Host Nation owns the battlespace
That is my snarky answer on a quick break from the ball game tonight. If the host nation does not own its battlespace then their is a military occupation by a foreign force. Think about that from the host nation's perspective and how that usually provides legitimacy in the eyes of the insurgents and the population who does not like foreign intervention, regardless of the foreign force's good intentions.
But on a serious note, until we learn to operate in support of the host nation's internal defense and development programs that are focused on their security forces defeating the security threats and bringing good governance and development to ungoverned or under-governed spaces we are not going to get these types of operations right. Even if we have to "own" battlespace in terms of our own organizations we should not forget that 8 times out of 10 we are going to be operating in a sovereign nation (the 2 out of 10 being Iraq and Afghanistan when we took their sovereignty from them and they were incapable of acting as a sovereign nation)
But to get into the discussion between regular and special operations forces let me offer this perspective. When regular forces organize geographically obviously gaps or seams are created. This is especially true when there are tribal boundaries that are different from the political boundaries that are different from the practical and logical and efficient military boundaries organized along geographic lines to make military operations as effective and efficient as possible.
If there is good coordination and cooperation among regular and special operations forces and if all are in tune with the Joint Force commander's mission and intent, special operations forces with a wider focus that may be less geographic and more politically and tribal focused can be of great value in reducing gaps and seams if there is good and effective information sharing. Everyone has their horror stories about lack of coordination and cooperation and there will always be friction, challenges and of course personalities, but if everyone is on the same page with the Joint Force commander (and if the Reagan principle is in effect - along the lines of "it is amazing what can be accomplished when no one worries about who gets the credit") the coordination and cooperation between regular and special operations forces can achieve effective results. There are a great many vignettes that can be told about that to match all the horror stories.
If you put special operations forces under the regular forces C2 then you are going to have all forces limited to the same geographic areas and everyone will have the same gaps and seams. Furthermore the Joint Force Commander's campaign plan gives the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander missions with different focus and tasks and purposes than the ground forces. Yes it is hard when there are forces operating in close proximity with regular and special operations forces all conducting complex operations, but great synergy can be achieved if regular and special operations forces understand the different focus of each as directed by the Joint Force Commander and learn to coordinate cooperate, and collaborate and follow the Reagan principle. But when personalities dominate rather than mission focus, we may as well just accept that there will be more friction than necessary and operations will be much less effective (and maybe ineffective) than they should be.
Just my 2 cents. Back to the half time show and then the game.
Thanks all for the responses.
Intel Trooper cuts to the gist concisely, thanks for the confirmation (1) and shared opinion (2).
jcustis Thanks, Jon. I suspected as much -- the qualities of the Commander in this technique, as in most others, make a tremendous difference. Curiously, we know that but do not really select for it...
82redlegI'm sure it isn't completely accurate, that's why I asked the question -- to get some accuracy. What in your opinion should be changed?
You are correct as far as I know in you statement that whoever owned an AO has been responsible for it. However, this owner thing has three aspects. First and basically -- should there be such a thing as an AO in this kind of war? Don't reject it automatically, please give it some thought. If you say there should be, fine, then consider whether an AO and a 'Battlespace' are the same thing and if they are, consider which term is most appropriate, flexible and accurate .
Second, as jmm says below, 'ownership' means different things to different people. I do not question allocation of responsibility for 'battle space' or a Zone, Sector, AO, TAOR or whatever we'll decide to call it next year. I do question the terminology in total and very particularly the 'ownership' aspect-- as the old Gen-Gen said, 'words are important.' Our doctrinal Command processes and procedures have been worked out over a long time. They work. Ad Hocery is often necessary in combat but it can also get out of control. Not to mention that we are not occupation troops. Afghanistan IS a sovereign nation... :wry:
Thirdly and the most important reason for my question, I understand the need to prevent fratricide, aid in battle tracking, and assist the moving units in case they need QRF, etc. This:
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I guess that I am of the opinion that the more control we give to the guy that is in the AO day-in/day-out, and responsible for what happens there, the better. Letting transient units, of whatever type (logistics, SOF, whatever) operate without coordinating with the guy in charge seems like a bad thing to me.
I also agree with. That doesn't address two things; coordination or being under control or de facto command? I totally agree with the former but have heard that some insist on the latter -- which I emphatically do not agree with.
Plus the "exceptions" I mentioned of which I understand SOF/SF is just on example -- who determines those that are valid and those that are not? The important reason -- is the 'ownership' of space militarily sound and should the concept be incorporated in changes to our C2 doctrine. If the answer to that is 'no,' then we shouldn't be using it today.
A point on the reconstruction and / or aid and support in an AO. Should the unit preparing to battle in a battle space even be involved in that other than peripherally? I understand that's the way it's being done -- I have operated in that mode but I also have operated in very different approaches that allowed units to concentrate on the military aspects while others handled aid and such. I fully understand where we are with all that now; again, my question is for the future -- should it be that way?
sullygoarmyI can identify with the many frustrations of having another Nation being the real 'battlespace owner.'
I think that your lack of OpCon over transiting units is important and is correct. Things can happen locally that you could not control while the man on the ground could. We really don't do as well at trusting each other as we should...
That really gets to the crux of my tertiary concern -- is it possible for the Battle Space Owner (hereafter BSO) to take the term to heart and attempt to exercise control where he or she should not? Before anyone says "what's this she bit?" there could an MI Bde tabbed to be the BSO. Unlikely and illogical but could happen. I can see the potential for both conflict and unknowing directions to transiting or other units.
I appreciate your SOF specific comments. My sensing was and is that what you describes as the change is taking place everywhere -- and that' better for everyone. The last thing we need is distrust between each other...
Bob's World:
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Personally, I think we need to evolve from traditional concepts rooted in Physical Battle Space, and adopt more effective constructs that take into account "functional battle space" as well.
Totally agree and that is a big part of my concern and an unstated reason for the question; that and the potential to focus excessively on geography and 'control' (to avoid unpleasant surprises from own side and echelons above reality) as opposed to focusing on the reason one is there.
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In general though the BSO is left holding the bag and is always left responsible for whatever the SOF guys break (and benefits from what they do well, which is much more and less recognized). Ironically, the SF guys are arguably more frustrated by the efforts of the JSOC guys than the conventional forces are.
I can see and believe all that (especially that last item :D ). That was part of my concern -- the development of ill will and enhanced parochialism and again, the words are important. An Area of Operations is one thing and Command responsibility is essentially understood and well delineated (as are OpCom and OpCon -- and when they are not appropriate...). However, 'ownership' implies something else and that can be misunderstood.
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One incremental step to smooth this out would be to put all SOF under one set of authorities. That means compromise though. I would, however, open the door to a cleaner C2 lash up.
I agree and as you know there are ways to do that cleanly and easily -- but that's for the over that beer discussion. ;)
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As to putting SOF under the BSO, it always sounds good, but it also always ends up in some tragic application of SOF to solve problems that are merely difficult and dangerous, rather than SOF-unique in the skills and capabilities required.
Also agree and that should not be done. No need for it if the parameters and command lines are clean...
jmm99 Thanks Mike, that is a valuable contribution and you apparently sensed what I was after. My answer to your question would be that such a Command line would be ideal. However, I'd have to caveat that by jabbering about personalities and parochialism. :(
max161Bingo!!!
I asked the Thread question for the two reasons I stated initially and for the reason you state far better than I. It was one of three unstated goals in asking the question -- the Nation whose territory it is "owns the Battle Space" -- US Forces can have an AO assigned within that and the C2 process for that are well established. The term BSO has bad connotations and implies a condition that cannot -- cetainly should not -- exist. The ANA can use the term, we should not.
A second unstated reason: To ask why on earth would we substitute dicey civilian ideas like ownership for proven doctrinal concepts and TTP? (I will not here ask about the either the Mayor or the BBQ coordinator on Afghan located FOBs...)
The third and most important of all was to suggest that yet again that it appears we are adapting unwisely and in administrative mode to a particular war and we will thus build bad habits that will not translate well to a new and different war...
I did indeed say it was okay -- even a good idea -- to post your comment.
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Originally Posted by
Cole
OPSEC guys, Ken White said it was OK to post it and I answer to that higher authority. :wry:
Partly so I could laugh at this:
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"Assigning areas of operations to subordinate commanders maximizes decentralized execution by empowering those commanders to exercise initiative. Mission command gives commanders the authority to create any effects necessary to accomplish the mission (consistent with the rules of engagement) within their areas of operations. However, commanders cannot create effects outside their areas of operations without permission from the commander assigned the area of operations in which those effects will occur.
I think that says "you're in charge except when you're not..."
Still, I get the intent and that's not too bad. Here's the part that does bother me:
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Further, commanders must control all parts of their area of operations not assigned to subordinates...
That 'control' word and that statement are, perhaps, part of the problem I see that led to my first post.
I'm not at all sure ANY Commander can truthfully 'control' "all parts of their area not assigned to subordinates" and I suspect many US Commanders do not fully trust some of their subordinates and that this all leads to OVER control -- or attempts to do so. Certainly some recent contacts from the 'Stan have said that is a problem -- and not just in one area. That's a bad and dangerously worded paragraph that merits review -- as IMO does that BSO bit...
As to your questions, not an OpSec violation in them to my mind though others may not agree and thus not answer. So I'll give you the pre-2001 answers. ;)
A BCT or battalion's boundaries do constitute its area of operations (AO) but it is important to recall that boundaries as a control measure differ from the use of a unit AO. They used to be called a Tactical Area of Operations (TAOR) and were the lower echelon equivalent of the AO used for echelons above reality. The paragraph following your quote, Para 5-79 and illustration 5-2 give a clearer picture than does 5-78. I think that also answers your Fires question asked later.
The larger area of influence for indirect fires relies on coordination, pure and simple. An area of interest is even farther out does imply one is busting boundaries beyond ones "intelligence collection" AO but again the key is coordination -- and as always, METT-TC...
Units have to be allowed to employ direct fires across a boundary anytime if positive ID is established. As for indirect fires without permission, the quote seems to imply no "effects" outside the AO but I suspect that's sloppy writing and that somewhere in that oversized tome, it's clarified.
At least, I hope it is... :D
I think SJPONeill is correct -- most Commanders will work it out and not get too hung up over the doctrine. My concern is simply that one must be careful with doctrine to limit the damage caused by those few Commanders who cannot (or, more often, just will not) work it out. :wry:
I also think Cliff is spot on with the comment that "the 'ownership' issue gets pretty emotional... like I said before (and I'm agreeing with the majority here I think), having a system of coordination seems to be more important than who owns what." That emotional aspect exists and luckily will only adversely affect a few. The importance of using known and standard names and processes is that system he wants. He's totally correct and about 80 to 90% of all folks know and will do that.
Those existing processes are unfortunately necessary and quite critical to limit the damage that other 10 to 20% can do. We aren't talking hurt feelings and bruised egos here -- people get killed unnecessarily due to such screwups and its easy to miss that point in peacetime or in low intensity conflicts. Such errors are far too costly in a mid or high intensity fight. Hopefully no one will have to endure one or more of those.
But don't bet the farm you or people you train will not have to do so...
Concur completely, however...
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
What worked in wars 3,000 years ago, works today. War is politics. Break will, gain control, and support follows. Influence comes from the application of force, to force compliance. Influence is control, and it is should be articulated as control.
Focus on killing and all else follows. Kill the people opposed to your policy. if that doesn't work the policy, not the killing, was wrong. Leave the population alone. Focus effort of breaking the will of enemy armed force, be they regular or irregular.
There is no confusion as to what works and how to do it.
"Give unto Caesar that which is Caesar's" Wise words. I would take the liberty to derive from that "Give unto Mars that which is Mar's."
What I just posted on the thread regarding globalization applies, and I won't repeat here. My case is yes, war is war; but NO insurgency is not war; and foreign intervention is not COIN. History is littered with the ruins of empires who never grasped this fine point.
I say it's time to break the trend. So, when at war, wage war. Crush your enemies and the will of his populace to even consider attempting such a thing ever again (or at least for a generation or two). But when faced with illegal challenges at home by one's own populace tread lightly in re-establishing security and focus on understanding and addressing the true causes (most of which will track right back to the government itself) of the uprising. When going overseas to assist a friendly government faced with such challenges give them this friendly advice as well. Tell them you will not assist them in the suppression of their own people, but rather that you are willing to help them in a neutral manner to mediate the differences between the people and their government. If that is not enough for that government, or if that government then seeks to screw you over by turning to your enemies for such support in suppressing the populace the answer is easy: Switch to UW and support the people against the government. At the end of the day, our national interests are in the resources and support of the land and the people. Governments come and go.
Bob - Joe Nye - Harvard - Smart Power
See his original Foreign Policy article: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...e-jr/get-smart
This is where Secretary Clinton derives the concept of Smart Power she talks about.
See also the CSIS Smart Power initiative: http://csis.org/program/smart-power-initiative
You and I are in agreement. Most Commanders will agree and do that wisely.
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Originally Posted by
82redleg
As I read that paragraph (and I fully admit to reading the snippet posted here and not going back to the manual), I understand it to mean that, if a commander is assigned an AO, and decides not to further assign responsibilities for portions of that AO to a subordinate, he/she retains responsibility for all the coordination required in controlling that AO (clearing fires, tracking movement, etc).
However, my belief -- and fear -- is that some (that 10-20%...) will latch onto the words "Further, commanders must control all parts of their area of operations not assigned to subordinates..." and overdo it. Some will take it to mean they must literally control the entire area by occupation. Others will be excessive in their exercise of control authority by insisting on excessive coordination or adherence to their restrictions and tactical direction. I have it on good authority that is occurring and that some are being quite rigorous in their exercise of 'control' (that wording makes me a master of political correctness... ;) ).
'Control' the verb is overly loved by too many in the US Army -- it leads to micromangement, reluctance or even refusal to delegate and / or to trust subordinates and increases the societal tendency toward risk aversion. I do not question the necessity for use of the word but know that overuse of the word and the concept can lead to the inadvertant stifling of initiative and innovation. I'm firmly convinced that its employment in doctrine should minimal and quite specific.
I fully realize that no doctrinal pub can account for all possibilities for misuse but I do strongly believe two things in this regard:
- The proliferation of terms, be they shorthand, slang or whatever should be avoided as such terms have a way of making their way into publications, largely written by Snowbirds, Blackbirds and civilian writers who hear but do not always understand the context. This proven tendency can create confusion and can among other things provide the unwary latitude for unwise directives and measures.
- The current trend toward ever more wordy manuals can also lead to such confusion as the critical points often become physically separated and lose impact.
I know there's little hope in educating the 10% -- my concern is to keep it at that level or lower if possible instead of allowing, even encouraging, it to hit the 20% level. :wry:
I'm also concerned that while adaptation to the current fight is certainly necessary, such adaptation excessively pursued can lead to blinders for other fights in other times and places against far different opponents. I saw many bad habits acquired by the US Army (and Marines) in Viet Nam. Some -- too many -- of those one war peculiar and undesirable traits are still around. My hope is that the potential for even worse habits from the current wars not get embedded to our future detriment.
If a commercial production run is flawed one can survive.
Even prosper -- after all, the flawed run may be a tax write-off, the items may be sold at a discount, perhaps there can be some recycling and the management team can be sent back to the drawing board and will likely produce a better production method or process.
In war, flawed processes will almost certainly mean unnecessary deaths. So while there is merit to letting leaders fail and recycling them, it's got to be tempered with full knowledge of the costs and a sense of time and place. A better solution would be improved selection of leaders and to not presume that everyone can do the job if not well, at least acceptably. They cannot.
Off topic, but somewhat related:
While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.
Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.
The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.
The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.
Just wanted to make that observation.
Close and also brings up another point
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Originally Posted by
Rifleman
While reading the thread I've pondered LE applications of the concept.
Wilf listed and defined Operational Area and Area of Responsibility. Operational Area seems to roughly equate to a jurisdiction. Area of Responsibility seems to roughly equate to a beat assignment.
AOR would be more like the entire large city jurisdiction the Police Chief is responsible for, while a precinct would be more like an operational area, and series of beats are the individual areas of operation (AO).
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The way Ken defined Battlespace Owner seems to roughly equate to an Incident Commander (IC) for a critical incident under the current Incident Command System, which is a subset of the National Incident Management System. The IC won't always be LE, even if LE is involved in the incident. The IC could be LE, Fire, EMS, etc., depending on the nature of the incident.
This raises the point that the commander of the area of operation has responsibilities listed in FM 3-0 for that area. That does not mean they "own" that space anymore than the police or precinct chief owns the space they operate in.
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The comparisons are general, of course. LE and military have some important similarities but also some important differences.
It also is analogous to how a police officer treats citizens and how (I would presume) a Soldier/Marine practicing COIN should treat foreign citizens...with respect. If police officers play rambo and treat citizens with disrespect, my bet is they don't last long on the job. It should be the same way for Soldiers and commanders in an AO with respect to average citizens. Police don't assume that everyone is a criminal. Troops can't treat every Pashtun like they are Taliban...IMHO the whole disconnect of those who advocate enemy-centric COIN.
Enemy-centric COIN implies an assumption that you can take greater liberties with the population as a whole and screw the collateral damage as long as you ferret out and kill the bad guys. Would a cop take that attitude?