Cordesman so right, yet so wrong
Quote:
• Vastly cheaper to use infantry and irregular forces than
conventional forces, progressively easier to given such forces more
advanced weapons.
I got this from Anthony H. Cordesman "lessons from the Lebanon," that Steve linked somewhere.
There are two important point to my mind.
a.) The premise is, on one level, essentially correct, and extremely useful. - yet utterly misleading.
b.) I strongly suspect Cordesman has no idea why this is the case. He just felt it was. - otherwise he would have expressed it very differently.
There are real possibilities for "Infantry Centric" forces over "Classic Combined Arms."
The war in the Lebanon gave a nano-second snap shot of why.
IMO, this has nothing to do with "Irregular" or even "infantry" Forces, being "cheap." It's about leveraging resources for maximum benefit, and squeezing out capability from necessity.
Again, I feel this is what the USMC, "Distributed Ops" managed to get wrong, and the essential utility of examining such ideas has got lost on the "go light, SOCOM, wood-ninjas" groupie fan club, that is so in love with form over function.
I agree with Steve and Slapout
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
It is Cheaper and more efficient to incrementally upgrade (light/conventional) infantry forces with vehicles (including armour), ATGMs, MANPADS, and fire support than it is to hold conventional combined arms forces
That's a totally true statement and it can also be said that it will work.
The problem as always is in the details -- combat use of vehicles of any type pose maintenance and tactical use issues that normally dismounted troops have difficulty with. Conversely, mounted folks in the dismounted role have tactical problems and logistic issues. If you really want to have fun, put a Mech unit in Choppers for an air assault; seen that -- it's hilarious... ;)
So, I guess the ol' bottom line is, yeah you can do that -- but should you?
Which goes back to Steve's and every Military School's 'depends on the situation...'
Disagree. Light vehicles have a place and combat
uses -- and, in some cases, the lighter the better. A 151 (if one trains one's drivers...) is better than a HMMWV for many things. The American way of a bigger hammer is adopted because its easy to train for and we're lazy -- that doesn't mean that Americans can't be trained to use a little finesse; they can and they do it well if you train 'em right.
The key as is true in many things, is METT-TC. That simple.
Tools for jobs. We overpay for most everything,
chop, channel and re-engine a 151 hull to fit in an MV-22 and we're gonna pay through the nose.
Almost as bad as paying over $3M for one of these LINK. Given a major war, probably lose fewer of the teeny weeny 1/4 tons than the other.
Nothing new under the sun...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Distiller
The universal infantry. Everybody can swim, run, fly. Is desireable, might even be do-able to an extent, but I think only in a professional force. Coming back to my 8/9 men standard formation hobbyhorse. And such a universal infantry can only be applied strictly to infantry, not cavalry.
In the case of the U.S. at least the USMC and Army infantry formations could be made compatible, maybe even unified. Would increase the pool of available manpower.
Technically achievable but perhaps not advisable. While universal infantry can be had, it would suffer from the problem of all compromises -- sacrifices great in some things for barely adequate in others.
I don't have a problem with US Army and Marine squads being identical but unlike you, I'd go the other way; having worked with Army 9 and 11 man Squads and the Marines 13 man Squad, the latter is far superior in firepower, flexibility and far most importantly in full combat, staying power.
Quote:
It was mentioned before - training. How do you train these people without actually having the weapons? It might only be cheaper in the longer run if you use virtual training.
But you need to have the weapons anyway, as there probably will be no time to buy them in case of war.
True on the latter point and on the use of virtual training, it has merits and benefits but there's no real substitute for actually doing things on the ground in all types of terrain and weather. Got to get dirty to do it right. Virtual is just a bit too easy...
Quote:
And mechanized units: At least when it comes to IMVs I think it would be possible to use a non-organic approach. Mobility companies serving various infantry battalions.
We tried that in the late 40s and early 50s. Didn't work too well, the mobility APC folks tended to think and act like taxi drivers -- who didn't want to go into bad neighborhoods -- and the tactical commanders never got enough experience to properly employ the vehicles and get full benefit of their combat power capability. Maintenance was also a major problem, a driver and a vehicle commander are not enough people to take care of a track (or even a multi-wheeled vehicle).
Quote:
@ that Singaporean buggy: Never liked putting high-value toys on unprotected vehicles. Shrapnels and branches can damage that stuff. And when it rains it's also not good. Better take a Toyota Hilux and seat six missilemen on the flatbed instead of mounting the stuff on the buggy. And that buggy is very military, doesn't blend in very well. And terribly mobile it is neither - can't swim for example.
About the usefulness of light vehicles see South Africa's wars.
Light strike vehicles have pluses and minuses just like any other piece of kit; they aren't for everywhere or everything. All goes down to "what works?"
ZA is a unique theater, they had and did a lot of good stuff but it was purpose designed for a specific environment; giving optimum performance. Having to be prepared for world wide employment significantly complicates both the equipping and training requirements. It's doable, just a little more difficult.
And unfortunately as is always true, politics (in and out of the forces) complicates everything... :mad:
Everyone in the RM still have to pass
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
...but, the Royal Marines are doing this, and it works very well. If you have the right training all the problems go away.
from Lympstone? :D
Last time I checked, RM training was the lengthiest in the OECD. Can / will everyone be willing to spend that much time and money on training? Is the RM doing that because that's the way they want to operate or because they can't afford more Vikings?
Either way, it's more than a training issue. As I said, it can be done -- but it is a compromise and proficiency in something gets sacrificed for flexibility achieved. Up to the individual armed force to make the choice.
Of course it's manageable - as I said, it's been done.
No question that all mode infantry is possible and that acceptable performance can be attained in all modes. The problem is that IMO, acceptable is okay but I prefer excellent performance if it's attainable -- and that is if units concentrate on their core tasks and doing them really well instead of getting to a fair performance level in many tasks.
For mechanized infantry with vehicle size constraints, 9 men is fine -- because the vehicle itself adds combat power and capabilities that compensate for the missing four men in the walking or airmobile infantry squad (where there is no added combat power).