Design for military operations
At the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 96 SAMS students, faculty and contractors recently finished a six week experimentation period using “design” to approach military operations. Students from the US Armed Forces, USAID, FBI and international militaries applied design theory to future scenarios templated in CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and NORTHCOM. The design principles concentrated the student’s efforts not on solving “the” problem, but first on defining the “correct” problem set and developing a methodology to manage the environment through application of all elements of national power. The most recent experiment took the design efforts and focused on producing information to be used by planners. The interface for designers and planners in this case was a campaign directive.
If the GWOT is a problem set, and we have been dealing with it as a government for nearly eight years, perhaps design is a useful approach for military leaders.
I would like to hear from the SWJ community, many with experience in developing campaign plans, about what might be a useful product for planners from a design team. I would also appreciate engaging in a dialogue about the utility of design in general. Links to two recent Military Review articles about design are posted below.
Thanks,
Dave
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...430_art015.pdf
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...430_art016.pdf
As with Surferbeetle I was really intrigued by this
Quote:
Originally Posted by
DaveDoyle
At the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 96 SAMS students, faculty and contractors recently finished a six week experimentation period using “design” to approach military operations. Students from the US Armed Forces, USAID, FBI and international militaries applied design theory to future scenarios templated in CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and NORTHCOM. The design principles concentrated the student’s efforts not on solving “the” problem, but first on defining the “correct” problem set and developing a methodology to manage the environment through application of all elements of national power. The most recent experiment took the design efforts and focused on producing information to be used by planners. The interface for designers and planners in this case was a campaign directive.
If the GWOT is a problem set, and we have been dealing with it as a government for nearly eight years, perhaps design is a useful approach for military leaders.
I would like to hear from the SWJ community, many with experience in developing campaign plans, about what might be a useful product for planners from a design team. I would also appreciate engaging in a dialogue about the utility of design in general. Links to two recent Military Review articles about design are posted below.
Thanks,
Dave
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...430_art015.pdf
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...430_art016.pdf
My initial response was -yipeeee
unfortunately followed by the realization that I have absolutely no idea what it would actually equate to by the time it works its way through all the levels required to really utilize it on a larger scale.
I have the greatest confidence that those serving in todays military would be able to do amazing things if given the chance to really design COA' s and look at operational environments in a learning environment such as presented.
The question that's still eating at me is can we actually get ourselves or those in the political realm to let the reigns that loose. Although it might not seem that risky up front; when those at the top start getting the kind of input that would result it may seem a lot less controlled (or perhaps better stated- risk averse than they might be comfortable with)
IMHO it is where we really need to be but having spent a lot of time trying to look at it from every angle its likely to have some big fans and some pretty important leaders not so excited about it.
Finger's crossed/ Ducking for cover:D
Reframing, product vs. process, and the Army Planner
Dave et al,
I am a US Marine attending SAMS with Dave. Reading through this thread, I have just a few comments on some things that I found interesting.
First, I would like to second Dave's description of reframing. Of course we need to ask the question if we are looking at the right problem in the beginning of planning as stated by Mr. Wolfsberger. But once you apply a solution, you have to evaluate the system you applied it to see the results. Those results help answer the question if your initial problem is still valid, or if a new one has presented itself. The situation continually changes within the action, reaction, counter-action cycle. Reframing is simply taking a holistic viewpoint of the situation within each step of this cycle.
The second thought I would like to comment on comes from "Bob's World". Specifically,
We do not follow some rigid doctrinal approach to design, but have combined elements of a variety of proposed processes out there. In simplest terms it insert a step in the front end of Mission Analysis that takes a holistic look at what exactly the problem is that you have been asked to address, and how it really functions, and then through that understanding being able to better see second and third order effects from various COAs, and also to be able to better advise the commander.
I think this misses the point of design. In my humble opinion (backed up by MCDP 1-2 Campaigning and MCDP 5 Planning, design is not a process or a step to be added to MDMP, MCPP, JOPP or any other planning process. Instead, it is a MINDSET. It is nothing more than considering as many variables and factors that affect the ability for a unit to MANAGE, not SOLVE, complex adaptive problems. If you could understand and solve a complex adaptive problem, then I posit you were faced with a problem that was neither complex nor adaptive. Bottom line, I believe the Army is trying to "doctrinalize" a thought process/problem management methodology into an MDMP process. I don't think this is the right approach.
This leads to my third point. Yes, I think Army officers focus way too much on developing a product, and are slaves to the processes that produce them much more than the other services. It's a cultural thing that I have gotten over a long time ago (this is my fourth resident Army school). Does it affect the Army's ability to plan and manage problems? Absolutely not. Does it make coming to a solution much harder than it had to be? Absolutely yes. Whether you climb over a wall or run into it as hard as you can a hundred times over, you eventually get to the other side....
But what do I know? I'm just a dumb Marine tanker.....
S/F,
John
All comments here are forward looking...
...Since USSOCOM is mentioned, the Strategy Division, a little background and "what we did" that may, or may not, be helpful re Doctrine & TTPs.
As a formerly (reserve) Purple suiter, organizationally we were the wargamming section of J4 of the old US Readiness Command.
We hired civilian programmers and our team, made up of active duty and reservists, all services, sat down with the design programmers to think tank existing war plans for the Folda Gap (sort of a dead item today) and Korea, among others.
Our biggest problems came from an Army Major General (active duty) who hated computers and limited exercises combined with computerized wargamming...which back then we did at Ft. Lewis, Washington, later we moved the war gamming center to Hurlburt Field, FL.
Our problem was "fixed" by retiring the General, and as we changed over from being USREDCOM into USSOCOM we brought in reservist US Coast Guard folks onto our formal computer driven wargamming team.
Civil Affairs was a key driver and decision tree maker...considerations of
(1) if we go into X country (2) what do we upset and how do we replace it to keep basic necessities going on such as power, water, sanitation, etc. (3) Whatever we do for ourselves for medical care, how does this compliment or how could it improve X nation's existing, or virtually non-existing health care.
Civil Affairs (to include unique religious considerations as could/would/did impact intended operations inside or of the nation to be invaded) would have been theoretically mapped out within the existing political process. How the displaced government would be reformed and a new government plan with some reusable indiginous government officials kept on hand to keep continuiting in basic operability of services, police/security services to try to maintain a semblance of law and order, etc. was a basic ingredient of our wargamming/planning.
The biggest problem we used to have (I hope this is resolved today) was lack of in common C4, communications, both among our own branches of the service and with and among our allies. The Grenada war experience was a huge C4 black eye for us. I had just joined USREDCOM as a reservist only a couple months before Grenada happened and was promptly thrown into the CAT and then tasked to do the after action report for the J4, then Brigadier General (retired as a Lt. General) Sam Wakefield, USA.
Yes, this is an oversimplified commentary. But, basics of who, what, and where to go into any foreign nation with a civil affairs plan that is nation specific instead of generic...was all to often the problem for us using largely Army "standardized" plans...I hope civil affairs and overall planning is much done much better and more specifically today as you younger guys carry the ball.
We eventually formed computerized wargamming teams from within old USREDCOM/replacement USSOCOM and did team wargamming studies on site with USCINCLANT to focus on strategic and tactical air, land, and sea factors (focused then on the Folda Gap from the beaches of France, Holland, etc, inland). I individually did wargamming visits and field exercises with FORSCOM, focused on the drug wars in Latin America. You guys have a "world" of plans to improve, create from scratch, whatever.
To me, sitting back and taking the know it all arm chair coach viewpoint, people have to know and understand people to be effective. Trying to make sense out of the archaic, tribal chaos of Afghanistan is tough. Ditto the tribal areas of northern Pakistan.
I concur or agree fully with the sharp point that the Army gets too caught up in trying to standardize the planning process, when today's world begins with unconventional warfare, stateless fighters, and our traditional concepts and "process" are as often as not destructive instead of being constructive.
Which I why I wrote recently here on SWJ that being loose and improvising is "the" key ingredient today, not so much old style "by the book." It is damn hard to codify chaos.
Sorry for the long input, but lessons learned does sometimes help, even if just in a ballpark, generalized fashion as is offered here.
Bob, as you are in USSOCOM you have the good experience now of working with the SEALS whose use in Afghanistan has broken new ground for a formerly parochial water based outfit.
"Systemic" vs "systems" is the key to design
Quote:
Originally Posted by
selil
I get concerned any time I see the military re-purposing a fairly well understood field of study and then referring back to internal military documents to support contention. The Air Force has produced some worthy documentation on systems analysis and design. I understand the scope of what is being attempted is further afield than simple mechanical, electrical, hydraulic systems. That does not mean the fairly well understood principles from engineering design will not serve.
It seems like two field of study are being mixed; design and decision science.
http://www.operationaldesign.net/default.html
“A key distinction is that the Cold War-era use of systems engineering to solve problems no longer works. In order to effectively deal with the increased levels of complexity that we are now faced with today, we need to adopt a more robust method for understanding our environment, with all the inherent relationships, tensions and barriers to security, so to develop well thought out, adaptive solutions to the complex problems that we face.”
BG (Retired)
Huba Wass de Czege
June 18, 2008
More about understanding a problem vs a more linear systems targeting process. Why something is vs how something is. I'll need to dig up a more official definition to help clarify.
Our products have been widely embraced at all levels
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Murph
Although my experience with design is limited to the context of an academic setting, I have had the opportunity to read and discuss design with several military & interagency partners; a step up (perhaps) from having stayed at a Holiday Inn. The attached pdf contains my thoughts regarding its utility.
While I’m aware of, and have observed, some systems frames created by command-level staffs, I’d like to echo Dave’s thoughts in soliciting feedback from strategists/planners who are currently engaged in design efforts to address contemporary issues. What has been your experience? Is design being embraced, accepted, discussed, shunned… Is their practical utility?
v/r
Murph
Just the SOCOM framing of the the global environment alone drew great interest and provided leaders with a fresh perspective. Since then the "big ideas" that have come from that in the Strategy Development process are producing concepts that are generating a great deal of interest across a wide range of disciplines as well. From this new perspective we are going to go back in and re-frame the original Strategic Appreciation, and take the whole process to the next level.
Meanwhile we (and be "we" I mean everyone from the President on down) get the same old stuff from the intel guys: AQ here and everywhere, look out for these big scary cold war states, etc. No big ideas there, just old thinking applied to the latest information. Sadly so much of what we do is based on these lame intel products. I will remain a harsh critic of the intel community until they evolve. Not because I don't like them, but simply because they deserve it.
Agree with Bob on the relative value of the Intel community
however, I'll also defend them by pointing out that risk aversion is a bureaucratic side effect.
Their risk aversion is part and parcel of that affecting all of DoD and the majority of the Armed Forces -- that is, regrettably, unlikely to be changed and is a function of the same phenomenon affecting society worldwide. It is most noticeable in western democracies and is likely to get worse instead of better. :mad:
The solution for that phenomenon in nature is death and new birth. Except for a few things that have developed the capacity to regenerate...
They always told me that doing the same thing over and over and achieving the same result was not smart and that if I discovered an obstacle, bypassing or flanking was better than a frontal assault. So it seems to me if the designated organization isn't doing the job, it should be flanked...
I like the way you think!
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
They always told me that doing the same thing over and over and achieving the same result was not smart and that if I discovered an obstacle, bypassing or flanking was better than a frontal assault. So it seems to me if the designated organization isn't doing the job, it should be flanked...
We're leaving bread crumbs for them to follow.
Actually to be fair and expand a bit on what they can't seem to grasp: The guy with stars on his chest/collar in the rear doesn't need the same tactical lay down that the guy actually on the ground with oak leaves or bars. Raise your game. How about some strategic analysis and perspective??? And that does not mean simply providing world wide tactical info.
J Wolfsberger is a good man and a
logical thinker. He hesitates to criticize the quote until he has full knowledge of the context. Admirable trait that. Seriously.
I, OTOH, read that and thought: "That systems engineering jazz never worked during the Cold War no matter how hard some tried to push it. Plus, the problems we face today are not more complex, they're just different."
I'd add we'd be much better off with some bright, intuitive solutions than with the well thought out adaptive solutions from a lot of really smart people that we've tried thus far...
As usual you gent's are on it dogonit
Considering the good BG(retired) is one of my favorites I usually find what he says pretty informative and thus I'm keepin hope alive that somebody talks him into taking the the new chair at the college.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
I'd add we'd be much better off with some bright, intuitive solutions than with the well thought out adaptive solutions from a lot of really smart people that we've tried thus far...
I have actually heard that same thing from quite a few so at least there's hope that maybe it'll stick.
Goal is to find a "simple" level of understanding
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
SOD is flawed. It briefs well, but it doesn't stand up to real world conditions. In war on the simple survives! - and SOD is, as you point out, bizarrely complex.
I suspect that Einstein began with a much more complex eqauation, and certainly an overvwhelming amount of raw information, before he identified what was really important and boiled it down to "E=MC2"
Similarly in any environment like Iraq (and yes this was and is much more complex than any homogenous COIN where there is only one cause and one rebel group to address) you have some base theories and an overwhelming amount of information to sort through. Insurgent forces from a dozen states experiencing poor governance that see the US as the source of legitimacy of those poor governances so they take their show on the road to try to break US support (foreign fighters). States and non-states conducting UW to incite and facilitate insurgency (Iran and AQN), and multiple local insurgents working for all three brands of insurgency (some separatist, some revolutionary, and some resistance).
To simply walk into a mess like that with a copy of "how the British did it in Malaysia" or "how the French did it in Algeria"; or even the US COIN manual under your arm; and you are likely doomed to flounder.
What SOD is intended to do is to identify all of the various actors in the drama, their inter-relationships, motivations, etc. It is a journey to work out what info is important and then to understand that which is important in ways that derive or support development of solution sets aimed at root causes. Otherwise you simply follow the intel guys assessment of who the threat is ( here's your deck of cards) to execute the mission that you were originally given.
I will say this though. I don't follow SOD or CACD in my work. It is all commonsense driven free flow (think Jazz with Chord changes, not sheet music) with an eclectic team of guys. The three senior guys are a Navy Sub driver, a Marine F-18 jock, and an SF guy who was conducting jury trials in Portland on 9/11.
So, don't try to memorize and overly apply any of these processes. But do take the time to try to truly understand what the problem is before you rush off to try to solve it. My opinion, SOD will fade away simply because Nave is such a proud father that he refuses to compromise the intellectual purity of his product. Ok, that's his right; but too bad, because understanding and applying the basic logic of this is critical to take planning to the next level.
Mostly. Not much excuse for it, IMO...
This is human nature:
Quote:
"The human psyche, the organisation of human society, and the production of knowledge all strive for order and regularity and to keep at bay what threatens to bring disruption and meaninglessness into them."
This, OTOH, is history:
Quote:
Indeed, all attempts to bring complete control and predictability prove to be inherently self-defeating while a tolerance for (and capacity to profit from) chaos and contingency seems an enduring necessity.
and should allow us to over come the natural inclination...
Intuitive leaders and commanders versus metrication... ;)
I know but my wife thinks gray hair is cool so I try to make
mine even more gray by wanting things I cannot have... :o
Still, I have faith -- some day, some way, we'll figure out how to measure talent and competence, fine tune ego and ambition and achieve military perfection.
Briefly. Then Congress will change the rules. :eek: :wry:
Blind men and elephants...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
It is worth pointing out, that the meaning and essence of nearly every sentence above was originally said by Clausewitz in some shape or form - back when warfare was "simple" and before it become "complex."
Wilf,
Clausewitz certainly has something to say, for me however his is not the only business model when it comes to warfare.
I am interested in chasing down a copy of his work to reread but this time I want to try it in German. Any suggestions?
Best,
Steve
Yeah -- I've got a suggestion
Don't screw w/the German. The language used is almost impossible to put in context due to evolution of the German language.
Get the Paret/Howard annotated translation, even if just from the library. It is the touchstone of Clausewitz translations. It also has great interpretive notes by two of the world's great military historians.