Air Force doctrine isn't doctrine?
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Originally Posted by
Brett Patron
The cited JP 1-02 definition of cyberspace makes clear that any "Service-only" view is way too narrow to be useful. There is no codified Joint doctrine, so Service doctrine is a nice idea that only applies to the Service. There is a "Joint Test Pub 3-12" roaming about, but is mired in stakeholder dispute.
Where do you think joint doctrine comes from? Joint doctrine is normally a combination of the best the various services have to offer. After all, you can't get doctrine for the unified whole if the individual parts don't know what they are doing...
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By the way, the term "cyberspace operations" is defined thus: cyberspace operations (DOD) The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Such operations include computer network operations and activities to operate and defend the Global Information Grid.
If you are involved in cyberspace operations, you'll know that there is (still) no codified lexicon (there are several attempts but still a good deal of acrimony among the various stakeholders).
I would argue that anyone that uses a DoD computer is involved in Cyber Operations. I'm not a cyber guy by trade, though - never claimed to be.
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For example: The legacy terms of "Computer Network Operations" and it's attendant terms "Computer Network Attack", "-Defense" and "-Exploitation" are being replaced, redefined or mulled for revision. Terms such as "Offensive Cyberspace Operations" (OCO), "Defensive Cyberspace Operations" (DCO), and "Defense of the Global Information Grid" (DGO) are in common (if inexact) use in USCYBERCOM, USSTRATCOM, and in other Combatant Command circles.
I stand to be corrected; but absent something that's been snuck through the process in the last 72 hours, I am comfortable saying there is no doctrine.
Brett, I said the Air Force has doctrine for cyber- I posted the link to the USAF doctrine. I get the feeling you don't like it... your words indicate that you dismiss it - "any "Service-only" view is way too narrow to be useful." Yet you then say that there is no joint doctrine. Is your preferred solution for the services to ignore this domain and wait for someone to deliver the joint doctrine?
I think that joint doctrine will follow from what the service doctrine brings in. This will likely take time and be influenced by the COCOMs that you cited. That said, I don't see any harm in the services trying to work their own doctrine in the meantime.
Finally, JP 6-0's new (10 June 2010) edition contains some pretty specific doctrine on CND and GND. Is this doctrine invalid for some reason?
I take it by your post that you're a part of the cyber world, and like I said before I'm not a cyber professional, just a dumb operator. The tone of your post initially made me feel like you're dismissing my views as a result. I'm sure that's not your intent, but that leads me back to my last post - I think one of the best things for cyber will be to integrate it with the other warfighting functions. If Cyber folks try to separate themselves from the other warfighters it will be to the detriment of our joint forces. We all work more effectively when we understand each other's capabilities and leverage our strengths to fill in our weaknesses. This doesn't happen if we use doctrine or classification to avoid integration.
The USAF Weapons School has led the way on this in other domains - space being one of the most important. I think you'll see a USAF Weapons School Cyber Division in the next few years - which will go a long way to integrating these functions in the USAF. It will be interesting to see how that plays out in the joint world.
Again, my post was not an attempt to start an argument - the thread simply asked about doctrine, and I was attempting to point out the USAF's existing doctrine. Looking forward to hearing your thoughts.
V/R,
Cliff
Definitions in joint doctrine:
CND includes actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information systems and computer networks. JP 3-0, 17 September 2006 (Incorporating Change 1 13 February 2008), pg 3-27.
computer network defense. Actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within the Department of Defense information systems and computer networks. Also called CND. (JP 6-0) JP 3-0, 17 September 2006 (Incorporating Change 1 13 February 2008), pg GL-10.
Computer Network Defense (CND). Actions taken to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information systems and computer networks. CND also employs intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement, and other military capabilities to defend DOD information and computer networks. CND employs IA capabilities to respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information systems and computer networks in response to a CND alert or threat information. DOD’s CND mission is global and focuses on protection and defense of DOD’s interconnected systems and networks. To protect the communications system, CND measures are employed with a defense-in-depth strategy.
JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, 10 June 2010, pg I-11-I-12.
Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology (IT) infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. Cyberspace threats are a real and imminent danger to GIG operations and information. Information is crucial to the success of joint and multinational operations. Information is also a critical instrument of national power, and the ability to achieve and maintain an advantage in cyberspace is crucial to national security. The GIG through cyberspace provides the valuable service of assured information transport, storage, and delivery for the owners and authorized users of the information. Networks and network operations (NETOPS) are the means by which DOD manages the flow of information over the GIG. Because all DOD components need the ability to operate unhindered in cyberspace, this presents a unique challenge. We are not the sole users or occupants of cyberspace nor is our participation isolated or without the presence of sophisticated adversaries who challenge us daily. Our joint forces, mission partners, and first responders demand communications that are not only secure, but also flexible enough to meet the ever-changing requirements demanded by joint and multinational operations.
JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, 10 June 2010, pg I-6-I-7.
Global Information Grid (GIG) Network Defense (GND) isn't in the definitions section but is discussed in JP 6-0, Pg 4-6.
Excellent discussions here
Hey gang... although this is my first post here (excluding my hail and farewell), I've been thinking, teaching, reading, and writing about many of these topics for the last 4-5 years now.
In that time, I've watched people argue (sometimes fanatically) about definitions (what is cyberspace, who is a cyber operator, etc.), organizational structures (who's in charge, or who should be), whether cyberspace is truly a domain (in the same sense as air, land, sea and space), and do we need a new military service specifically dedicated to cyberspace.
These discussions almost inevitably boil down to resources -- people, orgs and money. You can define cyberspace however you like, but as soon as your definition appears threatening to someone else, the antibodies all come out and start fighting.
Many Air Force leaders like to talk about how we are in the 1920s at the dawn of air power. Back then, air power advocates were developing theories about how wars might be fought in the air environment -- some of these theories panned out, while others didn't work out so well. But it wasn't until after WWII that the Air Force was recognized as a separate service. Unfortunately far too many "cyberspace debates" tend to revolve around who's in charge rather than "so how do we fight in this domain?"
One area in which we are woefully lacking is theory on how to wield power in cyberspace. As Brett said earlier, we really don't have much in the way of doctrine. Others have pushed back when I say this quoting me JP 3-13, Information Operations. But the focus of IO is on decision making and not about control of a domain. Gen Alexander had a good article on this several years ago in Joint Force Quarterly. The AF produced AFDD 3-12 specifically looking at cyberspace as a domain -- it is not a perfect document by any means, but it's a start. I am very curious to see what the other services come up with.
As Sam Liles wrote in one of his posts -- cyber is different, but conflict is similar. I could not agree more. How do principles of warfare apply in cyberspace? What about operational art -- maneuver, fires, key terrain, decisive points, interior/exterior lines, etc. -- do these concepts apply to cyberspace? Why or why not? What doctrinal nuggets and principles can we draw from the other domains as we figure out what a theory of cyber power might look like? I believe the Air Force is to some extent trying to make cyberspace fit into its air and space paradigm -- which is quite evident in AFDD 3-12. But perhaps there are similarities with the land and maritime domains that can be used to develop our understanding of cyberspace. Cyberspace is inherently a joint (and interagency) problem.
While I see cyberspace as a distinct domain, I also think you can't divorce it entirely from the other domains. We created cyberspace to enable business processes and improve our effectiveness in other domains. We did not build networks to employ IT people or to give us a new place in which to fight -- we built them to facilitate information processing. For this reason, I don't really see a new military service branch because all of the services care about cyberspace. It is both a warfighting and a utility domain, so ownership (however that is defined) will be shared to some extent.
One last point before I hit post and wait for the flaming arrows (as an academic, I've had to develop thick skin :))... One of my former students and I were trying to get a paper published on some approaches to operational targeting. The paper was rejected because a subject matter expert told the editor that our paper didn't describe "how they really do things." I thought that was quite interesting for a couple of reasons: (1) there was nothing in the open literature about "how they do things", (2) "how they do things" is apparently good enough, and there's no need to discuss further. Contrast this with the VOLUMES of articles talking about nuclear deterrence, strategic bombing, air campaign planning, land warfare, etc. We ultimately published the paper in a different venue and received good feedback. So even the experts disagree, which is why we need more academic research, publishing and discourse in these areas.
cheers
Bob