All wars are fought for political purposes
Posted by WILF,
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Also the FARC in Colombia provide a wide range of social services. - However these are only in areas they control!
Agree 100%, thus you must agree then that we have to develop HN capacity to secure the area, since we can only control so much?
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All war is political. It's why we fight wars. We do not fight wars to provide health care or dig wells. Those things are being presented as being instrumental to policy, and as such we have to be very sure that are reaping the rewards commensurate with the effort.
Hopefully this makes sense, I agree all war is fought for political purposes, but not all wars are fought using politics as a primary effort at the "tactical" level. That is perhaps the difference between irregular and regular warfare. To say all war is political is like saying all war is war, it is true, but not useful. The character of each war/conflict is different, and it is important that we understand it, or we'll likely fail to address the real threat or solve the real problem.
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Additionally, if the Talibans/bad guys hospitals, schools and wells are instrumental to their policy, do you preserve them, once you control the area?
M-A's comment captured my thoughts. Looking at schools specifically, the building isn't that important, but rather who appoints the instructors and monitors their curriculum that is critical.
NSC Historian- Vietnam vs. Now
John Prado, NSC Historian, has been reading the accounts of Mac Bundy, trying to assess the decision-framework in front of the President.
In his article posted on the History News Network, he underscores how,like Vietnam, military efforts at clearing, clearing, and re-clearing are not going to result in success without a strong civilian success process to hold and build. The path of decision-making that a president must follow after an escalation decision, it seems history is suggesting, becomes very narrow and fraught with risks.
http://www.hnn.us/articles/118034.html
"In Vietnam in 1967, to return to the Johnson analogy, for some months things seemed to go well enough, except for the lack of visible military or counterinsurgency progress. But the political side of the equation did not improve. Desperate for success, President Johnson launched a PR campaign designed to showcase the supposed gains in the war. Light could be seen at the end of the tunnel intoned the American ambassador to South Vietnam. Then came the Tet Offensive and America was visibly shaken. We need not engage the argument about the true outcome at Tet to make the point that the Vietnamese adversary could carry out their country-wide initiative because the measures possible for Johnson were not ones that actually affected the adversary’s capability. And such real progress as there was could not alter the final outcome of the war, except for adding to the toll in blood and treasure.
This too is characteristic of the Afghan war today. Reconstruction and civil affairs efforts will be unable to win the hearts and minds of Afghans disgusted at the dishonesty and profligacy of the Karzai government. A plan to mobilize massive friendly forces will founder in the crevasses of Afghan politics and the reluctance of the people to take up arms. An American or NATO buildup at any level will be incapable of actually winning the battle. The Taliban enemy, safely ensconced in bases across the border in Pakistan, chooses when it wants to fight. Widely touted plans to separate factions of Taliban by paying them off, depend on the entirely unsubstantiated thesis that there are enemy groups just waiting to be bought. In short the military strategy does not affect the fulcrum that might change the balance. The best U.S. force may be able to accomplish—like Vietnam—is likely to be prolonging stalemate. And the longer that persists—worse if deterioration becomes evident—the more restricted become the options for President Obama. This is the real Afghan problem."
Gotta watch those officers...
...without a good NCO around they tend to get into trouble. :wry:
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Steve, good post, and I even agree with the portion of your post that I copied above to a point, but I think it might be a little too simplistic and may explain why we haven't done well with our efforts related to providing essential services. First we don't identify what the "essential" services really are, because culturally we're terrible listeners. Second, there is something more to be a good government than providing good services. Case in point, the North Koreans are starving, yet according to multiple sources they remain loyal to their government. The government has effectively blamed the crisis (a crisis that has been in existence for many years) on the outside world, so they're able to stroke the flames of nationalism. We assume when we go to a place like Iraq or Afghanistan and build a medical clinic we made friends and are shocked when we return and hit an IED and everyone plays dumb. I don't think your statement is wrong, just incomplete, and once we figure out how to complete it we'll get a lot closer to accomplishing our objectives. Note, when I say we, the intent is to ensure that the government we want to help is getting the credit, so I guess that is point 3, they have to build it and we need to stay in the background as much as possible. We do that well in places like the Philippines, but what I saw in Iraq is every American Officer wanted his Kodak moment next to "his" project.
Another key to success is finding a way to deflate our enlarged western egos.
Bill, assessing and describing complex things accurately can be a tough gig, and I certainly do not have a lock on things. North Korea is a bit of a black box to me, with a potentially ugly succession looming. How about a quick flyby of Kurdistan, a region which I have visited, and its experiences with Advising, Insurgency, and Governance?
Kurdistan appears to be a region in which development and conflict has coexisted for some time. As I understand things Kurdistan received a boost towards autonomy from the rest of Iraq in April of 1991 with UN SC Resolution 688 and the resulting no fly zones. UN SC Resolution 986 and UN SC Resolution1153 (effective 1996 and 1998) resulted in Kurdistan receiving a legal cut of Iraq’s oil revenues and helped to fund a fair amount of development efforts. Alongside this development effort the PUK, KDP, and other Kurdish organizations fought among themselves for control as well as with and against Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish elements using a variety of warfare methods. The US was able to mediate a fairly functional reconciliation between thePUK and KDP with the Washington Agreement of September 1998.
During my time in Iraq I noted that Kurdish construction and engineering companies regularly pushed out into the Mosul area. My trips to Kurdistan revealed a vibrant business community, good infrastructure, a capable security force, rule of law, and visible participation in daily life by both sexes. The Kurds appear to have a concerned diaspora, Turkey appeared to be a major of supplier of goods to the region, and it is my understanding the Iran is another major supplier of goods. Upon my return home I have been following the KRG as it navigates the rough diplomatic and security conditions hemming it on all sides. They are making some interesting moves.
From a CA-centric standpoint Kurdistan might be seen as a model for the successes associated with spending more effort on advising a Government as opposed to ‘building’ one. Both efforts require skilled and experienced folks but only advising fully relies upon local folks for success. I had a very interesting conversation with a smart, capable, and conservative GO about this particular friction point which lies between mission failure, acceptable risk, and mission success. GO’s have a lot of responsibility to juggle and are understandably looking for the sure thing; yet I contrast this with my many experiences in which I have found that local civilians are very capable of accomplishing the development mission in the right circumstances with the right support. No easy answers tonight…