Planning and the proverbial "Squirrel!"
First, if you don’t get the “Squirrel!” reference, watch this….
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YaAxzIFgNso
I’m doing some research for a paper on the negative impact of technology on the art of planning. In particular, I’m focusing on how “current operations” centers embedded within various command posts have become bright, shiny objects that distract higher-level commanders and others from their roles in leading planning efforts.
I’ve noticed command posts (TOC, COC, JOC, AOC, etc.) have come to look the same over the last 10 years…just at different scales. Walk in any of them and you’ll find rows and rows of positions with multiple flat screen monitors at each…plasma screens on the front wall showing “Pred porn”…and some sort of “battle cab” in the back. The amount of information ingested into these operations centers is enormous….requiring not only dozens of personnel at each location to cope with it, but dozens more to feed them and keep them running.
The advent of blimps and other full motion video assets is compounding the problem…
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htintel/20101003.aspx
To make matters worse, there are several programs that are coming down the road that could potentially exacerbate the bias for current over future ops (I won't mention them here). As distant commanders believe they have more influence on the real-time fight because of “enhanced situational awareness and decision making tools,” boundaries of behavior for those actually in the fight are likely to become more narrow. In other words, ROE will likely become even more restrictive. Decision cycles, as a result, are going to grow so that commanders can pursue perfect information in order to make perfect decisions…as if this were ever possible. Lower-level initiative is going to be stifled just at the time it’s needed the most.
Maybe the most troubling aspect of this phenomenon is that the organizational seam between current ops and planning results in bad decisions on the fly. The shift-working current ops crowd hasn’t invested the intellectual capital into the operational environment that the planners have…they are too busy chasing squirrels. So when it’s time to take action, lets say against a high-value target, those directing the action may not understand potential consequences as well as others who have been studying it for a longer period.
That said, to keep from making this more of a doom and gloom discussion, I’d like to look to the crowd for solutions. At the end of the day, technology is a good thing...if we put it in the right context. How do we take the goodness of technology without falling victim to the belief we can “control” the fight? Is there an example of a command post organizational construct where current and future ops (planners) live in harmony? How can technology assist in this regard? My gut tells me the answer may lie in collaborative planning…but there hasn’t been much thought placed into that concept from what I can tell…I could be wrong.
If I can slow things down here a bit, I'll give that some serious thought.
It's an issue I wrestled with for years. However, two initial items based on my observation of the phenomena you mention:
I've seen Planning Cells as a major problem for over 40 years. Three points on that:
- The information explosion of the last 20 plus years has provided headquarters at all levels with more 'data' than they can absorb or process and the Army has failed miserably at providing effective filters for that. Filters must insure information is sent where it is needed as opposed to where the capability allows it to be sent.
- As we got effectively over-Officered (with respect to the Leader:Led ratio) during Viet Nam when restrictions were lifted and then hung onto those extra spaces post VN and even post 1989 (as a mobilization hedge -- needed but there are better ways to do that), the Army had to find something for these not fully employed, smart, able and energetic folks to do -- so it increased the size of Staffs across the board, needed or not. Most combat echelons now have Staff numbers virtually double their WW II -pre 1975 numbers. I very strongly doubt efficiency or effectiveness have doubled.:rolleyes: Staff size should be reduced.
- Planning Cells may be worthwhile at Theater level but I doubt it. They can be worthwhile at Corps level, mission dependent. They are almost never beneficial at Div and lower levels. A far better process is to have two Operational Cells which rotate in a Planning / Preparation phase and an Execution phase. The guys and gals that plan Operation Wednesday take charge and execute it while the other crowd reverts to planning for the next opn or time period. I've seen that work in large and small Hq, in peace and in war. You planned, you know the ins and outs and you know you have to execute it -- so you planned sensibly and you know the Plan. There should be no plans cell, merely alternating operations teams or cells.
Then there's this:
Quote:
As distant commanders believe they have more influence on the real-time fight because of “enhanced situational awareness and decision making tools,” boundaries of behavior for those actually in the fight are likely to become more narrow. In other words, ROE will likely become even more restrictive. Decision cycles, as a result, are going to grow so that commanders can pursue perfect information in order to make perfect decisions…as if this were ever possible. Lower-level initiative is going to be stifled just at the time it’s needed the most.
That too is a forty year old and increasingly bad problem. It is a chimera and one would think that the last few years would have shown senior folks that theory just does not work. In addition to removing decision makers from direct contact and thus adversely impacting their SA, it is a terribly bad impactor on the morale and attitude of the troops -- not to mention its adverse effects on retention. Unless the US Army adopts AND ENFORCES a 'one-two up, one-two down rule' wherein Commanders must talk to their immediate higher and lower headquarters only, with ability to go up or down one more echelon in an emergency, the problem will exacerbate, initiative at lower echelons will be stifled and the Army will continue to drive out really good people who see the terrible flaws in overly centralized control.
The trend developed after the lines stabilized in Korea when the Flag Officers found they had little to do so they developed the habit of interference as opposed to trust and delegation. Viet Nam, better radios and Helicopters only made that worse and thirty plus years of peace and generally poor training have elevated it to the point of, IMO, military embarrassment. The situation exists as a result of mediocre training and long peacetime service causing many commanders to have little faith in the ability or judgment of their subordinates. There are too many of them (that Leader:Led ratio again) and they're smart aggressive guys who have been trained to do something even if it's wrong. Only firm positive action, policies and enforcement from the top will preclude excessive centralization over control.
Your wishee is my command, Wilfie;
but don't gnaw at the hand that feeds you - gnawing at little red riding hoods is OK.
Illinois in the World War: an illustrated history of the thirty ..., Volume 1 By States Publications Society (pp. i-396, 30mb pdf)
Illinois in the World War: an illustrated history of the thirty ..., Volume 2 By States Publications Society (pp. 397 et seq, 30mb pdf)
Illinois in the World War: This history of the 33rd division, A.E.F., by Frederick Louis Huidekoper (12mb pdf) (Appendices I-XVII).
The history of the 33rd division, A.E.F., by Frederick Louis Huidekoper (10mb pdf) (Appendices XIX-XLIII).
and a bonus (32 ID in WWI - our Mich-Wis division)
The 32nd Division in the World War, 1917-1919 By Wisconsin War History Commission, Michigan War History Commission (17mb pdf) (our local Upper Mich 107th Engineers, still active including our local sapper company, is rostered in the 32ID at p.30 pdf)
Co. C, 127th Infantry, in the World War: a story of the 32nd Division and a complete history of the part taken by Co. C., Paul W. Schmidt (12mb pdf)
Cheers
Mike
A FRAGO should resemble a Tweet...
If it's more than a quarter of a page in total, it's too long. :eek: