found this exchange between Col. Gentile and an anonymous (but well-informed) poster very fascinating and informative. Scroll down and look for the exchange between "Looking Glass" and Col. Gentile. Great stuff:
Quote:
Gentlemen, I am not a battlespace owner. I never will be. I am a guy who operated with his boots in the dust on a continuous basis and saw (and still sees) the spotty application of the tools that others have proven will work; not exactly in each case but adaptively to particular situations. While you discuss such lofty things as future procurement budgets, I'm telling you that we are at war now and the horses are still being machinegunned from under their riders as we write. Young company grade officers are still being blocked from doing what they know to be best in their AOR's. COIN is still something that has not reached the strategic Corporal. He can't be strategic; the strategic Captain can't even be strategic. While Colonels dicker about the new tank, the Captains are still horse-bound. The Army has still not bought the weapon of choice for the war in which primers are being dented daily. COIN is still a subject of acceptance. This was touched on in the "some units were doing good COIN while others weren't" discussions on this thread.
Would we have accepted such random achievement in a conventional conflict fought under AirLand?
Not just "no," but "hell no."
Read the whole thing. I think he was able to poke more holes in Col. Gentile's arguments than anyone else I've read, and I consider myself more a "Gentilist" than not.