Better question -- which Bacevich would approve --
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Originally Posted by
tequila
This strategic argument has always intrigued me. After we toppled the Taliban and al-Qaeda and chased them into Pakistan, should we have simply pulled all troops out of Afghanistan and allowed it to collapse back into chaos?
is should we have gone into Afghanistan the way we did. Might it have been better just to reduce every AQ hangout in the country to less than rubble -- we knew where they were and pretty much who was in them. Unfortunately, despite the errors of the Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton administrations, despite the flaws identified in Eagle Claw, we had deliberately NOT developed a strategic raid capabiltiy for several reasons. Thus, to remove the AQ elements in Afghanistan, we had to use the capability we did have and as should have been expected when cranking up systems that hadn't been used for ten years or so with the concomitant skill decay; we screwed things up a bit.
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What could we have done to ensure that neither returned to power?
Nothing then and most likely nothing now. Afghanistan is Afghanistan. It is not going to turn into the Costa Rica of South Asia. we can leave it better than we found it but we will never stay long enough to 'fix' it. Nor should we, not our job.True and we knew that but given the resourcing and the flawed 'strategy,' the guys on the ground had little choice. They did the best they could with what they had.
The sensible thing would've been to severely clobber AQ in Afghanistan, bribe the Taliban to keep 'em out and not go to Iraq until we left there and were in Bush 43s second term. However, we needed to do something in the ME -- Afghanistan is not in the ME and the effect was not the same -- as all the hate and discontent came from there; Iraq was the spot; unpopular Dictator, geographically central, no major disruption of world oil supply. so the strategy was okay, the location was good -- but the timing was bad. The Army screwing the operation up didn't help. Iraq may still work out okay. We'll see in about five or ten years. Afghanistan will also probably be okay but little changed from its normative state which should be perfectly acceptable but is certainly not in accord with western values.
The fact that it is not a western state seems to befuddle many...
I think Bush knew that if he did not do Iraq or something like it, his successor probably would not and he thought it needed to be done. I agree with that, just wish he'd waited. Also wish the Army and Marines had done the post June 2003 stuff a little better. It would've also have helped had there been no Paul Bremer
Don't put too much stock in Bacevich -- he's a smart guy but neither he nor I have all the answers. Nobody has 'em. Bacevich does have an agenda, though, which is fine and his right but sometimes those folks with agendas can't see the forest. Sometimes their shattered dreams from earlier wars drive their thoughts on all wars. Often wrongly...
Purple Kool Aid and warm chunky goats milk...
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
We're not going to change 3,000 years of Afghan history and culture. Never were going to be able to do that.
Too true; not Costa Rica, nor "...a Scandinavian Democracy.", nor anything close to a 'western' construct.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
If one has swallowed the Kool Aid and believes the rather foolish rhetoric that population centric stuff matters, then one could hope for that. Big fly in that pie is that we do not have enough troops, NATO, US, Afghan (Police and Army) to do that. It would take five to ten times the now available strength to do it that way and neither we, NATO or the Afghans (or anyone else) are likely to come up with gold or the people. Plus we Americans just do not do that stuff well -- impatience again, plus the tour syndrome and the domestic political turmoil every two years. Not our bag.
So then, I agree with you on what the warm chunky goats milk of inadequate force ratios and unrealistic political schedules could to do to us :wry:
....and as a result I am eyeballing that damn population centric purple kool-aid... :eek:
Realworld applications-wise, upping the total force ratios/total mass (our side + % of population) by focusing upon population issues is possible and doable. We did it in Mosul for a while and we have done it in other locations (Japan & Germany, different sized delta yes but there were/still are appreciable cultural differences). The western clock we like to time ourselves on however may be the 'special' ingredient in the purple kool aid that we have to watch for. Reading about Mr McNamara in today's WSJ was pretty sobering.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
So we go to Plan B. Clear, then dazzle with footwork and get the crowd behind the Goal to wave their pom poms or whatever while building roads and schools and giving the max number of troublemakers an opportunity to repent and be productive Pomegranate growers. We can get there. Just makes it more difficult and more likely to provide a temporary 'OK' solution rather than a long term good one. Tough world out there, people don't play fair... :D
Schools/madrassa's are specialized high end type work that require sustained cash flows and networks, instead simple gpf water & ag projects might be playing more to our strengths....ring road status...
Steve the Planner was saying the other day the Afghanistan once exported ag products and I have read that Kabul U's ag program was supposed to have been pretty strong...where you around/aware when/if that occurred?
Finally, I note that we have transitioned from relying on only our boxing skills and are adapting …it's slow going sometimes but somebody wise told me that the kids always come through…;)
Can't rollerskate in a Buffalo Herd
Quote:
Originally Posted by
tequila
What evidence in the history of the Taliban suggests they could simply be "bribed" to remove themselves from power?
None to my knowledge -- that may be why I said bribe them to keep AQ out after we'd shaken them up a bit and destroyed every known or suspected or even slightly possible AQ hangout and cluster. That's a quite different thing.
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Afghan history is not exactly a unitary repetition of events over 3,000 years, despite what Steven Pressfield would like to think. Among other things, there was the introduction of Islam and the replacement of most of the ethnic population.
Really? Who knew....
Who's Steven Pressfield? Should I be concerned with what he says? If so, why?
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The Taliban itself represents something new in Afghan history - a nontribal movement taking its inspiration purely from a religious and foreign base, the twin pillars of Deobandi extremist faith mixed with Pakistani backing, that managed to establish a firm central government over nearly the entire country.
Be careful with the non-tribal aspect, it can bite. :D
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...During its drives to the west and the north, it did not face insurgents but rather armies like its own in the forces of Massoud and Hekmatyar, which it defeated in the Afghan version of conventional combat with artillery, tanks, and aircraft, not a COIN campaign.
Not really defeated. Neither of the two were whipped -- suppressed, yes but not defeated. You are correct that it was not a COIN campaign, so few are. There may be a message in that...
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From my understanding, improving government services comes after the population has been separated from the insurgents, in order to remove the root causes of the insurgency and cut it off from its political base.
Good idea -- lemme know when you round up enough Afghan, NATO, other coalition and US troops to do that.
As Surferbeetle said ""Thats an incomplete look of course...there needs to be some sort of local leadership structure which can sustain these tactical things. Now one heads into operational and strategic issues and of course it gets much stickier...''" Yup. Don't we all just hate it when that happens... :wry:
Went to the web site and the blog...
Thanks for the info. Your link to the web site doesn't seem to work for some odd reason but I Googled him. Link to the Blog was good.
Thus discovered:
(a) He's a writer whose books I have not read but many others have. I'm happy for him.
(b) I do not need to be concerned about what he says. Which is what I suspected all along. Nor does he need to be concerned about what I say, so we're even.
It's been a month or two...
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
On this one:Me, too. I'll give it a month or two before it quietly disappears. Not a smart move on several levels...
Has it quietly disappeared?
NATO (German requested) airstrike
From the AP this morning:
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NATO airstrike in Afghanistan kills up to 90
Afghan official says NATO airstrike on hijacked fuel tankers kills 90, including 40 civilians
FRANK JORDANS
AP News
Sep 04, 2009 09:00 EST
A U.S. jet blasted two fuel tankers hijacked by the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, setting off a huge fireball Friday that killed up to 90 people, including dozens of civilians who had rushed to the scene to collect fuel, Afghan officials said.
.....
In Kabul, the NATO command said a "large number of insurgents" were killed or injured in the pre-dawn attack near the village of Omar Khel in Kunduz province. In Brussels, the alliance's chief said it was possible civilians died.
Kunduz Gov. Mohammad Omar said 90 people were killed. A senior Afghan police officer, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the information, said that included about 40 civilians who were siphoning fuel from the trucks.
...
Navy Lt. Cmdr. Christine Sidenstricker, a public affairs officer, said the attack occurred after commanders in the area determined that there were no civilians there.
In Brussels, however, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said "a number" of Taliban fighters were killed and "there is a possibility of civilian casualties as well."
The German military, which has troops under NATO command in Kunduz, said the airstrike struck the tankers at 2:30 a.m., killing 50 insurgents, adding that "uninvolved (persons) were presumably not harmed."
Militants seized the tankers about four miles (seven kilometers) southwest of a German base and an unmanned surveillance aircraft was dispatched to the scene, German officials said. After the images showed no sign of civilians, the Germans called for a U.S. airstrike, which occurred about 40 minutes after the tankers were seized. ....
From this armchair, this incident confirms that UAV IDs are not infallible, and that civilian casualties come in large bunches where airstrikes are involved (the latter fact is established by the UNAMA Report).
This incident is different from the May Farah incident; although both boil down to how much ID is required to justify an airstrike - and whether the presence of any civilians requires an abort.