William S. Lind :collection (merged thread)

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Originally Posted by Chris jM

'Two decision cycles' is just too simplistic, isn't it? You don't fight an enemy commander in an isolated duel ala a chessboard - as a battalion commander you might be attacking an enemy company position, say. That enemy company commander is part of a Bn, who in turn is part of a Bde, etc etc. Each commander has his own reserve our counter-atk reserve, not to mention the neighboring companies to the one your trying to defeat.
So against whom do you 'generate confusion and disorder' by 'cutting inside your opponents decision cycle'? The enemy, as in the FF, will have dozens of different decision cycles whirling around and interacting simultaneously if we use the Boyd analogy. Saying that we are fighting any one of these - or even saying that we are fighting them all simultaneously - is more or less a meaningless pursuit... no?

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Absolutely, and now you’re cutting to the real issue. (At this point I want to yell “TADA!”) How do you apply an OODA Loop develop from air combat studies (one-on-one dog fights) to modern combat…or, as I said before, how do you control all those damn “arrows” in the Boyd brief? That issue and problem is what send Boyd into “Patterns”, Strategy ? vs ?, and all the rest, etc. Now we closed our own loop; that issue is what sent the Marine Corps into discussions, debates, nashing of teeth, whining, etc. on topics like “commanders intent”, mission orders” , “surfaces and gaps”, and all the rest. Based on this thread… my sinister and deviate mind and I would like to take this opportunity to welcome you to Maneuver Warfare and the joys self-flagellation…;)

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

If it was race, your first action is to trip the other guy.

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Yes…but remember it is both…tripping the racer is an example of MW…but even better is that you should also run like your butt is on fire…if you don’t, the tripee is going to get up and start running…with an adrenalin rush advantage from being so damn mad at you.

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

It's a bit more complex. Speed/quickness/rapidity has effects on many levels. A small advantage may have great effect on the ability of the enemy to shoot back (the famous first shot kill of MBT combat), while the same small advantage would be useless on another level (few seconds are meaningless in brigade staffs).
Overall, I'd say that the speed difference counts, and it has diminishing returns (adding xy speed advantage provides a lesser benefit than the previous xy speed advantage).

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Hear, Hear. You said it brother!

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Originally Posted by Polarbear1605

Yes…but remember it is both…tripping the racer is an example of MW…but even better is that you should also run like your butt is on fire…if you don’t, the tripee is going to get up and start running…with an adrenalin rush advantage from being so damn mad at you.

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Whoh there my big furry friend. The racer analogy is the very fallacy I was trying to address.
Trying to be faster is pointless. "Speed" (action faster then reaction) can only relate to the generation of surprise - the enemy being un-prepared for your action, which is why concealing an action is far better than competing in time and space. - which suggests than actions that impeded the enemy's ability to effectively prepare are those which are the most worthwhile.

This is where I don't get the OODA loops "speed of cycling" thing. A lot of stuff in a 7,000 man armoured brigade takes the time that it does, just because it cannot be done faster. - and if it was it would make not that much difference.

Me thinks speed contributes more to uncertainty than to surprise.

Surprise is an advantage - but quickly moving troops can be surprised by a contact just as much as those they ran into. The advantage lies then in superior readiness for battle, not in the speed.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Whoh there my big furry friend. The racer analogy is the very fallacy I was trying to address.
Trying to be faster is pointless. "Speed" (action faster then reaction) can only relate to the generation of surprise - the enemy being un-prepared for your action, which is why concealing an action is far better than competing in time and space. - which suggests than actions that impeded the enemy's ability to effectively prepare are those which are the most worthwhile.

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I can agree with the above statements but I don’t agree with the absolute of “only”… if you add a qualifier…something like…”understanding that it is situational dependent” or “in most but not all cases”, at least IMO, it is better because it is less predictable.

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This is where I don't get the OODA loops "speed of cycling" thing. A lot of stuff in a 7,000 man armored brigade takes the time that it does, just because it cannot be done faster. - and if it was it would make not that much difference.

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Your right…distributing ammo, refueling, issuing orders, repairs, moving to assembly areas, crap it is starting to rain, etc. takes time. Boyd (the engineer) would say they create friction that lengthens your OODA loop; therefore, any action you take needs to eliminate (or at least limit) your friction and at the same time increase or add to the enemy’s friction. Think about the Japanese switching bombs and torpedoes at Midway. If you can do these types of things faster than the enemy why not take advantage of the opportunity. Yet another reason to study mission orders, commander's intent, etc.
Now, getting back to your tripped runner scenario (you can tell, I really like it) just because it is fun. I made the assumption you knew that the runner you tripped was faster than you (otherwise why trip him). After you trip him, you still want to take off running to at least avoid the fist fight. Even if you win the fight you are probably going to be too sore and bruised the next day to race again…and if you going to run why not run towards the finish line. In any event, what I have learned about you is that I need to watch you closely, because I am beginning to think you have a bit of treachery in your blood when it comes to rules. ;)

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Originally Posted by Fuchs

Me thinks speed contributes more to uncertainty than to surprise.

Surprise is an advantage - but quickly moving troops can be surprised by a contact just as much as those they ran into. The advantage lies then in superior readiness for battle, not in the speed.

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I was always under the impression that Boyd (and crew) stressed the uncertainty thing more than surprised. :)

Back to the race. Seems Orienting (step 2) on the enemy/opponent by tripping him is pretty good Boyd cycling. So if he gets back up instead of tripping him this time, you break his leg(s). Point being Orienting(step 2) on the Enemy so you can conduct a Decisive Maneuver is the critical part of the cycle, not so much speed but Orienting to be Decisive. A modern example would be the Israeli Nuclear Reactor raid on Iraq in the early 1980's. It was a Decisive Maneuver.

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Originally Posted by Polarbear1605

Yet another reason to study mission orders, commander's intent, etc.

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Absolutley agree 100%.... Mission orders,Main Effort,Surfaces and Gaps are better concepts. Is Boyd really that helpful or would we be better off without him? A lot of really smart folks in the Air Force thought he was a little bit of a flake.

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Originally Posted by slapout9

Back to the race. Seems Orienting (step 2) on the enemy/opponent by tripping him is pretty good Boyd cycling. So if he gets back up instead of tripping him this time, you break his leg(s). Point being Orienting(step 2) on the Enemy so you can conduct a Decisive Maneuver is the critical part of the cycle, not so much speed but Orienting to be Decisive. A modern example would be the Israeli Nuclear Reactor raid on Iraq in the early 1980's. It was a Decisive Maneuver.

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Absolutely. One of the old west lawmen; when asked what is the best way to shoot a man answered "in the back of the head" or something to that effect.
But remember there is always a reaction...look at Irans nuclear sites today...how deep are they under ground?

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Originally Posted by Polarbear1605

But remember there is always a reaction...look at Irans nuclear sites today...how deep are they under ground?

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Yes, that is probably not an option today. Another thing I learned in LE (modified from the original) its not the weapon that is the problem...its the guy with the will to use the weapon that is the problem.

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Originally Posted by slapout9

Absolutley agree 100%.... Mission orders,Main Effort,Surfaces and Gaps are better concepts. Is Boyd really that helpful or would we be better off without him? A lot of really smart folks in the Air Force thought he was a little bit of a flake.

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Good Question. IMO he is essential, however, Boyd (and crew) didn’t teach us mission orders or any other MW tool sets. Boyd, again IMO, taught us how to think and how to approach the problem. This gets back to his snowmobile analogy. You have to pull everything apart, look at the components and figure out what works best for you and why; and at the same time think why it what works against your opponent. He used the word “discourse” a lot – a formal, orderly exchange of ideas and thoughts … to adapt to our environment that is always changing. We (Marines) were looking for a formula or a set of rules…but he would not commit to one…he kept sending us back to the books and discussions (he made our heads hurt).

This OODA loop theory was starting to be taught in LE back in the 80's....but it is based on standard Medical Theory form the 1930's:eek: All problems that are solved by human beings go through a 4 step process.

1-Perception
2-Analyzing and Evaluating
3-Formulating a Response
4-Initiating A Motor Response

To me this seems a lot easier to understand and certainly seems to accomplish what the OODA loop was trying to do but with a lot less ambiguity.

http://www.emich.edu/cerns/downloads...nforcement.pdf

There were better and more elaborate models than OODA before the 80's, including in the U.S. and USSR. The basic thought has been incorporated in written texts generations ago, if not centuries ago.

OODA has two strengths:
a) good marketing
b) fuzzy and wide interpretation to fit all needs

I was privy to the best example that speed does not equal tempo...

As contextual setting, I had just joined the 101st after a year as a planner in 2ID...

In the Div rehearsal for UFL, the Div CMD made a point of addressing all the new "Iron Majors" by emphasizing that "the 101st maneuvered and made decisions 160km/hr" at which point I immediately thought... "it also gets its arse in a fix at the same speed"

segue to the exercise...

From my seat in the TOC, I literally looked into the the senior officer VTC suite, couldn't help but listen :D

The Corps commander hounded the Div CDRs to go faster (in fact he threatened and maligned their manhood)... he order a BDE AASLT over the objections of the DIV CDR who tried to inform him that despite best efforts conditions had not been set... result: BCT reduced to 30%...

In the midst of the ground attack, the 2ID CDR kept trying to counsel a more deliberate approach explaining very clearly the impact of bypassing known UGF and HARTs and the size of the force required to secure the ever expanding LOC, he was ignored and the Corps was grinding to a halt as the LOG was interdicted... and I KNEW the red CDR was sitting in his cell at the Yongsan BCTC site just licking his chops as the fly got further entangled in his web...

To protect the relatively innocent, I won't elaborate on the AASLT to conduct a deliberate river x-ing IOT pass a heavy div :eek: THAT WAS SPECIAL!!!

I provide all the above, because when asked for AAR comments, I gave my BN CDR the best, most poignant input (for which he was too timid to contribute)... The Corps mistook speed for tempo, at no point was the Corps inside the opposing commanders ability to respond /// it was a great lesson -- that unfortunately went un-learned as the same Corps CDR made the same mistake the next year:mad:

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Originally Posted by Hacksaw

I was privy to the best example that speed does not equal tempo...

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We have a saying - "slow is smooth, smooth is fast". It is used to prevent guys from just rushing things and generating what I call "speed wobble" - you see it happen when guy's try to get things done too fast to "be fast". I remember a mech attack during an exercise where orders were issued fast, steps missed and people started to lose track of things. Speed wobble kicks in and the whole she-bang falls apart (much like your example, Hacksaw).

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Originally Posted by slapout9

. A modern example would be the Israeli Nuclear Reactor raid on Iraq in the early 1980's. It was a Decisive Maneuver.

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It may have been a decisive action. It really had nothing to do with Manoeuvre.
Was it even decisive? Did it halt Iraq's WMD program?

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Originally Posted by Infanteer

I remember a mech attack during an exercise where orders were issued fast, steps missed and people started to lose track of things. Speed wobble kicks in and the whole she-bang falls apart (much like your example, Hacksaw).

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Which is why Drills are so important - especially in Mech, because Quick battle orders have to be passed, over the radio, possibly while on the move.
That could mean going from the march/hide/FUP, to crossing the start line/FAP in <15 mins.

http://www.spartancops.com/ooda-loop...mbat-strategy/

H/T to John Robb at Global Guerrillas for finding this.

I could pontificate on any number of these postings, but I've said more than my piece in many other places. All I'll say is--at the time--the MANEUVER WARFARE HANDBOOK was all we had that told us there was a different way to do things that what we were currently being taught in our service schools and in field exercises. Keep in mind, nearly all of us were historically and theoretically ignorant. Those well-versed in history and theory are right to be somewhat startled that we would grab onto such things as this book. For many of us, it started us reading and learning--and now the book seems relatively quaint given this new understanding. But even if quaint, I've found it's difficult for many to adequately practice what Lind and Wyly recommend, which is why I tend to teach MW solely through TDGs, Case Method, and wargaming--and through nothing else. Too hard to talk abstractly about it. Found many who could "talk the talk" but not "walk the walk."

A good example is with regard to Main Effort. While it's convenient to label a particular unit as the "Main Effort," over a series of TDGs/wargames it usually becomes clear that it's the ACTION that the designated unit is intended to do that should be listed as the "Main Effort." At least that has been my practice. For example, I might say "Main Effort is getting past the enemy fortified belt and taking this crossroads here. Initially, this will be 1s Battalion." If 1st Battalion gets held up and 2nd Battalion is getting past the enemy fortified belt and promises to get the crossroads, it's very easy for people to "pass the ball" (usually combat support assets and supplies) from 1st Battalion to 2nd without waiting for orders. A little bit trickier on the defense, but it's done in much the same way.

We do some Irregular Warfare scenarios and the principles still hold, although the communication is much trickier. We're still practicing that.

I would hope for a 2nd Ed of MANEUVER WARFARE HANDBOOK. It's a quarter century old and in serious need of an overhaul given all that's been discussed and studied (and learned/not learned) since it's publication. While Bill Lind and Mike Wyly have talked about that even fairly recently, I've not seen much movement in that direction. Maybe if Westview Press would pay them more in royalties...now that Bill has retired to Cleveland OH in the last month, he certainly has time on his hands, even if Mike in Maine has not!

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Originally Posted by ericmwalters

We do some Irregular Warfare scenarios and the principles still hold, although the communication is much trickier. We're still practicing that.

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That is one of the things that intrigues me the most in that it wouldn't make any difference between regular and irregular warfare.

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Originally Posted by ericmwalters

But even if quaint, I've found it's difficult for many to adequately practice what Lind and Wyly recommend, which is why I tend to teach MW solely through TDGs, Case Method, and wargaming--and through nothing else. Too hard to talk abstractly about it. Found many who could "talk the talk" but not "walk the walk."

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Concur. It was actually war gaming that first began to kill my faith in MW. 99% of the time there was a sensible plan, and a dumb plan. Calling the dumb plan "attrition" and the good plan "manoeuvre" was simply idiotic.
My point being, you cannot teach some thing that is not MW. There is not Attrition or Manoeuvre. There is simply Warfare done well, and that which is not.

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A good example is with regard to Main Effort. While it's convenient to label a particular unit as the "Main Effort," over a series of TDGs/wargames it usually becomes clear that it's the ACTION that the designated unit is intended to do that should be listed as the "Main Effort." At least that has been my practice.

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If you read the discussion between Guderian and Von Kliest about the crossing of the Meuse River, the allocation of the Main Effort is made without any references to units at all. They are actually worried about avoiding to have to do two river crossings, instead of one, and where the boundaries of the French 2nd and 9th Armies are.