All about the bottom line
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
Now this is strange.
I understand your assertion in the context of "blue 1x6 Bde moves east and two red 2x3 Bdes move west", as you've got unity of command advantage for blue in such a scenario.
Yet, modify this into a pincer scenario or let blue face some smarter red behaviour and you end up seeing an inferior blue unless it divides itself into dissimilarly behaving components. At that point, the advantage of blue is all but gone.
Now keep in mind the experience from WW2; namely that smaller formations are handy and practical, whereas large ones are clumsy until they fragment- and are very difficult to command when fragmented.
The practical experience seems to suggest that small is beautiful while theory cannot convince me that big is beautiful.
A disadvantage of the 2 brigades of 4 Bns of 3 companies is who/what Hqs coordinates the actions of both of the brigades. You will normally defalt to a DIV HQs.
So the Brigade of 6 has a single (probably overall smaller) HQs while the Brigades of 4 will have three (2 BDE & 1 DIV). More people to direct and conctrol the actions/activities of the same number of units.
The 'problem' is peace. Procurement and policy don't help.
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Originally Posted by
TAH
Ken, can you please expand on your definition of the "Cav Problem".
The problem is the excessively European focus based on 50 years of peace and misperceptions about the quality of the once potential cold war turning hot opponent and equipment procurement practices that are excessively bureaucratic, oriented toward pleasing various communities and NOT focused on combat realities. Short answer: Sixty plus years of mostly peace and no major requirement for reconnaissance or cavalry functions exacerbated by American impatience.
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At the start of WWII, we had the same situation we had until recently, flawed doctrine that restricted Mechinized Cavalry units to recon only. Found in North Africa it didn't work. Open terrain, impoper training, out-gunned etc.
Agreed, though I would say the situation that we still have to an extent... :wry:
The problem you cite and that the author of your last link notes well was simply a very conservative Army, unwilling to change and adapt and tootling off to war -- only to get the shock of their lives and then having to adapt -- which they did and did pretty well. By the end of that war, we had the principles down pretty well. The "problem" ensued when we abandoned those principles.
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I would ask anyone interested in some of the roots of the CAV/Recon to read the following...
I've read and digested the first three over the years. The first was the result of three hard years of combat experience and was the catalyst that effectively put Cav on the right track for the 50s and 60s. It was and is a good primer for what's needed in a European or similar terrain scenario. It does NOT well address desert, mountain or jungle operations -- a problem for an Army that theoretically has a worldwide deployment and operational focus.
The second illustrates the two major flaws in the use of Cavalry by the US Army. In order, those are excessive impatience with concomitant pressure for speed of movement and information acquisition; and poor training -- In a good many years and literally knowing or seeing hundreds of commanders operate in combat or on exercises, I can count on one hand the number of Commanders I met or saw who truly knew how to use their reconnaissance or cavalry. Most Infantry and many Armor commanders are not good at using those units... :mad:
I would also in fairness note that the pressure for speed often comes not from Commanders but from their Staffs...
From Fight for Information:
""In 2009, the Army Reconnaissance Course remained a work in progress. A pilot course in the early spring built on the lessons learned from work done the previous 2 years...after 6 years of combat operations in Iraq to an acknowledgment of the value of more robust reconnaissance organizations capable of fighting for information. Ironically, this acceptance did not prevent the abolition of armored cavalry, though it did generate efforts to create a more versatile BFSB. If the past is prologue, future operations by the US Army will require the capabilities of both stealthy and fighting reconnaissance organizations.""(emphasis added / kw)
Reconnaissance will always be a work in progress because the vagaries of METT-TC force rapid adaptation. EVERY war is different; to build based on any one war or theater is a major error (and that was the major shortfall and problem in the 1975-2005 period...). Cavalry or robust recon organizations that are reasonably decently equipped and moderately well trained can perform stealthy recon and / or fight for information -- they can always do that. They can do it quite successfully provided their employing command knows how to use them.
The Thesis is interesting but really adds little that is new.
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While there are others, these give good background/backup info on how we got here.
Yes -- provided they're read with a critical eye and given some thought... ;)
Some agreement, some disagreement...
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Originally Posted by
82redleg
Except that to do the job of a BDE (or whatever level) HQs entails a certain amount of overhead...
Very much agree, been in big strong Bdes and small weak Bdes -- the larger always worked better. Not least because they're less personality dependent and more error tolerant -- and IMO, less inclined to facilitate micromanagement. Size is an impediment to that trait; redundancy and strong capabilities render it unnecessary.
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When drawing comparisons from WW2, you have to remember 3 things:
1-...2- ... A BCT of only one IN BN left us scrambling for combat power- we eventually made up for it, and ended up with 4 battalions attached in theater (total of 9 BNs in the BCT), but we were in-effective without the plus up, and effectively only a rump BCT.
Yep. Cautionary tale that -- ala TAH comment on the poor Cav performance early in WW II, inexperience causes people to attempt to 'economize' in all aspects. Doesn't work well, most warfare tends to be manpower intensive. In a given unit, I'd rather be understrength than overstrength (the latter allows, even encourages, slack habits at all levels) but I'd rather have too many units available than not enough, those not employed can always train. Hopefully we know that training is a constant, in combat and out...
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3- in WW2, we were an amateur army...Most WW2 company commanders were shake and bakes with only a couple of years service and almost no professional education. This lead to a need to micromanage, from DIV CG on down, which effectively decreased the size of units that can be controlled.
All true, however the counter to the first portion of number 3 is that the cream (generally ) rose to the top and slackers got summarily fired -- that does not happen today, therefor the increased education and training * are countered by the luck of the draw on competence and drive. Not to mention that IIRC, it's two years to CPT today???
My experience with a slew of WW II Commanders in the immediate postwar era and in Korea was that they did NOT micromanage. That began to change in 1952 when the line stabilized in Korea and suddenly Regimental Commanders, GOs and worse, their Staffs, had little to do and being aggressive take-charge guys, learned to micromanage which essentially forced CPTs who knew better too do the same thing. That trend was severely exacerbated by Viet Nam when again the COLS and Generals really had little to do (as is often the case today...).
That trend migrated down to Bn level after 1969 when the third and fourth string LTCs got in country and found they had no CPTs and few senior NCOs but a bunch of 2LTs and SGTs (NCOC Grads, six months of service...) who would do anything you asked but who knew little and thus almost had to be micromanaged -- thus a generation of Generals learned to over micromanage everything. They made it a way of life... :mad:
I would also suggest while the the WW II guys may not have been as (book wise) tactically and technically competent as todays crop, those guys knew people. I sometimes wonder if that is not a lost skill in today's Army. :wry:
Thus, they knew what to watch out for and what to ignore. Given the spate of aberrant and senseless behavior by NCOs and Troops about which Commands seem to be clueless and the number of horror tales about uniformtiy, haircuts and such, that too seems a lost skill. :wry:
10th Mountain CG in Afganistan
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Originally Posted by
ODB
One cannot forget in today's technology driven warfare and over abundance of arm chair quarterbacks watching live feeds from the sky, of operations hundreds if not thousands of miles away
Early in the fight in Afganistan I recall seeing a picture taken inside the the 10th Mountain Division HQs/TOC. It showed their CG (a two star) watching a live feed from a Predator UAV orbiting above a mission.
My thought is/was, excuse me sir, that's jot your job.:eek:
TAH
Thanks for the update, glad all's going well.
They've got a good teacher, they'll be okay. I know NOT micromanaging is far harder -- but IMO it's worth it.
Keep up the fire!
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"Don't apologize, Mister, it's a sign of weakness."
By chance, did any of the old-time cavalrymen here ever serve with one Captain Nathan Brittles? There are a few guys here who are old enough to have been the ground guide for the Trojan Horse.
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