Many problems with "decisive"
American Pride,
Count me with you as one who is skeptical whenever someone makes a claim that a particular piece of the warfighting pie is or was "decisive." This goes equally to the air power and ground power mafias. It's my belief that the "whole is greater than the sum of the parts" when it comes warfighting and even the most "decisive" single capability has dependencies without which it wouldn't be "decisive." In reality, the way one organizes and employs various capabilities what is truly decisive. For example, it wasn't the tank or airplane that made the German military in WWII so effective, it was how those capabilities were organized and employed. So I agree with most of your excellent comment, especially this part:
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I think it's absurd to suggest, therefore, that any form of power is "decisive" if it is not ultimately capable of subduing the will of the enemy or destroying his capabilities.
The second part, however, requires significant caveats IMO:
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And the way to do that is to deny the enemy space. Land. People don't live in the sky or in the ocean -- they're just ways to get to other people's land. Blow up a man's house from the air and he'll build another house. But take away his land upon which his house is built, and he'll be homeless.
I might agree that taking an enemy's land is probably the ultimate coercive tool besides killing but it is not always necessary nor desirable nor possible to do that. And it's not possible to do that in the vast majority of cases without air power (and naval power too). It seems to me that the most strenuous ground power advocates go too far in suggesting that taking land is not just the ultimate way, but the ONLY way.
As for "On War," yes, it is required reading in Air Force circles.
WILF,
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The real problem with the air power weenies is there enduring quest to show that air power is an effective political or coercion/influence tool.
I might suggest that military power in general is not a particularly good coercion/influence tool regardless of what limited sphere of "power" it comes from - at least before military operations commence.
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We all know it is an historically indecisive military tool, and getting more and more limited in it's applicability.
Historically indecisive except when it isn't - the Battle of Britain and Midway being the most obvious examples.
More limited in its applicability? Please explain that - in what areas is air power no longer applicable where it previously was? When did air power "peak" in terms of applicability? I think, if anything, air power is more applicable today than ever before, especially in the realm of conventional conflict.
American Pride,
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I think to test the claim of decisive airpower, it'd have to be done counter-factually in order to isolate it as a variable. What if the US did not commit soldiers and marines to the Global War on Terrorism?
One can ask a related, but opposing question: What if the US did not commit air power at all? For instance, how would we be doing with no aircraft of any type in Afghanistan?
So again, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. The ground power and air power weenies (to use WILF's term) would have you believe the other is merely incidental which is not the case at all IMO.
The view from 10,000 feet.
I was one of the lucky ones who got to clean up the pieces after a pilot claimed self defense and dropped a 500 pounder on the Canadians conducting training at Tarnak Farms. He called it in numerous times and was told not to drop it. His self defense claim was because of the tracers from their M240 machine guns. See if I remember right, tracer burnout is 900 meters. Kind of short range in comparison to 10,000 feet. This was the incident that brought about the Amphetamine use claim. I fully understand making bad decisions but this is an example of how different things look from 10,000 feet and the way they look from the ground.
We're more in agreement than not...
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Originally Posted by
Entropy
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However, I think it can be useful when combined with other forms of coercion and influence - IOW as part of an overall strategy that uses all appropriate forms of influence while recognizing that adversaries have "red lines" that even credible threats of military force will not budge.
You're right to point out the problem of will, but I think that is a "feature" of democracy we will have to live with.
True on both counts.
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Well, that all depends on what level of warfare you're talking about. If your scope is "WWII" then you may be right, but in that case it could be argued that every battle was simply a "battle won" that, by itself, could not "impose a strategic victory" or be decisive by themselves.
With only a few caveats, that's essentially true. Lot of evidence of many 'won' battles leading to a lost war.
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...We succeed because we can integrate our forces that goes beyond "combined arms."
True again.
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At the tactical and operational and even sometimes at the strategic level, the various elements can be decisive factors and that includes air forces IMO. In that context, I believe air power was the most decisive factor in the two cases I put forth.
Since both were effectively air battles, well, yeah. :D
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:D You got me there, though we both know those opponents have advantages we do not and never will posses.
Many of which could be removed but that 'will' thing gets in the way again. :(
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I don't disagree. People in LPC's in dangerous and unpleasant places will be an enduring feature of warfare. I do think, however, that air power can be the difference between three exhausted and grubby grunts left out of a squad and three left out of a company.
Sometimes yes, sometimes no. Lot of variables. Still, mostly that's a good statement.
We can agree it takes everyone and there is no one-service takes all situation (Except maybe in mid-ocean... ;) ).
I love it when we agree...
Ken, when we come to agreement it really does make me feel smarter than I should. I know you get a lot out of it too, but this forum is very lucky to have you here. :)
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Since both were effectively air battles, well, yeah.
:D Why do you think I picked them?
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We can agree it takes everyone and there is no one-service takes all situation (Except maybe in mid-ocean... ).
I guess you haven't heard about the new effects-based Air force submarine program! :D
Awright, this has got to stop...
Entropy; you're too kind but the check is in the mail (and I think I learn a whole lot more here than I impart). ;)
Nope. I missed the news flash on the EBS (don't go there... :D) but I do know about B52 mine capability and a couple of other AF tricks in the ocean in motion...
Bill Moore: Well said -- as you aptly point out it's a whole lot more complex than tactical application. Your comments on strategic deterrence and this:
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On the other hand, I think our air and naval power is absolutely critical to our national defense, and for more reasons than I addressed here.
totally accurate summation are spot on.
ADDED, inadvertently truncated:
I said this earlier about military force as a policy instrument:
""However, I disagree on this. It can be an excellent coercive tool, even without actual application if the strength and, far more importantly, the previously demonstrated will to use it if necessary is present.
It's on the latter aspect that military power too often fails as a coercive instrument. I could make a strong case for the fact that virtually every US war occurred because an opponent thought the US was too lazy, introspective or hedonistic to respond to a provocation. Contemporarily, I'd go even further in pointing out that our current military operations are the result of four Presidents from both parties over a period of over 30 years -- and since 1979 in particular -- failing to show some will and responding not at all or very halfheartedly."
I'd add an interesting thought. In most of those earlier wars, our military unpreparedness was almost always a major factor in the opponents miscalculation; that was a possibly a larger concern than our will.
Since 1955 or so, our military preparedness has certainly been commensurate with the various threats -- now our will is suspect. Thus, this comment by Bill Moore is important:
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in "theory" naval and air power could have prevented them from projecting their force in the first place. The same applies for projecting our shores, our air and sea power is critical.
No question Entropy is correct on the problems with 'will' in a democratic society but the problem just illustrated seems to me to say we should have a better and more firmly entrenched policy on the use of force.
While we were doing other things...