I'd say that three and four are mostly one in the same for all intensive purposes :wry:
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New from WINEP: Apocalyptic Politics: On the Rationality of Iranian Policy
Complete 50 page paper at the link.Quote:
.....Contemporary Islamic fundamentalism in Iran—and even generally in the Islamic world—finds its representatives not in the traditional seminaries but among modern educated engineers and doctors. One of the remarkable consequences of this fact for Western policy makers is that while Shiite traditionalist theologians are thinking and acting within a specific theological framework which makes their behavior highly predictable, the new fundamentalists do not follow any established theological system and model. Therefore, understanding their rationale as well as predicting their political actions becomes very difficult.
One might say that only two issues are really operative--the face-to-face issues between the US and Iran and the efforts by Iran to assert power inappropriately in the whole MENA/SWA area. For what it's worth, for all intents and purposes I found 2 and 6 to be subsets of Bullet 1 while 3 and 4 are circumscribed as sub-categories of the 5th bullet. The devil, as they say, is in the details.
(But, of course I'm not Cordesman or another CSIS employee and don't need to punch out a lot of words to make people read my stuff and think it is deep analysis. :rolleyes:)
YES! So glad you said this. I am constantly annoyed by having to wade through 100-pages .pdfs to find that author could have said it all in 10! :mad:
The study of COIN and military thought is in great danger of becoming pseudo-academic, and IMO has already. A certain author of a very well known book on "Asymmetric Warfare" confessed to me (after an hour of arguing) that he had had to "bulk" the book out for the publisher. All could have been said in one chapter! :mad:
...and yes, I know this is the ME forum and I'm not supposed to be here, or said I wouldn't post.. :wry:
USIP, 16 Jan 08: Negotiating With the Islamic Republic of Iran
Complete 16 page report at the link.Quote:
Summary
• Both Iranian and American sides come to the negotiating table burdened with years of accumulated grievances and suspicions. Their recent history has led both sides to assume the worst about the other and to see it as infinitely devious, hostile, and duplicitous. Yet, while talking to Iran may sometimes be difficult and unpleasant, it is also worth doing and may help both sides to find common interests lurking behind walls of hostility and distrust.
• To enhance the prospects of a fruitful encounter, American officials should pay attention to a variety of traits that their Iranian counterparts are likely to demonstrate. Although some of these characteristics might make productive negotiation difficult, American negotiators should remain patient and focused on the issues under discussion.
• Iranian negotiators may base their arguments on an abstract ideal of “justice” instead of defined legal obligations. This distrust of legalistic argument springs from the belief held by many Iranians that the great powers have long manipulated international law and the international system to take advantage of weaker countries. The American negotiator should, therefore, look for unambiguous, mutually agreeable criteria that both define ideals of justice and avoid legal jargon.
• The combination of Iran’s great imperial past and its weakness in the last three hundred years has created a gap between rhetoric and reality. Yet, while history certainly matters to Iranians, they will on occasion bury the past to reach an agreement, especially if that agreement serves a larger interest.
• There are parallel governing structures within the Islamic Republic, making it difficult but also important for American negotiators to be sure they are talking to the right people. The factionalization of the Iranian political system can make Iranian negotiators reluctant to reach an agreement lest they become vulnerable to charges of “selling out” to foreigners.
• Grand gestures may overshadow the substance of issues under negotiation, and American negotiators need to be able to distinguish substance from political theater.
• Iranians feel that they have often been treated as fools in political contacts, and they will be very sensitive to American attitudes. If they sense that the American side considers them irrational and unreasonable, they are likely to react in exactly that way. American negotiators should thus treat their Iranian counterparts with professional respect and not lecture them on what is in Iran’s national interest.
• The Islamic Republic believes itself surrounded by hostile American, Arab, Turkish, and Sunni forces, all determined to bring about its downfall. Conspiracy theories are very popular, and events such as the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War are often considered the outcome of great power plots.
• If an American negotiator senses that that the Iranians are overplaying a hand and pushing a momentary advantage beyond its value, the best response is to ask, “On what basis are you asking for that?” and to insist that the Iranian side come up with some understandable basis for its position. Mediation or arbitration by an impartial body can sometimes help to counter what appear to be unreasonable demands.
• What works in any negotiation—preparation, knowing each side’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA), building relationships, and understanding underlying interests—will work in negotiations with Iranians. What can undermine any negotiation—such as ill-advised public statements—can also compromise negotiations with Iranians.
RIA Novosti Opinion & Analysis
Quote:
Moscow changes stance on Iran
According to certain diplomatic sources, Russia is ready to agree to use harsher wording in the third UN Security Council resolution on sanctions against Iran to be discussed at the meeting of the Iran Six, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, in Berlin in the second half of February.
However, the sources failed to clarify whether Moscow could expect any concessions from the West in response for its compliance...
Some sources mentioned that this was down to Moscow's disappointment with Tehran, which failed to comply with its request to least temporarily suspend uranium enrichment, as required by the earlier Security Council resolutions. During his last year's visit to Iran President Putin personally suggested to the Iranian government the so-called zero enrichment option.
Until recently, Moscow had hoped Iran would cooperate, and even suggested the group of six should praise its active collaboration with IAEA. But there was no positive response. That is why Russia has lost some of its enthusiasm about Iran's willingness to clarify all the issues with the IAEA regarding its nuclear program in the next four weeks, the diplomatic sources maintained.
'Bomb kills' top Hezbollah leader
BBC News, 13 February 2008
andQuote:
Lebanese group Hezbollah says one of its top leaders, Imad Mughniyeh, has died in a bombing in Damascus, and has blamed Israel for assassinating him.
ANALYSIS: Hezbollah terror chief was more wanted than Nasrallah
By Yossi Melman, Haaretz Correspondent
Haaretz, 13 February 2008
Quote:
Imad Mughniyah was the number one wanted terrorist on Israel's list, ahead of Hassan Nasrallah.
Wow - a major win for Israel, especially given Mughniyeh's operational legend. One wonders how much help other Lebanese factions lent to the Israelis here, assuming it was them (a pretty safe assumption)?
General Ali Reza Asgari who reportedly defected last year, was Mughniyah's primary Iranian contact in the 80's and was said to have a strong relationship with him. Possibly some insight was gleaned from him and put to good use.
Amen.Quote:
A toast to Peter McCarthey and Rich Higgins.
A lot of 1/8 Marines alumni are smiling on hearing this news as well. Semper fi, brothers.
The Terror Wonk, 13 Feb 08: After Mughniyah: Will Hezbollah Retaliate?
Quote:
Long-time Hezbollah operations director Imad Mughniyah has been a seminal figure in the evolution of modern terrorism. He has links to Arafat and bin Laden, and is believed to have masterminded suicide vehicle bombings in Beirut, Argentina, and Saudi Arabia. His demise by car bomb in Damascus is just (and fitting). It is an open question as to whether or not it will prove to be a major body blow or inspire revenge attacks.
There may be reason to worry, but it is also possible that this was the best possible time to target Mughniyah.....
And, not surprisingly, Hizbullah has said it would:
Nasrallah vows to strike Israeli targets abroad
Haaretz - 17:02 14/02/2008
Quote:
"You have killed Hajj Imad outside the natural battlefield," Hassan Nasrallah said, addressing Israel and referring to Hezbollah's longtime contention it only fights Israel within Lebanon and along their common border.
"You have crossed the borders," Nasrallah said in the fiery eulogy at Mughniyah's funeral in south Beirut. "With this murder, its timing, location and method - Zionists, if you want this kind of open war, let the whole world listen: Let this war be open."
I guess its all perspective. It seems when its convenient to them, its along their border - of coursse there is some perspective about where the broder really is I guess - there are probably some that would argue their border goes to the sea. There are just some folks that need to killed - clearly Mughniyah was long over due.Quote:
You have killed Hajj Imad outside the natural battlefield," Hassan Nasrallah said, addressing Israel and referring to Hezbollah's longtime contention it only fights Israel within Lebanon and along their common border.
"You have crossed the borders," Nasrallah said in the fiery eulogy at Mughniyah's funeral in south Beirut. "With this murder, its timing, location and method - Zionists, if you want this kind of open war, let the whole world listen: Let this war be open."
Best, Rob
2-15-08 "A senior military commander of the radical Islamic Jihad movement was killed Friday night along with at least five others as a powerful explosion destroyed his house, but the Israeli military denied having anything to do with the blast."
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/15/mideast/gaza.php
2-13-08 "It there is, or rather if there was, a man who symbolized the very essence of the 'Axis of Evil,' his name was Imad Fayez Mughniyah. The link between Iran and Hezbollah, between the extreme Ayatollah ideology and the Lebanese Shiite movement is epitomized by Mughniyah."
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/953926.html
Ultimately, it doesn't really matter who actually offed this guy. Israel will be blamed either way. If it was an inside job then the ones who did it will just scream that much louder how Israel did it. I suspect that Israel won't mind.
SFC W
I agree in the sense that Israel will take allot of the blame. But disagree that it doesn't matter who did it. If the Syrian government was responsible, it could be pretty significant.
Our relationship in the post 9/11 era with Syria has been pretty interesting. We have gone from active cooperation with Syria to fight AQ in the wake of 9/11, to a hostile posture against Assad. It has gotten to the point where it's been reported that we are supporting the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood opposition. If the Syrians did it, it could speak volumes. Whether or not we listen is another thing.
It seems unlikely to me that the Syrian government would use a car bomb for a local hit. The regime, after all, prides itself on tight domestic security--and the explosion has been seen with some shock/surprise by Syrians.
(On the other hand, if you wanted to make a domestic hit not look a domestic hit... oh, the wheels within wheels of these things.)
In the absence of any other information, it seems to be the Israelis are most likely the responsible actor.