I think much depends upon the proficiency of the Russian armed forces as of this moment. If they are as inept as they were when they first went into Chechnya, things could get very complicated for Vlad.
Printable View
I think much depends upon the proficiency of the Russian armed forces as of this moment. If they are as inept as they were when they first went into Chechnya, things could get very complicated for Vlad.
situation on friday (found in another forum)
http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/files/Jar...arta_vojny.jpg
I found following post from Russian military forum. One sentence is that Ossetians shot Gerogian prisoners.
http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/co/1663697.htmQuote:
На посту у этнических сёл наши солдаты собирают у бегущих грузин оружие и отправляют домой. Днём был мерзкий конфуз, осетины перестреляли 30 грузинских пленных, дезавуировав для мира зверства грузин против миротворцев. Грузины наглеют и ставят грады за административной границей рядом с обгоревшими остовами подбитых вчера. Танки и АА стреляют только через границу."
http://www.milkavkaz.net/forum/viewt...asc&start=1470
I have no clue how reliable this info is. Is this the beginning of blood feud? Geographically the ethnic villages are mixed.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...tailed_map.JPG
The Georgian government, apparently.
The Georgians have displayed a good deal of operational incompetence as it seems. There's only one road (actually partially a tunnel!) between Russia and SO - they should have taken that in an air assault and blocked it (if not blown up altogether).
The mountain passes are impassable in winter - the Georgian attack in summer.
The initial attack doesn't seem to have won much terrain - apparently only a few kilometres at most before the Russian advance guard of few battalions arrived .
Well, #### happens if you begin a war with a 1:100 inferior army that's incompetent.
The Russians didn't produce flawless photos of their columns either. Poor camouflage, poor march organization, perfect targets for air/arty, irregular uniforms, riding on top of APCs...
I've observed discussions about this where people refrained about an oh-so-good U.S.-trained Georgian brigade.
Well, maybe we should create a thread to identify the armies that were trained by the U.S. military and didn't afterward suck asap?
I've got difficulties to remember any.
For so eloquently pointing out the various reasons that this particular conflict and its origins seem only to fit the requirements of one of the participants.
To assume that the Georgians or their trainers;) didn't realize what you say is true might be asking a little much
It does however help to make it quite evident why now would have been a good time by Russian terms. And why preemption may have seemed acceptable.
Just another way of looking at it
Well, with the Russians knocking at the door of Gori in the centre and Zhigdidi in the west (NYT), things are not exactly going swimmingly for the Georgians, though they did manage to make a casualty of what appears to have been 58th Army's commander. But with perhaps three MRD, elements of three Airborne formations, plus other Russian formations and units moving into or already in the AO, good as Georgia's regular troops may be, they've definitely got their work cut out for them. The Russians do not appear to be willing to settle for anything less than precipitating the fall of the present Georgian government. Maybe they won't even settle for that now.
Some US advisers and contractors may really get to earn their pay soon (if not already); I'm sure they'll really looking foreward to that.:wry:
I'm not sure that is an accurate judgement. The Georgians, like everyone else are hostages to the pre-conflict start positions, and political constraints. We won't know the truth for a couple of months.
... however, I bet all the "experts" will rush in with a whole series of "lessons from Georgia," which will mostly prove inaccurate, and be completely free from Georgian Staff and Command input.
Unlike Shimon Naveh, I don't and never have rated the Russian Army. Talk Jedi Knight, but act Cave man! - they can never do what they set themselves up for.
You may note that Georgia borders a Russian province called "Chechnya", and you may recall some unpleasantness there. Well, there is also a province immediately to the west of Chechnya between Chechnya and North Ossetia called Ingushetia which has also been restive due to Chechnyan fighters who fled to its mountains after the Russians defeated them in Chechnya. Because of all this, Russia had approximately 250,000 servicemen in the area six months ago as well as approximately 200 aircraft. There was/is a major Russian base in Vladikavkaz to deal with the Chechnyan situation to keep Chechnyan fighters from fleeing westward, indeed this is an ancient Russian fortress city built in 1784 to deal with the Chechnyans (who were rebelling then too, go figure). Which city, if you are looking at your maps, is 80km from the Roki tunnel, and then a further 40km to Tskinvali.
In short, it is not unusual for Russia to have forces in the area that are on alert, and furthermore, not unusual for Russia to have some of their best forces in the area -- as, undoubtedly, those T-90 tanks with reactive armor indicate. It is a two hour drive from Vladikavkaz to Tskinvali at 60km/h, so Russian troops arriving in Tskinvali twelve hours after fighting begins indicates that it took about ten hours for the Russians to get sorted out and underway -- not a great showing for a rapid reaction unit intended to respond rapidly to problems in Chechnya, but certainly not indicative of anything other than the fact that this region has been problematic for Russia for quite some time and South Ossetia happens to be close to Russia's main base in the region. In other words, the rapidity of Russian response does not indicate the Russians were necessarily expecting this particular trouble. They have plenty of other troubles to expect in the region too. Indeed, one wonders what the Chechnyans are thinking, now that the main force to their west keeping them suppressed has taken a detour into Georgia...
Just today morning I found from Russian MoD site that they are denying involvement of Chechen "Vostok" and "Zapad" units. This info has vanished now. Reuters says that "Vostok" is in.
http://search.us.reuters.com/query/?...%6b&s=USPHOTOS
I agree with your overall opinion, but I disagree about the description of the quality of the 19th MRD. It's one of the better units, but not equipped with significant quantities of 1990's or newer material.
The 19th MRD was equipped with equipment that was mostly 1970's/1980's equipment.
I am observing a board that focuses on hardware and they have running commentaries on the equipment on the published photos. They identified BTR-70 and T-62 (in a later wave), BMP-1 (probably part of the original peacekeeping force), mostly T-72 / BMP-2 / BTR-80.
They did also spot a Tunguska somewhere.
The general consensus was that the Georgian patchwork arsenal of 2nd hand equipment from Eastern Europe (and some American infantry equipment like BDUs) was in average more modern than the 19th MRD equipment.
The 19th MRD is a rapid-raction division with a lower than usual share of conscripts and higer than usual expenditures for training.
It still needed a rapid reaction force in itself (which formed the advance guard of few battalions) to have at least a part of it at a level of readiness approaching that of all Soviet ground forces in Central Europe during the 1980's.
"How well have Russian forces performed in Georgia?"
http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/...e-russian.html
Considering that military historians and operational analysts are still debating WW2 actions where we have a wealth of info, and there is still considerable debate over recent operations such as "Gothic Serpent" and "Anaconda", I can't see how anyone can yet produce a well informed opinion on the Russian Army, or the Georgians.
What all this tells me, is that there is now even less reason to suppose that the future wars will be small wars.
...and if you want to rapidly deploy a Brigade from Germany to Georgia, via Turkey, driving all the way, may be something to consider.
A more entertaining look at the conflict, from The War Nerd:Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Quote:
.....What’s happening to Georgia here is like the teeny-tiny version of Germany in the twentieth century: overplay your hand and you lose everything. So if you’re a Georgian nationalist, this war is a tragedy; if you’re a Russian or Ossetian nationalist, it’s a triumph, a victory for justice, whatever. To the rest of us, it’s just kind of fun to watch. And damn, this one has been a LOT of fun! The videos that came out of it! You know, DVD is the best thing to happen to war in a long time. All the fun, none of the screaming agony—it’s war as Diet Coke.
See, this is the war that I used to see in the paintings commissioned by Defense contractors in Aviation Week and AFJ: a war between two conventional armies, both using air forces and armored columns, in pine-forested terrain. That was what those pictures showed every time, with a highlighted closeup of the weapon they were selling homing in on a Warsaw Pact convoy coming through a German pine forest. Of course, a real NATO/Warsaw Pact war would never, ever have happened that way. It would have gone nuclear in an hour or less, which both sides knew, which is why it never happened. So all that beautiful weaponry was kind of a farce, if it was only going to be used in the Fulda Gap. But damn, God is good, because here it all is, in the same kind of terrain, all your favorite old images: Russian-made tanks burning, a Soviet-model fighter-bomber falling from the sky in pieces, troops in Russian camo fighting other troops, also in Russian camo, in a skirmish by some dilapidated country shack. No racial overtones to get bummed out by—everybody on both sides is white! And white from places you don’t know or care about!......
The initial combat did not seem to include much territorial gains.
The Georgian troops in the large Georgian valley enclave north of teh city were apparently overrun by the Russian advance guard.
I have heard (read) that there was little resistance after the first couple hours of combat between the Georgians and the Russian advance guard at the southern front line.
It sounded a lot as if the Georgians were withdrawing even without proper delaying actions - Russian recce units were able to "take & occupy" objectives.
Gori, for example, was apparently evacuated when the Russians arrived.
There was apparently no numerical or equipment superiority to speak of at the front lines.
Whatever success the Russians had was probably 95% psychological; the Georgian likely assumed their overall inferiority and didn't want to make last stands.
Neither Russians nor Georgians seemed to have been much interested in camouflage & concealment (judged by the published photos).
Caucasus people have a reputation of being more aggressive & physically robust than Russians, bullying superior numer sof Russian recruits in the army a conscripts. Maybe that description only fits the smaller nations north of the caucasus mountain tops.
The Georgian air defense fought apparently fairly well - the Russians did not seem to wage a SEAD campaign or use proper SEAD escorts.
The Russian Air Power (Su-25 and Mi-24 were mostly on video/photos) attacked operational (supply depots) and tactical targets (at least vehicles on road march) targets. I'm not sure how significant it was, but it seemed to have had an impact.
Russian air supremacy allowed their troops to drive along the single road without beign attacked.
That's the snippets that I heard/read about.
It'll be easier to learn about the Russian story than about the Georgian one because of the numerical superiority of exile Russians to exile Georgians.
An excellent first post, Badtux !
As time permits you, please do introduce yourself here.
I would also add that Putin's 2004 Presidential order to create Mountain Troop brigades resulted initially in haphazard selections and often competing forces (glamor and better pay, if you will). Even as late as October 2007, weaponry and equipment for the new brigades were to come from defense arsenals, and more would need to be procured. That left one tiny little detail -- the construction of a base for the 33rd brigade in Botlikh (near the Chechen border) and the 34th brigade's base near Sochi and the Abkhaz border. Both brigades should have been formed and (ahem) "ready" by 01 December. Well, so much for that :D
As we are all well aware of, Russia has been fighting rebels in the North Caucasus since 94, and Russian peacekeepers are currently deployed in the mountainous South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia. The so-called mountain brigades "more or less" ended up being heavy armored motor-rifle groups.
I reckon that's why the peacekeepers ended up with artillery for the "rapid and initial" offensive :wry:
Welcome aboard and regards, Stan
Thank you, I did not take a look at the published photos but relied on someone who saw the reactive armor on a T-72 and thought it was a T-90. Of course the two have completely different turrets but the same hull so if you aren't looking closely it's a reasonable mistake to make. I probably should have checked more but it wasn't really the point of my piece so (shrug).
I am not sure that the readiness of Soviet ground forces in Central Europe during the 1980's was all that high, other than their equipment being thirty years newer then. The Soviet infrastructure was crumbling, the Soviet economy was in the toilet, discontent and dissent were rife, they had the same problem of poorly-trained draftee soldiers as the heart of their army that afflicts the current Russian army. But that is a topic for another area.Quote:
The 19th MRD is a rapid-raction division with a lower than usual share of conscripts and higer than usual expenditures for training.
It still needed a rapid reaction force in itself (which formed the advance guard of few battalions) to have at least a part of it at a level of readiness approaching that of all Soviet ground forces in Central Europe during the 1980's.
The Cold War readiness of WP forces in Central Europe was beyond belief.
Evacuation of bases in a matter of minutes upon alarm, for example.
They had two different sets of tanks; some for training, many always ready for immediate action (maintenance done, ammunition, fuel, oil, zeroed gun).
Exile Russians who were in the Soviet Army are VERY embittered about the post-Cold War developments in the Red/Russian army. The standards dropped to the bottom and 19th MRD was not much above that bottom apparently.
Readiness and threat are two different kettle of fish.
For Entropy
Quote:
Unchallenged air power was Russia's trump card
By Tom Lasseter | McClatchy Newspapers
TIRDZNISI, Georgia — The Russian fighter jet screamed low to the earth and peeled off so quickly that the bomb wasn't visible until it hit the ground. The explosion shook everything and sent a shower of debris flying over the head of a young Georgian soldier.
The soldier, lying against an embankment on the side of the road, shouted in a panicked voice for everyone to stay still. His palms were flat on the dirt in front of him. "It's Russian MiGs," the soldier said, his eyes wide.
For three days, Russian jets and bombers have unleashed a massive aerial campaign against Georgian forces that, more than anything, dramatically changed the war's direction.
Until Russian jets showed up, Georgian tanks and infantry looked to be on their way to defeating rebel forces in Tskhinvali, the capital of the breakaway province of South Ossetia.
Tom,
Please redirect "Unchallenged air power was Russia's trump card" responses to the Ever-ready Bunny of SWC - The Never Ending Airpower Versus Groundpower Debate ...
:)
Although, no one should be surprised if we see this cited in the future as an example of the "Ten Propositions Regarding Air Power", especially "Whoever controls the air. generally controls the surface" and "Air power is primarily offiensive".
posted a copy and linked it
And a partial from Aerospace Daily (requires subscription) via ebird:
Quote:
Georgia Strikes Back With Air Defenses
If the land war in Georgia so far seems to be going decidedly in favor of the Russian army and navy, the Georgians seem to be racking up a lopsided score with their air defenses....
...However, Georgian air defenses appear to be taking a steady toll on Russian aircraft. Russia has admitted to losing a total of four aircraft (the Georgians claim 10) in the conflict. So far they've admitted to the destruction of three Su-25 Frogfoot strike aircraft and a Tu-22M3 Backfire bomber that was flying a reconnaissance mission.
I can't understand why the Georgians would try to fight Russia using tanks? The Georgian Army should be a Army of 6 man cells, with the best shoulder fired weapons money can buy. I didn't hear about one Russian tank being hit by an anti-tank weapon? Why?
I assume that Georgia needs some armour protection to fight Chechen Guerrillas or other various "rebels" in their country? But so far, I can't say I'm too impressed with the Georgians.
If I was a Baltic State or Ukraine military planner, I would make note of this. It seems like these countries (and Georgia) have developed their militaries to take on NATO/American missions, while not thinking about their own territorial defense?
It seems necessary to have deployable units for peacekeeping or COIN, and then have units of small independent cells for the nation's defense against the bigger Russia. For a small country like Georgia, it shouldn't really be that expensive to equip and train some units to specialize in hit and run tactics, and supply line disruption?
I not only concur but applaud your observation. It is exactly this point I tried to present to the Royal Thai Army. A couple of points are worth expanding.
a.) Tanks are fire support. They can achieve little in themselves, but you still need some. Tanks engender human emotion in a way I can never understand and I believe their generally unchanging form nearing the limit of its usefulness. No the tank is not obsolete. It merely needs to evolve.
b.) Beware the heroic little tank hunter teams. Context is everything, and the tide can very quickly turn against them. In order to be consistently successful they need large amounts of support and preparation. Even then they may suffer considerable attrition, unless they have the ability to very rapidly disengage.
a.) Countries like the Baltic States could probably use some armour if their Russian populations try to break away, but for actual war against Russia, they'd be useless.
b.) During OIF I my unit faced thousands of men acting in hunter killer teams, and it was very ugly for them (even in the cities). Terriean really makes a difference, as the desert is a bad place for the small AA team. However, a place like Georgia, or the Balkans is ideal for this. Another factor in OIF I was the Iraqi weapons. If the Iraqis had Javelins and Carl Gustavs instead of RPG 7's and 14's, we most likely would have had a lot of problems?
Some interesting (self) observations at RIA Novosti as reported in the Russian press.
Quote:
The Georgian army has not yet tried many of its state-of-the-art weapons in the South Ossetian conflict, but is ready to do so at a decisive moment, Israeli media reported.
Even Georgia's Soviet-made T-72 tanks are better equipped than their Russian counterparts. Georgia has re-engineered its inventory of 165 T-72 tanks by fitting them out with the GPS navigation system, identification systems, thermal imagery systems for targeting fire, and up-to-date Falcon communication systems. The Georgian version of the tank, the T-72-SIM-1, is capable of night fighting and in adverse weather conditions, which is beyond the capability of Russian tanks.
The course of the war has shown that the Russian army needs overhauling. Meanwhile yesterday Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin refused to back a proposal by key security ministries to increase defense spending.
The weapons are certainly an issue. Some UK MBTs took 12 + hits from RPGs when doing "raids" into Basra. The poor quality of both enemy troops and equipment was explicitly noted in the post operational report. EG- Don't try this again!
As I have said before, Javelin and Spike (MR/LR) change the world in ways we may not yet fully appreciate, but they are vastly expensive (especially Javelin). I see there as being a clear requirement for low cost, light weight wire guided ATGM, such as 9K115-2 or a much improved M47 Dragon.
...and yes, I know Dragon sucked more than a blind stripper with a club foot, which is why I said "much improved!" :wry:
As Estonian I can say that due to our joining with NATO (now) 99 percent of effort is commited to joint operations with Allies. This means that platoon and company-sized units are trained to work as part of bigger Allied forces formation (company, batallion) against insurgents. This tactics changes 180 degrees from guerilla war. There was proposal that Ministry of defence chould produce side mines against armoured vechicles (that Finnish deep operations units use, kind of side mines used by Iraqi insurgents), latter was chocked. You can say that at least lessons are known, but you have to also drill this during conscription. This is not done. Picture of war in small country depens A LOT wether this is done with the help of allies or alone.
This case study is part of topic "how decisions are done."
If I remember correctly, US train and equip program was started to make Georgian army able to fight against Chechen isurgents that inflitreted Kodori gorge and established safe haven there. Russians were complaining this all the time and bombed Georgian territory.
Even US officer proposed deep operations concept.
http://www.bdcol.ee/fileadmin/docs/b...w/08bdr200.pdf
This paper is about territorial defence.
http://www.bdcol.ee/fileadmin/docs/b...w/07bdr200.pdf
Here you can find tons of papers.
http://www.bdcol.ee/?id=64
Dear G*d! Not something I would ever want to try. A 10-man "deep operations squad." :eek:
Good romantic punchy stuff, but can't see how on earth you'd make it work in practice. If nothing else, the "2-man Carl Gustav" team is not going to work. You need about 4 men to make a Charlie G do its stuff
I'm all for "Stay behind ISTAR" with some sniper capability, and secure comms. That is proven to work.
Indeed, it seems they missed some of the key lessons of Chechnya. Trying to take on the Russian Army in a conventional fight was an exceptionally bad idea. It looks to me like the Georgians wanted to use armored shock to quickly overpower the South Ossetians, but they appeared to have no contingency plan for the rapid response from the Russians. Light infantry could have hidden until the Russian main body had passed and then attacked the Russian LOC. This would have slowed the Russian advance and taken some of the Russian combat power away from the units facing the Georgians further south.
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe...war/index.html
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7558399.stm
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/14/wo...hp&oref=slogin
Saakashvili is making accusations of violence by Russian tanks in Gori. The Russians are denying any presence in Gori and making counter-accusations of attacks by Georgian troops. Some journalists are saying they've seen no Russian tanks in Gori. Others (the BBC) are saying they have. Very murky details at the moment, but the cease-fire hasn't been formalized yet and it appears ready to break at any moment.
Yeah, I just checked Sky News and found this tidbit.
Might they be Georgian tanks who moved in when the Russians supposedly vacated the premises? Or has all of Georgia's armor been destroyed by now?Quote:
Russia had denied its troops were making their way to Tbilisi.
But Anatoly Nagovitsyn, the Russian military's deputy chief of staff, had also categorically denied that there were any tanks on the streets of Gori....
Sky News correspondents Stuart Ramsay and Jason Farrell confirmed there were tanks on the streets in Gori, which has suffered extensively from Russian bombing raids....
"(The tanks) just rolled past us with their guns at the ready, definitely looking like they were ready to engage," he said.
I'm glad that someone who knows what they're talking about raised this issue, because sometimes I look stupid when I ask obvious questions.
:D
I wondered if:
A) we didn't want to sell the Georgians sophisticated AT weapons or
B) we didn't want to teach these type of tactics because now that Hezbollah uses them that makes them "terrorist tactics."
After reading here though, the previously mentioned, we only trained the Georgians to get rid of terrorists because that's all we cared about, makes the most sense.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia..._Equip_ProgramQuote:
The Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) was an American-sponsored 18-month, $64-million plan designed to increase the capabilities of the Georgian armed forces. On February 27, 2002 it began to be reported in the US media that the U.S. would send approximately two hundred United States Army Special Forces soldiers to Georgia to train Georgian troops.[citation needed] This program implemented President Bush's decision to respond to the Government of Georgia's request for assistance to enhance its counter-terrorism capabilities and addressed the situation in the Pankisi Gorge.
Mission completed. Georgians got rid of Chechens and US got allies in COIN operation in Iraq.
This is not only Hezbollah tactics. This is partly Chechen tactics, Iraqi insurgents tactics, Mujahideen tactics etc. ... but this is not politically correct tactics, because Goliath got hit to the groin. If I remember correctly van Creveld wrote in the beginning of nineties in "Transformation of war" that big states teach only their type of tactics. First, they can sale hardware and know-how. Second, this will not work against them.
That's what I was getting at. Were we more worried about avoiding scandalous headlines back home - "US teaches Georgians terror tactics", than what the Georgians would need to do if they ever faced a Russian tank invasion?
Though, as others have mentioned, these teams have very high casualty rates. Maybe the Georgians weren't interested in being martyrs. A decision that I can't really disagree with.
As always, could be both, plus other factors too.
I'm not so sure about that. I think that it depends on what your view of the lessons of Chechnya are. A good part of the reason for whatever success the insurgents have had against us in Iraq and Afghanistan is that we will always do our level best to avoid civilian casualties. The Russians seem to have no such compunctions. I suspect that if the Russians smell another Chechnya brewing, ie the trees start growing RPGs and ATGM things will get significantly more nasty, particularly if there are a lot of Chechnya vets in the Russian forces. I remember reading reports of how the tallest building in Grozny was no taller than two stories owing to the Russian air and artillery. The Chechan insurgents managed to do some damage to the Russians and the Russians, in turn, managed to do some significant damage to the insurgents, the civilian populace and the national infrastructure. The Georgians are probably still holding out hope for a solution that stops short of that kind of war.
SFC W
Photos by 1 photographer, who moved with Russian troops.
http://lsd-25.ru/2008/08/14/voyna-v-...iya-babchenko/
Great link and photos, Kaur !
Not to sound ungrateful, but it seems all those burning tank shots are the same 4 or 5 in all the Russian press. Begs the question: Just how many Georgian tanks were "actually" destroyed by Russian armor?
On another note, looks like we're cleared to go there and help out, as long as we dress like civilians :D
Ilusat Päeva Sulle, Stan
FPRI, 13 Aug 08: Russia Resurgent: An Initial Look at Russian Military Performance in Georgia
Quote:
.....No doubt Russia’s military action in Georgia will prompt many countries to view Moscow in a sharper light, from the capitals of Europe to Beijing and Tokyo. However the world eventually interprets Russia’s intervention in Georgia’s civil conflict—whether as a “humanitarian effort” as Moscow portrays or as a “full scale invasion” as Tbilisi portrays—it does demonstrate the Russian military’s renewed ability to prosecute a relatively complex, high-intensity combined arms operation. Still, the evidently high state of readiness of such a broad array of Russian military units across all three services raises more questions about Moscow’s intentions and planning prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
should end anyone's thoughts about how the Georgians should have defended their border (sealing the Roki Tunnel, etc.).
One wonders what old Uncle Joe (½ Geo., ½ Oss.) would think about all of this - as the Russians took his home town of Gori.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_StalinQuote:
Joseph Stalin was born Ioseb Besarionis Dzhugashvili in Gori, Tiflis to Besarion Dzhugashvili, an Ossetian [8] cobbler who owned his own workshop, and Ketevan Geladze a Georgian who was born a serf.
[8] Simon Sebag Montefiore. Young Stalin. 2007. ISBN 978-0-297-85068-7 p19
IIRC, the Russians had moved elements nearer to Georgia back in June-early July as a counter to the biennial Immediate Response Exercise (US, Georgia, Armenia and others) that began 15 Jul and ended 28 Jul. There's a lot more we don't know, open source, than we do but based on what I've seen since they had probably instituted provocations or very at least tacitly encouraged Georgia to attack, I suspect the fine hand of the FSB and a long time -- a year or more -- contingency plan. Time will tell.
Such a plan likely included all the things cited in the linked article and quite probably entailed prep, rehearsals and moves well prior to May or June predicated on Russian plan execution at Endex of the JEX and the beginning of the Olympics. Add to that some of the comments above in this thread and I don't see any significant improvement in Russian performance -- other than use of the media -- and, importantly, Vlad's shrewdness and will, which should not be underestimated. :eek:
Who, of course, was out of town and on international TV at the time, thus having a perfect alibi -- and allowing Dmitry to appear to be the BBMFIC. He loves it when a plan comes together... :cool:
I agree more with this opinion.
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/assau...a-conflict.htmQuote:
Still, for serious military analysts, the remarkable thing has been how little Russian performance has changed over the years (and decades, and even centuries). Overwhelming force—the sledgehammer blow—remains the Russian approach to warfare. Nothing wrong with that in theory—it’s essentially the Powell Doctrine (which the Bush administration ignored in Iraq, leading to a near-disaster). The problem is that the Russian military remains indiscriminate in its targeting and horribly sloppy in its execution. Their sledgehammers tend to hit everything in the general area.
OPFOR Battle Book ST-107 gives better overview.
Only outsider who who has entered Tshinvali.
http://www.hrw.org/doc?t=europe&c=georgi
Was thinking along 'Charlie Wilson's War' today, wondering what could have blunted the Russians within the Georgian capability to employ.
The answer I came up with would have been Javelin Missiles. Fire and forget, will take out a T-80 (or an M1). Could have made life nasty in the armored columns.
Just a late night musing.
Cavguy, I was in Estonian military in the middle of 90-s. It was time when in the service was quite many officers who sereved in the Soviet army (in the rank of majors and up). During 1 exercise couple of those Soviet ones worked as advisers to young officers, who had finished Finnish military school. We were playing OPFOR column and moved to west. Half a day our units moved like snails under the instructions of Finnish military school graduates. In front of every possible ambush site recce was sent out. If cou calculate that recce on foot moves 1 km per hour, then it was slow going. Soviet school people got enought and instructed to "bomb" every possible amush site. Finnish ones opposed that there are farms etc. Soviet ones said "Just do it!". After first order, referees reported destroyed ambush. Finnish ones continued this pattern and columns were moving average 40 km per hour and we were showing middle finger to guys crawling out from the bushes. So much about ROE and possible Javelin sites.
The terrain in Georgia offers more potential ambush locations.
http://lsd-25.ru/img/navoine-ru_IMG_9513.jpg
Also, Hezbollah countered the bombing of potential ambush locations by spending 5 or 6 years digging in. With only a handful of roads, deep buried IEDs and EFPs would've been effective. Of course, we didn't want the Georgians doing that. Plus, making the Russians angry probably would've convinced them to flatten Tbilisi. "Don't poke the bear" is probably Georgia's only option. To bad we forgot that. It's really too bad they forgot that.
Just to add some backround info to my last post.
Terrain.
http://www.einst.ee/publications/nature/Quote:
Mosaic of Forests, Meadows and Marshes
Almost half of Estonian territory (47.6 per cent) is under forest and woodlands; the area of forest stands has more than doubled during the last 50 years and is still growing.
Forests and woodlands are not evenly distributed in Estonia. The largest forests can be found in the northeast and in Mid-Estonia — a zone stretching from the Northern coast to the Latvian border.
Owing to abundant precipitation and slight run-off, Estonia is rich in wetlands. There are some 165 000 marshes greater than one hectare in area, of which 132 peatlands are larger than 1000 ha. The total area of marshes and swamp forests measures 1 009 101 ha which is over one fifth (22.3 per cent) of the country’s territory. Only Estonia’s northern neighbour, Finland, has a higher percentage (31) of peatland.
Approximately two thirds of the marshes in Estonia began as lakes which were gradually turned into quagmires by the spreading shoreline vegetation. The rest of Estonian swamps were formed by an opposite process, the paludification of mineral land.
It's all about TTP, but during the exercise I described, opponent failed.
About foresest. Most of the collective farms are dead. Grandparents, who were mostly peasant are now in the end of their life cycle. Children are useing those farms mostly like summer houses. This all means that there is no need for fields for agricultural purpuse. What happens to the field, if you don't use it? During first ten years there are bushes. After that comes forest.
Thanks for the insight. As a tanker, I just know the fire and forget cpability of the Javelin scares me. Capable of top attack from 2.5k, with night sights, the "shoot and scoot" capability would seem ideal for a light unit seeking to harass armored formations. Get in range, pop a few off, and withdraw fast. Might work as the stinger did against the Russian helicopters in Afghanistan. It is also remarkably easy to use. Stories from SF employment with Pesh in northern Iraq (OIF 2003) is that Javelins decimated an Iraqi BN and forced a withdrawal.
Doesn't suprise me on the Russian counter-ambush tactics. Their COIN philosophy from Chechnya is brutal and effective.