Another way of looking at North Korea
A short (10 mins) MNSBC news report:
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Richard Engel visits The Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, where academics use publicly available maps and media, and a lot of creative problem solving, to assess North Korea's progress toward nuclear weapon capability
Link:https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow/...ist=associated
Quite interesting use of open sources and crowd sourcing. Their website is:https://www.nonproliferation.org/about-2/
The professor is none other than Jeffrey Lewis, who is Arms Control Wonk:https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/ and a respected SME. His short bio:https://www.nonproliferation.org/experts/jeffrey-lewis/
Using UCAVs to shoot down North Korean ICBMs
From Garwin and Postal at FAS: https://fas.org/rlg/airborne.pdf
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Summary:
- The DPRK has demonstrated missiles with near-ICBM range and tested underground nuclear or thermonuclear explosives of yield estimated to be 100 or even 250 kilotons—comparable in yield to many of the current U.S. strategic warheads.
- Although there is not evidence that the DPRK has mastered the technology of a ruggedized warhead and reentry vehicle that would survive the 60 G deceleration and heating of atmospheric reentry at ICBM range, they could do so in time. It is also not clear that any of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons can yet be carried to ICBM range, but that also is only a matter of time.
- We sketch here an "Airborne Patrol System to Destroy DPRK ICBMs in Powered Flight" incorporating the well established MQ-9 Reaper (Predator B) remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), The Big Wing version of the MQ-9 has a loiter time of some 37 hours at 500 miles from itsairbase in South Korea or Japan, carrying two Boost-Phase Intercept missiles assembled of available rocket motors, e.g., from Orbital ATK.
- A two-stage rocket would provide 4 km/s, with a 75 or 55 kg homing payload providing an additional 2.0 or 1.5 km/s divert velocity, and carrying a 25 kg seeker that would home optically on the booster flame and the ICBM’s hard body.
- All of the technologies needed to implement the proposed system are proven and no new technologies are needed to realize the system .
- The baseline system could technically be deployed in 2020, and would be designed to handle up to 5 simultaneous ICBM launches.
- The potential value of this system could be to quickly create an incentive for North Korea to take diplomatic negotiations seriously and to destroy North Korean ICBMs if they are launched at the continental United States.
- The proposed Airborne Patrol System could be a “first-step system” that can be constantly improved over time. For example, we have analyzed the system assuming that interceptors have a top speed of 4 km/s with a 25 kg seeker. We believe that faster, or lighter and smaller interceptors can be built that would increase the firepower of the system and possibly its capability against somewhat shorter range ballistic missiles like the Nodong – which poses a threat to Japan.
- Since the Airborne Patrol System would be based on the use of drones that would loiter outside of North Korean airspace, the electronic countermeasures needed to defeat distant surface-to-air missile defenses would be easy to implement because of the long-range between the drones and the air-defense radars.
- The availability of relatively inexpensive high-payload long-endurance drones will also improve, along with the electronic countermeasures
- systems to protect them.
North Korea is almost certainly going to remain a nuclear weapons state
A former Washington insider's commentary on recent matters and face-to-face diplomacy has limits. Yes he is ex-CIA. He starts with:
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Time to face it: North Korea is almost certainly going to remain a nuclear weapons state. Its nuclear capabilities are now impressive, well-documented and embraced by
Kim Jong Un as regime survival tools. But in assessing adversaries, you also always have to weigh
intent. And that is the question least well-explored: What exactly does North Korea plan to do with its nuclear weapons — and how should that affect our perception of the threat?
The short article ends with:
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Such personal relationships are important in diplomacy, but they need to be married to a clear, flexible and persistent strategy — one that seems so far to be missing.
Link:https://www.ozy.com/opinion/-lets-fa...ts-nukes/95413
