Yes. The ones ARVN had, SF had early on and that we tested
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Originally Posted by
Rifleman
Was the weapon and cartridge first used by SF in the early days of Vietnam different from those fielded by the Army in 1965?
were Stoner and Sullvan's original rifles and the cartridges were the original Remington designed and manufactured 5.56 -- you're asking a lot from an old guy with a flaky memory... :wry:
The original had no bolt closure device (dumb item to add, but the Ord Corps insisted for some unknown reason...) and the gas tube was larger in diameter. There were other minor differences, one being the method of attaching the bolt carrier key and another had something to do with the gas seal rings on the bolt. They also changed the rifling twist from 1:14 to 1:12 to achieve better stability for the traveling bullet -- a factor that lessened the yawing and therefor wounding capability (and then later we went to 1:7 for the SS109 / M855 which made it reach out further but with less energy and upset potential...).
They changed the cartridge from a DuPont extruded powder to Olin ball; slower burning, to lower the chamber pressure, they then had to lighten the original bullet (whose weight I can't recall, 58 gr, I think...) down to 55 grains to meet the MV specs so they shortened it making it less stable -- not realizing or, more likely, not caring, they had decreased the energy at all ranges and increased the propensity to be deflected on contact with a brisk wind in so doing. With that MV, you had a light Gopher hunting pill that traveled too fast to upset on a hit except at the end of its range envelope; in close range shooting it passed right through bods and did little damage. Overpenetration, they said... :rolleyes:
So given a weapon that the Troop Test had clearly shown was deficient in lethality, they bought it anyway, made it less lethal and issued it to people in combat.
Politically purchased weapon. Fault of the Pols. Politically modified to satisfy whims. Fault of the Army.
Few minor points of agreement and disagreement...
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Originally Posted by
AlexTX ret
... politics was becoming the great battleground and it was sort of becoming a battle of "theologies" sort of like the 9mm vs the 45 cal. It is a battle that has never been won and there is still fanatics that are fighting the good fight today.
That's sure the truth. Plenty of logic and studies to back up any position and most will work to at least some degree; it boils down to politics and preferences.
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...the present bias against infantry rifles because the powers at be still think that MGs and Artillery are the real killers of the enemy. This is done from studies done in WW1, WW2, Korea and actually some done in Vietnam which I would of thought impossible because of our objectives and the reliance on the rifleman to hold ground.
Function of the type of warfare. In medium to high intensity combat, Artillery may again be the big killer. What is problematic in my view is that a well armed and trained infantryman has not been available to the US in large numbers really since the end of WW II -- and those infantrymen mostly came out of Italy and the Pacific, the northwest European battles were, after July 44, not Infantry battles but combined arms in the greatest sense; infantry skills were of marginal value except for the period in the Ardennes -- and we payed heavily for not having them. In any event, the senior leadership of the Army will invest heavily in the Infantry but the priorities get skewed and tend to emphasize technology as a substitute for training.
We'd be far better off without laser pointers and with a better cartridge. Not weapon, it's adequate -- the cartridge isn't. However, that would require better marksmanship training...
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The only problem with that it requires a change in tactics and politics of the military. There are various studies that are positive about the 6.5 MPC. The problem is that can the cartridge over come the prejudice of the procurement system of the military.
Agree on politics but I believe the tactical changes would be quite minor.
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LeMay wasn't an idiot, he was head of the Air Force with a political agenda. ... he just brow beat the Army and Marines into accepting that they were lower on the feeding chain and would have to accept what the Air Force wanted... All he had was a set of data points and it showed him that he wanted the AR15/M16.
LeMay was not the big Kahuna; he was a peripheral player but was an asset to McNamara in the decision. The determinant factor well known at the time, though it obviously didn't make the mainstream press.
The M-14 contacts had gone from Springfield Armory (the government original and the developer of the tooling who also manufactured some 50K or so for issue) to Harrington & Richardson with a contract for 150K (IIRC) ~$145.00 each; Winchester got the contract for the second batch of the same size at about $109. each. Having completed proofing test production runs, DA was going to let a contract for 1M. TRW had never made a weapon before but wanted in the defense business and they had some good Engineers; they said we won't bid on 1M but if you'll give us a contract for 2M, we'll make them for $90.00 each (and that was four dollars cheaper than the M1 at the time...). So they got the contract and were in mid stream when McNamara decided to kill the contract (paying a cancellation penalty) and buy the M-16 for about $210.00 apiece.
The decision was based as much or more on the fact that TRW had contributed to Nixon's campaign and were big time Republican supporters while Colt had contributed to Kennedy's campaign. Bobby Kennedy was a vindictive little guy.
It is also noteworthy that McNamara repaid the Army's insistence on not going to a varmint cartridge by insuring Sprigfield Armory was closed in 1968.
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...The Army is not blameless here. When the M16 was problematic when the main supplier of the rounds being use changed the powder that was specified to save money, they said it was the soldiers fault and he needed to keep up the maintance on his rifle. It took too long for this problem to rectify itself.
Not exactly. Olin didn't do that on their own, the Army dictated the powder change to get a lower chamber pressure. That also resulted in lower energy and more powder fouling. Regrettably, the first year of service in Viet Nam did see a lot of failure due to not keeping weapons clean.
The M16 and M4 are adequate combat weapons; they aren't great but they're okay. They DO require, IMO an excessive amount of maintenance.
General Response to many points
I think we can all agree that 5.56mm SS109 may not be perfect, but what is?
Carried weight, human performance, doctrine (tactics?) and training are all more critical issues - or more important than calibre. Put another way, I can't see a need to alter training, (apart from the handling) doctrine and tactics, if I change my main infantry weapon from M4/5.56mm, to an M4/6.5mm, or even an AK/7.62. Actually an optic sight might have more overall impact.
In 1987 I went from using a 7.62mm SLR and GPMG to an all 5.56mm platoon, and tactical doctrine did not miss a beat, except for some very minor issues, caused by now having everyone with a fully automatic weapon. Even today the minor tactics of 1919 remain relevant, regardless of calibre.
IMO, Fragmentation is the best primary wounding mechanism, for a small calibre round, but it is not useful to suggest that the primary purpose of an infantry round is to break up inside the human body. Perforating cover is just as important - thus the CRISAT criteria. After that, multiple hits would seem to be a very strong determinant in providing the relative state of incapacity required - or much more likely to kill.
All that said, as a point of tactical doctrine, I assert that infantry minor tactics should emphasise the use of projected HE, as the primary means of breaking enemy will. I fully recognise that this has some problematic issues associated with it, but it is a viable solution.
FRAGMENTATION
The data I have on this is that the M855 cartridge (62-grain, gilded metal-jacketed, lead alloy core bullet with a steel penetrator) will at high velocities, (900m/s) fragment up to 50% after travelling 5-8cm into a 10% gelatine medium. M855 remains intact at velocities below 763m/s, so from an M4 barrel, M855 will not fragment on impact. In fact it will only achieve viable fragmentation (30-20%) out to 100-125m.
However, I think it is fair to say that the actual requirement for immediate incapacitation is a close range issue, bearing in mind that even with multiple fatal wounds into the heart and lungs some men may continue to function, to the degree he can walk and return fire for up to 15-20 seconds.
According to ARDEC, this would account for why some soldiers assume that their fire has not been effective.
As a correction to an earlier post the UK round is actually L2A2, not L1A1.
In moderate to intensive combat, one cannot clean a weapon
daily -- or, in an adverse environment, two or more times a day. If you clean the M-16 - M4 in combat that often they're fairly reliable. That has generally been acceptable in Afghanistan and Iraq as it has been in all our wars since the weapon was adopted.
Problem is in heavier combat, you cannot always do that. It's reall bad with the M-16series since you have to clean out the residue from the gas tube excess in the receiver and that's not done effectively without breaking the weapon open and rendering it temporarily inoperable, something you cannot always do. The bolt closure device is a dumb idea -- but it is there for a reason...
Ideally, a weapon that can go three to five days (or three to five basic loads +, which ever comes first) with no attention other than reasonable care in handling and be 100% reliable should be the goal.
If parts are fragile or sensitive enough that replacements should be carried or readily available, that's inadequate reliability IMO.
I think the M1, BAR and M14 were less maintenance intensive and were more reliable (though they had other problems...); as I said somewhere above, all weapons are compromises. The M16 series are IMO decent weapons but they require excessive cleaning (they also get it and that creates other problems).
It fits so well with my Officers Training
I have a question for everybody...
You all say to one extent or another that the effectve range and hitting power of the Infantryman doesn't effect tactics. But even here, I 've heard people say that we need a better cartridge than the SS109/M855 round. On the oppsosite tack, there are those who say that the cartridge doen't mean that much, it's all about tactics. My Officers training and the War College said similiar things to the effect that obediance to well conceived operational plan will over come minor weaknesses in the soldier's equipment.
However, in the 45+ years that I have been playing soldier, (somehow I still remember running around the neighborhood with plastic guns) I've been in some very non-standard spaces and fought in some unusual places. In these environments, the soldier's effectiveness was closely tied to the weapon he carried. There weren't a lot of LMGS and heavy support weapons. Supply was also important. The fewer different rounds involved the more the ammo loadout could be achieved.
So today the average soldier has an effective range of 200m and a bullet that overpenetrates, possibly making a lot of small caliber holes in the enemy's body for little imediate effect. If you created a round that increased the range of engagement and increased the chances of creating immediate shock in the target so that he can't fire back, wouldn't that change tactics at least on the small unit level.
Wilf. the effect of "Knock down power" (as it is misnamed) is well known to Law Enforcements Agents. The 357 Mag as it was originaly loaded had tremendous power but ineffective bullets that didn't open or mushroom most of the time. Simply blowing a small caliber hole through the body with little effect on the perpetrator. This was the one of the major findings of the FBI Miami incident. I digress. :o
However, the opposite is true in that a weapon with too heavy a recoil in either semi or full auto mode is going to cause problems for the soldier. I know this to be a fact. I'm not a proponent to go back to the 7.62 Nato round to be used in all weapons. However, wouldn't it be for the best to create a weapon that maximizes the abilities of the soldier to fight and is a sufficently effective cartridge that it can be be used in all a squad/platoon rifles, LMGs and SDMs. Wouldn't that give the Individual trooper more trust in the abilities of his weapon. And since it would increase the effective ranges of engagement and be better suited to the ranges of his support weapons, such as the Milkor M40 GL, wouldn't make the small unit more effective across the board?