Gun Control in Counterinsurgency
This article showed up on today's SWJ Blog, Chad Machiela, with pdf Gun Control in Counterinsurgency: A Game Theory Analysis.
The author's BLUF, BLOB & CV:
Quote:
Application of populace and resources control measures in counterinsurgency is often more art than science, and in Iraq’s Salah Din Province in 2006 the battlespace commander’s attempts to reduce the number of weapons available to insurgents actually caused residents otherwise uninvolved in insurgency to violate the law, while effectively ensuring that the population had no means to resist insurgent theft of supplies or forcible recruitment. Game theory offers a means to analyze the options available to different actors in a conflict, and to help identify courses of action more beneficial to all.
...
In conclusion, whenever any authority criminalizes a legal activity in an attempt to reduce the incidence of an illegal activity, second and third-order effects are generated which may result in an outcome not only less effective than hoped for, but even counter to the desired effect. In the case of the al Jazeera desert in Iraq during 2006, the coalition forces’ attempt to minimize the number of weapons available to the insurgents operating in the area contributed to the insurgents’ means of support. The farmers were unable to do anything but support the insurgents regardless of whatever preference they might have for a functioning Government of Iraq. The presence of criminals and the coalition forces’ inability to protect the population resulted in a lack of support for both the legitimacy of the Government of Iraq and coalition forces, and provided the farmers no incentive to follow the rules of an authority that made criminals of a group without criminal intent. By analyzing the options available to the farmers, local commanders could have shifted policy to provide incentive to the farmers to protect themselves, perhaps eventually resulting in less of a need for weapons at all, and a willing reduction of arms.
....
CW3 Chad Machiela is a Special Forces warrant officer assigned to 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), Joint Base Lewis McChord. He holds a M.S. in Defense Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School and a B.A. in Public Law from Western Michigan University. The opinions expressed here are the author’s own and do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
Of course, I've omitted all the good stuff that is writ large between the 1st and 2nd quote snips.
This is simply an interesting article, dealing with a topic that has been discussed in the MSM and Net (with spin and heat) re: the US-Mexican border, etc.
I'd as soon this NOT turn into a political (Second Amendment) discussion - and simply ask that folks stick to evidence (with sourcing) about the first, second and third order effects of gun control - as Chief Machiela has done well in his article. In light of SCOTUS's Second Amendment cases, this topic has both legal and practical aspects.
Now, Truth in Lending: As those here who know me well already know, I'm an NRA Life Member (from the 1970s); when I was a "barrister", a pro bona participant in the Second Amendment Foundation and its Legal Assistance Program; and my idea of Gun Control is the almost-perfect 1000 yd, 10X 5-shot group with a .338 Lapua (slightly modded to a "300 Hulk" ;) ), Sarver Sets Amazing new LG Record, 1.403", 50/ 5X (gif of target), in this webpage.
While I'm perfectly capable of slugging it out about Second Amendment issues, I do NOT want this thread to turn into that kind of political discussion. What I would like to see are rational, evidentiary postings regarding the various order effects of gun control in the arena of Small Wars (those that favor gun control, those that don't and those that are inconclusive).
Regards
Mike
Naw, Steve, I don't want to ...
be into "kicking down doors and ransacking homes" - I'm a low kinetic person. ;)
I'm positing indigenous "COIN", where the people in my district are my people (some well-guided, some misguided and some uncertain). I'm not positing non-indigenous FID (much less foreign "COIN" or some half-assed form of co-belligerency) because that introduces too much complexity that clouds even more otherwise complex issues that have to resolved first.
Tactical alternatives to "kicking down doors and ransacking homes" abound - basically the opposites are being the bull in a china shop or a boa digesting a meal (making haste slowly). You may judge where you think my ground would be to stand snorting or to lay sleepily.
Rather than first moving into specific tactics, I'd first have to decide on the strategy to enter the district in the first place. I see two basic options:
1. "Clear, hold and build" (pretty much "standard COIN" for the last 40 years) - the direct approach with the most apparent short-term results - which I've tended to follow (as in post #7) as something of a norm in examples cuz that seems more familiar to most folks; OR
2. "Build, hold and clear" (build an unconventional force which will infiltrate and subvert the insurgent shadow government and forces; hold and expand strategic base areas and disperse the insurgent forces; and clear by the juncture of conventional and unconventional forces) - an indirect approach with slow apparent results (it took Giap four bites at the apple).
-------------------------
Those more inclined to the first course of action (which I do not reject out of hand), especially those who like the "clear" phase, might be more inclined to Heinlein's Starship Troopers.
On the other hand, the second course of action is somewhat akin to what we find in Isaac Asimov, Foundation - the Foundation's strategy, especially as found in Part IV, the Traders; as "engineered" by Limmar Ponyets and Eskel Gorov.
Limmar Ponyets and Eskel Gorov are not among Asimov's major characters, but I like their style in doing their "things" - infiltration, subversion, etc.; and using the target's weaknesses to create the conditions for the target's defeat (and often demise). Or, perhaps, the motto "Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what is right." ;)
Part IV can be found here; e.g.:
Quote:
Part IV, The Traiders
.....
TRADERS-… and constantly in advance of the political hegemony of the Foundation were the Traders, reaching out tenuous fingerholds through the tremendous distances of the Periphery. Months or years might pass between landings on Terminus; their ships were often nothing more than patchquilts of home-made repairs and improvisations; their honesty was none of the highest; their daring…
Through it all they forged an empire more enduring than the pseudo-religious despotism of the Four Kingdoms…
Tales without end are told of these massive, lonely figures who bore half-seriously, half-mockingly a motto adopted from one of Salvor Hardin's epigrams, "Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what is right!" It is difficult now to tell which tales are real and which apocryphal. There are none probably that have not suffered some exaggeration…
Encyclopedia Galactica
Review here (pp.44-45 of pdf) of the original version of “The Traders.” (Astounding Science Fiction, Vol. 34, No. 3, Issue 167, October 1944 as “The Wedge”).
Quote:
The Foundation now controls the four kingdoms by means of religion, but outlying areas are beginning to see that the atomic religion is only a wedge for aggression, and refuse it entry. It is now becoming clear that religion is played out as a weapon, and that the next mode of expansion, trade, is in the air.
***About 75 years after the events of the previous story, Limmar Ponyets is dispatched to Askone, a world rich in raw materials that has thus far spurned any commerce with the Foundation, for fear that it would lead to the Foundation’s Scientism religion controlling their society. Ponyets’s job is to negotiate for the release of Eskel Gorov, a Foundation agent who was sent to find a way to initiate trade with Askone. This was a violation of that planet’s law, and Gorov is scheduled to be executed.
***The Askonian society is dubious of technology, and practices ancestor worship. The Grand Master (their elderly leader) is firm about not accepting any technology from the Foundation, and about proceeding with Gorov’s execution. However, Ponyets convinces them to release Gorov in exchange for a gold transmuter jury-rigged out of a “food irradiation chamber” (presumably a more advanced version of a microwave oven).
***More importantly, Ponyets accomplishes Gorov’s mission of creating an opening for Foundation trade. He blackmails a member of the governing council, Pherl, to buy all of his cargo, which consists of many devices and machines forbidden by Askonian law. This council member, who does not believe in his culture’s superstitions against technology, then has an incentive to work towards the legalization of those machines, so that he can begin using and selling them to recoup his loss. It is indicated that Pherl, who is young for someone so important in government, will be the next Grand Master shortly, further hastening Askone’s susceptibility to Foundation trade and the controlling religion that it brings with it. Ponyets and Gorov head back to Terminus with a shipload of tin, which Ponyets was able to extract from Pherl as part of their bargain.
Query, should AQ be translated as the "Base" or as the "Foundation" ?
Regards
Mike
Steve, I already know (it has been revealed !) ....
They keep; I Know
from this:
Quote:
from Dayuhan
The populace is heavily and illegally armed, but the weapons are not displayed. The police are local people and are not going to do a thing about it. Military forces know the guns are there but as long as the guns aren't used against them they pretend not to know: they've no desire to stick their heads back into that particular hornet's nest. So the deal is basically that the locals will keep the guns under wraps and not shoot soldiers as long as the soldiers stay low profile and avoid confronting civilians. It mostly works, though it's not ideal.
They are my police (I'm the district civil affairs officer) and indirectly my military. Now, if you're telling me that my cops and troopers won't tell me what they know, then we're into a different problem.
Sounds to me that what you have is a pretty good solution. The local population in effect is its own power center, with its own armed force, so that, at the least, it has something of a Mexican standoff (the Magnificant Seven x2) with both the government and insurgents.[*]
So, this district officer would not rock the boat, but would want to know as closely as possible what potentially harmful stuff is out there. Patience and time would yield those answers - the python who slithers, not the bull who stomps. It would also help if the district officer is at least something close to local - and not some knucklehead born and raised in the capital's suburbia.
Outsiders ?
Which takes me here:
Quote:
from Dayuhan
To illustrate my point above... back in 1988 a group of drunk soldiers fired weapons in the town center here and killed 2 kids, one 2 years old, one 11. Nobody was prosecuted or punished. 20 years have not chilled that memory one bit. My wife still feels very uncomfortable in the presence of anyone from the Philippine military, and most of the populace feels the same way. If the people who shot your kids (it's a tribal society, the kids of one are the kids of all) come around wanting to know how many guns you have, will you tell them?
Were the soldiers (and their Os and NCOs) outsiders ? I could relate to that if a bunch of Trolls (them that live under the Bridge; it being the Mackinac Bridge) were sent up here to garrison us Yoopers. Obviously, my solution (as the fictional district officer) would be different (both preventative and reprobative) than what occured in your town in 1988.
I suggest that, where the folks that represent the government are "outsiders" (wherever the locals draw that line), those folks (1) are very similar to an occupying foreign force; and (2) are practicing what is in effect foreign COIN - as we did in Iraq, and are in Astan, by being the lead sled dog.
So, the ideal is to have locals involved, as Giap had in SVN ca. 1959-1965. By the end of that time, he'd run through about 100K of his Southern-born military and political cadres; and had to use more and more Northern-born PAVN. That did have an adverse effect on the VC (although other factors also entered the picture).
Interesting discussion for me (although I'm a poor fiction writer). I'd say our views are probably similar; but, of course, not in lockstep - which would be no fun at all. :D
Regards
Mike
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[*] Illustrating the practical effect of an armed citizenry, keeping and bearing arms - something that appeals to this libertarian for more than esoteric legal and political theories.
Moving from JMM fiction to Jon Custis fact ....
and thank you, Jon, for a non-armchair response which tells us what the real, practical issues are.
It doesn't need any armchair comments from me; except I have to say that it ends in an astute observation:
Quote:
Right now, learned helplessness is keeping these people on their knees, and it doesn’t need to be that way.
Thou art a worthy successor to the CAP guys of 45 years ago.
Regards
Mike
The response to an incursion is simple...
Quote:
How long would it take for groups of Taliban to start frisking farmers? And one of two things will happen, they'll either come up with a pistol or an empty holster, neither of which indicates long-term survivability for the local.
Hopefully they'll come up with a pistol to their temple. This is the whole point of allowing the common man to be armed. All the farmer need do is present the weapon to said Taliban center-mass areas, pull the trigger, rinse, and repeat as necessary.
I agree though, it requires collective response. We get collective complaints when patrols stop by to conduct engagement...perhaps it is best the collectively address the issues of knuckleheads encroaching on the perimeter of their village.
The Consequences of Abuse (real or perceived)
No doubt:
Quote:
from Dayuhan
I realize that in your hypothetical situation you would not condone or tolerate abuse of the populace. My point was that given the realities of most places with active insurgencies you would probably have to deal with the legacy of events that happened before you arrived… and that trust once broken is difficult to restore.
where the "legacy of events" shortly or long past (consider No. Ireland) determine the present; and that lack of trust (lack of "legitimacy") (lack of "good governance"), for whatever reason(s) and attribution or not of particular fault, underlie discontent growing into the level of violence that becomes unacceptable.
So what ? You still have to find an acceptable way to deal with the problem(s).
I suppose that one possible way would be to always walk away from the problem(s) - "Walk away, Dryden. Walk away. Always walking away, aren't you?" ;)
So, what are your positive suggestions ?
Regards
Mike
Makes no fun being an eternal pessimist ...
and makes no sense being an eternal optimist. ;)[*]
Buying in part, not buying in part, as to this:
Quote:
from Dayuhan
Ok, assuming your populace is armed and intends to remain armed, the real question is whether or not those arms pose an immediate threat to you and to your plans. [1] If they do, my best suggestion would be to walk away or change sides. [2] If not, I say agree to ignore. Let it be known quietly that as long as personal arms aren't used against you or in criminal activity, you're not interested.
[rationale for 2] Registration creates the impression of an intrusive presence that wants to hold the option of confiscation, and is likely to add to distrust and suspicion. It doesn't even gain much: the guns will still be out there, and the chances are the vast majority will never be registered, turning ordinary citizens into at least rule-breakers, if not outright criminals. I just don't see how it gets you anywhere.
Taking point [1], if an armed force poses an immediate threat to me and if I have the means to overcome that armed force, my morals and ethics (as well as law) suggests that, all else being equal, shoot center mass - and there will no longer be an immediate threat. There may be reasons (besides my inferiority in opposing force) to withdraw in the face of an immediate hostile armed force, but I better have worked that out before the immediate threat develops.
From how you describe the community, it will remain neutral so long as its semi-autonomy is respected. OK with me; so long as the neutrality is genuine and I am not dealing with a Laos-Cambodia situation on my flanks (which is somewhat akin to what Jon Custis described with his villagers).
So, situation [1] (an immediate hostile armed force) is not likely to come from your community, but from either the insurgents or criminals.
I can't argue with your [rationale for 2] cuz I believe pretty much the same thing. Someone else will have to dispute that point. BTW: Knowing who has what firearms and/or munitions does not have to involve a formal, overt process.
Now how would you go about getting information about the firearms and/or munitions held by the insurgents and criminals, who are very likely to be an immediate hostile armed force against me (and possibly against the otherwise neutral community) ?
Regards
Mike
-----------------------
[*]
If you're not a commie at age 20,
you have no heart.
If you're still a commie at age 30,
you have no brain.
No original scenario ....
survives the first round, even if it's a blank. ;)
What has been added is a large population, armed but nominally neutral unless its ox is gored by someone. They seem not to be sheep. If they present a problem, it would seem to be a political problem; that is, they don't want the central government there.
The insurgents and criminals would be fringe elements, presenting a military or paramilitary problem only to whoever has to deal with them.
What are the reasons for the central government to be so interested in this area - so that it has to deal with insurgents, criminals and concerns about firearms and munitions ?
What reasons (if any) are there for the central government and the local population to cooperate on issues - if so what are the co-operative areas (what are the win-wins) ?
I'm a lousy fiction writer.
Cheers
Mike
Hey Steve, hijacking allowed ...
cuz I ain't Isaac Asimov. I do better on analysing a given data set, present or historical.
Quote:
from you
Quote:
JMM: What are the reasons for the central government to be so interested in this area - so that it has to deal with insurgents, criminals and concerns about firearms and munitions ?
JMM: What reasons (if any) are there for the central government and the local population to cooperate on issues - if so what are the co-operative areas (what are the win-wins) ?
If we're talking about my neighborhood, I could tell you
Obviously what I'm looking for are any useable "bridges" from the central government to your "Obstinentinians", but also what "dams" separate the central government from them.
As I see the scenario, your large, neutral unless gored, armed group is the political key to the area. The armed insurgents are not in the mobile warfare phase, but can bite. I'm also including some renegade criminal gangs (you might not have them; but they were in the SF author's OP scenario and could be expected in an area of unrest) that can bite. I'm positing that the insurgents and criminals are part of your population group; and that whatever problems they present will be finally resolved only if your population group is involved.
An historical example (which provides no cookbook answers; and your population might not like some of the recipes actually used), on a macro level, of a new national government (saddled with excess baggage from the past) having to deal with armed insurgents, armed criminals and armed semi-autonomists, was SVN ca. 1955. Briefly, over 100K of the Viet Minh military and political cadres had gone North (temporarily) as regroupees, leaving perhaps 10-15K cadres in the South. Diem's initial problems were the Saigon Mafia and two well-armed religiious sects near Saigon (Wiki):
Quote:
Diệm's position at the time was weak; Bảo Đại disliked Diệm and appointed him mainly to political imperatives. The French saw him as hostile and hoped that his rule would collapse. At the time, the French Expeditionary Corps was the most powerful military force in the south; Diệm's Vietnamese National Army was essentially organised and trained by the French. Its officers were installed by the French and the chief of staff General Nguyen Van Hinh was a French citizen; Hinh loathed Diệm and frequently disobeyed him.
Diệm also had to contend with two religious sects, the
Cao Dai and
Hoa Hao, who wielded private armies in the Mekong Delta, with the Cao Dai estimated to have 25,000 men.
The Vietminh was also estimated to have control over a third of the country.
The situation was worse in the capital, where the
Binh Xuyen organised crime syndicate boasted an army of 40,000 and controlled a vice empire of brothels, casinos, extortion rackets, and opium factories unparalleled in Asia. Bảo Đại had given the Binh Xuyen control of the national police for 1.25 m USD, creating a situation that the Americans likened to Chicago under Al Capone in the 1920s.
In effect, Diệm's control did not extend beyond his palace.
So, nothing new under the sun - the problem of firearms and munitions "control" (over groups not overtly "enemies") has been, is and will be with us in "small wars" in many guises.
Two other adds to the scenario.
1. The local population has members in the police (how about the higher grades, "Os" and "NCOs"), but apparently not in the military. Reasons for that ?
2. What is the relationship between the local population elites and the national power elites ? E.g. (not saying it's this), semi-feudal, neo-colonialist, comprador bourgeoisie (as one type), or something different.
Feel free to ruminate.
Mike
the stars my defenestration
Quote:
It's becoming clear that Asimov's psychohistory reflects an undoubtable truth that all the world's different social networks interact in multiple ways to generate a single future. From people to corporations, cities to governments, all the pieces of society must mesh. What appears to be the madness of crowds must ultimately have a method, a method that science can discover.
From a brief article on Asimov's meshing of psychology and math in Foundation for those who have an interest.
Asimov's 'Foundation' theories on society move from fiction to academia - Jewish World Review, July 16, 2004.
Fearful Iraqis scrambling to buy weapons
Fearful Iraqis scrambling to buy weapons
By Leila Fadel
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, August 31, 2010
Quote:
BAGHDAD - Four days after his brother was slain in a Baghdad robbery this month, Muntather Shaker borrowed $1,500 and bought a pistol. He carries it in his back pocket, sleeps with it under his pillow and is ready to use it to defend his family.
"If I thought the government could protect me, I would never buy a weapon," he said. "We don't know what will happen when the Americans leave."
Shaker is one of many Iraqis who feel they must depend on themselves for protection now that the U.S. military has drawn down to just under 50,000 troops and will end combat operations Tuesday.
The withdrawing troops have left behind a country with only a tenuous hold on stability: Nearly six months after parliamentary elections, no new government has formed, violence is on the rise and Iraq's security forces are being targeted.
Despite assurances that the United States is not abandoning Iraq, people here are scrambling to prepare themselves. Weapons dealers in Fallujah, Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk said sales of personal-protection weapons are up by 30 to 50 percent in the past four months....
Hi Rex, thanks for the current article.
It is no surprise. The OP article and Schmedlap's comments (page 1 of thread) presaged what many Iraqis feel is needed - personal security weapons. Whether they will or will not provide that security is quite another issue.
The irony is that Iraq is a very gun-controlled, gun-licensed nation (snip from the current article):
Quote:
For Kobaissi and the Shaker family, the hope is that weapons will deter the next attack. But their weapons are illegal.
The Interior Ministry, which oversees police and security issues, stopped issuing weapons licenses more than a year ago, and it is illegal for anyone to have a weapon without a license. But Iraqis still buy weapons from black-market dealers. Men train their wives to use the guns in case of emergency, and they hope it will be enough.
Local police largely look the other way, in spite of Interior Ministry orders.
"The number of personal weapons in a country like Iraq are too high right now, even though the Ministry of Interior is not issuing new licenses," said a statement from the Interior Ministry's general inspector's office.
Regards
Mike