The Future of AQ: Foresight Project (CSIS)
Hat tip to a "lurker":
Quote:
CSIS (the Canadian one) has done a really rather good foresight paper about the future of AQ
Link:.https://www.csis.gc.ca/pblctns/cdmct...130501_eng.pdf
Just over eighty pages looking forward to 2018, with sections on: AQ core & AQ in Iraq, AQIM, AQ in East Africa and AQAP.
This thread fits in with other strategic threads in this section.
Al Qaeda today may be weakened, but its wounds are far from fatal
A CNN commentary 'Terrorism at a moment of transition' by an ex-CIA officer, John McLaughlin, for an Aspen event:http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/0...of-transition/
Remarkably the only focus is on an evolving AQ, as if it was the only terrorist group. It does have some succinct passages, like:
Quote:
So this is a highly fluid moment of transition for international terrorism – when we can confidently discern trends but cannot predict end states with any assurance.
This one struck me as odd, read first:
Quote:
It is no accident that the two most significant terrorist attacks in the last six months occurred here: the assault on the U.S. base in Benghazi, Libya, and the attack on the In Amenas natural gas plant in Algeria.
Emblematic of the freedom that terrorists have here, the leader of the latter attack was able to use networks across the region to gather weapons and recruit fighters from Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, and Mauritania.
I think it is significant that the In Amenas attack needed such a range of fanatics; we invariably miss that so few Muslims are attracted to the violent Jihad. It is a sign of weakness IMHO.
Maybe a minor point, but why use 'the U.S. base in Benghazi', my emphasis. It was a diplomatic building, although we now know some murky activity was under-way elsewhere.
Bombers trained in Brooklyn?
Quote:
Transnational networks are indeed a function of modern Islamist terrorism, as they are of almost every other aspect of modern life. Just as with cross-border fraud or organised crime, they require an enhanced international response. But they have not been unknown in the past. The Fenian bombing campaign in London of the 1880s depended upon its foreign training camp – the Brooklyn Dynamite School – and the propaganda produced under First Amendment freedoms including that notable New York periodical, “Ireland’s Liberator and Dynamite Monthly”. The identification of religiously-inspired plotters with foreign powers and foreign training goes further back than that: several of the Gunpowder plotters of 1605 were educated by foreign Jesuits; while their explosives expert Guy Fawkes was recruited for the task in Flanders, where he had learned his skills as a mercenary, originally for the same King of Spain – Philip II – who had recently launched the Spanish Armada.
From an article 'Shielding the Compass: How to Fight Terrorism Without Defeating the Law' by David Anderson, a UK lawyer and now the Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation - which I am currently reading:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c...act_id=2292950
The passage cited illustrates that so much of contemporary terrorism is not new and has some odd historical episodes.
Managing diehard extremists who are imbeciles or traitors
Somewhere there is a thread on the management style of AQ, but on a quick search it has eluded me:(.
Returning to this issue, assessing AQ's future, was prompted by a short article in Foreign Affairs 'The Business Habits of Highly Effective Terrorists Why Terror Masterminds Rely on Micro-Management' by Jacob Shapiro, which has some illuminating insights:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...ists?page=show
Jacob Shapiro's book reviewed
I missed in the last post jacob Shapiro had written a book 'The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations' and Clints Watts has done a short review, with my emphasis:
Quote:
I’m only about 50-60 pages in and it is fantastic....is a must read for those trying to understand how terrorist group’s make decisions and I hope everyone gets a chance to read it. It’s well written and uses a fantastic array of case studies from throughout history and around the globe. And with that, I’m off to read some more.
Link to review:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=1121
Link to book, with no reviews:http://www.amazon.com/The-Terrorists.../dp/0691157219
Craving attention and blood
Steve Metz (SWC Member) has a short article on WPR, 'Strategic Horizons: Al-Qaida’s Resurgence, Like Its Demise, Is Greatly Exaggerated'
'
I liked this passage:
Quote:
The threat today comes less from al-Qaida as an organization than from the ideas it popularized by disguising sociopathic violence with a religious veneer to appeal to the world's extensive supply of lost, disillusioned and angry young men. It is extraordinarily difficult to kill ideas. But Americans and the citizens of other nations victimized by terrorism must understand that an occasional attack, however tragic, does not demonstrate that the extremists are undergoing a revival. Violent Islamic extremism, like other forms of barbarism, will eventually fade, but it will continue to kill both Muslims and non-Muslims as it does so. Al-Qaida and its allies can murder, but they cannot manage, produce or govern. And those latter qualities are the benchmarks of a truly dangerous enemy—one that begins small and fractured and, over time, grows more organized and better able to administer and undertake centrally controlled, coordinated political and military efforts.
Al-Qaida and its affiliates are moving in the opposite direction, becoming less organized, more fractured and less able to exercise political power. Thus they are more reliant on terrorism, particularly terrorism in highly populated areas, which is more likely to get the attention the extremists so crave.
Link:http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/a...ly-exaggerated
In the very long term, yet to be seen Steve is right to say:
Quote:
Violent Islamic extremism, like other forms of barbarism, will eventually fade.
Historians, one whose name escapes me, trace such violence back to at least the Indian Mutiny. Or does such violence just become part of the landscape, that we fail to notice? Before 9/11 very few of the public in the USA noted this extremism, many others countries, including some in the UK remarked "Ah, now you see what we've fought for years".
There is another article on this theme, but till tomorrow.
Jihadi-Salafism’s Next Generation
A short CSIS paper, with some pithy comments, for example:
Quote:
the new jihadi-salafists are undertaking a more strategic, grassroots effort to Islamize society while occasionally using targeted direct action, including violence, to advance their goals.
Link:http://csis.org/files/publication/13...lafism_Web.pdf
“AQ Core” is no more: the changing shape of Al Qaida
A short, simple explanation by the British FCO. Fascinating assessment and a public document too; the weblink IMHO suggests a regular publication, although first time I've seen this:https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...newsletter.pdf
The summary:
Quote:
For the first time, AQ’s top leader has appointed a deputy from beyond the Afghanistan/Pakistan based “AQ Core”, from Yemen based AQ in the Arabian Peninsula (AQ-AP). This geographical spread at the top mirrors the spreading threat posed by the wider AQ Movement which has already been underway for four years. It means that we should stop calling Af/Pak based AQ figures “AQ Core” since they do not necessarily have a higher standing than any of the other AQ groups - the top leadership is multi-national and in that sense “AQ Core” is no more.
Yemen bomb-makers 'working on new devices'
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25206462#!
Quote:
"They are technically adept, they move very fast, they have a core of experienced people, they operate in a country with fragile areas and elude the Yemeni authorities. Plus they have the ability to inspire people to lone acts of terror."
What makes AQAP so dangerous is its Saudi master bomb-maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, one of the CIA's most wanted targets. He is thought to be the brains behind all three non-metallic devices that got past airport security.
Quote:
Last year, just weeks before the London Olympics, they handed a new, upgraded device to one of their number who volunteered to be a suicide bomber. But he turned out to be an informant who fled to Saudi Arabia, taking the device with him, which was then passed by the Saudis to the FBI for analysis.
All the more reason we should continue drone strikes. These individuals are striving to kill hundreds of innocent civilians by destroying commercial aircraft and we're worried about the potential blowback from drone strikes? Does anybody really think if we stop they'll stop?
The Three Versions Of Al Qaeda
http://www.eurasiareview.com/2612201...-qaeda-primer/
The Three Versions Of Al Qaeda: A Primer
Quote:
Al Qaeda today only slightly resembles the al Qaeda of yesteryear. Al Qaeda operatives or “al Qaeda-like” organizations stretch throughout North Africa, across the Middle East and into South Asia. This disparate string of organizations hosts a handful of al Qaeda’s original Afghanistan and Pakistan veterans but mostly consist of newcomers inspired by al Qaeda’s message — disenfranchised young men seeking an adventurous fight in the wake of a tumultuous Arab Spring. Al Qaeda, or more appropriately jihadism pursued under al Qaeda’s banner, has morphed in several waves over the course of more than two decades.
Quote:
Evaluating al Qaeda through three incarnations may help us fully understand the group’s evolution into the present day and what it may become in the future. Al Qaeda may be examined in three periods: al Qaeda 1.0 (1988 – 2001), al Qaeda 2.0 (2002 – 2011) and al Qaeda 3.0 (2011 – present). Note, these periods are not distinct entities. Al Qaeda has transformed slowly through each phase. Some affiliates carrying al Qaeda’s name have rapidly morphed based on changing local conditions while others have adjusted more pragmatically. However, two significant events, the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the death of Osama Bin Laden on May 1, 2011 provide natural turning points for tracing al Qaeda’s evolution.
Preventing AQ expansion: a strategy needed?
Moderator adds: Post 2 asks for this thread and Post 9 created this thread (ends).
Quote:
Originally Posted by
CrowBat
'Encouraging' somebody is not making him/her anybody's proxy. Only direct support does.
It is how it is done.
Too many examples (in the past) of lone or small teams of CIA operatives attempting to direct the opposition forces in exchange for weapons and other support where these CIA individuals are woefully unqualified militarily together with this a near total lack of knowledge of the complexities of the situation on the ground. Sadly pathetic.
The one consistent aim of the US since 9/11 has been to go after Al Qaeda and prevent their expansion. In terms of Syria this has been a spectacular failure.
More police, less soldiers
Within an article on scaling down the military presence in Kashmir and placing the emphasis on the police are several facts, here are some:
Quote:
The principal reason to consider scaling back the Army’s counter-insurgency presence in Kashmir is simple: there isn’t an insurgency to be fought. Ever since the 2001-2002 near-war between India and Pakistan, levels of violence in the State have fallen steadily. In 2001, as many as 1,067 civilians, 590 security forces personnel, and 2,850 terrorists were killed in fighting. The numbers fell in 2003 to 658 civilians, 338 security forces and 1,546 terrorists. Last year’s numbers, the authoritative South Asia Terrorism Portal records, were 20 civilians, 61 security forces and 100 terrorists.
In population-adjusted terms, the insurgency in J&K cost 1.51 lives per 100,000 persons of its population, lower than the homicide rate in Delhi or Haryana. The State’s total firearms fatalities were well below those in Uttar Pradesh (1,575 in 2012) or Bihar (681) or even West Bengal (269).
Link:http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead...le5597916.ece?
Preventing AQ expansion: a strategy needed?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
carl
MoorthyM:
If the 'Preventing AQ expansion' thread gets going you gotta get into the discussion. The US needs some ideas beyond Preds shooting Hellfires.
Jmm99 & Carl
Thank you for the kind comments.
I want to posit a new paradigm that I believe will help us safely navigate the threat of radical Islam (and beyond): If a social phenomenon has a wide following (such as the Al Qaeda variety) it has to have a simple and well-known construct.
Indeed, I am confident that we know now how radical Islam functions, and consequently, how to neutralize it. In other words, a “Grand Strategy” policy formulation of addressing the engulfing worldwide threat of radical Islam and the associated Muslim socioeconomic stagnation may be feasible. A research article of mine (about 11,000 words long) that identifies the radical Islamic construct is scheduled to be published in a few months.
I don’t see why it would take more than a few years to break the back of the ideological basis and power centers of radical Islam. We should be able to do that without attacking the religion or antagonize the religious majority. In fact, we can get the religious majority to our side, as they are victimized by Islamists as much as anyone else.
Even then, I do admit that we would still need a few Hellfire missiles, not so much as part of any reactive response, but as part of a strategic one.