Open Thread – Which US DoD Dinosaurs Would You Slay?
After 30-plus years in this business; I’ve come to the conclusion many, many times along the way; that the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Services, and associated activities have an abundance of antiquated and dysfunctional commands, organizations, offices, programs, and processes. Go figure. With two-plus wars, an ungodly optempo and shrinking resources we really cannot afford the excess baggage anymore.
I’d like to highlight some specifics in a potential Small Wars Journal article and SWJ Blog posting. I’d like this to be a Council effort and therefore asking our members to lay it out in this thread.
The ground rules are:
- Antiquated and/or dysfunctional commands, organizations, offices and processes that hinder progress and are high-impact. Not General Joe Blow “who didn’t get it” or a dysfunctional battalion in Operation ABC. Think big, critical, and long term.
- Identify the problem, cite, and provide recommendations to correct – and be reasonable.
- "Write" - don't ramble or bulletize.
- For those who wish to remain anonymous – e-mail or PM me – as long as I can verify your authority to make such commentary and recommendations you can rest assured your identity “goes to the grave”.
That is all.
I'm giving Dave's request some serious thought.
I came up with several things when I read his fist post in the thread this morning. My problem with all of them is that -- like OPMS and the USAR / ARNG problem (and I very much agree both are major problems) they're things that DoD or the service has had to based on either law or significant Congressional pressure.
I'm not saying that all the inefficiencies can be laid at the feet of Congress; the Services are quite capable of doing some strange things but the really big things that immediately popped to mind are all Congressionally driven. I suspect that will make them difficult to change. I'd guess that, given the right rationale, change to OPMS would be attainable; change to NGB and the USARC are so deeply political I'm not sure they're adjustable.
Difficult, however, is not impossible. Many things need to be changed and Congress can be strange but they also are not totally unreasonable. I think when we proffer a problem, the issue(s) that make(s) it a problem and recommend solution(s), we need to bear in mind that if the item has interest from the Hill, we'll need to give a rationale that they can or will accept and that accords with the legislative cycle.
That is going to be time dependent. For example, many items in OPMS were pushed by Congress in an effort to be very fair to all concerned; to be fair to the point that they accepted degradation of effectiveness and officer competence and capability that resulted; that and the effort to be 'objective' in evaluations as opposed to subjective (as if that were possible...). Point is , a Republican majority just might revisit that 'fairness' angle, a Democratic majority is less likely to do so.
I could cite some things in the Army enlisted promotion system but my spies tell me that is in flux right now. So the status of a system or process -- and very current knowledge of it -- and whether it's embedded or in flux can have an effect on what one recommends...
I mention all that only as a mild caution...
You, as usual, are correct.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
John T. Fishel
we agree more than disagree.
...Changing DOPMA would, I think, be harder to do than tampering with the Reserves, except at the margins. But internal implementation policies and regulations - like OPMS - don't usually engage the interest of the Congress.
True, forgot that aspect. The rest of your comment is distressingly true and there a couple of other winners in OPMS needing a 21st Century thought process applied...
If a very long time observer can make an
observation...
Let me piggy back on 82redleg's comment:
Quote:
"...The problem is that, as every senior leader I've ever worked for acknowledges, we've made so much "stuff" a matter of regulation (some for good reason, some to CYA, some as a matter of "fairness" or "equality" in some form or another- OPMS XXI may be an example of this) that commander's are forced to pick and choose, because it is impossible to do it all.
This was true to an extent back in th 50s and as I stuck around, the level increased every decade. When I retired from the DAC job in 1995 the sheer volume -- not only at Co level but all through the chain had a tremendously adverse impact.
The really sad thing is that in my estimation the ratio of 'good reason : CYA : equality' in 1995 was about 10 : 70 : 20. Working backwards, fairness and equality are great -- war is not fair and it should not be equal if possible...
The CYA category does include some 'lower validity' items that have morphed into CYA status because not enough time is allowed to do more than pay them lip service. The percentage of 'valid' items is in the eye of the beholder but IMO, it is abysmally low by any measure compared to the other two categories.
Quote:
...it was overridden by the S3 and CSM (the CDR was absent that week for whatever reason), because "SGTs Time has to happen on WED". Never mind that we were executing the intent (in fact, the exact same, NCO-led, NCO-planned, section level training), certain leaders can't get past it.
I'm not surprised; angry, saddened -- but not surprised. The S3 made a bad decision and good commanders will not let their their Staffs intrude in that way; in the absence of the Cdr, someone was the Acting Cdr and the issue should have been resolved by him if a Battery Cdr and the 3 had a disagreement (and the 3, if senior, was the one who had a duty to refer it to the Acting Cdr and to not overrule a subordinate Cdr). The CSM deserved consultation (perhaps...) but he should've kept his nose out of it as long as the NCO element, SGTs Time, was covered. He also IMO, should have told the S3 privately he was exceeding his authority. CSMs don't have much positive power but they do have a whole lot of negative power and they should use it wisely (In my observation most do but the exceptions give the rest of us a bad name :mad: ).
What should be and what is, alas, are rarely the same. I have known over the years a number of senior people who were acutely aware of these growing problems (training distractors and staff interference) and have vowed to do something as they advanced . Some tried -- but most were constrained in what they could do by exactly the same impactors as they reached higher command -- too many Alligators and the imperiousness of the always overlarge, overpowerful, underemployed and therefor overly intrusive next higher staff.
These are problems that can only be fixed by the senior leadership of the Army raking some drastic and radical steps because the Alligators will just reproduce...
Having appeared before and been a board member
on a large number of promotion boards at unit and DA level, I'm here to tell you the Board process is far from an all encompassing solution... :(
Testing for promotion has merit -- as do boards if properly structured but when things occur as they did at one DA Board I was involved with where the President told us what parameters the then-OPM Personnel Actions chief told him HAD to be applied to all potential selectees and the prime criteria was the picture...
However, your point that the current systems are archaic, out of touch, seem to exist to serve the personnel managers rather than the services is well taken.
Target PASs and Agencies/Field Activities
First the only President Appointed, Senate approved individuals in DoD should be the SecDef, DepSecDef, and undersecretaries. All the rest should be hired by the SecDef within criteria set by the Congress and be career SESs.
Second, nearly all Defense Agencies and Field Activities probably could be eliminated or scaled down considerably. The litmus test would be:
What do you do to directly support the warfighter?
What functions/capabilities do you have that are not already resident in the Joint Staff, COCOMs, and Services?
If you scrubbed hard you could eliminate a lot of beauracracy and use the savings realized to plus up the similar functions/capabilities within the Mil Deps. It would be cheaper and more efficient.
Umar, talk to your Congressman
and Senator (and the Pres, while you're at it). DOD political appointees(about 1300 in all) are there because the Congress and the Executive want them. they want to make sure the President's (and Congress') policies are followed and not misinterpreted by the permanent bureaucracy (civilian and uniformed) as happened in DS/DS with the PSRC. One of Pres Obama's best appointments, IMO, is Michelle Flournoy as USD-Policy. But where do you think she got her experience that qualified her for the post? In the Clinton Administration she was a DASD and Principal DASD (political appointments just below the level of Senate confirmation). So, there is reason for the political appointments as they stand, whether we agree or not. (BTW, the Brits do it kind of like you suggest but their career civil service has far more power than ours does.)
Cheers
JohnT
Some interesting points...
First a request -- try to avoid posting lengthy quotes, to avoid copyright issue and to conserve bandwidth, it's better to provide a link if at all possible,
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bullmoose Bailey
Also the National Guard exists as one of the last vestiges of The Sovereign State, which edifice of history the post Lincolnian, post Dick Act Federal Government remedied by eliminating their officers in 1933. Today all NG Os are actually AR Os assigned to NG units which seems to mean that during peacetime deployments (ref: US Constitution, The "wartime" clause) they have a different Commander-in-chief from the Soldiers they lead.
I'm not sure that's totally correct. As you know, they are Officers of the Army of the United States (AUS); one of the Armies (plural) the Constitution says that Congress may raise and fund. The AUS as opposed to the USA (as in US Army, the regular army that Congress has also raised and funded) consists of the ArNG (for Federal purposes), the USAR and the USA.
The issue of a 'declared' war is IMO a false one. Forces committed to combat operations constitute a war and if the Congress funds it, they have declared it a war; if, as is true for the current fights, Congress has passed a Resolution authorizing force then they effectively declared war. Thus, ArNG troops federalized for deployments have the same CinC as their Officers; the President.
Quote:
Very significant however is the fact that every Governor disagrees with every President on who controls the National Guard. Yes; including Clinton & GW Bush disagreeing with themselves on they day they moved from the Governor's Mansion to The White House.
It is a fact though we disagree on its significance. The Governors are entitled to their opinions and political preferences but my suspicion is that as long as the US Government pays in excess of 80% of the costs of the ArNG, Congress and the Courts will not be sympathetic. Membership in the ArNG is totally voluntary; anyone who was in the Guard in early 2003 should have been able to see what was going to occur as sholud anyone who joined the Guard since 2003. The Governors have no case -- political pleading, yes; legitimate complaint, no.
That said, it is my opinion that the Guard has been misused to an extent in all this; that many Guardsmen and reservists have suffered due unexpected short notice and lengthy deployments and that the Guard has done a great job.
Quote:
The State Control has been a big issue in OIF, although mostly in smoky back rooms. I assert that the Governor's collectively refusing "combat" assignments for their respective forces led Pres. GW Bush to begin de-escalation & Iraqification here, among other variables.
I strongly doubt that but do not know.
Quote:
The name "National Guard" is at once an homage to our French co-liberators of 1783 & a rather deceptive indicator of non-ownership.
Let me remind you that the Constitution requires Congress:
"To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;"
Seems to me that clearly states that Congress is to pay for a Militia -- and that said payment allows them to specify when the Militia may be called up for Federal duties AND that Congress may prescribe the training regimen. I'll remind you that the National Guard wanted to be the "Militia" and lobbied hard for the Dick Act; Dick himself being a MG in the Ohio Guard. That may be an example of "be careful what you want, you may get it."
Quote:
Governor v. President arguments usually happen like this:
. . .
Gov: Well then if that's how it is why don't you finance them ?
Pres: I'm sorry I'm late for a.......meeting. Say hello to your family for me.
I think you should do a great deal of research into what share of your peacetime support is paid by your State (not counting add-ons like free College and other benefits that the State Guard got through the legislators) and what is paid by the Federal government. That guy at your State Headquarters is, after all, the 'US Property and Fiscal Officer,' not the ____P&FO
Quote:
I feel this controversey was at work in the GW Bush administration's odd decision to defrock the US global military zone commander's of the title Commander-in-chief in favor of Combatant Commander which isn't even accurate or logical.
That wasn't the Administration, that was the then SecDef; his idea -- I ignored him, I still call them CinCs as did and do a great number of people.
Quote:
To those who keep saying there's only 1 C-in-c now might I be so bold as to say actually 58 ?
Sarah Palin agrees with you. I agree with you -- until the guard is Federalized; then there's one Cinc at the top and the Joint Command Cincs a little lower.
Quote:
In previous wars (again we could discuss whether we're at "war" per se Tm: Now) the Guardsmen were not federalized, not deployed, not op-conned, not called forth, not called up but "Drafted" into The National Army, WWI, or The Army of The United States, WWII, Korea, Viet-Nam; distinct from the United States Army, or regular Army. The Army of The United States is what AUS stands for.
Terminology varies widely and can be confusing. Facts matter. Like it or not, the US is involved in a war that the Congress has funded, it is thus deemed legal by most. You and others may not agree but you're a small minority. ArNGg units have been activated, deployed and done well. If you do not agree with that, it would seem your decision might be to leave the ArNG at the earliest legal opportunity. No sense staying in an organization that you believe is being wronged when it is a voluntary organization.
Quote:
Seperately, I was highly offended by the statement: "People used to join the Guard for just that reason: to stay out of the regular Army that got shipped overseas and not used to bolster a destroyed dying military the way they are used now in Iraq"
I agree, that's offensive to me on several counts.
Quote:
The States have lost so much power in the last century; most significantly the power of electing Senators; this is part of what leads to controversies like The Blogojevich Senate Auction & The Kennedy-Schlossberg Campaign for one vote & similar nonsense due to the Constitution being stood on its head in 1917 in order to even further advance Federal Totalitarianism.
Possibly true but that wanders off thread, into political territory and this is not a political board. Political aspects pertaining to war fighting are fair game, general politics should be left outside.
Quote:
So needless to say the Governor's are in no rush to give up their National Guard Units.
I suspect some senior people in the Regular Army would like to see the ArNG absorbed by the USAR. Others would like to see both disappear and the resources they consume devoted to the Army. Neither of those things is likely to occur so I imagine that regular Army agrees with Governors; lets keep our Guard.
Not only has the personnel system not progressed
from the World War II model but the Cl IX / ULLS process has not advanced from the Ford Motor Company parts supply to Dealers that McNamara imposed on DoD in 1962. It has never worked well, it has always been a burden -A training personnel and logistic burden) and has not done what it was supposed to do; provide an easy audit trail for the Bean counters. It is particularly bad at handling demand surges due to increased OpTempo; it can take almost a year to react with some items. We were able to afford that dealy in OEF /OIF -- will we be able to in future deployments?
Bad system. Why, then, is it still here? Inertia. Our training has progressed a bit but all of our 'systems' are way out of date and changes are resisted not because they don't make sense -- but because some are worried about erring, some about 'accountability' and others are worried about turf. Dumb.
We've been talking about 'just in time logistics,' cutting out middlemen and some good experiments have taken place -- no big changes though; "change BAD..." :mad:
Yeah, I know it costs -- everything does. Costs less if you do it right instead of doing it due to a false sense of saving money...