COIN Perspectives From On Point
COIN Perspectives From On Point
Lessons Learned in Iraq
by Sergeant Michael Hanson, USMC
COIN Perspectives From On Point (Full PDF Article)
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Tanks and artillery don’t defeat Insurgents, nor do warships, fighters, or bombers. Infantry defeats insurgents. These weapons can help the infantry man, but in the end it is the soldier on point that will locate, close with and destroy the enemy either by direct action or by denying the enemy the ability to operate against him. American infantry are outstanding troops, but there are simple ways to make them even more effective. If our infantry forces are restructured and reequipped, they can be better tailored to the fight they are currently engaged in. American infantrymen are equipped with a vast array of "force multipliers" and "battlefield dominators".
This is equipment that essentially gives an American Soldier the combat power of several enemy combatants. Devices like night vision goggles, PEQ2 infrared laser aiming devices, ACOG (Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight - a 4 power rifle scope) and advanced body armor. The United States outfits its warriors with the best gear it can afford. "The best equipment for our troops" is a universal ideal that the vast majority of Americans support.
So then how have small groups of rag tag insurgents with no complex war machines of their own confounded American efforts in Iraq for over four years? How have these bands of unrelated rebels armed with Soviet-era small arms and home made weapons managed to hold on beneath massive American military might for as long as they have?
On point, is spot on point
The author effectively addresses several serious flaws in our operational and tactical strategy, and he proposes a daring course of action.
After reading the article, it trigger the following thoughts:
1. Our military is still overly focused on Force Protection, and it limits our ability to take the fight to the enemy effectively. This is a case where political considerations (casualty rates) have once again won over the correct tactical employment of our forces to win this type of war.
2. His high risk proposal of deploying numerous small units to saturate an area is classic, but unforunately too daring for our military. I have to disagree with one of his points though, he said said the terrorists wouldn't know where we're at, they would just know that we could be everywhere (paraphrasing), so their freedom of movement would be severely limited. U.S. military forces in an urban environment for he most part would still be identified by the locals, and that information could be relayed to the enemy by suportive locals. This tactic is still sound, but we can't assume invisibility in an urban environment. Another option to expand upon his concept to develop local forces that are capable of using this strategy.
3. We're overly focused on the IED and IED cell/network. We're spending billions of dollars to protect ourselves from this threat as he pointed out, yet in doing so we are in many ways making the IED more effective. Sometimes I see parallels in our response to the IED problem to our response to the German submarine threat during WWII. The submarine threat was a much greater strategic threat than the IED, and there was considerable effort put forth to develop technologies to mitigate this threat. It was an appropriate effort in this case. Developing new armors, jamers, etc. to counter IEDs should be pursued in a similiar effort, but it shouldn't be the main effort.
If we put half that effort into defeating the insurgency, instead of the IED we would have a much greater impact on reducing IED attacks (as noted in the relatively secure areas). It seems to me we're looking at the IED as though this something completely new, yet it has been around forever. We used to call them booby traps and mechanical ambushes. We developed tactics to pacify an area, thus we defeated this threat by defeatng the enemy, not their tactic. Now we seem to be focused entirely on the IED and the cell that emplaces it.
Great article.
Sergeant Hanson and Bill are on target
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
1. Our military is still overly focused on Force Protection...
True.
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2. His high risk proposal of deploying numerous small units to saturate an area is classic, but unforunately too daring for our military...This tactic is still sound, but we can't assume invisibility in an urban environment. Another option to expand upon his concept to develop local forces that are capable of using this strategy.
Probably correct that it is too 'daring' at this time -- though I submit we've done it many times before in many wars, it works and it isn't really all that daring -- it just assumes some risk. I for one do not think it is high risk; a risk? Sure; but not high -- not with halfway decent training which we can do.
You're of course correct that it will not generally work for us in an alien urban environment and that the HN folks will have to do it in such a locale -- but it will work in rural areas. In all cases, the factors of METT-TC apply...
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3. We're overly focused on the IED and IED cell/network... Developing new armors, jamers, etc. to counter IEDs should be pursued in a similiar effort, but it shouldn't be the main effort.
True dat. Defeat the tactic, not the weapon. Where is the Joint RPG Task Force???? :D
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If we put half that effort into defeating the insurgency, instead of the IED... Now we seem to be focused entirely on the IED and the cell that emplaces it.
Great article.
It is that.
Good job, Sergeant Hanson
I don't disagree with that, Reed but I will offer one caveat to it.
I've seen exactly the same thing several places:
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"...small cells will attack larger units in hit and run in order to slow them down and to allow a "swarm" style attack when possible."
but in my observation that 'will attack' generally relies on one of two factors; either the COIN unit appears to be not too competent or unprepared at the time; or the insurgents have a really, really important to them area, item or person to protect. The former reason is the most common, the latter should usually be known if the Intel is fairly good.
Generally if a unit has its act together and looks like they really know what they're doing, the insurgents will avoid contact. I've seen that repeatedly even when they outnumbered the COIN force.
METT-TC, as always... ;)
Having been on both sides of that fence --
and there is a fence there... :eek: ;)
It's turf and dollars on the part of the senior folks, it's what the British call 'cap badge' loyalty for most -- simple unit loyalty and the unfortunate human tendency to make ones self feel better by trashing others (even if partly in jest).
It is counterproductive and my sensing is that it's less a problem now than it used to be. Still around and needs to get better As more elements from both sides of that fence work together, it will.
Good example of why the US Media does a poor job of reporting on Military matters.
They're bone ignorant and don't know what to look for.
Go to this LINK (.pdf) and read Paragraphs 8. and 11 of the Responsibilities Enclosure. I think they've done a pretty fair job of tabbing out responsibilities and stating requirements. The changes in the paper are subtle but there are changes and all, IMO are pretty much for the better. Massive changes would be good but that is not the American way of guvmint... :wry:
The elements you quote above are all worthwhile and I don't see business as usual in them. As a long time Grunt, I understand the value of Infantry -- I also understand that there are always only going to be so many Infantrymen, thus there will never be 'enough' of them and that force multipliers like IRS assets are beneficial to those four Grunts.
There is no question in my mind that we have significant need for ability to reach into denied areas; we have neglected that since a need was shown in 1979. More aviation assets are needed to reduce road exposure of convoys.
Bad article by the WaPo (not much new there...); good paper by DoD, I think.
9.b. is also a good direction:
"...to ensure the U.S. Armed Forces are prepared to plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns involving IW-related activities and operations..."
Although (1) through (5) look to be in part lifted from here.
It looks like this DoDD is trying to eliminate some of the residual parochialism and institutionalization. I agree with Ken that it has gotten better in the last 20 years or so and this looks to be an even larger effort to make the point that each service is really part of one team.
So while, as Sabre points out, there is no specific mention of more infantry or specific training thereof (DoDDs try not to be too specific in taskings, they are more for outlining overarching responsibilities together with specific organizational arrangements and authorities) 9.b. does require all the service components are trained in IW.
Irregular warfare now equal to "traditional" warfare
Link.
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The Pentagon this week approved a major policy directive that elevates the military's mission of "irregular warfare" -- the increasingly prevalent campaigns to battle insurgents and terrorists, often with foreign partners and sometimes clandestinely -- to an equal footing with traditional combat.
The directive, signed by Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England on Monday, requires the Pentagon to step up its capabilities across the board to fight unconventionally, such as by working with foreign security forces, surrogates and indigenous resistance movements to shore up fragile states, extend the reach of U.S. forces into denied areas or battle hostile regimes.
The policy, a result of more than a year of debate in the defense establishment, is part of a broader overhaul of the U.S. military's role as the threat of large-scale combat against other nations' armies has waned and new dangers have arisen from shadowy non-state actors, such as terrorists that target civilian populations.
How very nice of the Pentagon...
to finally formally recognize the prevalent mission that the Army and Marines have been performing for the last couple hundred years... :D
I can very much agree with cutting Staffs. Ours have always been too big
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Originally Posted by
Sabre
I should have clarified what I meant by "not enough infantry" - I mean that, as a percentage of the total force, there aren't enough. I see numbers assigned to headquarters staffs increasing dramatically, and Intel slots increasing dramatically, and given that there is an "inelasticity of demand" for support troops (mechanics, truckers, medical,etc), it is the combat MOS's that end up with fewer personnel, one way or the other. Sure, ISR has value. But do we really *need* one Intel MOS soldier for every Infantryman?
and I'm sure they're worse now than ever. As far as a percentage of total force, in addition to staffs and intel increases, I'd be willing to bet that there are many 11Bs buried in out of the way and esoteric jobs all over the world.
I doubt there's one intel person per grunt but I do understand your point. What we don't know is how that ISR plus up will work.
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To be picky, I could crunch some numbers, but I am reasonably certain that even a massive increase in aviation assets wouldn't be enough to prevent the need for resupply with ground vehicles - trying to move all materiel and personnel by air is prohibitively expensive.
Didn't mean to imply that. POL other than in small doses isn't going to be air delivered -- still, more aircraft will mean less total ground exposure. If the force in Afghanistan stays light Infantry, we proved in Viet Nam you resupply at an 85% plus level by air.
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(The only thing that would do the trick would be to cut back on the amount of resupply that you need, perhaps by using far fewer folks to accomplish a mission...)
Not the only thing but definitely a plus on several counts.
My major point was that the article was not terribly informative and it missed the point that the Infantry is a part of the General Purpose Force (the bulk of the army by far) and is not a part of the IW force which the paper and Vickers were addressing. That's why the infantry increases such as 4/1 and 4/4 -- both new light inf Bdes in heavy Divs -- plus the others weren't mentioned.
