Kashmir militants give up fight and head home
4 March New York Times commentary - Lessons From Another Insurgency by Anit Mukherjee.
Quote:
... "I joined the insurgents only because of you," the young Kashmiri man told me, sobbing, "because of the way you humiliated me, they way you tormented me. To regain my honor, I picked up the gun." It was one of my more shocking encounters during my two and a half years of counterinsurgency duties as an Indian Army officer in Kashmir. Shocking, because it was the antithesis of everything I had worked toward. The self-awareness that inevitably dawns on all soldiers in a combat zone came upon me: I was not a part of the solution; I was the problem, or at least part of the problem....
During the first year of my counterinsurgency duties, I believe I created more insurgents than I, for want of a better word, eliminated. This was not only because of inexperience, but also because I lacked fundamental knowledge of the terrain, the people, the culture. I also didn't know how to sift through local intelligence effectively...
As a result, I mostly drew on tips and informants who, with hindsight, were mostly unreliable. The motives for giving me this information were usually property and land disputes, family feuds, tribal and ethnic conflicts and other causes unrelated to the insurgency. Thus, a combination of my own naïveté and enthusiasm, not to mention pressure from senior commanders to deliver results, resulted in actions that alienated the locals and, inadvertently, helped the insurgency.
It was only after a year of combat operations that I was able to build up my own intelligence network and gained the experience to be effective. Although conventional wisdom says that the tours of duty should be short, in my experience militaries fighting insurgencies should instead keep junior officers in the field for as long as they can. Successful counterinsurgency campaigns have usually been small-team operations led by junior officers with intimate knowledge of their areas of responsibility...
As the insurgents in Kashmir lacked the ability to mount conventional attacks, their weapon of choice was the improvised explosive device. Eventually, we largely neutralized this threat by constantly changing our tactics. By being unpredictable and undertaking intensive offensive operations, admittedly a function of abundant manpower, we seized the initiative and became the hunter rather than the hunted.
One of the few, and rarely noticed, successes of Indian security agencies has been their ability to subvert an insurgency. For example, in Kashmir, Indian intelligence services were able to buy out an entire strand of insurgents in the mid-1990's and create local counterinsurgents called Ikhwanis. For a time, they were extremely effective, and were able to wipe out the local insurgency before the foreign-born jihadis poured into the valley. By the time we deployed in the valley in 1999, the Ikhwanis themselves had become corrupted and were being phased out. But that experience taught us how critical it was to co-opt the locals into our counterinsurgency strategy...
Kashmir militants give up fight and head home
This insurgency has faded from the limelight for a long time, partly as Pakistan has restricted militants crossing the LoC into India-occupied Kashmir for years and Jihadists have focussed on Afghanistan.
Anecdote here (UK) indicates suggests dwindling support for the campaign, reflected in monies raised and Jihadists who seek to fight go elsewhere.
So it is with interest I read this BBC Urdu report, which opens with:
Quote:
Twenty years after they took up arms to fight Indian rule in the Kashmir valley, hundreds of local insurgents are now returning to their homes after renouncing militancy. The reasons are diminishing support from the Pakistani government, a realisation that the "Kashmir jihad" is going nowhere and a promise of amnesty by the Indian government.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18270058
Astute move by the Indian state to accept the returning militants and families. Be interesting to see how LeT and other, more militant groups change their rhetoric within Pakistan as this struggle was the original catalyst for their emergence.
Background reading on Azad Kashmir
A book review on a country that rarely gets much attention today, the book being 'The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir' by Christopher Snedden. Only Pakistan recognises Azad Kashmir is an independent country IIRC.
Link:http://tahirabbas101.wordpress.com/2...-azad-kashmir/
Quote:
The book is likely to be a tremendous value to historians of the region as well as sociologists and political scientists exploring the important developments in Azad Kashmir from the time of partition to the present.
Its more than all that....
We had their parents begging us, trying to bribe the police and trying every political contact they knew to permit their children back. One of the most important reasons why they are coming back is the collapsing economy in Pakistan and the prosperity in India. Jammu & Kashmir had one of the lowest levels of poverty in India, even at the heights of insurgency. The militants who went to POK, are known as "Muhajirs" ( refugees from India ) and found it difficult to survive on the pittance paid by the ISI which gradually reduced. One of the other important reasons why the insurgency never really succeeded military is the extremely (even I say so myself ) successful light infantry campaign conducted by the Indian Army : no drones, no air support, no artillery( notwithstanding whatever tales you've heard), restrictive Rules of Engagements but the fight was always in the mountains.... the insurgents were relentlessly hunted worn down and eliminated. Own casualties... yes... but in comparison to the Iraq & Afghanistan campaigns.. low. I remember in the 90s the villagers used to tell us that the Afghans & Arabs used to boast to the : " We've driven out the Russians what will these vegetarian, puny, Hindus be able to do , we will massacre them !!" But though they fought the good fight, especially the Afghans, eventually they were eliminated or went back after their "posting". I also think that the very real threat of Human Rights prosecution forced us to conduct a more restricted military campaign which has contributed to this strategic victory. As platoon & company commanders we chafed at it, but in hindsight I think that was one of the best things that happened. When I read about nightime raids and the way the US forces operated in Iraq & Afghanistan I feel that cultural alienation plays a major part in generation of hatred & the accompanying military failure. If one does nightime raids in a culture where women are hidden in Burqas..... what do you expect ? Did I ramble on a bit.... ?!
A few interesting links on the Indian experience
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/n...tions-in-jk-i/
http://www.ipcs.org/publications/
THE INDIAN APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
Colonel Behram A Sahukar, The Parachute Regiment, Indian Army retired
Interesting about night....
Quote:
There is no gung ho attitude and instead as if it is in the routine of a day's work, even though unpleasant.
A touch of reflexive antipathy, or perhaps I am mistaken?
:wry:
@ Gurkha: At any rate, interesting about day versus night. I thought the opposite was true during the Punjab insurgency, that night time meetings were important and used for a time to suggest more troops and police? But it seems that different approaches were tried at different times and in different ways in different places, because of multiple insurgencies in different parts of the country. Makes sense, I guess.
Interesting comments. To quote carl, this forever civilian looks forward to hearing more :)
Did WHAM didn't have as much of a place in that insurgency, or was it approached differently? I admit, it's difficult stateside to get good information, because there are so many parties to various conflicts that prepare a kind of mental space within American media and academia. I'm not saying that a particular claim is true or false, just that it's hard to know who is downplaying human rights violations and who is exaggerating said incidents. Also, Western human rights groups and academics have a tendency to inadvertently side with one group versus another, often due to the concerns of a particular diaspora. Some members of a diaspora are more concerned with overseas events and are persistent and interested in getting a message across. Just tough to know, to get an honest assessment from a distance. It really is quite a difficult environment, in terms of truth-getting. At least, that's what it feels like.
