Completely my own opinion
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=William F. Owen;92309]Starry mate. For me it comes down the 2 uses rule. Can I use this for regular Warfare and Irregular warfare
Man, just gotta use some imagination. Even an F-22 at supercruise with lots of gun ammo and small diameter bombs could support a COP being attacked with a quick response...at least when they eventually put a Sniper pod on them...and a helmet mounted display...which is why the F-35 is essential.
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1. Why do you need OH and AH?
Check out what happened at COP Wanat, COP Zeroc, and COP Keating when AH-64Ds came to the rescue and could use 30mm, rockets, and Hellfire close to troops while other more lethal aerial and artillery systems could not. At Wanat, casualties would not have been evacuated as rapidly without Apaches securing the MEDEVAC LZs. UH/CH often need aerial escorts for security. The Brits have used their stronger-engined AH-64D quite effectively in Helmand, too.
Manned-unmanned teaming is the future, and AH and OH fit it perfectly teamed with UAS. UH can get in the act as well carrying a squad QRF cued by UAS. Reconnaissance and security are still critical AH/OH missions in regular warfare or IW as is close combat attack. IED diggers, builders, and financiers don't like AH and OH aircraft or UAS.
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2. Can armed UH fulfil 80% of OH and AH tasks? - door gunners with NVGs and LL-LP?
Think Direct Action Penetrator UH-60. Personally never understood why UH-60 Hellfire in the GPF would not work, or why an AH and UH version of essentially the same aircraft could not exist. We did a lot of scout-like missions in the Sinai using lowly Hueys, while still doing ash and trash at other times. But UH NVGs are not the equal of the latest Apache, OH, or UAS FLIR. Personally never understood why our MEDEVAC could not be more like USAF CSAR H-60s and be armed and armored for self-defense. Every Soldier is a sensor so that should include UH and CH aviators, as well. Company fusion teams?
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3. Can A-10 do the rest?
Yeah, A-10s are great as are light attack prop planes with their long endurance. But the value of that endurance somewhat dims when the last of its few bombs are dropped. Then it's slowly back to a distant airfield while AH/OH can visit a much closer FARP at a FOB to arm/refuel, and head back for more. Plus its still hard to see dismounts at 250-350 knots, and diving gun runs at those speeds in mountains can be dangerous.
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A lot of the debate about AH that I see outside the US is a general agreement of the need for armed helicopters, but a general rejection of a machine as large, expensive and complex as AH-64 - whose cost being associated with survivability, seems very much in doubt.
The US has lost far fewer helicopters in these conflicts than were lost in Viet Nam or by Soviets in Afghanistan, despite flying over 2.5 million rotary wing hours. Lots of countries have purchased AH-64s to include in the Middle East and Europe. They are not overly complex or unaffordable.
Bottom line is the Quadrennial Defense Review correctly identified the value of rotary wing aircraft of all types to all types of conflict. I may personally believe that the AH/OH guys get too much emphasis vs. UH/CH just as combat arms get all the attention in the new Capstone Concept while logistics and COIN are barely addressed. That's just the nature of the Army beast and why infantry, SF, aviation, MP, and sustainers seem to embrace COIN and full spectrum conflict while armor and artillery branches appear to fear it, IMHO.
Greater truth sayeth no one...
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Originally Posted by
Infanteer
...the infantry defines the pace of events on the ground against both regular and irregular foes; all else should simply do what they do and provide the support inherent to their capability. That capability does not change in an irregular fight.
Nor will it change in future MCO due to the comparative expense of other combat elements. Infantry will always have the numbers to achieve economies of scale denied others... :D :cool:
Luttwak: Why terror from the skies still works
Of course, I'm not sure Luttwak has yet met a problem that he couldn't bomb :D
In Praise of Aerial Bombing: Why terror from the skies still works.
Foreign Policy Magazine
BY EDWARD LUTTWAK | MARCH/APRIL 2010
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Ever since the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey cast doubt on the efficacy of aerial bombardment in World War II, and particularly after its failure to bring victory in the Vietnam War, air power has acquired a bad reputation. Nowadays, killing enemies from the skies is widely considered useless, while its polar opposite, counterinsurgency by nation-building, is the U.S. government's official policy. But it's not yet time to junk our planes. Air power still has a lot to offer, even in a world of scattered insurgencies.
...
Most unfortunately, having so often greatly overestimated air power in the past, the United States is now disregarding its strategic potential, using it only tactically to hunt down individuals with remotely operated drones and to support ground operations, mostly with helicopters, which are the only aircraft the Taliban can shoot down. Commanding Gen. Stanley McChrystal, understandably concerned about the political blowback from errant bombings widely condemned both inside and outside Afghanistan, has put out the word that air power should be used solely as a last resort. He intends to defeat the Taliban by protecting Afghan civilians, providing essential services, stimulating economic development, and ensuring good government, as the now-sacrosanct Field Manual 3-24 prescribes. Given the characteristics of Afghanistan and its rulers, this worthy endeavor might require a century or two. In the meantime, the FM 3-24 way of war is far from cheap: President Barack Obama is now just about doubling the number of U.S. troops by sending another 30,000, at an average cost of $1 million per soldier per year, to defeat perhaps 25,000 full-time Taliban.
COIN Academy for Aviators
Have a look at the 'COIN Academy' for Aviators, a RFI thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9605 and maybe contact its author LtFuzz (Who I have tried to make contact with).
Good points all, Sylvan. Got a comment on one item:
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Originally Posted by
Sylvan
5. Not everybody carries a compass anymore (their fault, not yours). When relaying directions to ground elements, try to orient based on their positions. "To your 3 O'Clock"
Instead of "To the Southeast".
Totally understand the problem and where you're coming from but the far better solution is for the troops on the ground to have better situational awareness and a sense of direction. That means looking at their GPS, carrying the dumb compass, noting where the sun is (in the Stan, it'll always be south of you, comes up in the east, moves 15 degrees an hour and goes down in the west. At 1200 local standard time will be directly overhead). Stars are available at night, ridge lines are oriented in some direction. Streambeds, even if intermittent or even if the creeks are dry, are on the Map more to show you where low ground is than they are to show you water. Plenty of ways to get there. There's no excuse for a ground commander (dare I say everyone...) to not know where the cardinal points are in relation to where he is located. It ain't that hard...:cool:
I do know the difficulties but it's a training issue that can be easily solved. Use of "Your 3 o'clock" is better than nothing but can be disastrous if a guy is facing 180 degrees away from what looks like or should be his orientation -- or the guy hearing and reacting is not the guy you're talking to. :eek:
In this case, it's better for the Aviation support to force the cardinal directions on the ground guys. As you say, it's the ground pounders fault, not the airplane drivers...
Our problem is that is rarely the case.
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Originally Posted by
JMA
...where the air support is integral to the ground force unit/formation and working with the troops everyday simple left/right and clock face directions would be fine.
If it were, I'd agree. Our problem is that other than the Marines who do have integral air to an extent -- but only to an extent and even they may often get support from the Dutch, the French, The British, or an unfamiliar US Army or Air Force element. Our rotation and centralized control / pooling system mean that the likelihood of dedicated or familiar support for most units most of the time is very slim.
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If the support from people you have not worked with before then standard FAC (forward air controller) procedures need to be followed if only to ensure he doesn't put his load on your head.
True. However, the issue to me is not air support, it is one of training quality (and ours is poor... :mad: ). As I said "There's no excuse for a ground commander (dare I say everyone...) to not know where the cardinal points are in relation to where he is located. It ain't that hard." I'll add that "everyone" includes IMO Joe the rifleman with less than a year of service. People will say that's asking too much. No, it is not. And you don't ask for it, you demand it -- the vast majority of the kids are more than capable of doing it.
It's simply a matter of competence for worst case situations. Best case stuff is good but you cannot rely on it in most combat and you positively cannot in major combat operations or mobile armored or mechanized warfare.
Of course it makes sense.
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Originally Posted by
JMA
...Now what if fate hands out a card which places a brand new company in a situation where a brand new squadron (probably from another NATO country) comes overhead to support. That is a truly worrisome situation for all concerned.
Not terribly worrisome but it is a constant and it does have some minor adverse impacts.
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I can begin to understand why the Marines want to keep it all in the family in Helmand so to speak. It makes perfect sense.
Yep, makes sense. Also more effective. Unfortunately, it's costly and not terribly 'efficient.' We're bigger on efficiency than we are on effectiveness. :rolleyes:
The Marines are able to pull it off by dint of being fairly small but mostly by having a strong support group in the US Congress; the other services also have them but the Marines assiduously cultivate theirs and it has awesome power, enough to fight off those of the other forces...
I digress. Why we value efficiency over effectiveness I've never really understood. :o
My wife says it's about money -- but then she for some odd objects to my proposal to buy a certain additional weapon, not from any pressing current requirement but because it works really well and just in case I might need it... :wry: