Hizballah and tribes, useful networks for vetting
I was mulling this over. Given the ethnic and sectarian bases of Hizballah's power base I am sure that the tribal network is useful in terms of the vetting of potential recruits, information sharing and counter-intelligence. Much harder to break into Hizballuh if you have no-one to vouch for you. That said, I think the tribal issue is peripheral to Hizballah's internal political/military structure or system of mobilisation but that doesn't mean it doesn't have a role to play.
authority, obligation, mobilisation
Quote:
Originally Posted by
tribeguy
Tribal leaders in Iraq eventually realized that Al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups came with the intention of taking away tribal leaders’ authority. This suggests to a counterinsurgent fighting an Islamic extremist group that in the event that no other viable authority exists, finding a viable way to empower tribal leaders against the insurgents may be most wise from a cultural perspective. Taking authority from a tribal leader without compensation is a recipe for disaster, as this certainly played a role in the rapid growth of the Sunni insurgency in 2003.)
I found the excerpt on the whole very interesting but it was the above proposition that caught my eye. I think one of the things we tend to forget is that structures are constantly in flux with elements of both order and disequilibrium present. Although it may make sense to empower local elders/sheiks/clan leaders this may merely stoke the fires (or dampen them, but that's a contextual issue). What I mean is that if we look at Yemen (tribes) and the Caucasus (Clans) part of the appeal of the Wahhabi style of Islam was that it bypassed the elderly, rigid and largely ossified chains and networks of authority and loyalty which the young felt stifled by.
In Yemen the threat of AQ Yemeni/Southern Arabian branch is precisely in its ability to appeal to the dissaffected youth who feel constrained by the tribal system. Similarly, young people in the caucasus found their clan based systems of obligation to be politically, culturally and economically stifling. Having to bow to pressures of "elderly elders" who usually bowed to Russian government requestes or saw loyalty to Mosocw as traditional/acceptable meant those same eleders/sheiks were seen as collaborators. The flattening or equalising force of Wahhabism which stressed the indiviual's submersion into the will of Allah and thereby removed any mediating authority was greatly appealing. Thus, a relatively unexamined aspect of the Wahhabi phenomenon is it's demographic underpinnings fuelled by a population explosion of dissafected youngsters who feel constrained by tribes/clans and who thurst for freedom under Wahhabism (it is not, contra Fromm, of Muslims desiring to escape from Freedom but, rather, that they seek social freedom through the levelling effect of Wahhabism).
It was this, IMO, that forced tribal elders in Iraq to counter AQ; that they would lose control of their own cadres and thus their own systems of nepotism, patronage and influence. This is also, I recall, one of the reasons that Saddam kept an eye out for Sunni extremism. Gievn that he was suppressing, incorporating and balancing the tribes the last thing he wanted was for an alternative non-tirbal source of mobilisation which couldn't be bought off. Interesting excerpt nonetheless, is the book widely avaliable?
To Retake Cities, Iraq Turns to Sunni Tribes
A new book: Tribes and Global Jihadism
Tribes and Global Jihadism' edited by Virginie Collombier and Olivier Roy, is published by Hurst & Co (London) and their release describes the book as:
Quote:
Across the Muslim world, from Iraq and Yemen, to Egypt and the Sahel, new alliances have been forged between the latest wave of violent Islamist groups –– including Islamic State and Boko Haram –– and local tribes. But can one now speak of a direct link between tribalism and jihadism, and how analytically useful might it be? Tribes are traditionally thought to resist all encroachments upon their sovereignty, whether by the state or other local actors, from below; yet by joining global organisations such as Islamic State, are they not rejecting the idea of the state from above? This triangular relationship is key to understanding instances of mass ‘radicalisation’, when entire communities forge alliances with jihadi groups, for reasons of self-interest, self-preservation or religious fervour. If Algeria’s FIS or Turkey’s AKP once represented the ‘Islamisation of nationalism’, have we now entered a new era, that of the ‘tribalisation of globalisation’?
Link:http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/...bal-jihadism/?
It might just interest a few here.:)