"Bug basher COIN aircraft" point
In reference to both Wilf and Rhodesian on the expense/ capability debate (expressed in regards to aircraft, but I imagine it applies equally to AFVs and even the lowest-level infantry capability) - there is substantial benefit to platforms based off the environment we are in. A turbo-prop aircraft, ala a A-1 Skyraider or even an old Mosquito type of WW2 vintage, would be more beneficial in delivering CAS than an F15E, and far cheaper to procure and easier to maintain than the likes of the F-15s or AH-64s.
Inevitably the opportunity cost for a force fielding equipment intended for low-intensity conflict (i.e. a turboprop meant to hammer enemy positions 'low and slow' that is unable to deal with enemy AD or enemy aircraft) will not be as effective in fielding a high-tech force intended to fight against an equivalent force.
Perhaps the answer, then, is that the effort should be on creating an Afghani air arm able to fight their war, the way it suits them. Instead of creating a RAF or USAF air-wing-lite, as we seem to be doing in focussing on their rotary wing capability, we should be worrying about their ability to beat the Taliban their way (not that I'm being original here, this is obviously Kilcullen's 23rd article - Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves). Do we need the ANA to be able to conduct expensive helo ops, or is it better for us and for them if they were able to sustain economical infantry/ light armour operations with effective fire support from a suitable CAS air wing?
We don't have to field and deploy the COIN-specific platforms ourselves. We can procure and deploy them to the host nation forces, thus getting the best of both worlds.
Q-cars, fire force and pseudo operators
In a wide ranging review of what is happening in Nimroz Province FRI ends with a comment that could re-open this thread:
Quote:
I ask one of my brother Marines what he would do were he given this problem to solve under the historical constraints normally faced by Marine commanders fighting a small war. He replied immediately ; Q-cars, fire force and pseudo operators.
(my inserted break)Which is exactly the same thing I would say as would all of my friends who are in the business. But the only way a regimental or battalion commander could even think of doing that now would be if we sent a vast majority of the troops deployed here (along with every colonel and general not in command of troops) home. There are legitimate, very good reasons to see this thing through but we don’t have to spend billions we don’t have to do it.
Link:http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=3805
FRI are well aware of OPSEC, as are SWC members; it is just that I as an observer do not know if such tactics are being used and after eight years of direct Western intervention I simply do not think we are.
A leaner, thinner and cheaper strategy IMHO is required and maybe such options the USMC officer sought are components?
The item in the lower right
Quote:
Originally Posted by
JMA
OK, I'm looking at this one. What exactly is the problem with this terrain?
You miss that?
That's a small hill from whence the picture of that nice level easy in which to operate terrain was taken. Said hills are the principal problem and, as Fuchs says, the bocage like walls aren't helpful. Nor are the long range fields of fire offered by said hills or in the relatively flat valleys where there is no farming..:rolleyes:
Terrain is, as always, what one makes of it.
Terrain is the first enemy to overcome
and no picture does Afghanistan any justice untill you've had to move from 3000 ft to 1200 ft to get to where you have to go. Also Helicopters are easy targets in that terrain.