Consider the sources' (AKA authors') background
It may give one pause (not meant as an ad hominem).
NPS Vita information on Arquilla is here and very limited data for Ronfeldt at Rand is here.
Jan Breytenbach interview
From Firn's post (No.126)
Quote:
Jan Breytenbach has a number of interesting reviews of many actions and operations of the border war. He gives some good insight why units like the 32. Batallion were so successful in the smaller, guerilla and larger, more conventional phases of the war.
Firn found a lengthy interview in German alas in the Austrian Defence Forces publication: http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/omz/oemz2009_01.pdf
Whilst the main website has the option for an English version finding the publication in English eluded me: http://www.bmlv.gv.at
Jan Breytenbach's book on 32 Batt. has appeared before on SWC in late 2009:
'They Live By The Sword: 32 'Buffalo' Battalion - South Africa's Foreign Legion' by Col. Jan Breytenbach (Pub. Lemur 1990). A unit formed in 1975 from black Angolans, with South African (white) officers and NCOs. Formidable reputation as mainly COIN fighters and suggested as a non-US / non-Western example. Note Eben Barlow (Executive Outcomes) was an officer in them.
Few copies about if Amazon is correct: http://www.amazon.com/They-live-swor...9129763&sr=1-1 . Republished in 2003 as The Buffalo Soldiers: The Story of South Africa's 32 Battalion 1975-1993.
The unit's website; http://www.32battalion.net/index.htm
New Rules of War with Hanson & Arquilla
Uncommon Knowledge
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Foreign Policy: The New Rules of War
The visionary who first saw the age of "netwar" coming warns that the U.S. military is getting it wrong all over again. Here's his plan to make conflict cheaper, smaller, and smarter.
JOHN ARQUILLA
MARCH/APRIL 2010
Quote:
Every day, the U.S. military spends $1.75 billion, much of it on big ships, big guns, and big battalions that are not only not needed to win the wars of the present, but are sure to be the wrong approach to waging the wars of the future..........(Snip)
Swarming? Fuhgedaboutit...
... at least if you’re a well trained Aussie. Apart from the colloquial use of the term swarm (as opposed to the conceptual status it has acquired in the hands of some) the following comments may be of interest from “Taking Tactics From The Taliban: Tactical Principles For Commanders” from the Australian Army Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, Autumn, 2009 ...
Quote:
The ‘swarm’ is the Taliban offensive tactic [my emphasis], usually employed against dismounted elements in the ‘green zone’ that remain static for too long (two to three hours) and defensive positions such as overwatch and patrol bases. Some warning of a swarm is often—but not always—provided by the exodus of local Afghans from the area some ten to twenty minutes prior to the attack and an increase in intelligence warning of an offensive. During a swarm, Taliban fighters will manoeuvre on two to four flanks using fire teams of three to six men armed with medium machine-guns and RPGs who attack simultaneously. This was a tactic with which CT Spear became very familiar and tactically equipped to confront. I developed my seventh tactical principle as a response to the Taliban fire pocket and swarm: dismounted patrols must always operate within mortar range.
CT Spear countered the Taliban’s major tactics with carefully planned tactics of its own. The team defeated the fire pocket by fighting into one side while suppressing the other firing points and then rolling them up from the flank. The Taliban fighters would occasionally withdraw to alternate firing points as the team advanced and the commander would then decide how far he wanted to pursue them given his existing boundaries and task.
The team used the same tactic to counter the swarm, although a platoon was unlikely to be able to handle a larger force on its own and such a confrontation would usually turn into a fully-fledged combat team engagement. The element in contact would go into, or remain in, all round defence and allow its JTAC or JFO to call in indirect fire and close air support to buy time for the combat team commander to manoeuvre his cavalry and infantry to support. My eighth and ninth principles supported this and carried the necessary corollaries: any force must contain at least three elements that can support one another while patrolling deep in the ‘greenzone’.
Dismounted sections must operate within 500 metres of one another and platoons within 1000 metres of one another, particularly if they are operating away from the protection of overwatch. Use of this tactic facilitated rapid offensive manoeuvre in support of an element in contact. In essence, we aimed to ‘swarm the swarm’ [my emphasis], in keeping with my tenth principle: fight the most likely course of action, but be postured for the most dangerous.(culled from pp.31-38)