Infantry Unit Tactics, Tasks, Weapons, and Organization

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Originally Posted by JMA

A company attack with two platoons up with each platoon in turn attacking with two sections up is in effect then four simultaneous section attacks involving section level fire & movement. Each platoon commander is observing their individual two section attacks and have the third section in reserve in case the attacks stall. This while the company commander observes the progress of his two platoons and hold his third platoon in reserve in case either of the platoon actions stall.

So I see it that the sections are not attacking isolation and have an objective and boundaries for each action (with the reserve section passing through to take on the next objective) the command and control is always with the next higher HQ.

Are we on the same page?

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Well that's exactly how I was trained. IMO, it's grossly simplistic, and a poor starting point. It never worked well in WW2 and markedly failed in the Falklands.

IMO, the section level of command is superfluous as concerns co-ordination of the attack.
Section commanders should do fire control and conduct moves.
Platoon Commanders and Platoon Sergeants should be the lowest level of co-ordination, so F&M occurs a the Platoon level, not the section.
Company commanders organise and control supporting fires.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Well that's exactly how I was trained. IMO, it's grossly simplistic, and a poor starting point. It never worked well in WW2 and markedly failed in the Falklands.

IMO, the section level of command is superfluous as concerns co-ordination of the attack.
Section commanders should do fire control and conduct moves.
Platoon Commanders and Platoon Sergeants should be the lowest level of co-ordination, so F&M occurs a the Platoon level, not the section.
Company commanders organise and control supporting fires.

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I suggest you are moving the command to far forward. We did the reverse by spliting the section in two (basically) and then expected to stick commander (Cpl or L/Cpl) to get on with it. Put in some 4 man attacks where used the gunner to fire us in then he followed at the double. Talking 50-75m here but can't do that with inexperienced troops especially the gunner. I believe once the fire fight has been won you got get to them quickly and put an end to it.

However... I do accept that due to the supporting fire requirement both before and during an attack on a prepared position there will have to be a MFC, FOO, FAC or whatever forward and the need to coordinate and control the position and movement of own forces the platoon cmd/coy cmd may have to move forward to take local control.

Again we are talking different wars, different terrain, different enemies etc. I suggest not to try to make it a hard and fast rule either way.

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Originally Posted by JMA

Again we are talking different wars, different terrain, different enemies etc. I suggest not to try to make it a hard and fast rule either way.

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Concur. This is why I see the ability to group the platoon to the operation and not alter the operation to fit the platoon organisation.

...but, you do have to have a base line of reference, or "default setting" that is as simple and coherent as possible.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Concur. This is why I see the ability to group the platoon to the operation and not alter the operation to fit the platoon organisation.

...but, you do have to have a base line of reference, or "default setting" that is as simple and coherent as possible.

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Has someone produced anything better than the current section and platoon battle drills as a basic foundation?

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Originally Posted by JMA

Has someone produced anything better than the current section and platoon battle drills as a basic foundation?

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As of 2009 There are 6 section battle drills:
a. Preparation.
b. Reaction to effective enemy fire.
c. Locating the enemy.
d. Suppressing the enemy.
e. The attack.
f. Regroup.

The 4 Platoon Drills are
a. Preparation.
b. Reaction to effective enemy fire.
c. The attack.
d. Regroup.

Personally I think we can do better.

Although Rex Brynen set his challenge some time ago I have spent the time since thinking through my proposal and am submitting it here for the consideration of the SWC (be gentle with me I'm a ToE virgin!;)). None of what is proposed here is original (I owe a great deal to two articles in the Marine Corps Gazette written by a Cap. Spricin, Sen. James Webb, the French Type 107 infantry battalion, WILF, Col. Odom, the Regimental Rogue and kiwigrunt among others) but I have spent some considerable time examining the pros and cons of each proposal and formulating a syncretic combination to achieve the best organisation (IMO only).

Conceptual basis of force design: Find, Fix and Finish
I have proceeded from the assumption that platoons and companies are the smallest subunits to which tactical tasks can be assigned. As such they must be combined arms formations which contain sufficient organic firepower to accomplish those tasks. Furthermore, they must be organised in a fashion that enables them to do so effectively/efficiently. Hence, and in accordance with the core functions (F³) my company contains a reconnaissance (recce) platoon, two rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. Recce plt finds and fixes with indirect fires whilst the two rifle platoons manoeuvre to finish (preferably from a flank).

The recce platoon has a HQ team with a 60mm commando mortar (2 men), 2 radio men, a PL armed with an M32 & a P2iC, five recce teams and an RPV team with 4 Puma AE (for instance) UAVs and a GCS. Operates according to infiltration and patrol based techniques. For FIBUA/MOUT recce teams would have UGVs too. Once TiC I envisage one or two teams peeling off to provide flank security/observation. Not too sure about the RPV team attached to Recce plt HQ...got an inkling it should be attached to coy HQ.

The rifle platoons comprise a HQ team and two 20-man sections and operate along Wigram lines. The HQ team comprises a 3 man HQ element, a 2-man 60mm mortar team and a LRR (1 man). Each section has a two man HQ element. One section is a “pure” rifle-grenadier section with three 6 man teams each with an M32 and 5 IW. The other section is the direct fire section with two six man rocket teams and a LMG team. The rocket teams each comprise three two man teams (MPMS gunner and ammo man) with a minimum of five rounds carried between both (15 for each team). The gunners carry pistols as secondary weapons whilst the ammo men all carry IW (or rifle calibre PDWs). The LMG team is similarly organised with light machine gunners carrying pistols as secondaries. In practice the section compositions can be chopped and changed. For constabulary type operations (peace-keeping rather than peace-enforcement) not requiring such overwhelming firepower both rifle platoon’s direct fire sections can be re-rolled as rifle sections to provide more BOG (they’d keep their CLUs for obs purposes). Depending on mission both DF sections can be consolidated into one platoon with the other a pure “rifle-grenadier” platoon (for especially stubborn stains, sorry, I mean targets/strongpoints/bunker complexes/urban block houses). The Rifle-Grenadiers can be liberally sprinkled with LAWS/RPG-27s according to METT-T (don’t fancy the NLAW myself; much too large a weapon- weight and volume wise- for what it offers which may be technologically out of date anyway given current and projected active protection systems such as LEDS).

The weapons platoon has a SF section with a two man HQ and two 6-man SF teams (each with two GPMG or M307 should they ever come on line in which case three four man M307 teams). ATGM section with three Javelin (3 men each) and a two man HQ and finally a mortar section with two mortar teams each of four men. The mortar section HQ element doubles as an FDC.

Attachments such a FOOs, Medics, ADA personnel have not been included because I haven’t figured that out yet. It’s not because I’m lazy (being thorough can sometimes be perceived as such) it’s just that I’m still figuring manpower requirements in relation to emerging and near term technologies especially with regards to FISTs/ COLTs/ FOOS. In this latter respect I am assuming that the Recce platoon teams have personnel trained as FOOs (either the sniper No. 2 or team 2IC) in order to help them accomplish the Find/Fix function. Also, I am assuming that the recce plt HQ can form the core of a specialist CLIC.

Weapons/Equipment:
All troops have combined TI/NVG. The M32s are all equipped with the IMI MPRS or STK LV ABMS sight and can thus fire air-burst munitions as well as MV rounds (out to 800m). Recce plt teams and rifle platoon section commanders carry HUNTIR rounds as standard and can be issued with smaller UGVs (i.e., for FIBUA, trench-clearing, etc.). The MPMS (Multi-Purpose Missile System aka Mini-Spike) CLU also has a useful observation capability ideal for use in FOBs or OPs (as do the Javelin CLUs) whilst I am assuming that FAE and anti-bunker rounds are available/can be developed for it. I would prefer SPIKE MR (at both coy and Bn level) simply because of their NLOS capability (gives one more employment options) but as we (UK) have chosen Javelin that’ll have to do (at Bde level I’d have a 9 launcher Spike LR -25km+- battery in the Artillery battalion but that’s a different thread/site). Gimpys/Jimpys have lightweight tripods and are employed as a section not broken up and attached to plts (though not wholly out of the question). 60mm mortars (as well as the 120mm battalion mortars) all fire PGMMs (of the GPS variety) hopefully easing log demands (but HE is still ubiquitous). I’d like to see 60mm FAE rounds given that they are more lethal than straight HE-Frag but I could (more than likely am) wrong about that (I suspect blast overpressure would tie with molten metal fragments at a game of papers, scissors, rock on a summer’s day...on a rainy/humid day however....). For Afpak type operations from FOBs I had envisaged some kind of MULE-T section accompanying the company but at 2 tonnes (2.5 tons) each for a payload of half that something along the lines of laws of diminishing returns start taking over (for the weight and volume of each MULE-T that would have to be transported intra-theatre wouldn’t you rather have more ammo/food/medical supplies). I’d rather issue each coy with a few Supacat ATMP from lighter composite materials and power them with solar batteries/small diesel engines converted for vegetable oil or some such (they can be stacked for LAPES or C-130 transport too).

Means of conveyance:

Mechanised Infantry (UK)-
The entire company (+ say a 10 man attachment) of 195 men can be lifted by a “carrier company” of 14/15 APCs of the GPV Captain or iKlwa variety (2+13/14) armed with nothing heavier than a 40mm GMG with airburst capability) and either a Javelin pod (1-2 rounds) or a 5 round 70mm guided rocket pod in a RWS. C2 would be as per the (old) UK and Aussie principles (i.e., APC crew are separate from the mounted infantry although organic to the formation). Vehicles’ baseline armour protects from 155mm fragments, mines and 14.5mm HMG rounds. Additional armour can be mounted. Vehicle protection suite would include active protection systems and (in future) electric armour.

Armoured Infantry (UK)-
Entire company (as above with 185 + 10 men attached) carried in a “carrier company” with 17 converted Chally 1 hulls (or similar) to create a Heavy APC (Namer/Temsah/BMPV-64-style) alternatively a stretched CV-90. Each vehicle would be powered by a Europack engine (which frees up a great deal of room within the hull, though it may need extending slightly), have identical armament to the APCs above and carry 2-3 crew plus 12 men. Baseline armour would provide better protection than the APC but with similar provision for up-armouring.

Air-Assault (UK)-
An eight or sixteen bird squadron of EH-101/Mi38s should be able to lift an entire company (8) or two (16). With a Battalion being lifted by two/four such squadrons or fewer numbers of CH-47s escorted by AH. For rapid reaction missions follow on echelons would be airlanded by An-70s once the Paras had taken Pristina airport...or some such suitable LZ. (An-70s are the missed opportunity of European aviation, could have helped Ukrainian industry whilst providing EU troops with an affordable and capable transport...bloody politicos)

Royal Marines- However they want, not going to argue with them (...or the Paras).

Battalion
A battalion would have four companies, a weapons coy (mortar plt of 8 120mm, SP in mechanised and armoured formations, towed in air-assault and light roles; GMG plt with 9 GMG (or M307); ATGM plt w/ 9 ATGM & a 30 man sniper plt), artillery battery (6 155mm LWH/SPG and a FDC/FOO platoon), combat engineer/pioneer company, a recce platoon and the usual CSS attachments (I say usual, but they are the unheralded decisive enablers). Tank and AH support according to mission/threat/taste.

Not a big fan of single 60mm at the platoon level. Better to consolidate and task organize as needed. A 4 or 6 gun section in the weapons platoon could fit that bill.

I view recon as a mission not a unit. Would suggest removing your snipers from the recon platoon and adding them over in the weapons platoon. Move the UAV to the Co Hqs. With only one, the Commander needs to be the guy directing it's use.

Given the two wheeled APCs listed will not carry a full section of 20 (14 or 15), suggest re-working the platoon task orgs so that a full squad/section can fit in an APC. Maybe something along the lines of the 13-man squad found in the USMC.

Your organization seems a heavy on the supporting arms/fires role and is left wanting for "Plain Ol Foot Solider" (2 20-man section 40 troops total) whose job is to enter/clear buildings. rooms, trenchs, fortifications etc.

However, I was very impressed by Tuki's effort - It will take me a week to go through his hyperlinks. :) It's very easy to sit back and snipe at things negatively; it's much harder to put together something that is positive - right, wrong or indifferent.

The overall TOE (leaving aside modern technology) looks akin in total numbers and platoon structure to a WWII rifle company as of 1 Jan 1945 - e.g., Charlie-1/117-30ID.

Attachment 1204

Note the 3 1903 sniper rifles (last item in weapons list).

So, congrats to Tuki for daring. ;)

Mike

Pretty much a standard triangualr infantry Company.

Three platoons of three 9-man rifle squads and a 9-man weapon squad with 2 MMGs and 2 MPMS each.

Weapons Platoon has:

Platoon Hqs of 2
MMG Section of 4 guns with 3-man crews and a 1-man Hqs
ATGM Section of 4 Javelins with 3-man crews and 1-man Hqs
Light Mortar Platoon of 6 60mm (3-man crew each) and 2-man Hqs/FDC
Sniper Section of 5 2-man teams

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Originally Posted by jmm99

However, I was very impressed by Tuki's effort - It will take me a week to go through his hyperlinks. :) It's very easy to sit back and snipe at things negatively; it's much harder to put together something that is positive - right, wrong or indifferent.

The overall TOE (leaving aside modern technology) looks akin in total numbers and platoon structure to a WWII rifle company as of 1 Jan 1945 - e.g., Charlie-1/117-30ID.

Attachment 1204

Note the 3 1903 sniper rifles (last item in weapons list).

So, congrats to Tuki for daring. ;)

Mike

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This T&E looks like designed with extremely strong (1 per squad or Plt) support from Shermans in mind.
The extremely weak machine gun armament (comparable to one German full Panzergrenadier squad's worth of machine guns of that time) is telling.
The Garands cannot make up for this - German Panzergrenadiere were at that time supposed to be equipped with assault rifles and automatic rifles as well.

Charlie-1/117-30ID often wished it had Shermans. 1 per sqd or even 1 per plt would have been quite a luxury.

As to MGs, the Bn TOE included a HW Coy (D = Dog Coy, for the 1/117):

Attachment 1208

whose platoons or sections could be parcelled out to the rifle coys (A = Able; B = Baker; C = Charlie). So, the MG situation was not quite what a rifle coy TOE alone shows.

HHC (Headquarters & Hq Coy) in 1/117 also included an AT plt with 3-57mm towed, and what amounted to a sapper-recon plt.

Notwithstanding those additions, I suppose you're right about the relative superiority of the German Panzergrenadiere. But, no one seems to have told Charlie about that.

So, when the 1/117 cut Peiper's supply (and retreat) route at Stavelot, quite a few PzGrs paid the price of assaulting the Bn in failed attempts to open up the road through that little town. See this post, Ratios vs Mission Accomplished, for the Stavelot engagement map and a few after-action report snips.

Stavelot was the second time Charlie and 1/117 met Liebstandarte - and held the field at the end. The first engagement was at St.-Bart near Mortain. There, the Bn took very heavy casualties; but Wilf's "relatives" in RAF Typhoons flew in at hedgerow level to provide very close air support and saved the day. The tanks were stopped at the doors of the Bn and Regt HQs.

Attachment 1209

US tanks played no significant support role to the Bn in either engagement. Regt AT (76mm towed), its 4.2 inch mortars and its Cannon Coy (105s or 155s) did play significant supporting roles in both engagements.

On its way to Malmedy and Stavelot, 30ID was reminded of its destinations by Axis Sally, who called it "Roosevelt's SS". A wise a$$ MAJ colored up a crayon sketch of a new division patch (adding the SS runes and FDR to the existing "XXX"), but for some reason the Powers That Were shelved it:

Attachment 1210

Ah, if only they had Photoshoppe back then, and a good Powerpoint presentation.

Regards

Mike

Theory (TO&E) and reality were very different in 44/45.
The company looks too dependent on heavy support from other units and attachments in my opinion.

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Originally Posted by TAH

Pretty much a standard triangualr infantry Company.

Three platoons of three 9-man rifle squads and a 9-man weapon squad with 2 MMGs and 2 MPMS each.

Weapons Platoon has:

Platoon Hqs of 2
MMG Section of 4 guns with 3-man crews and a 1-man Hqs
ATGM Section of 4 Javelins with 3-man crews and 1-man Hqs
Light Mortar Platoon of 6 60mm (3-man crew each) and 2-man Hqs/FDC
Sniper Section of 5 2-man teams

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6 60mm tubes at coy level seem an aweful lot to my untrained eyes. Who's carring all those rounds (IIRC a fire for effect mission on attacking troops is ...somewhere in the region of ...ok I don't rememebr but I think it's about 30). I know IJN infantry platoons had a mortar or grenade discharger section of three tubes and nine men. The 70mm GAT-r rockets carried by the HAPC and APCs would provide a precision guided artillery round for dismounted troops (esp. the recce plt whom I would envisage being equipped with a miniature laser designator as would team and section leaders) thus obviating the need for the dismounted troopers to carry heavy loads. The 60mm tubes could then concentrate on obscuration, suppression and destructuion missions within the parameters of their design (if you see what I mean)

As regards the recce plt and snipers my concept was to have enough people who are specialists (MOS wise) who can throw their hat into the CoA development process at Coy (HQ) but also to have enough specialists so to facilitate company training during peacetime (snipers, for instance, would be responsible for marksmanship, etc.). Also, I wanted to get the different unit "spirits" working harmoniously. There is a way of looking at the world, call it a weltanschauung if you will, that snipers and recce personelle have that others don't similarly the aggressive close combat "punch you in the gut, spit in your face" spirit of the rifleman would complement the silent but deadly attitude of the recce troops (I know what I'm talking about even if I don't know what I'm writing:p); left hook, right knockout blow. One could even make the argument that we don't need specialised troops just geenrealists who could be given snap training as and when to fulfill specialsied roles (recc one day and ANTI-Tank the nexxt) but that's all down to cost, training and inclination (IMO). Each unit has its own peculiar TTPs (rifle platoons operate more on Wigram principles whereas the Recce plt operations more on "Hutier"/stormtroop dispersed, skirmishing tactics, so to speak). I thought a lot about core functions (F3) and was inspired by Hart's Men in the Dark theory. Do I want my heavy hitters (a rifle plt) to be groping around in the dark when I could have my recce teams infiltrate, observe, call-for-fire, enagge HVT or fleeting targets (sniper and recce training and key skills are virtually identical) while guiding in the rifle plts to the kill; float like a butterfly sting like a ....bitch! (This is strange, the boxing analogies did'nt really occur to me before...even when I read Hart, how's that for odd:D).

As for the total numbers of riflemen I stated in my post that the second section in each plt could be re-roled as riflement (sans launchers but not CLUs). In fact, the recce plt could als be re-org as a line rifle plt for peace-support (not peace-enforcement) ops or constabulary types missions. With regards to the means of conveyance issue I am following the principles laid down/adumbrated by WILF and JTAN135(?) on the Cav platoon thread (don't have the link immediatlely to hand). Thanks to their patience in explaining the operating principles and TTPs of a carrier Plt/Coy/Bn my own confusion regarding MICV/IFV/APC load outs and employment was dispelled. Thanks for the criticism, always good clear the thickets of mine mind with the shears of another Reason (is that J. S. Mill?:D)

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Originally Posted by TAH

Given the two wheeled APCs listed will not carry a full section of 20 (14 or 15), suggest re-working the platoon task orgs so that a full squad/section can fit in an APC. Maybe something along the lines of the 13-man squad found in the USMC.

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http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ht=Cav+platoon

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Originally Posted by TAH

Your organization seems a heavy on the supporting arms/fires role and is left wanting for "Plain Ol Foot Solider" (2 20-man section 40 troops total) whose job is to enter/clear buildings. rooms, trenchs, fortifications etc.

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Sure, I can see that but given that in the assault you want a ratio of somewhere between 2-3:1 supporting to assaulting elements I don't think its too much. All I did was delete the idea of three identical sections and just weight one of them with HE projectors and LMGs making them the equivelant, if not an over match, for the two sections that would otherwise have been neded to generate a similar ammount of fire. Nor am I familiar with an entire platoon being ordered to clear a trench...at least a third to a half of them would be need for suppressive fires and to shoot the trench clearing teams in before following them on (if need be). Besides in the UK a rifle platoon is 24 men, or thereabouts, so one of my sections isn't too far off without being overly pumped up on steroids. Once TiC (Troops in contact) on a multi-coy or Bn level operation the recce platoons would more than likely perform some kind of rifle platoon function (but their primary task is small unti- RSTA). The ideas/arguments for the 20 man sections were essentially clinched by Sen. James Webb and kiwigrunt on a post on a different thread. Again, I apologise but I don't have the links immediately to hand (I also apologise for my spelling...had a "rough night";)).

Regards,

T

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Originally Posted by TAH

Move the UAV to the Co Hqs. With only one, the Commander needs to be the guy directing it's use.

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Yep, I thought as much tallys with existing doctrine and, much much much more importantly, practice:D As for the UAVs there are four aerial vehicles but only a single GCS; loiter time for the Puma is about 2 hrs IIRC.

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On infantry small unit development

(First a disclaimer: I'm going to write about warfare with opponents who have corrected vision, comparable combat morale and who can aim.)


Some authors claim that a German infantry squad of WW2 typically had 80% of its firepower concentrated in its one machine gun; a MG34 or MG42.
That was probably quite correct, but the carried ammunition and practical rate of fire indicate a slight exaggeration.
The issue was more fundamental than simple mechanical or material statistics, though. A machine gunner has the feeling that he can actually achieve much in battle and has typically a different psychology in effect than most other soldiers have.


Infantry is not all the same - you cannot give a special weapon to just anyone and expect always the same results. Differences are also deeper than mere qualifications and physical fitness or strength.

Some soldiers are aggressive, many are capable if lead well and some are basically carriers, not fighters. The most basic problem for infantry is therefore to identify who belongs to which group and to assign jobs and missions accordingly (and possibly reject the carrier guys).
The aggressive, daring guys who are very difficult to suppress need to become leaders (the smart ones) or operators for the most important weapons (such as a machine gun).


A 80/20 or 70/30 rule of thumb fits to many forms of human activity: 20-30% of the people have 80-70% of the overall effect (Pareto Principle). This is applicable to the spreading of diseases, the work in staffs, the kills of World War fighter pilots, the number of friends on social networking sites, the performance of snipers, the performance of computer gamers, the success in flirting and it's also relevant for infantry combat.
We can dream on in fantasy land and look at a platoon as a small unit of 20-50 equal men, but that's not going to be confirmed in intense combat.

- - - - -

OK, let's say we succeed to assign the most valuable men to the leadership jobs or give them the most powerful weapons. What does this tell us about the others in the platoon or squad?

The readers may not like it, but to be honest; the average assault rifle user will be little more than an ammunition carrier for the main weapons and a rear/flank security man and message relay.

How does this fit to the everyone-a-super-soldier approach of modern Western infantry equipment programs? The average assault rifle user has got some heavy AT weapon, a designated marksman rifle or an underbarrel grenade launcher nowadays. He's so overloaded with his own kit that carrying additional ammunition for a machine gunner or a platoon commando mortar reduces the mobility to that of a four-year old.

The technology-driven approach with a flair of combined arms (accurate single shots, full auto suppressive fires, high trajectory HE projection) down to squad or even fire team level may be a terrible misunderstanding.

To equip everyone with better rifle optics than were available to WW2 snipers isn't going to turn everyone into a super soldier either. The sights may be worth their weight and bulk, but they don't turn cowards or extremely frightened and shaking men into cold-blooded fighters with an overwhelming lethality in a 400 m radius.
Such equipment will still have the greatest effect with the few men who are psychologically best prepared for combat (this may include being simply too dumb or crazy to understand the danger - in fact, smart people rarely turn out to be among the most daring).


It's probably about time that the psychological differences between infantrymen again consciously influence the setup of infantry small units. This ranges from personnel selection over equipment to tactics and TO&Es (tables of organisation and equipment).

Combat in complex, though. It may be a good idea to 'waste' some good weapons on not very good soldiers in order to distract hostiles, to relieve the few over-performers off (suppressive fires) pressure.


Next, we should keep in mind another pressing challenge: The extreme lethality of modern weapons. Forget about the experiences against unskilled paramilitary (or lesser) fighters in recent warfare. The extreme lethality of modern infantry battalion arsenals (up to 120 mm mortars) restricts the infantry small unit repertoire for most actions. Only very high pay-off actions justify very risky tactics. Most often infantry needs to be very cautious in order to preserve itself for important actions (the military view) and a life after the war (the individual's view).

The combination of high lethality and cautious behaviour leads quite naturally to very short yet intense fire fights with (whenever possible) the advantage of surprise, followed by a quick withdrawal and rallying. The latter is necessary in order to avoid being stuck (and fixed) in a protracted fire fight till hostile mortars end it.

This justifies an emphasis on the right weapons (and munitions) for such an action. A salvo of M72 or SARPAC-like weapons, a very high rate of fire for the machine gun (with an appropriate, stable tripod) and the use of command-detonated mines (~Claymores) are possible answers.

Another approach might emphasize stealth and the avoidance of breaking said stealth. A minimised muzzle fire thanks to suppressors and optimised flash hiders, barrel lengths and cartridges as well as the employment of deception tools (fake muzzle fires) are imaginable.

There's also the possibility that both the own and the hostile infantry are very cautious and often stumble into each other at short range. That could be avoided with detached scout pairs and the use of military dogs, but it's still a possibility. Devastating and immediate fires would be important in this case. Hand grenades might become more important in such situations than all electronics combined and independent (re)actions of all soldiers without much leadership would become most important.

Other patterns for dominant forms of infantry combat are imaginable and need to be considered. Every such form might lead to distinct preferences that could shape the ideal infantry small unit TO&E.


Another hugely important factor in 'real', wars of necessity (if not even total wars) is attrition.

Life expectancy drops to very, very sad levels once a man becomes an infantry lieutenant in wartime. It doesn't look substantially better for infantry NCOs.
A serious army needs to be prepared for appalling losses among its leadership. One way to prepare is to have more leaders than necessary (the U.S. way), another one is to overqualify their subordinates (the old German way).
As far as I can tell, the latter is superior because it enables a very quick adaption once losses happen. A decapitated platoon can continue its mission if an NCO takes the lead, while it would need to wait a while till a replacement leader arrives (and that guy would be unknown to the soldiers).
Some of the most effective and consequential small unit actions in military history have been completed by subordinates who took over command after the initial leaders fell.

This is quite a challenge for TO&Es, for you need enough well-suited men for leading, for employment of the main weapons AND as 2nd or 3rd in command. You don't want to rely on your best machine gunner as emergency platoon leader - that would equal a terrible loss of firepower. The 2nd in command should on the one hand not be too close to the 1st in command, but on the other hand you don't want him too far away. For example, he shouldn't be in the assault element if your army's tactic prefers the platoon leader to be with the fire support element.


Psychological capability in combat, the expected nature of infantry combat and attrition should influence our infantry small unit concepts much more than they seemingly did after the Cold War. Gadget-driven concepts of infantry combat and infantry small unit TO&Es have dominated for about 15 years and are still in fashion. This exaggeration needs to be corrected.

Again, it was impossible to cover the topic comprehensively. I limited myself to mention a few rather rarely discussed aspects of infantry small units setups. Maybe I ruined all the future fun of discussing gun calibres and 40mm underbarrel grenade weapons for you, but that's within the limits of the usual risks of reading this blog...

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

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All good stuff mate...from your blog, no?;) Similar thoughts were swimming around in my head and refused to gel ... but I lacked your particular take on things. Wehter we can have all-purposes troops and train them to be jack off all trades or wether we can make them professionals as a specific MOS (specialsied generalists) is as much of a problem as is C2. Personally I'd prefer having specialised generalists who like the stormtroopers in WWI were so proficient at their tasks could do them in their sleep (let follow on forces/echelons mop up and do the "conventional" WII stuff). And, yes, I know, there's no such thing as "Hutier" tactics (which I why I put it in inverted commas in the previous post) it was just a short-hand way of orienting the discussion.

Yes, it's a quite recent text.
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot....velopment.html