William,
I am not the 5.0 expert and although it seems to make sense to me; I have forwarded your questions to the doctrine people to help find answers to your qustions. Also, I asked about getting access without ako.
Bill
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Or, Injun Joe's Slo-Motion Potion--good for trifles, snifles, and carbine rifles, zits, fits, and sagging ####.
Only 15 bucks a bottle through this special offer. But wait! There's more if you act now. We'll also throw in a free copy of FM5.01(R), COIN by Design. When you order , don't forget to include that R (for ridiculous)
Bill I don't have AKO access. I do however teach Design. In fact I teach architectural design and analysis of networks. Though information technology is woefully far afield of waging war (though some would say they are the same).
There are a host of design methodologies and decision making techniques. From the ubiquitous and flawed waterfall model (stuff roles down hill), to the Boehm (and others) spiral models of iterative processes (also used by ISO/ANSI and others).
Planning on the other hand can use the same techniques, and other strategies such as structured analysis. I will say if you really want to screw up design and analysis you will have to ask the Air Force for their expertise. In my view design is an umbrella for planning but we're likely just making word salad anyways.
Not that I expect this to happen.
If TRADOC wants to officially ask me to review the document (FM for Design), release the document to me, and acknowledge that release. I will provide a synopsis of my findings. <- Why that? Stupid people making threats about professors getting FOUO info when they disagreed with the findings. And, heck I won't even charge them $15K that they pay others
"Design" is more of a power word than "plan"; it conveys more of a "God like" height :wry:.
More seriously, I think it reflects the extreme engineering orientation of a lot of military doctrine. Not that that is bad per se, but it can have certain, hmmm, let's say "epistemological limitations" when it comes to dealing with lived reality.
Selil, you mentioned ISO. Did you ever look at the old ISO 9004? It's an intriguing example of how fuzzy "design" has to get once you add nasty people into it (like the "enemy") who insist on doing things their own way.
15k?!?!?! Drat!
The engineering bend to education and waging war I think is an effect of attempting to put everything in quantifiable terms. The push of the quants relies on the engineers to make it happen. Though the word design is definitely part of the qual side of the house. "Good" design can have horrible metrics.
I'm currently a SME on the ISO/TC WG for "Societal Security". I was appointed by the US ANSI chair to help with the technical questions they had. Not much for me now but it was interesting for awhile. So, I've also worked with 900X, 2700X and a few other ISO standards.
I know I'm cheap but I am a gray beard. I just never was a general.
I have to say, I'm really intrigued by this "Design" stuff because it's proto-form "Systemic Operational Design" failed under fire in real operations, in terms of being unable to produce clear and concise orders.
The classic being the one that told an Infantry Brigade Commander to "Render the enemy incoherent within the operational area."
Moreover, what I read about "Design" makes no sense. I've come to the conclusion that planning is the product of skilled people, based on experience. "Understanding the problem" cannot be held to be a separate or discrete process, as in military operations you have to plan for not having understood the problems correctly, because the enemy is trying to make a mess of your plan - and often you have to compensate for your guys making a mess of your plan!!!
Hi Wilf,
I agree. Much of the late 1990's systems based problem solving techniques were useless in the field. Even down on the battalion level, I've received orders that said we were focused on security, governance, economics, and no social reforms. I'd say, "No Sh*t, but what do you want me to DO?" I rarely got a response.
Design, as I understand it is a means to take a complex situation, sort through it, and finish with a simple order. In terms of MDMP, it's a way to really wrestle and determine your facts and assumptions before jumping into IPB and COA development.
Here's a brief outline of how I did it on the company level for y'all's critique.
Phase One: Shaping the Environment
1. Understanding the Environment
- Conflict Ecosystem- fill in the bubbles of Dr. K's chart.
- Cultural Immersion- develop empathy and understanding of the internal stakeholders' grievances and vulnerabilities
- Prepare a General Area Survey. How did/do the previous and current stakeholder's define the problem?
- Develop a Hypothesis on the Situation
2. Testing the Environment
- Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to gather intelligence to confirm/deny hypothesis.
- Conduct leader engagements to gather intelligence to confirm/deny hypothesis
3. Defining the Environment
- Full out planning process. Facts and Assumptions are determined based off initial efforts and decisions are made. Commander determines how the world is and how he wants to influence it. Simple OPORD is endstate.
4. Influecing the Environment
- Develop the Message
- Conduct Psychwarfare to get the truth out
- Conduct Deception operations as needed to assist in your initial penetration during clearance.
- Disruption Operations. Targeted raids, ambushes to prepare the environment by disrupt the enemy's infracstructure, maneuver, and morale.
Hi Folks,
Bill Jakola has sent me a copy of the final approved draft of FM 5.0 for posting here. You can download it from here (NB: this is the updated location)
Cheers,
Marc
The following extracts from FM 5.0 point out what I find to be a fatal flaw in the "Design" construct.
The first paragraph (3.26) says that design helps one figure out what problem one is supposed to solve. That is, the design frames the problem. But the second paragraph (3-36) says that the problem frames the design. Unless "design" is being equivocally in these two paragraphs, this seems to say that design aids one to understand the problem by understanding the problem.Quote:
Originally Posted by FM 5-0 FINAL APPROVED DRAFT 25 February 2010
Or, maybe I'm just as dense as Hacksaw. :rolleyes:
Without trying to either defend or attack said statement
Riddle me this
Plan to build a house
< make it a steel house
-no nevermind make it out of bamboo
< and build it in a jungle next to a waterfall
Seems to me sometimes a problem can very well define direct the design-
Ready for incoming;)
I agree completely. But I'd say you are using plan and design where the FM is using design and design (or design concept). Consider Figure 3.1 in the FM that portrays the three frames that make up/ (constrain?) the design: environmental frame, problem frame, and operational frame. I tried a similar thought experiment to yours, but since it is snowing where I am, my problem was set in a different environmental niche:
Context: I was left behind by the TRADOC team on a distant range while visiting the Arctic Region Test Center in Alaska (probably due to my snide comments about FM 5.0).
Environment Frame: I'm in a frozen, snow covered wasteland.
Problem Frame: I need to provide myself shelter
Operational Frame: I only have natively available material to use to build the shelter.
What is it about these three parameters that will drive me to see that a good solution (aka design concept) is to build an igloo?
By the way, for those familiar with how the Army assesses training, do the three frames remind anyone besides me of task, condition, and standard?
(I'll be charitable and accept that maybe my way of trying to understand what is really meant by the environmental, problem, and operational frames is colored by my experiences and does not demonstrate the creative thinking that, along with critical thinking, is a necessary precursor to successfully design according to paragraph 3-1 of the FM.)
Hi WM,
Of course, FM 1C-E hasn't been released yet, so what you will obviously need to do is to hire a doctrinal consultant (at 15k Selil says) to study the problem. Personally, I think that this is really a failure of strategic vision ("Alaska? Ar you crazy! I'm going to the DR!"), but we could debate that endlessly. I will note, however, that if you had an embedded HTT they might, assuming they actually had an area specialist, note that asking the natives for their suggestion would be a good idea ;).
Right. Obviously, you need to put your immediate situation in a global, strategic context in the same manner as a congressman: immediately call for a full investigation to take place in the DR :eek::D.
Does this qualify as a dog pile... even so it was instigated by SWC version of "bring it on"...
Ron, I don't think anyone would argue that it is best to determine where and what type of house one wants to build prior to laying a foundation ;)
What most of us would argue is that a good plan kind of strives to understand the problem well enough to answer those questions... if not the plans staff is an abysmal collection of dope smokers (not beyond the realm of the possible - I've been accused of just that in the past)...:p
However, I will accept that Design might (MIGHT) be a useful construct at the strategic level in response to a question by the president that says, "CDR, USSOUTHCOM I really want to help the people of Haiti who have been so tragically impacted by the misfortune of geography, what can we do"
At that point I'd like his planners to assist their brothers in USAID in thinking through what should vs. what can be done in support and why... and offer those thoughts back to the CinC for his contemplative thought prior to sending 1st AD on RORO to provide security (note we could do this, but probably don't want to)...
If tactical units get orders/tasks that are so froggy that a young officer (see MikeF response) must use design to figure it out... shame on the issuing staff's CDR, CoS, G3 and staff... that is problem of professionalism and not a gap in doctrine:mad:
I would have taken one step further back in the process
1- Call them on your trusty lil sat phone(which I'm sure you have on you) and say your sorry for your slight over exuberance.
Use the time waiting for a ride to dig a hole in the snow to get out of the wind(something which may very likely lead you to consider adding a roof to the mix)
Use the snow from the hole to build a beacon snowman so they can easily locate you(might help if its a monument to TRADOC's greatness:D)
Think Marc addressed this one well (asking locals)
Although I get that they might seem similar it might be of note That the former do tend to lead to ones expectation of a (how to ) to be found in the document.
Hasn't that been one of our biggest complaints about Doctrine in the past
Ill leave it to the pro's to defend the approaches and/or written word, Just figured I'd share why at least so far from what I've read it makes sense to me.
Course I'm really not the target audience:D
Of course good planning attempts to account for variables and possible branches from the original guidances. Perhaps a more relevant question; is that really what lies at the heart of this issue.
Or is it more likely that when one goes about the task of providing effective guidance part of the well thought out planning should include the fact that even given perfect orders those like Mike will still more often then not have to do some of what he stated do to the proximity to the actual application of said plan.
So do you mean you'd want them to design various approaches to provide the administration with viable options?
:wry:
I think one of the key phrases is in 3.26 "Commanders use design to ensure they are solving the right problem. [ emphasis added ]". Now, part of the problem with this comes right afterwards:
Who defines what are the "root causes"? There is an underlying assumption that the commanders will be able to identify them which, IMO, is all sorts of hubris.Quote:
When commanders use design, they closely examine the symptoms, the underlying tensions, and the root causes of conflict in the operational environment.
In theory, this sounds wonderful, but what if the underlying problem is some ID10t error of a politician or a trans-national corporation with lots of "friends" in DC? Should this be understood as a doctrinal rationale for the assassination of home grown (i.e. US politicians)?Quote:
From this perspective, they can identify the fundamental problem with greater clarity and consider more accurately how to solve it. Design is essential to ensuring commanders identify the right problem to solve.
Okay, I'll admit that may appear to be a touch on the reductio ad absurdam side but, given the beliefs of many in the world, I don't think it is too far out. There is what I can only describe as a very dangerous lack of limits placed on the way this concept is expounded.
Interestingly enough the underlying assumption for me here would be if they couldn't they'd be taking the time to find someone who could.
In regards to the first you fight the battles your given not the one's you choose(sorta) wasn't there this old saying about spilled milk
As for limitations, have you seen anywhere yet that the final products already well institutionalized are going away?
Hacksaw,
Well, like I said before, I’m no experts on FM 5.0 or design but here is a view as I see it.
Our doctrine is changing to meet the complexity and competitive nature of the environment in which we now must operate. For example, battle command, the art of maneuvering forces and managing violence shifts toward mission command, to reflect the reality that the instrument of military power is also largely a national tool for doing many things traditionally outside the military’s purview.
FM 3.0, describes full spectrum operations (FSO) as Offense, Defense, and Stability Operations, which means leaders must be grounded not only in the tactics, techniques and procedures of force on force, but also in integrating capabilities with others in a battlespace that’s increasingly crowded and transparent.
Therefore, if we decentralize capability and authority to lower tactical levels, to empower the edge, then leaders at these levels need mission command type orders that are broad and not so prescriptive that they can’t develop the situation on their own.
I see design as the means that empowers these junior leaders to do just that—develop the situation.
Bill Jakola
....but that is simply not true.
a.) It could be that the doctrine was always very poor and badly written. No one seems to want to ask that one.
b.) Warfare simply cannot get more complex and competitive than it was 600-1,000 years ago! - however the US Army can be less-skilled than it was in understanding the application of force for political purpose.
The vast majority of what is getting written is simply addressing imagined problems. I have yet to see a "So what" document that manages to get past that.
So essentially you are saying people do not understand the application of military power? - Regular and Irregular Warfare are not mysteries. We know exactly what works and what does not. The only place confusion exists seems to be in Western Armies concepts and doctrine.Quote:
For example, battle command, the art of maneuvering forces and managing violence shifts toward mission command, to reflect the reality that the instrument of military power is also largely a national tool for doing many things traditionally outside the military’s purview.
What capabilities and who is the crowd? How is the battlefield more transparent than it was in 1970?Quote:
FM 3.0, describes full spectrum operations (FSO) as Offense, Defense, and Stability Operations, which means leaders must be grounded not only in the tactics, techniques and procedures of force on force, but also in integrating capabilities with others in a battlespace that’s increasingly crowded and transparent.
Bill, not giving you a hard time for fun. I really struggle with this stuff as I see smart men telling me things that make no sense once I hear it, or see it written down.
Why does doctrine progressively get more complicated and misty - the estimate process is turning into a doctrinal thesis. I'm waiting for the Doctrine guy who chucks most of the manuals and is able to issue doctrinal pamphlets that can be carried by, issued to, read and understood by all leaders at all levels. When I show this stuff to my Sergeants, they laugh and say "whatever". Pretty bad when doctrine is spit out and not read by 95% of the target audience.