Day 24 of Mosul campaign. Iraqi forces stuck in eastern Mosul more displaced.
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Day 24 of Mosul campaign. Iraqi forces stuck in eastern Mosul more displaced.
Day 25 of Mosul campaign.
Day 26 of Mosul campaign.
Day 29 of Mosul campaign rundown.
Mosul campaign has entered Day 30. Review of events.
Day 31 of Mosul campaign.
Mosul op has entered day 32.
Day 33 rundown of Mosul op.
Day 34 of Mosul offensive.
Day 35 of Mosul campaign.
36th day of Mosul campaign.
Day 37 of Mosul campaign review.
38th Day of Mosul campaign.
Day 39 of Mosul campaign. Iraqi forces entered 36 areas of east Mosul, only 7 of which appear to be secured so far.
Nicholas J. Kramer
Cited in part:Quote:
The campaign to retake Mosul is well underway with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) consolidating gains in the eastern districts of the city. And despite stiff resistance and the potential for infighting among the anti-ISIL coalition, which ostensibly could stall the advance, the city will most likely be liberated by early 2017. So with ground forces making progress and Mosul’s fall certain, observers have turned their commentary to the day after the Iraqi flag flies again in its second largest city, and rightfully so. The politics of Ninewa province, frozen in time due to ISIL’s conquest, can begin in earnest once again. But irrespective of whether Mosul falls at the end of this year or early next, for better or for worse, it will be the policies of a new U.S. administration that will ultimately influence Iraq’s trajectory toward a more, or less, stable nation.
However, this simplistic telling misses key aspects of the Sahwa story, which then leads to ill-considered policies. For starters, the Sahwa was a bit more complex than the “tribal uprising” that we tend to depict. As the Sahwa movement spread outside of Anbar in 2007, it witnessed the integration of large numbers of former Sunni nationalist and Islamist insurgents who were under tremendous pressure from Shia militias and were fighting their own war with the Islamic State of Iraq. A comprehensive story of the Sahwa includes, at the very least, mention of the psychological effect on Sunni Arab calculus of this crushing sectarian civil war waged by Shia militias that had reached a peak in 2007. Knowing who filled the Sahwa’s ranks during this period and their intentions and allegiances when siding with U.S. forces is critical to understanding both how and which elements of the later Sahwa disintegrated and further explains Baghdad’s reactions. These are just some of the important nuances missing from the fuller story that should make us reconsider the legend.
A recently published book titled Confronting Al Qaeda: The Sunni Awakening and American Strategy in al Anbar is a good place to start for interrogating our understanding of the movement. In the book, Cottam and Huseby trace the factors that influenced the strategic choices by the majority of relevant actors of the Anbar Sahwa — tribal leaders, administration officials, and military leaders alike — from the beginning of the Iraq War through the formation of the Anbar Sahwa and finally the withdrawal of U.S. forces. After all, Anbar was critical to the larger movement as its birthplace and the inspiration for what spread to other Sunni areas like Babil, Diyala, and Salahuddin provinces, as well as Baghdad.
http://warontherocks.com/2016/11/wak...nni-awakening/
War logic and warfare solutions work to resolve war. But this a revolutionary conflict that has evolved to a war stage (phase 3, decision in the Maoist model). A military "defeat" of phase 3, and the accompanying re-taking of cities or territory secured by the revolutionary does not "win" the contest - it merely converts it back into a less organized phase of revolution.
Where is the clearly communicated viable political solution for the Sunni Arabs to turn to once the ISIL solution is denied? A return to the political solution for Iraq we created as our answer for that people and space? A removal of Assad and the advancing of some similar Western solution for Syria? The failure of those inappropriate and inherently illegitimate political solutions are what fueled these revolutions to begin with.
Where is the clearly communicated plan to limit Iranian influence in the region and to restore a stable line of competition / spheres of influence for the Saudis, Turks and Iranians?
Where is the reconciliation program and prisoner's dilemma designed to fracture ISIL leadership and offer the reasonable currently fighting under that radical flag a trusted means to come in from the proverbial cold?
I see no strategy, only tactics. This story does not end soon or well as currently pursued, irregardless of what ultimately happens in Mosul.
Day 40 of Mosul campaign.
Day 41 of Mosul campaign.
Mosul campaign has entered Day 42.