If it's that good, why not just post the slides here?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
...Three simple slides. One for process, one for COIN, and one for CT. (or more accurately, one for FID to help the HN with COIN; and one to counter the external organizations that are conducting networked UW operations to influence the insurgency).
I think most of us would be interested...
Minor comments from the Peanut Gallery...
Bob's World's slides: Good, usable but not, as advertised, by Squad Leaders; :wry: I'd add not even by most Company Commanders most of the time or by few Battalions. Though I'll caveat that and give Bob a prop by noting that people differ; the analytical type will appreciate his idea, the intuitive folks will note it and say "Well, yeah, isn't that what everyone does?" (Acknowledging that everyone is not an intuitive commander or leader).
The Leavenworth PPT show: Generally agree with Bob's critique with particular, strong, effusive and total agreement with his comments on Slides 15, 34 and 37. I think his comments are VERY important for the process and for the thinking of he who would be a COIN / FID fighter. I'd also add that for Slide 37 it can be extremely difficult to insure that you have accurately determined the Insurgent's desired end state while determination of the goals of the bulk of the populace are far simpler and more sure. They are, after all, what it's really all about.
Also agree that Slide 48 + series is probably overkill for most other than the really analytically inclined. On Slide 68, don't think it makes much difference what you call it, people will juggle and jiggle terminology in any event and DoD / DA / TRADOC will change the vernacular in any event. On Slide 72, Bob's comment is valid but it leads to a far larger point in my mind:
That process is all very well. I'm surprised that CGSC needs presentations with that much elementary detail (acknowledging that the course has foreign and civilian students and I haven't attended) but the Slides do lay out an effective presentation and a functional methodology. My concern is that the process gets so far down in the weeds that it will take an inordinate amount of time for the initial assessment (time that may not always be available), will require constant updating (previous remark applies plus manpower requirement) and will become an end to itself to some (a cynic might say "too many..."). I think that means that it's overdone and therefor needs significant paring and simplification in order to be usable by the Bn or Bde Staff which is operating at 50% strength due to casualties and personnel shortfalls...
EBO: Bastardization of Airpower?
Last week a note about this subject in the Air Force Magazine's Daily Report eNewsletter started a lively email discussion within our teaching department at the Army Command and General Staff College.
We had just stood up our new blog, Joint Chatter, the day before. So the discussion was moved there under the post Effects-Based Operations: Bastardization of Airpower?