That's a collection of sensible statments - that do not respond to the request.
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Originally Posted by
JMA
Ken, this is all about knowing your enemy. If the enemy in Afghanistan can't be identified and dealt with is there any wonder why the situation there is getting to be so "difficult"?
Uh, no, not at all. Most of us understand that's a significant part of the problem that is Afghanistan. however, stating that obvious fact doesn't answer the query: "...hopefully you have some suggestions on how to accurately determine which variant he happens to be..."
Thus I take it you have no viable suggestions. :wry:
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One minute we are being told that the fight is for the "hearts and minds" of the villagers (assuming that the Taliban is some outside force demanding support from the same villagers), the next we are told is that the same villagers are actually the ones using weapons against ISAF. Which one is it?The first, the second or both?
Umm, how about "'C,' both of the above."
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If its the second or both then surely its time to admit the war for the "hearts and minds" has been lost (in that particular village)? If so then getting rid of the poppies and the opium trade will have no affect on already offsides villager?
Rather simplistic, don't you think? What about the relatives and friends of those villagers in nearby villages? What about tribal cohesion and xenophobic reaction to outsiders killing local no matter what the problem. More importantly, what about the opinions of those citizens of the western nation whose troops were / are involved and who strongly disagree with your "offsides" assessment or the right of their troops to even make such an assessment in the first place...
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Who said anything about shooting civilians?
No one. However, your 'gloves off' statement is a really neat example of plausible deniability. Good job. :D
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If the 'farmer' is a part time insurgent then he is fair game for detention or whatever? Like a bank robber, he does not rob banks everyday but makes a hit now and again when a target presents itself.
True, and while the Rules of Evidence in the criminal sense do not fully apply, the wily P'than are masters at feigning innocence and outrage at attempts to accuse them of such perfidy. All gaming on their part, I know -- as do the Troops -- but the constraints of western civil society are applied even where totally inappropriate. More regrettably, the media types present in Afghanistan either do not understand just how wily the guy is or they sympathize with him regardless. In many senses, Afghan opinions while important, are not nearly as important as are those of the citizens of western nations involved...
All that forces the Troops to just keep slogging in a sea of frustrations. That, as they say, is COIN writ large. Regrettably, most such operations and third party interventions are like that. Rarely is one fortunate enough to find the unique series of circumstances that existed in Rhodesia...
So I can put you down as, like the rest of us, having easily identified the readily apparent problem but having no ready or real solution. ;)
Scientists create 'custard armour' to protect soldiers
Couldn't resist this, no doubt a brilliant scientific discovery, but the headline is great! Subtitled:
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British scientists have created a liquid body armour suit that hardens and absorbs shrapnel on impact using – "bullet-proof custard".
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...-soldiers.html
Might offer less body armour weight to carry.
Not surprised, but nice to see the Falklands reference
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html
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Britain's 'donkey' soldiers are losing the war in Afghanistan
A senior Army officer has warned that Britain risks losing the war in Afghanistan because commanders are more concerned with protecting soldiers than defeating the Taliban.
tacking the British strategy in Helmand, the officer claims that soldiers are now so laden with equipment they are unable to launch effective attacks against insurgents.
The controversial account of situation in Afghanistan appears in the latest issue British Army Review, a restricted military publication designed to provoke debate within the Army.
Writing anonymously, the author reveals that the Taliban have dubbed British soldiers "donkeys" who move in a tactical "waddle" because they now carry an average weight of 110lbs worth of equipment into battle.
The consequences of the strategy, he says, is that "our infantry find it almost impossible to close with the enemy because the bad guys are twice as mobile".
The officer claims that by the end of a routine four hour patrol, soldiers struggle to make basic tactical judgements because they are physically and mentally exhausted.
"We're getting to a point where we are losing as many men making mistakes because they are exhausted from carrying armour (and the things that go with it) than are saved by it," he warns.
Britain's military's command structure in Afghanistan also comes in for criticism and is described as a "bloated over complex system that sucks the life out of operations" and where "decision and action get lost in Chinese whispers and Chinese parliaments that turn most of operational staff 'work' into operational staff waste".
In Helmand, a quarter of the 9,500 British troops deployed are involved in management or management support roles in various headquarters, according to the report's author. In Kabul, the combined strength of the US and Nato headquarters amount to more than 4,000 personnel.
The report is entitled "Donkeys Led by Lions", with combat troops likened to pack animals and headquarters staff to "fat, lazy" lions.
The author states that while researching the article he discovered that in the early 1900s, New Zealand loggers limited mule and pony loads to 128lbs, a sixth of their body weight while working in temperatures of 25C.
Even seaside donkeys, the author states, carry just over a quarter of their body weight and rarely work in temperatures above 30C. By contrast, British soldiers are expected to fight in temperatures of over 40C carrying 65 per cent of their body weight.
As the threat facing British soldiers has changed so has the composition of body armour, which now consists of front, rear and side plates designed to protect soldiers from small arms fire and IED blasts but weighs around 40lbs.
In addition to body armour, a typical soldier on patrol in Afghanistan will carry: a weapon (10 to 20lbs); radio, batteries electronic equipment (40lbs); water (10lbs); ammunition (20lbs); Javelin missile (25lbs). Soldiers will also be required to wear eye, groin, ear and knee protection as well as gloves and a helmet.
The officer adds: "A straw poll of three multi-tour companies found only two platoons that had successfully closed with an ambushing enemy. Our unscientific poll might be showing exceptions but rumour control suggests that the lack of closure is common. Some soldiers only do firefights because they know manoeuvre is a waste of effort when they're carrying so much weight.
"The result is that apart from a few big operations where we have used machines to encircle the enemy there are so few uninjured insurgents captured in contact that it's simply not worth recording."
But some of the most stinging criticism was saved for the headquarters running the campaign.
The author wrote: "Lions, contrary to Victorian opinion, aren't brave or noble; they are fat, lazy creatures that lie around all day licking themselves.
"They get others to do the dirty work and they have a penchant for infanticide. We are not saying our commanders are fat, lazy child killers, far from it, but it has reached a point where their headquarters are."
The larger that headquarters become the more the staff there force soldiers into wasteful activity which results in lots of people "who aren't doing anything about the enemy; they aren't even thinking about the enemy; they're thinking about how to make a pretty picture of how they think someone else ought to think about the enemy."
The article also states that British headquarters deployed in Afghanistan now produced a terabyte of written orders and reports every month – equivalent to hundreds of thousands of documents.
The report continues: "In one Afghan headquarters, it took a man nine days to read one day's worth of email exchanges – and he didn't have to open any attachments.
"The further we get back from the patrol base the worse the problem becomes. By the time we get back to the UK there are more people managing the operation than are actually deployed."
The article concludes by reminding readers of past conflicts and asking whether soldiers of a previous generation would have been able to march across the Falklands carrying "all the extra kit we have now?"
The officer writes: "Consider what the logistical and tactical impact of that extra 45lbs for Burma, Dunkirk or Normandy. How would these operations have played out if it took weeks to plan minor operations.
"If we don't work out now how we are going to lose that weight we will do the old trick of starting the next war by repeating the mistakes of this one."
A spokesman for the Ministry of Defence said: "The issue of weight carried by soldiers on operations is well recognised and work is constantly under way to reduce the amount carried by soldiers.
"Since June 2010 a number of weight savings measures have reduced the weight carried by soldiers by up to 26lbs."
Jon, I totally agree with your post. However...
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Originally Posted by
jcustis
I think that in every troops in contact situation, watch officers at the echelons above the battalion actively in the fight need to have a speak set by the watch officer's desk. He can fiddle with CPOF tracks and UAV feeds all he wants, but he needs to listen to the voice reporting that is happening, to give him the context he needs to understand what is going on on the ground. Anything less is really hollow stuff, and we suffer for it.
I'd urge one minor point of caution on that. I strongly agree that it should be done, however, said Watch or Duty Officers / NCOs need to be constantly reminded that initial reports of contact almost always tend to be exaggerated. What was initially reported as 600 Insurgents with Artillery and 35 DShKas as well as air support turns out to be about 30 bods with a couple of RPMs and a pair of RPG launchers while a few buzzards circle overhead hoping for lunch. :wry:
First reports always need to be given a few minutes or to settle down and get real (without any hassling by the folks in the TOC/ COC...). That flawed reporting pretty much goes away with a little experience and a newly arrived unit takes from one to three months to get settled down, unit and situation dependent and given our current personnel and rotation policies. Given a bit of recent experience the problem is less but it is always a possibility and the S2/S3 crowd needs to be aware of it.