Outlaw,
I think US strategy in the ME has been relatively stable over the years, with the notable exception of the Iraq invasion (which I will address), and very clear in its intent: maintain close relationships (but not too close) with strategic partners Saudi Arabia, Gulf kingdoms, Egypt, and Israel while sustaining pressure (but not too much pressure) on adversarial governments in Syria, Iran, and formerly Iraq (and to a lesser extent, Libya). We've more or less pushed this strategy to the limit with our current partners, and combined with the misadventure in Iraq and opportunism in Libya, there's not much more that can be done short of another out right war, which we recently learned is not necessarily an American interest.
The US has a number of basic and traditional tools to influence the ME, chief among them military power and money. But as we know, both of these have their limits, and the complexity of disparate interests and the rapidity with which regional alliances shift makes exercising the first a dangerous proposition. And I think Yemen and its problems demonstrates that the use of the second is no guarantee of success.
Now I said the Iraq war was a misadventure, not just because of its execution, but also because it marked a significant break from historical US policy to let local allies or alliances figure out their problems (with US weapons and money of course). And then afterwards at some opportune point, the US steps in to facilitate an agreement. The security of Saudi Arabia is the longest standing linchpin of US interests in the region, and around it we have built a considerable military-oriented strategy to secure the Gulf. But actually exercising that power to destroy Hussein's Iraq only upset the balance of power and not in our favor; more or less forcing us into an understanding with Iran.
The Arab Spring doesn't demand a unifying US policy or a reimagining of US strategy. The US actively intervened in Libya, stayed more or less on the sidelines in Egypt and Syria, and basically ignored unrest in the Gulf. Unless there's a fundamental change in the structures of power in the ME, US strategy won't change and shouldn't -- our allies might change, but that's another question. Here's where I see emerging decision points:
- a nuclear Iran can't be ignored and probably not "occupied by policy". Some kind of accommodation will have to be made to maintain security in the Gulf (and to a lesser extent, the Caucasus). That might come at a heavy price for the US and probably not without some more violence.
- Iraq is out of the game for the foreseeable future. Escalation of Iraq's internal violence could pull in outside actors (read Iran and KSA) deeper into the country again.
- Syria is also out of the game; now it's just a matter of how long and under what conditions. A peace agreement will leave the international jihadists exposed and open to government repression. Where will they go next?
- Although it's not quite over in Egypt yet, as far as the US is concerned, the changes transpired with US interests intact. The question is with the elevated expectations and militancy of the population, what policies will this compel the Egyptian government to pursue?