That was a great show that people should listen to.
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The Badr Organization portrays itself as just one of many political parties, but it wasn’t always like that. The Badr Organization started off as the Badr Brigade, an arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force, and the militia of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). It fought on the Iranian side in the Iran-Iraq War, and after the 2003 invasion continued to work closely with Tehran carrying out covert operations for it. Even to today it is committed to Iran and its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but it doesn’t like to talk publicly about that.
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Given the dire security situation that Iraq faced from 2003-2008 it was no surprise that the United States gave little attention to the Iraqi Army’s logistics. It wasn’t until several years after the U.S. invasion that the Americans finally began planning and contracting to develop the Iraq’s support network, so that it could maintain its forces and equipment. This went through huge problems including the complete un-interest amongst the Iraqi military leadership for this task. By the time the U.S. withdrew its forces in 2011, several supply depots had been established and a computerized management system was in place. The problem was that the Americans oversaw this network, and when they left the Iraqis weren’t capable of keeping it up and running. The result is that most of the logistics for the Iraqi army has broken down since then.
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Ramadan began at the start of July 2013, and so has a new wave of attacks by Iraq’s insurgency. June saw a decline in deaths, but that was apparently because militants were preparing for the holy month to begin. In the first half of July there has almost been twice as many killed as the same time period in June. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) knew that such an offensive was coming, but have proven hapless at stopping it, because of their institutional deficiencies. July is looking to be one of the deadliest of the year highlighting the rebirth of the insurgency, and the weakness of the government to prevent it.
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Besides the daily regimen of bombings and shootings Iraq has also witnessed a number of attacks upon clubs, bars, cafes, liquor stores, and women since 2003. This year is no different with reports emerging of a number of closures, beatings, and drive by shootings of various businesses in Baghdad. While no one has been named, it is widely believed that Shiite militias are responsible. Several politicians have come out in support of these operations, claiming that they are enforcing the public’s morals and restrictions during Ramadan. The government on the other hand has issued a number of conflicting justifications for these incidents, while no one has ever been prosecuted for them. A rather ironic set of events given that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s list is called State of Law. That has led some to accuse the premier of either being behind some of these assaults or standing by and doing nothing about them since they likely involve some of his erstwhile allies. These acts represent how Islamists have attempted to impose their will upon Iraqi society using force.
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Mark Van Der Laan is a Professor of Biostatistics and Statistics at the University of California, Berkeley. In 2005 he won a presidential award for his work. In 2006 he wrote a number of articles about the two surveys on deaths in Iraq since the 2003 invasion that publicly became known as the Lancet reports. The first Lancet paper was published in October 2004 and estimated 98,000 excess deaths in the 18 months following the overthrow of Saddam, excluding the province of Anbar. The second one argued there were 654,965 killed from March 2003 to July 2006. Van Der Laan was one of many who questioned the reliability of these polls. Unfortunately, those critiques remained mostly academic, and were never heard of by most of the public. Today as violence is increasing in Iraq and the insurgency is making a comeback, the Lancet studies are being brought up again even though they have major flaws. Here is Prof. Van Der Laan explaining his views of the Lancet reports.
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Comments after a quick glance at the interview:
2. Of course there was sample bias. The survey was done during a war.
3. “Many studies explain how they do their survey work.” And many do not.
7. Any article can go from submission through peer review to publication in a month. Reviewers need part of a day to do the reviewing, but that usually happens weeks to months after receipt because they are unpaid and their review commitments are near the bottom of their to-do list.
9. The Lancet published the then best study to date. That doesn’t call its credibility into question at all, in my opinion. As for major media outlets, it is old news that they like to sensationalize. Another problem is that they don’t hire or contract out to people who can correctly interpret studies created for specialists and rewrite them for a general audience. That’s on them, not on The Lancet or the original researchers.
Apart from being what I feel is judgmental about The Lancet, I don’t necessarily disagree with Van Der Laan’s critiques. But they are critiques of research and its dissemination in general, really.
There were actually two others surveys released almost at the exact same time as the two Lancet reports that interviewed thousands more Iraqis and had much smaller ranges and averages for possible deaths in Iraq, and are widely considered more reliable than the Lancet reports.
Iraq and Afghanistan are both in the news, but for all the wrong reasons. The United Nations recently released a paper noting increased civilian casualties in Afghanistan. In Iraq, the insurgency is seeing a re-birth carrying out almost daily bombings. When comparing the two, Iraq is still more than twice as deadly as Afghanistan.
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July was an especially bloody month for Iraq. Insurgent groups, especially Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) launched an offensive characterized by a series of bombings in quick succession, plus the dramatic attack upon the Abu Ghraib prison. What made the situation worse was that the security forces knew an offensive was coming, and even knew about the prison raid, but were completely unable to stop any of it from transpiring. That showed that the militants are in the driver’s seat, able to dish out death anytime they want with little to no resistance from government forces.
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Interesting short read from ISW after the jailbreak:http://iswiraq.blogspot.co.uk/2013/0...ing-walls.html
A little more:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...aeda?page=full
Iraq is in the midst of finalizing a multi-million dollar arms deal with Russia. The contract was surrounded in controversy when it was originally announced in late-2012 with accusations of corruption. Now Baghdad is moving ahead with it claiming that it was re-negotiated, but the same claims of kickbacks and commissions for officials and businessmen have resurfaced. This follows a pattern started when Iraq first regained control of its government in 2004 using middlemen in weapons procurement contracts that skim off millions of dollars. It is deals like these that make the country one of the most corrupt in the world.
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Sectarian politics has ruled Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Although the Americans are widely blamed for institutionalizing this style of government, the Iraqi opposition was already organizing themselves by sect and ethnicity in the 1990s. Since the U.S. invasion, every Iraqi government has been a national unity one where all the winning lists have been given a seat, and top positions are divided up using ethnosectarian quotas. Washington and others have argued that this system was necessary to include all of Iraq’s diverse population, so that they could work together to form a new democracy. In practice however, it has only led to dysfunctional governments and corruption. To discuss the impact and future of this form of rule is University of Miami Political Science Professor Adeed Dawisha who specializes in democracy and politics in the Middle East.
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Iraq's insurgency is making a comeback. The number of attacks and deaths has gone up dramatically this year with almost weekly mass casualty bombings. The security forces have proven incapable of preventing any of these operations. The April 2013 raid upon the Hawija protest site in Tamim province is widely regarded as the spark that ignited the current unrest. There were larger political issues however, dating back several years, which led to the current deterioration in security.
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Nouri al-Maliki has been the prime minister of Iraq since 2006. His reign has been marked by increasing controversy as he has reneged on promises, and taken on his rivals using the security forces and corruption charges. His approach to government can in part be explained by his past. He joined Iraq’s first Shiite Islamist organization the Dawa Party in the 1960s, which was then an underground movement. He was eventually forced into exile in 1979, because of his activities, and became a leader in the armed struggle against Saddam Hussein in both Iran and Syria. After the 2003 invasion, he served as an underling within the party until he was picked as a compromise candidate for the premiership between the rival Shiite religious parties. Most of his early history was unknown outside of Iraq until a recent article by Ned Parker and Raheem Salman in the Spring 2013 issue of the World Policy Journal. Here is an interview with Mr. Parker about Maliki’s life, and how it has shaped him as the prime minister of Iraq.
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Deaths in Iraq dropped slightly in August 2013, but they are still far higher than what they were at the beginning of the year. It appears that the insurgency has free reign in certain parts of the country, and has been able to carry out wave after wave of car bombings despite a new security plan launched at the beginning of the month. In fact, the crackdown is likely making the situation worse with indiscriminate arrests that can only turn sectors of the population against the authorities. This unfortunately is the new status quo in Iraq with emboldened militants, and an ineffective government.
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While Moqtada al-Sadr is gloating over his showing in Iraq’s 2013 provincial elections, and picking up his attacks upon Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki he has another issue to deal with. That is the Sadrist breakaway group the League of the Righteous led by Qais Khazali, who was one of the followers of Sadr’s father Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr. Both claim to be maintaining the legacy of the elder Sadr. That has often led to clashes between the two, which picked up in recent months. This dispute plays into the larger struggle over who will be the leader of Iraq’s Shiite community.
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The main narratives of the Iraq War tend to come from American and British sources. It has not been until recently that the Iraqi perspective has been added to the mix. One major difference between the two is what was the turning point in the conflict. According to the U.S. Iraq had fallen into a civil war by 2006, and things were not reversed until 2007 when the Surge began. That brought new counterinsurgency tactics, which focused upon protecting the population and turned many tribes and insurgents against their compatriots. Some in Anbar would disagree with that history. Thamir al-Asafi is the chairman of the Council of Muslim Scholars, a theologian for the Sunni Endowment, and a professor of religious studies at Al-Anbar University. He helped bring clerics on board for the Anbar Awakening, and was an early spokesman for the on-going Anbar protest movement. He was interviewed for a U.S. Marine Corps history of the Anbar Awakening, which was published in 2009. According to him, it was the people of Anbar who were faced with Al Qaeda in Iraq and foreign fighters on the one hand, and the Americans on the other, who decided to take a stand, and try to secure their communities before the Surge began. To Asafi it was the Iraqis who turned things around despite the Americans, not because of them.
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