Where Are Our Priorities Focused…Lack of Knowledge of Basic Enemy Capabilites
Where Are Our Priorities Focused…Lack of Knowledge of Basic Enemy Capabilites
About three days ago, I had a student that was completely lost during the FTX of the All-Source Intelligence Analyst Course (35F). I was bringing up points on knowing your enemy, their capabilities, what they are equipped with, how this effects you as an intelligence analyst, and how you need to take your knowledge of the enemy to better brief the Commander.
We started to discuss the aspects of the scenario, who the players were, what they were doing, what the pattern of life was, and eventually…we got on the topic of…What are they using to attack us.
I asked a few questions regarding weapons that were within the scenario that would pose a threat to friendly forces operating in that area. I was asked by the student who is about to graduate…
“You mean we need to know enemy weapons too???”
The student was being honest and sincere in their question, which made it hit me that much harder.
What I have been finding out is that there is the focus of targeting, data mining, COIN, etc., however intelligence analysts and combat arms troops alike can not differentiate between an AK-47, AKM, AKMS, or AK-74. I sat through a brief today, and was told that a PKM fires 5.45x45mm, and that an AK-74 is the same as a PKM, that is the same as an AK-47. The other day, the student was doing a scenario brief and tried to explain how the indicator to Indirect Fire (IDF) on a FOB was directly related to SA-7’s and DSHK Machine Guns found in a cache located near where IDF was reported to have been fired from. When I asked, acting as the commander, what the primary target of an SA-7 was, I came to find out that they did not know that it was a Surface-To-Air MANPAD weapon, and is not a weapon utilized in IDF attacks.
Additionally, I asked the students today what the difference between a 7.62x39mm and 7.62x54r was, and how that effected what may be found in a cache and how it might be related to a threat to troops in that area. Not one out of (24) students knew the difference, or could explain that the scenario that was presented to them included the application of that basic knowledge.
What I am finding is that we used to have playing cards that had Warsaw Pact aircraft and tanks on them that were commonly found in units. Only to now find that the students cannot differentiate between the application of an AK-47, and a Dragunov. After (4) months of courseware, these same students had no idea that a DSHK 12.7mm machine gun could take out a helicopter. Well…the problem arose that they didn’t even know what I was taking about at first until I showed them a picture.
What is going on with our training? What is it that the higher commands are expecting from our intelligence professionals, when all they know how to do is to identify data trends in a database? The current focus on upper echelon commanders has trickled down into our analysts not knowing basic information about how to research enemy capabilities, or knowledge of what they use.
I can understand if they have trouble differentiating between a VOIED, RCIED, etc., but to not know anything about weapons that are out there??? The Taliban utilizes weapons that are not lasers, or plasma guns, but basic weapons that have been around since their initial design in the 1940’s with only improvements in design, but still remain similar to the old.
I am finding that the analyst of today is useless without their computer, and unable to perform basic link analysis, enemy capabilities knowledge, or knowledge of common threats to our troops…which includes the everyday weapons that wound or kill our soldiers that leave the wire.
If training was outcome based instead of process based
you wouldn't have that -- really unforgivable -- problem. The Task, Condition, Standard based model of training was never appropriate for a military force and was foisted on the Army by a series of civilian Education 'professionals.' It needs to go...
We need to apply Outcome Based Training and Education totally and rapidly instead of in spots and sporadically.
That some individuals or units are able to transcend the existing system is a compliment to them and the few people who got the extra mile to try to properly train them.
Like you. Thanks for doing that -- you might have helped someone keep some folks alive down the road...
Good response, VED. I'm also in the 'would expect' mode.
Not least because I've seen too many demonstrate they can do analysis -- and embarrass a senior soul or two in the process. You didn't even mention that if you don't start 'em out properly, they will not perform well later when they will be expected by everyone to think and do a decent job.
If we do not break this "Joe isn't paid to think..." mentality then Joe will continue to try to avoid thinking to the maximum possible extent; most currently see it as part of their job description.
OTOH, if you demand that Joe think, he will -- and we'll ALL be better off and perhaps Officers and NCOs can start spending less than 90% of their time on 10% of their people -- while ignoring the others to raise themselves. That 'lowly enlisted swine' attitude possessed by a few has done the US Army no favors...:mad:
Too terribly true -- and why, yes, I can...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
JMA
Never in the history of warfare have there been more intel analysts and other assorted odd bodies yet the ability to join the dots in a place such as Afghanistan appears to be unimproved from the distant past.
That is true and the Staffs are far too large. However, I will defend the folks that are there by saying the Strategic and policy failures that put and keeps them there and which rules their day to day conduct intrudes significantly on their ability to accomplish as much as they should be able to.
Having said that, I believe the blocking points -- there are several -- lie here and in this order:
LINK.
LINK.
LINK.
In short, the blocking points are overall US bureaucracy, organizational self serving systems and processes and marginal training inculcating a lack of trust and a reliance on processes rather than people.
It's that simple -- but that is extremely difficult to remediate.
Good news is the Kids mostly make it work in spite of the system...
Helluva way to fight a war. :mad:
Kids don't know how to think
Quote:
Originally Posted by
JMA
Never in the history of warfare have there been more intel analysts and other assorted odd bodies yet the ability to join the dots in a place such as Afghanistan appears to be unimproved from the distant past.
Ken, you seem to believe that if you set these guys free they will do the job that's expected of them? So where exactly is the blocking point in the system? Can you point your finger on it?
I tend to agree with Ken; give them proper training and guidance and they will do the job, and many will do it well. They majority just need a sense of purpose.
In my experience, one blocking point is in how we train intelligence analysts. At Huachuca, we teach them tools and process, but I think we fail to teach them how to extract anything useful from the whole process. Some of the kids seem to get it, but they're usually from that part of the population I call "the naturals," inherently inclined and gifted for this kind of work. The majority need to be taught critical thinking skills and how to synthesize intelligence from information. During FTX briefings, I would constantly hammer students on the "so what" factor. I would ask them "Why is this important?" and I would get the deer-in-the-headlights look. This goes back to their civilian education (or lack thereof), but I'll refrain from that rant.
So why do we not train on this? My theory is that it is too difficult to teach and too difficult to evaluate. TRADOC likes clear cut answers and well-defined metrics for success and failure; analytical work is essentially nebulous and difficult to define as right or wrong becuase it's not necessarily the final answer, but the thought process (as opposed to the mechanical process we teach) that matters.
The second blocking point is how we (fail to) lead young analysts. MI NCOs are often deficient in leadership skills, especially when it comes to mentoring and developing young troops. Many are too preoccupied with their own ambitions and fail to see that Soldier development can fast track them to their personal goals. So they marginalize the youngsters and offer them nothing; no training, no encouragement, no motivation. And then we wonder why they misbehave and won't work.