Soldiers Versus Defense Contractors
15 Dec. New York Times editorial - Soldiers Versus Defense Contractors.
Quote:
It's what passes for crunch time at the Pentagon. Word has now gone out that $32 billion in savings must be found out of the $2.3 trillion the Defense Department is planning to spend in the next five years. After the Pentagon's spending orgy over the past five years, there is plenty of scope for cutting, without weakening America's defenses - but only if the cuts come out of the most costly and least needed Air Force and Navy weapons programs, not from the money required to replenish and re-equip the Army and Marine ground forces that have been worn down by Iraq.
Alleviating the dangerous strain on America's overstretched, underrested and increasingly taxed land-based forces must be the Pentagon's highest priority for the next five years...
Contractors Doing Combat Service Support is a Bad, Bad Idea
From "Lost Army Job Tied to Doubts on Contractor," NYT, 17 Jun 08
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/17/wa...hp&oref=slogin
Quote:
Army officials denied that Mr. Smith had been removed because of the dispute, but confirmed that they had reversed his decision, arguing that blocking the payments to KBR would have eroded basic services to troops. They said that KBR had warned that if it was not paid, it would reduce payments to subcontractors, which in turn would cut back on services.
“You have to understand the circumstances at the time,” said Jeffrey P. Parsons, executive director of the Army Contracting Command. “We could not let operational support suffer because of some other things.”
Whether the rest of the content of the article is correct, what Parsons says in the sixth paragraph is truly scary. Essentially, he admits that even if the contractor is screwing the government it has to be overlooked because the contractor is holding the troops hostage. Nice business ethic on the part of the contractors there. But the important thing is that there's almost certainly a yellow flag magnet on the back of their cars and a flag pin on their lapels.
I find it strange that SecDef would have gotten involved in this personnel issue unless there was something much bigger at stake. I also don't much care for the bonuses -- seems like a backdoor way to pay the contractors more than was contracted.
In my humble estimation this problem is way bigger than anything going on with the AF, and Gates would do well to get a handle on it.
Bottom line, can we please relearn that Rev War lesson about contractors not being the right men for the job of handling logistics at war, especially at the front lines? The sooner the better.
An interesting tangent to this. My husband and I were discussing the article, and he said that one of his Marines noted, with pride, that he'd been on three deployments and had never served on a FOB with a DFAC. My husband either. This point of pride will make for an interesting point in the conclusion of my dissertation (on gastronomy and morale). If my thesis is that civilian socio-cultural influences affect the decisions regarding gastronomy for morale, then it is understandable that conspicuous consumption has become a part of logistics effort. It also makes sense that military personnel will potentially bristle at having conspicuous consumption forced upon them. You don't join the military if conspicuous consumption is your objective or your interest.
Regards,
Jill
Thoughts one might consider
With all its flaws -- and it has plenty -- contracting basic services has merit. The troops hate that kind of stuff and the cessation of a lot of grass mowing, rock painting and, yes K.P or Mess Duty plus a lot of other minor annoyances has helped keep folks in all the services. The Navy can't do that on ships and thus, they have a very minor retention problem because of that scut work. Add it back into the Army, Marines and AF and it will cause retention problems. In an era of an aging population and a kinder gentler world where military service is eschewed by many that may not be a good idea.
It's easy for those who don't have to do that kind of make work (which is what some of it is) and necessary but unpleasant work to overlook the inhibiting effect on Joe. Joe doesn't do windows if he can avoid it -- and, if we're going to train him well enough to go risk his life (which we don't do well) then the least we can do id let him skip washing windows.
The the Army and Marines get plenty of enlistees for the combat arms and for both services, the re-up rates in the combat skills are great. Not so in the Combat service support arena. Enlistments are down and reenlistments are far lower than in the combat arms.
I'm not sure that a reversion to the WW II / Korea / Viet Nam era Army (all effectively the same; little changed) is a good idea. Having been a part of it, there was a lot of crookedness and corruption, petty and major theft by people in uniform. There was also a lot of mediocre performance. Even stupidity -- like the 1LT who futilely and rather foolishly told me and about 15 armed, dirty and smelly troops who needed shaves and haircuts we couldn't eat in his Chu Lai Mess Hall... :D
The Revolution was a long time ago, so was the Civil War which had the same 'contractor' problems. In fact, all wars seem to have contractor problems. The mostly Korean and Japaneses contractors in Korea were crooked and bore a lot of watching; the Consortium RMK-BRJ in Viet Nam got wealthy (the BR being then Brown and Root, now part of KBR. BR in the day were friends of Lyndon...). I suspect it's a human frailty problem and there's no fixing it, just a lot of watching.
My belief is that contracting is probably going to be with us absent a return to the draft (to which I am very strongly opposed) and that aside from the services getting a lot smarter about it -- and eliminating a lot of the Congressionally imposed bureaucracy involved in the contracting process as well as continuing Congressional influence in that process (NOTE: Which has a whole lot to do with the apparent DoD willingness to 'overlook' possible chicanery...) -- it seems to me that design of structure and equipment should be undertaken in the future with elimination of as much contract support as possible as an essential goal.
Consider also that the wants and needs of armed forces in peacetime and those in wartime differ considerably. The US has effectively been at peace since 1945 -- parts of the services have been to war many times since and are there now but Congress and the Pentagon have not been at war in a long time...
No easy solutions to this one...
What you are all failing to consider ...
... is that the transition to contractors was driven by authorized end strength, the Congressional limit on the number of people in the active duty components.
The authorized end strength of the Army is 512,400 (authorized for 2009). The Army wants to get maximum combat power out of that number. The brass has decided (correctly, in my opinion) to identify areas where they can hire civilians to perform certain activities, and free up another troop slot for combat power.
That is the reason every company doesn't have its own mess section. Its the reason so much of the higher echelon maintenance/repair is performed by contractors. It's the reason a lot of the logistics (i.e. transport) is done by contractors. Having contractors do a lot of that work frees authorized slots for combat power.
A second consideration is pay. As an exampole, the Navy's electronics tech schools are (or at least used to be) the best to be found anywhere, military or civilian. They last(ed) about 18 months. Add 36 months for service in a unit, and the sailor is at the end of his enlistment. At which point, he can get a job at SCI Sanmina, Rockwell-Collins, Harris, etc. at two or three times the pay, company paid education to get a BS EE, etc. At this point, the Navy has exactly one avenue to pursue if it wants to retain the expertise: go to the contractor and pay them for the work.
Jill, a lot of your points and ideas are very well taken. But the problem isn't with what the services want. The problem is with the constraints imposed by Congress.
Tom, I don't quite understand
what you are driving at in your third trend:
"A third but somewhat buried trend in all of this dealt with breaking with the Weinburger/Powell/Myers changes to the military that required full mobilization of reserves and NG. Giving those functions over to private companies reduced societal and political costs (in theory). This dovetailed nicely with transformational rhetoric about the intrinsic value of rapid deployment, none of which took into account the costs of an extended war effort."
Tom[/QUOTE]
One of the consequences of both the Gulf War decision to call up RC personnel using derivative UICs and the subsequent Rumsfeld understaffed Army was to require the call up of all sorts of RC (USAR and NG) units - CA, CS, and CSS for multiple tours well beyond what they thought they were signing up for. Can you clarify?;)
Cheers
JohnT
To amplify what Tom said, Abrams came back
from Viet Nam and as CofSA almost immediately set out to move the bulk of the CS/CSS to the Guard and Reserve for two reason. First, to insure that no future President could go to war without calling up the RC and secondly, to put those kinds of unit -- even then having problems recruiting -- in the RC where they could better recruit and could allow unit members to work in their trade in civilian life as well as in training, thus enhancing their skills if they needed to be called up. To that end, some thought was put into what units went where in an attempt to locate units where there were likely locally required skills that would enhance the effectiveness of the unit.
Unfortunately, in the 80s, politics took over and two things happened. first, the ArNG got agreement to take over all CA units in the RC (bad decision on the part of DA) and the USAR picked up the majority of the CSS (read: all that the ArNG did not want) while both components shared CS elements. There was also some movement of unit locations based on politics and not on what native to the area skill pools might contain. Both of these actions were detrimental (IMO) to the concept, to the Army and to the RC.
Come Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Vouno tried to go to war without calling up the RC CS/CSS pool -- he couldn't do it. He and Benny Peay tried every trick in the book and couldn't make it work so the CS/CSS package had to be called up, thus units tabbed Capstone to VII and XVIII Corps had to be activated. Third Army's down trace was mostly RC, they had to be called up. Congress also insisted on ArNG Brigades being called up and sent (they paid for 'em and they and the Guard wanted to put 'em to work). So three Bdes were activated over loud protests from DA. The DA plan was to stall and not deploy them in order to justify a couple of full up, all AC deployable Corps so they decided the RC refresher training would entail a trip to the NTC. One Bde, the 48th from GA, went through that and completed it just about the time of the ceasefire in Kuwait. It never got certified for deployment by DA (a statutory requirement) on the basis "the war's over..." Fun and games the DA way...
Come this one, Tom's got it right plus the need for for more troops due to a rotation policy drove the deployment of ArNG Bdes -- all of whom have done pretty good. 278th from TN did exceptionally well.
There are a number of lessons in this for many, from Congress to DA to the RC to Defense contractors. Let's see how smart everyone is... :D
Balance and moderation in all things...
My mom told me. I think she was right and I think we've forgotten that...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
J Wolfsberger
Whatever I think of it, and I personally believe it has been dramatically over sold, the Army is becoming increasingly information centric.
Too true -- and that has one driver. Over centralization. :mad:
That, in turn is driven by the lack of willingness to trust subordinates induced by the experience in the last few years of Viet Nam where Bn Cdrs found out that instant NCOs and 2LTs were wonderfully willing and dedicated but didn't know much and required constant supervision. A partial solution to that is far better training and a better personnel system. Until those very significant problems are fixed, we will over rely on technology and pay the CLS price. Seems dumb to me but what do I know....
Quote:
And that's just one area. That sad truth is that the technical sophistication of our systems are (and have been) at a level where the Army can't compete with the private sector for the expertise required to keep them going. CLS is here to stay.
IF we keep edging reliability and and simplicity out for sophistication -- which the industry wants to sell, it's got a bigger markup -- and if we keep insisting on trying to solve human problems with mo' better machinery...
OTOH there may be other, less expensive and more reliable ways to do things.
Not to mention that in my experience, reliance on electronic systems is dicey at best. They have the annoying habit of working well for months on end for unimportant things and then failing when you need them most... :rolleyes:
Remember what Einstein said
Quote:
Originally Posted by
J Wolfsberger
I have this persistent vision of the next highly kinetic war beginning with a three or four day orgy of destruction of multi-million dollar systems ...
... followed by weeks, months and years of old fashioned infantry slug fest. :wry:
Something to the effect of ( Not sure about wwIII, but WWIV ; sticks and stones):eek: