Military Governance versus Stability Operations

Moderator's Note

The author has requested a title change; the thread started as "Area Support Group", and now becomes "Military Governance versus Stability Operations" (ends).


All,

I am looking into the old concept of a rear area and specifically how we used to be designed to administer territory and the population of that territory once we took it over. In the post WWII days the US Army used military governors. The next time we did anything close to that would be Kosovo, but I am not sure it worked the same.

In any case, I am looking for a reference, preferably open source, that can provide a little background on how we used to think about how to administer occupied territory before we decided that there was no rear area. If anyone has any insights on why we dumped the ASG (who, if I recall correcely, was in charge of the rear area) I would appreciate it.

Also, for the Marines in the audience, did you handle things differently when you occupied small countires?

How about the UK or Australia - do you even consider post war administration in your doctrine.

Thanks

Area Support Groups (as far as I know) had nothing to do with security and "area governance" as you refer to but were large support/ log units. They became corps support groups and have now been re-named sustainment brigades.

Not sure who/ what was responsible for administering rear areas (from a governance perspective). The post-WW2 constabulary units come to mind but they were re-organized "cav" units (2d ACR/ CR is given credit for service as a constab unit). I think such elements were adhoc deals given to the senior commander in the area. You may want to begin your search of such efforts with post-WW2 constabulary units as well as precursors to civil affairs units.

Many moons ago, back in the 80's, I was an enlisted MP. I seem to remeber that we conducted Rear Area Combat Operations, which was primarily security type work keeping LOCs open and dealing with small bybassed units. I vaguely remeber that the doctrine then had us under a ASG who also was responsible for civilian control (even though we never considered civilians on the battlefield back then).

I don't know when we got away from dealing with the general administration of the area we took. Not sure if that ended with the beginning of the Cold war or if it continued on in the background somewhere.

It seems to me that the biggest lesson we failed to learn from Iraq is that we need units capable of this type of administration after we take the ground. I am not talking COIN. You only need to fight an insurgency once you screw up the civil administration. Civil Affairs is not equiped for this. They can coordinate but they don't have the internal structure to actually do anything. The concept of the Battle Space Commander is close, but it assumes that there is an ongoing battle, which means that the mindset is all wrong. They don't want to be civil administrators or policemen, they want to kill things. Civilians are not capable of this. They won't be on the ground in time and they have no units of their own.

Not sure what I am looking for, but I will know it when I see it.

Hi Stan,

If these are relevant, you'll have to find the links; they should still exist. Or, if no present links exist, I could email you the .pdf manuals (which, I'd prefer not to do - the files ~100MB):

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1940 FM 27-5 Military Government

1943 FM 27-5 Military Government & Civil Affairs

1944 Ann Arbor, Law of Belligerent Occupation

1947 FM 27-5 Civil Affairs - Military Government

1954 FM 41-15 Civil Affairs Military Government Units

1957 FM 41-10 Civil Affairs - Military Government Operations

1958 FM 41-5 Joint Manual for Civil Affairs - Military Government

1962 FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations

1966 FM 41-5 Joint Manual for Civil Affairs

1967 FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations

1967 FM 41-15 Civil Affairs Support - TASTA-70

1969 FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations

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This monograph may be useful: Burgess, US Army Doctrine and Belligerent Occupation (2004).

As to the old, historical doctrine, his take (starting at p.52):

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Past Doctrine

The most significant occupation examined in this monograph is post-World War II Germany and from that occupation came many examples of relevant doctrine. Especially when compared with current doctrine on occupation, two documents from the World War II era offer outstanding examples of how occupation should be executed. First, FM 27-5, Civil Affairs Military Governance originally published in 1940. The scope of FM 27-5 differs dramatically from its current doctrinal counterparts.[183]

183. In 1958, FM 41-5, Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government superceded and removed some of the detail that FM 27-5 had. In 1962, FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations replaced FM 41-5 and there was further removal of the specifics for military government. By the next revision in 1969, military government became even further indistinct.

Field Manual 27-5 specifically laid out the scope and purpose of civil affairs and military government activities, organization, personnel, operations orders, proclamation, and tribunals. Where current doctrine only starts to sketch the concept of what an occupation is, FM 27-5 demonstrates the application of legally required occupation tasks on the battlefield including medical care, government, administration, and security. Unlike the lack of current doctrine on occupation, Field Manual 27-5 provided one reference source for anyone needing information on the conduct of an occupation.[184]

184. Departments of the Army and Navy, Field Manual 27-5 Civil Affairs Military Government, Washington D.C., 14 OCT 1947.

Field Manual 27-5 was superceded by FM 41-10 Civil Affairs, provided “procedural and doctrinal framework within which the Army could conduct civil affairs and military government should the need arise.”[185]

185. Ziemke, vi.

The current FM 41-10 is certainly not the procedural and doctrinal framework for occupation. However, the earlier version still has worth today.

The second doctrinal document is the Handbook for Military Government in Germany written by the German Country Unit in 1944,[186] which provided complete guidance and direction for the military government soldier on the battlefield. Moreover, the very existence of this handbook demonstrates that the planners and military government soldiers had completely thought through their upcoming actions. The Handbook for Military Government in Germany is a specific application of the principles outlined in FM 27-5, and was the specific resource for the occupation in Germany. The Handbook provided the framework for execution and the training for military government soldiers, and set forth policy and provided the basic documents such as proclamations, law, ordinances applicable for every military governance officer in Germany.[187]

186. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Handbook for Military Government in Germany, December 1944, <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/books.asp#military> [12 JAN 2004].

187. The Handbook for Military Government in Germany.

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Burgess sums the lack of then-current (2004) doctrine:

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Summary

Field Manual 27-5 and the Handbook produced for Germany were products that discussed what to do and how to do it. However, a quick review of current doctrine on occupations shows a disturbing lack of guidance. Currently, the military has no more than a few pages on the subject. As such, the civil affairs and military communities have grown and adjusted into an environment based on Cold War thinking, which conjectured military occupation would never again take place, and had grown away from the possibility of conducting an occupation. It is time to reconsider this lack of doctrine and consider the law, history, and past doctrine offer a method to resolve this problem.

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The manuals from WWII, and thereafter into the 1960s, were joint Army-Navy efforts.

Regards

Mike

PS: The 1947 Joint Manual may be material to what you seek (at pp.34-35):

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b. Control. (1) During combat phase. (See fig. 1).

(a) During the period the theater is divided into a combat zone and a communications or naval advanced base zone, the theater commander exercises control over the combat zone through the commanding officers of field armies or naval fleet or task force commanders, and over the communications or naval advanced base zone through its commanding officer.

(b) If, however, the theater is subdivided into zones of operation assigned to separate task forces, each of which has its own communications or naval advanced base zone, control is exercised through task force commanders.

(2) After active combat has ceased. (See fig. 2.)

As long as military government continues in the occupied area, the theater commander will exercise control through a separate CA/MG command. Only in unusual circumstances will CA/MG be in the tactical chain of command.

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It then gets into specifics.

Mike,

Thanks, this is exactly what I was looking for. I am going to read Burgess paper first, but I will probably be back to ask for the various versions of the 27-5.

Stan

Stan aka The Curmudgeon,

You asked at the start:

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How about the UK or Australia - do you even consider post war administration in your doctrine.

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IIRC there are some British official WW2 history volumes on military government, Germany is one and an assortment of odd places in another (Trieste, Eritrea etc). There is a more recent book on Naples in 1944:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Naples-44-In...ds=naples+1944

Sorry that is all I can recall. It has not been a subject in RUSI Journal.

Thanks Dave,

Painting with a very broad brush I get the impression that with the end of the colonial period Western powers began to shift into a primarily defensive mode when it came to doctrine. WWII would be the last big hurrah for occupation as a matter of policy. From that point on Western militaries moved to a defensive posture. If we were to go to war, it would be to "liberate" an allied government. Perhaps as “war” became “cold” the idea of offensive warfare lost political support and all offensive operations moved into the shadows – covert not overt operations. So there was no need for doctrine on occupation. That changed (as the Burgess paper notes) when Bush II crafted a preemptive military strategy. With that America (and perhaps her allies) was confronted with the idea of occupation again. But our DoD, led by Rumsfeld, was not interested in such things. In a kind of “let them eat cake” moment, we “freed” the population of Iraq and then let them fend for themselves until we realized that plan was not going to work.

Now we look at the problem as one of stabilization. It still depends on the indigenous population to do all the heavy lifting. I am not sure this is any better. We still draft our doctrine as if everyone wants to look exactly like a Western power. We don't bother to try to figure out what caused the instability (like perhaps the fact that we instituted "regime change"), nor does the doctrine really care. I am not sure what it is, but I don't see it as actually stabilizing anything.

In any case, I feel that something is wrong here. I feel like our doctrine lacks reality. America builds an Army to fight and win wars but not one that is capable of dealing with the consequences of those actions. Years ago we implicitly understood the reality of war and its aftermath. Now, even after living it, we deny it. The argument has shifted to COIN, but no one is asking how to prevent the insurgency in the first place. I will have to think on this a while.

Stan,

This week @ Oxford a CCW seminar may help, looking at what the author has written, even contact him:

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Dr Jonathan Fennell (KCL), Armies Making Peace: the British and Commonwealth Armies in the Second World War and Post-War Social Transformations

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Link to author's bio:http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/department...z/fennell.aspx

After reviewing this latest Joint Civil Affairs doctrine it makes me wonder if we have learned anything over the past 10 plus years of conflict about the need for a military government option. Seems we wished it away once again (SEP 13), yet I remember like it was yesterday in 2003 a senior Civil Affairs officer in Iraq tell me they're only trained to support an existing government, not establish one.

JP 3-57 Civil-Military Operations

https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_57.pdf

This paper is worth looking over,

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j...55819444,d.cGE

Should Military Governance Guidance Return to its Roots?

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The 1943 Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs focused on the authority, responsibility, scope, and organization for how U.S. forces were to administer militarily-occupied territories. In contrast, the 2006 Civil Affairs manual focuses more on tasks performed in support of existing indigenous governments, in concert with other governmental and nongovernmental agencies.

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The 1943 Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs outlined authorities for the theater commander (in his role as military governor) that are no longer found in today’s doctrine. For example, “The taking of hostages, the imposition of collective fines, or the carrying out of reprisals” most probably constituted extraordinary measures for U.S. commanders to consider even in 1943, but nonetheless were still allowable.6 None of these actions are politically feasible or doctrinally recognized today.

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On the other hand, the 1943 manual recommended that “local laws, customs and institutions be retained” and that “it is unwise to impose upon an occupied territory the laws and customs of another people.”

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Beyond the brief paragraph on civil administration, the 2006 manual does not provide any direct guidance on how the military is to exercise its responsibilities to reestablish a viable government in accordance with international law. Furthermore, current training of civil affairs personnel completely ignores this function.

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Since the doctrine back in the day apparently advocated using local laws, it may be implied that we would assert control through the former government structures in cities, provinces, states, etc. For unconventional warfare we use the term area commands, but if your objective is to overthrow the existing the system it seems like the best of course of action would be to build parallel shadow government structures with the existing structure to facilitate a smooth as possible as transition. As Dr. Kilcullen points out in his new book Down from the Mountain people like predictability. Not relevant to your question, but a point for consideration.

The 1944 Law of Belligerent Occupation (JAGS Ann Arbor) is a practical how to do manual. It allows either COA suggested by Bill, former government structures or parallel shadow government structures.

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from Bill:
Since the doctrine back in the day apparently advocated using local laws, it may be implied that we would assert control through the former government structures in cities, provinces, states, etc. For unconventional warfare we use the term area commands, but if your objective is to overthrow the existing the system it seems like the best of course of action would be to build parallel shadow government structures with the existing structure to facilitate a smooth as possible as transition.

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See CHAPTER III LAW-MAKING POWER OF OCCUPANT for the rest of the story.

Moving from WWII to the present, everyone should be aware that just war academics and advocates (I include Kilcullen in the latter category) are developing a jus post bellum - the law after the war; as well as a 2012 ICRC symposium of experts.

2010 The Aftermath of War: Reflections on Jus Post Bellum (with Michael Walzer) (Youtube 1.25 hrs)

ICRC, Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory (2012).

These more recent additions, IMO, are less satisfactory from a military point of view than the WWII manuals.

Regards

Mike

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

After reviewing this latest Joint Civil Affairs doctrine it makes me wonder if we have learned anything over the past 10 plus years of conflict about the need for a military government option. Seems we wished it away once again (SEP 13), yet I remember like it was yesterday in 2003 a senior Civil Affairs officer in Iraq tell me they're only trained to support an existing government, not establish one.

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I agree whole hardheadedly. Considering drafting a short article on this. Want in?

Based on your backgrounds, experiences in Iraq and elsewhere, a dual authorship article could be a valuable contribution to guys and gals who will have to deal with this problem in the future.

I'll proof read and check citations if you want that sort of assistance.

Regards

Mike

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Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon

I agree whole hardheadedly. Considering drafting a short article on this. Want in?

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PM me and let me know what your thinking, I'm interested but recently committed to co-authoring an article with a friend on another topic. Although I should have some time over the Christmas period if you're willing to wait.

I really need to keep up on this international law stuff. Did not even realize that the very idea of spreading democracy violates international law (not that I believe in international law). Learn something new every day.

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The 2003 occupation of Iraq ignited an important debate among scholars over the merits of transformative occupation. An occupier has traditionally been precluded from making substantial changes in the legal or political infrastructure of the state it controls. But the Iraq experience led some to claim that this ‘conservationist principle’ had been largely ignored in practice. Moreover, transformation was said to accord with a variety of important trends in contemporary international law, including the rebuilding of post-conflict states along liberal democratic lines, the extra-territorial application of human rights treaty obligations, and the decline of abstract conceptions of territorial sovereignty. This article argues that these claims are substantially overstated. The practice of Occupying Powers does not support the view that liberal democratic transformations are widespread. Human rights treaties have never been held to require states parties to legislate in the territories of other states. More importantly, the conservationist principle serves the critical function of limiting occupiers’ unilateral appropriation of the subordinate state’s legislative powers. Postconflict transformation has indeed been a common feature of post-Cold War legal order, but it has been accomplished collectively, most often via Chapter VII of the UN Charter. To grant occupiers authority to reverse this trend by disclaiming any need for collective approval of ‘reforms’ in occupied states would be to validate an anachronistic unilateralism. It would run contrary to the multilateralization of all aspects of armed conflict, evident in areas well beyond post-conflict reconstruction.

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Transformative occupation and the unilateralist impulse

See also International Law, human rights and the transformative occupation of Iraq

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I really need to keep up on this international law stuff.

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you'll get a headache. :D

Regards

Mike

Just finished reading the Burgess paper, which just goes to show how slow I read. It was good on WWII and Panama, laughable on Iraq, and good on its review of current doctrine. It seems clear there is no current Army doctrine that realistically deals with post war occupation duties and responsibilities. It is interesting to see the change in attitude in the government and the military from WWII where the post war occupation was considered a serious matter, serious enough for the President to weigh in on who was in charge, to today where, even after an obvious failure to deal with the duties of occupation until it turned into an insurgency we still have not changed our way of doing business. Everyone can find someone else to blame and are happy to leave it at that.

As the Land Component Command it would seem the Army would take this more seriously. It is our job to deal with things that happen on the land ... where everyone lives. Apparently we are content to let everything go to hell so we can have an insurgency. I guess insurgencies are sexier than occupations.

So I pulled down the old DODI 3000.05 and it was pretty clear that the military is supposed to take the lead until other agencies can come in

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Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces , or international governmental organizations. In such circumstances, the Department will operate within U.S. Government and, as appropriate, international structures for managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the deployment and utilization of the appropriate civilian capabilities.

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Yet the Stability Operations manual never mentions this

OK, from what I can determine there are three types of military intervention that could be considered "Stability Operations." I exclude COIN as it still has their own separate doctrine (although it could fairly be argued that it is a subset of Stability Operations). The manual does mention Peace Operations in regards to conflict prevention

Peace Operations including Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and conflict prevention: military force invited or sent in to deal with a failure of the local state to deal with a crisis. This can be at the behest of international organizations or of the failing state itself although the term “host nation” seems to indicate that this is most often at the request of the state.

Occupation: A military force invades and occupies the territory of another sovereign. They become the de facto government but generally only administer government operations on a temporary basis with the intent of eventually turning it back over to the sovereign.

Annexation: A military force invades and occupies the territory of another sovereign. They become the de facto government and permanently displace the prior sovereign.

The current doctrine on Stability does not seem to deal with Occupation at all. It also does not mention the laws of the host nation except that the new or restored government must be legitimate in the eyes of the people. We are either in a Peace Operation mode or we are Annexing territory via the mechanism of regime change (and ultimately democratization).

Arguably, under some interpretations of human rights law, using the Right to Protect, we could argue that sovereignty exists in the body of the people and is only vested in the government by the population’s grant of authority. If that is the case, then we are in fact an occupying force since we are acting as the de facto power until it can be returned to the sovereign which is in the body of the people. It would take some tortured logic to assume that if we are instituting regime change the "host-nation" is found in the body of the people and they are supposed to be adminstering the government. In any case the invading force should be required to install a military government until there can be a transfer to civilian transitional authority can be formed and eventually a new local government created.

Under international law it is the military’s responsibility to administer this government in occupied territories with a constabulary force. It also makes the most sense since no other USG agency has that capability.

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The demand for civilian power exceeds the supply. Despite this clear preference for civilian-le responses, U.S. military capabilities are “more readily available, more strategically postured, and certainly better resourced” than its civilian tools.

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Rethinking Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction

So, it would appear that our current doctrine is missing something.

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Peace Operations including Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and conflict prevention: military force invited or sent in to deal with a failure of the local state to deal with a crisis. This can be at the behest of international organizations or of the failing state itself although the term “host nation” seems to indicate that this is most often at the request of the state.

Occupation: A military force invades and occupies the territory of another sovereign. They become the de facto government but generally only administer government operations on a temporary basis with the intent of eventually turning it back over to the sovereign.

Annexation: A military force invades and occupies the territory of another sovereign. They become the de facto government and permanently displace the prior sovereign.

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All three are apt to trigger a resistance insurgency within some % of the host nation populace. The likelihood of that growing over time regardless of how one acts, and almost immediately if one's actions are on their face illegitimate in the eyes of that population acting out.

Military stability is almost always going to be the simple establishment of some form and degree of artificial stability. A simple suppression of violence adequate to allow the rudimentary functioning of governance so long as that supppressive energy is sustained.

One key metric of if one is supporting or creating a system of artificial stability or not is to simply look at what the primary focus of security forces are. If the primary focus is to protect the government (both that of the intervening party and those they profess to be there to help) from some segment of the population, it is artificial stability. If the primary focus is to protect the people from each other so as to allow them to go about the daily pursuit of life, liberty and happiness in the context of their own culture, then it is most likely a system of natural stability that has been attained.

Many large, effective, long-stable states are artificially stable. The KSA is a poster child for this condition. China as well. These are the "Titanics": often perceived by many as "unsinkably" stable, when in truth they are quite brittle and vulnerable to rapidly sinking into an unstable or violent condition with little forewarning.

Just pulled down the U.S. Army's Peace keeping and Stability Operations Institutes GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION and found that the Geneva Convention is mentioned only once, in regards to educating the population.

Apparetly the Law of War does not apply to Stability Operations.

Check out the book "Civil affairs soldiers become governors" and the Small Wars Manual"

Civil Affairs: Soldiers become Governors looks like a great resource on how and why we ran Civil Affairs after WWII.

The desire to create doctrine for occupation was the result of the failures after WWI

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: IN WORLD WAR I INADEQUATE ARMY PREPARATIONS AND EVENTUAL CIVILIAN CONTROL

[Col. Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany, Rpt, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920, 4 Mar 20, pp. 56-57 (hereafter referred to as Hunt Rpt), OCMH files]

* * * All of the energy of the American army had been centered on an early decision in the field and there had been no opportunity to study the civil problems involved in an occupation of German territory. The American army therefore began its duties in occupied territory with only the scantiest information both of the particular situation confronting it and even of a broader nature, such as would permit it to intelligently frame an organization commensurate with its wide governmental powers. From the beginning therefore there was a crying need for personnel trained in civil administration and possessing knowledge of the German nation.1
It is extremely unfortunate that the qualifications necessary for a civil administration are not developed among officers in times of peace. The history of the United States offers an uninterrupted series of wars, which demanded as their aftermath, the exercise by its officers of civil governmental functions. Despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Porto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines and elsewhere, the lesson has seemingly not been learned. In none of the service-schools devoted to the higher training of officers, has a single course on the nature and scope of military government been established.

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And so, with WWII approaching we fixed the problem.

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UNTIL 1940 NO FIELD MANUAL FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[Memo, Brig Gen William E. Shedd, ACofS, G-1, for ACofS, G-3, 18 Jan 40, G-1 files, 9985-41]

1. Attached is an extract of a study, prepared by a student committee at the Army War College, pertaining to a proposed Basic Field Manual, entitled: Military Law, The Administration of Civil Affairs in Occupied Alien Territory. It is recommended that a Basic Field Manual be prepared and published by the War Department, using the attached study as a guide.

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It appears we may again be in a post WWI world with no realistic version of doctrine covering occupation and military governance.

Does anyone know why the chapter on Tranisitional Military Authority that was Chapter 5 in the FM 3-07 Stability Operations was not included in the ADRP 3-07 Stability Operations? It is referenced three times (with a note to see the FM) but it was not included. I am curious why.

Transitional Military Authority is the doctrinal term used by the US Army and is included in the ADRP 1-02 Terms and Military Symbols

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transitional military authority – A temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. (FM 3-07)

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It is not covered extensively, but it is mentioned.

I am now looking to see if it is nested in any of the planning doctrine. Below is the only reference I can find. It was from the ADRP 3-0.

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Stability is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities
conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or
reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergencyinfrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (See JP 3-0.) Army forces conduct stability tasks
during both combined arms maneuver and wide area security. These tasks support a host-nation or an
interim government or part of a transitional military authority when no government exists. Stability tasks
involve both coercive and constructive actions. They help to establish or maintain a safe and secure
environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability tasks can also help
establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions while supporting the transition to legitimate hostnation
governance. Stability tasks cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives. Stability tasks
must maintain the initiative by pursuing objectives that resolve the causes of instability. (See Army
doctrine on stability tasks.)

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Not a lot.

Should Military Governance Guidance return to its Roots?

Good short article by then Colonel, now LTG Vanroosen.