Here is a link to a new essay by historian Dick Kohn in the journal World Affairs on senior American military leadership and what Kohn argues is a failure to be able to do strategy.
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Here is a link to a new essay by historian Dick Kohn in the journal World Affairs on senior American military leadership and what Kohn argues is a failure to be able to do strategy.
Thanks for the link! A very interesting essay.
Not sure what to make of it - I agree with much but I think parts are stereotyped.
I think the politicization worry is somewhat overblown, and am not sure that retired officers have an obligation to remain silent and neutral. I don't think his argument applies outside the GO corps.
And frankly, it may be that the political "firewall" is part of what keeps us from developing effective comprehensive approaches to conflict. If war is ultimately political, we must be trained in that battlefield as well. Of course, partisanship by serving officers remains verboten.
I do think we haven't had much strategic direction, because I think the military expects its civilians to do that for us. They decide, we execute has been the mantra of past years. Our strategic deficit may be because we outsourced our strategic planning to think tanks and politicians. Just off the cuff thoughts.
I also know the professor was savaged by the salty majors in ILE when he visited a few weeks ago.
;)
Good article.
Agree with his descriptions of failures with the caveat that he's being very polite...
Don't agree with all his fixes -- though most would be an improvement. He makes the same mistake most outsiders (including some in uniform...) tend to make, reforming the Monster starting in high places. Won't work, all the Bull Elephants are too set in their ways. They aren't going to change and will not initiate meaningful improvement.
We have created an institution that is risk averse and that stifles innovation. the only way to fix that in a large bureaucratic organization is start at the bottom. Educate the incoming kids, Enlisted and Officer, forcing them to exercise initiative, take risks and to plan things correctly and the system will improve.
You can start that with your charges... :D
I think the professional requirement is what is said where and when rather than who. All ranks should remember that they are now retired and they should be circumspect in comments.Quote:
Originally Posted by Cavguy
Because they have no responsibility for the issues.Just so. They allow senior leaders to be lazy avoid responsibility, put their Staffs to work on pet projects -- and the Think Tanks do not do it well at all.Quote:
Our strategic deficit may be because we outsourced our strategic planning to think tanks and politicians.
Because they have no responsibility for the product...
You're right. But now you have to accomplish it while performing the trick of not getting trampled by the Bull Elephants. :wry:Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
Not always as easy as it might seem:(Quote:
Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger
The bulls don't move all that quick... :D
On a serious note, I've never really had one give me static if I was right in what I wanted to do. I have occasionally had some ask (yes, ask; not tell) me not to do a certain thing to preclude an adverse reaction from on high (almost always correctly in hindsight). There are those that operate by trying to get what used to be called the Indian Sign by trying to bulldoze you and snarling a lot -- all you have to do is snap back at them (but be right when you do :wry:).
The key with all Bulls is finding a fence they can jump to get to the cows -- or cutting the top few strands of the fence so they can leap it. You can also politely show them a gate they weren't aware of and wait until it's their idea to use that gate.
Do not tell them how great they are (they know that) or try to bring them a cow, both those things are sycophancy (to clean it up) and they'll spot it, use it, use you and then throw you away like an old washrag.
Never ever try milking them. THAT is bad ju ju... :D
I got some very mixed messages from this piece, and they suggest shallow thinking.
Re: politicization - "Officers now vote, in substantially higher percentages than the general population; they identify themselves as Republican or Democrat, and less as independent or non-partisan, much more than the American people as a whole."
This guy needs to get over it. The irony of complaining that officers vote is that most vote by absentee ballots which frequently are not counted at all. Officers exercising civic responsibility. The shock and horror of it all, and to make it worse, they have the audacity to not be independents. If the issue is that officers vote "in substantially higher percentages than the general population", whose fault is this? Kohn should be kvetching about the lack of civilian voter turn out. This is the worst sort of inflammatory populist tripe.
Re: retired officers speaking out - Retired officers should stop speaking out when retired academics and retired politicians stop speaking out. Is the problem that they speak out, or that they have more credibility than other retirees? Candidly, it sounds like retired military officers have opposed his interests and this is his petty way of getting back at them.
Re:
"Now there are many other factors in the Iraq War about which the American civilian leadership was even more derelict than the military"
"(T)he Army War College, dedicated to the mission of educating “strategic leaders,” teaches “about strategy,” in the words of a faculty member there, but not “how to develop strategy.”"
"(T)he navy seems actually to have subordinated strategy to the capabilities of its fleets rather than designing its fleets to fit the larger needs of American foreign policy and national security strategy."
The first point is the key one. National strategy is set by civilian leaders. The AWC is doing exactly the right thing, as it is not a soldiers place in a democratic nation to set national strategy. The Navy is acquiring the fleet Congress approved, again as a reflection of Congress' national strategy. Does Kohn lack the fortitude to look our elected officials in the eye and tell them that they need the education in strategy? And for someone so upset of over the politicization of the officer corps, he is awfully quick to recommend that military leaders do civilian leaders' jobs.
He complains about the politicization of the officer corps, but whines that officers aren't doing the civilian leadership's jobs for them.
Re:"a growing careerism that has led to micro-management from above and a sense that any defect will derail a career, which in turn leads to risk aversion and sometimes to cover-ups, avoidance of responsibility"
The Long War has taken the edge off this problem. Careerism appears to be a poison that enters the military in peacetime. Eight years of continuous conflict have reduced the damage inflicted by the early 1990s draw-downs where 'zero defects' was a survival trait.
His recommendations:
-1. choose a greater proportion of candidates with demonstrated intellectual as well as operational and command ability
-2. undertake a systematic effort to eradicate the careerism, anti-intellectualism, and politicization of their officer corps
-3. institute programs of continuing education to be pursued by officers on their own, separate from and in addition to intermediate and advanced professional military education in residence or by correspondence.
-4. make certain that officers at commissioning are fluent in a foreign language and conversant with a foreign culture, and senior service schools should revise theirs so that strategy, leadership, and command are the focus of a war college education. are the focus of a war college education.
1. The services basically require graduate education to go past O-4. Yes there are exceptions, but a masters is the norm (and minimum) for O-5 and up.
2. "Anti-intellectualism"? Has he actually spoken with General Petraeus, Gen. Caldwell, or Gen Lorenz(USAF AETC cdr)? Politicization and careerism were previously addressed.
3. Continuing education for officers outside PME? We're seeing officers get passed over for not completing PME, where do we find the time and resources to support this? Also, has he looked at the PME curriculum? What else are we supposed to study?
4. I was under the impression that the foreign language requirement was already in place. Re:"strategy, leadership, and command " in war collges, again, has even made an effort to check his research? Has he spoken to anyone at a war college?
These are some shockingly stale and sterotyped accusations that have made it to print with no fact checking and flawed internal consistency.
focusing on "trained in that battlefield" -Quote:
from Cav
And frankly, it may be that the political "firewall" is part of what keeps us from developing effective comprehensive approaches to conflict. If war is ultimately political, we must be trained in that battlefield as well. Of course, partisanship by serving officers remains verboten.
Is "that battlefield" a political battlefied ?
If so, what does it look like ?
And, finally, what kind of training ?
I'm not sure what idea you are floating here - or, whether the paragraph is not internally inconsistent. I.e., all politics (even politics solely issue-oriented and not tied to a political party) are inherently partisan - you have at least two sides hammering and yammering at each other.
Stream of consciousness - Van articulated my thoughts better. Basically the same. I don't see officers voting as the downfall of the profession, or retired officers voicing opinions as a threat to the republic.Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
Niel
Ya All*h! Thank you for saying it first.Quote:
Originally Posted by Van
There was much I could agree with if for example I thought that "tortoises are stealthy" - rather than just slow and thus usually quiet.
I have a great deal of respect for many US Officers, and I don't adhere to any of the popular stereotypes, bar the few that consistently let the side down.
To my mind these men have always suffered from the "how to do something" mindset, rather than the "why to do something" mindset. This creates a self defeating mechanism, when the why has to be invented to justify the how. - and that is WHY these men
- either ignore or corrupts military history to the degree to they do.
- look at other conflicts and armies and consistently draw the wrong conclusions in terms of informing their own decisions.
- promote faulty and misleading concepts, as forcing mechanisms for their agendas.
This all gets covered in a thick layer of pseudo-intellectualism, and poor writing, using silly words, so the ultimate output is actually quite attractive.
- and strangely I feel that a fair few of us share this belief, yet SWC appears not to be forum in which to present it. - and yes I am an opinionated SOB, but you be reading this post if I wasn't. :eek:
I think a greater concern is if the military is being used for domestic gain by political factions at home, and if so, how that influences military decision-makers, the reputation and effectiveness of the armed forces, and the public perception of servicemembers. There are other questions: where does politics end, and where does it begin? The defense budget is a major political issue -- so where does that put the obligations of military officers? Are National Guard officers to be treated differently (as far as this issue is concerned) than Regular Army? What effect, if any, does the internet and other free media have on the 'politicalization' of the officer corps? Is the military's role in strategy different than its role in policy? Has there been an encroachment of civilian authority into traditionally military spheres (i.e. strategy)? And is there any relevance to the absence of an overwhelming moral cause of purpose (i.e. Pearl Harbor, 9/11, Lusitania, USS Maine, etc) for the Iraq War (and some could argue the Afghanistan war, also) that may contribute to this dispute?
I'm curious how other democratic countries handle this issue, if it is an issue at all. I'm also curious the extent the general academic narrative and the military's own narrative align with the historical record, which raises all kinds of questions about real and perceived American traditions.
EDIT: Also, to which is the greater moral obligation: obedience to (civil) authority (loyalty/duty) or one's sense of goodness (integrity/personal courage)? Is this question compounded by the belief that soldiers are citizens first?
Agreed. It would fit nicely in the why do liberal professiors hate the military?thread because it fits that category nicely.Quote:
Originally Posted by Van
nor do I.Quote:
from Cav
I don't see officers voting as the downfall of the profession, or retired officers voicing opinions as a threat to the republic.
As to the third part of Kohn's article, starting here:
I simply do not see it based on what I see here; and among the actives and retireds who inhabit my little world.Quote:
Related to these strategic and political failures are possible moral deficiencies among the officer corps, which have arisen in the last few years.
When I compare the "moral deficiencies" of similar management and leadership classes in the broader civilian world (including my own profession), there is no comparison.
I do see problems with the civilian-military interface (which I perceive to be the focus of Kohn's 1st two points - strategy and politics). We have to communicate better - something about hanging together, or hanging separately.
that this the article is 100% USA centric. That said, based on my knowledge and experience of the US mil , it is also nearly 100% assertion and prejudice. I think Niel and Van nailed apt responses,
Cheers
Mark
If he had then he might have recognized that what he is bemoaning is largely an example of such a catch.
On one hand, he describes the lack of strategic abilty, which he also miscategorizes (my opinion, to argue it here is a distraction) as an intellectual failing. On another, he complains about partisanship. I submit that he is arguing along these 2 lines: To be a military strategist requires one to be political; to be political is antithetical to being a military member. For what it is worth, I believe that being partisan is a necessary condition to choosing/fighting for a strategy. Perhaps Kohn and I just have different meanings for partisan and politics.
I am also at somewhat of a loss for his support of LTC Yingling's point about differing punishments for a lost weapon and a lost war. Privates usually have direct control over actions taken to secure their weapons. Flag officers are not so lucky about the degree of control they have in prosecuting wars. Generals do not lose wars by themeselves. They often have to fight the nation's opppnents with one had tied behind their backs. I guess that is as it should be because, according to Kohn's view of things, they are not supposed to be political partisans.
Perhaps our writer might want to review the literature out there on personal and public ethics--the notion that what one does in one's job comes with a set of ethical strictures that may be quite different than the rules one follows as a private citizen. Another point that relates here is the author's unhappiness about the use of contractors. A large number of contractors are former military members who choose to continue to serve in a way that is in keeping with the prior commitment to be apolitical while in uniform. Once the unifrom comes off, former officers may return to support the nation in a way that has a different set of ethical norms.
The UNC-CH basketball staff seems better at its task than this member of its academic faculty.
BTW, was anyone else put off by the use of lower case letters to start Army, Air Force, and Navy, but uppercase for the Marines. Seems like another instance of inconsistent thinking by the author .
Yet it is argued in defense of military participation in the political process (i.e. voting) that soldiers are citizens first, and therefore "the rules one follows as a private citizen" ought to supercede the "ethical structures" in "one's job".Quote:
Originally Posted by wm
Yet those companies with which contractors are employed are not apolitical.Quote:
Originally Posted by wm
I think it is important for the purposes of this conversation to differentiate "political" and "partisan".
From the bio blurb, Kohn was air force, not a Marine - so that's not an explanation. As they say, Colonialement :DQuote:
from wm
BTW, was anyone else put off by the use of lower case letters to start Army, Air Force, and Navy, but uppercase for the Marines.
that is an excuse then, as he wasn't in the military....Quote:
Originally Posted by jmm99
(tongue firmly in cheek):rolleyes:
To posit a decline one has to either assume or demonstrate that things were somehow better in the past. If Kohn believes that there was some golden moment when the officer corps (as a whole) was:
1. Apolitical
2. Intellectual
3. Not prone to micromanagement
4. A moral exemplar
5. Capable of seamlessly integrating tactics, operations, and strategy
I wish he would point it out.
The greatest measurement for the effectiveness of the military instrument is whether it wins its nation's wars. So the military may or may not have been more apolitical, intellectual, macro-managed, moral, and capable in the past, but that does not mean that the condition of those things have not contributed to a posited decline in American warfighting power. If it is true that the military now lacks a fundamental understanding of strategy, for example, it should reveal itself in American wars where even if battlefield victory was attained, the political objectives sought were not secured.Quote:
Originally Posted by Eden
"The second is political: the absence from the officer corps of partisan political divisions, its subordination to the legally constituted civilian authorities in charge of the state, and its ability to establish an effective working partnership or collaboration with the civilian political leadership regardless of party or faction."
The DC relationship is more often adversarial with the military constantly under the light of interrogation accused of wasting money or abusing people.
The author goes on to whine about retired, senior Officers aligning themselves with political candidates. Conversely, individual Constitutional entitlements should then be defined by occupation but everybody thought it was wonderful when Joe the Plumber got in the lime light.
My favorite:
"......This may require further de-emphasis of mathematics, science, and engineering at the academies, on the grounds that war is first and foremost a human phenomenon, not a technical or engineering problem."
-right, who needs abstract thinking ability these days........
He did fail there, although I suspect it's partly due to the nature of the article and (possibly) limits set by the journal.Quote:
Originally Posted by Eden
It's been my read that the officer corps has never actually hit the "perfect" state in all of the above areas, although they have been more capable in some areas than others at various times in the past. In many cases the corps was apolitical only because they couldn't actually vote (due more to a lack of absentee voting mechanisms or postings in territories where no one could vote in national elections), but the level of internal politics and willingness to use political connections to gain desired postings was always high (especially in the days when there was a clear separation between the Line and the Staff...). As for moral exemplar...obviously one would have to ignore a great deal of stuff to make that claim. Like any other group, some come closer than others to the ideal.
There was a time when micromanagement was limited, but that was more due to widely dispersed units and a lack of rapid communication systems (and one could also contend that it was before the rise of "business school methods" in the post-World War II Army). Some commanders tried to micromanage, but the results were usually sub-par (imagine that...). I still think that in many ways our personnel system aggravates the flaws that might exist.
As an aside, it's kind of interesting to see the reaction to stereotyping and such when with a few word changes Kohn's comments could be quite similar to some of the rants against academics we've seen on this board.;) (just an observation...)
He did in a rather left-handed way with his comments about the military that won World War II. Reading his piece somewhat reminded me of reading Vegetius, who spends a lot of his verbage extolling the virtues of the Republican-era Roman legionnaires (who probably never really existed), or Tactitus' discussion in either his Germannia or Agricola, 2 examples of panegyric with significant hidden agendas.Quote:
Originally Posted by Eden
The more things change, the more they stay the same.
Micromanagement waxes and wanes, as I'm sure Ken and Tom can attest to. We used to refer to higher ranking micromanagers as "Squadleader 6". There are tales from Vietnam of multiple command and control helicopters stacking up over a single firefight in order to "help" the engaged unit. As a young officer, my favorite "get off my back" technique was to answer a radio call from higher with some garbled throat sounds, then turn off the radio.
I ain't buyin' the political thing either. I served as an apolitical, but voting officer. You think I'm not going to vote for someone who is going to define my life for the next four years? Maybe send me off to a BS war somewhere? On a coupla different occasions I have worked with foreign armies where bennies as low as battalion command were handed out by party. Trust me, we are not a political military.
others disagree. IMO, A professional volunteer force for any nation should not have a vote. That 'soldiers as citizen first' mantra is touted by politicians and it is certainly applicable in times of conscription. Thus far that includes the Civil War, the two World Wars and half of the Cold War -- note only half -- the rest of the time the professional armed forces were legally allowed to vote but traditionally most did not do so.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
Many support your position, few today will support mine but I think the matter deserves serious thought on the basis that politicization is bound to occur with excessive emphasis on the 'citizen' aspect. That does not bode well.Many will be able to meld the issues but some will not and that will create -- has created -- problems. Fortunately, mostly minor. Thus far...Of course they aren't -- they are massive campaign contributors because it's in their interest to do so. The armed forces are not big contributors, the contractors are -- that's why the contractors are about in such massive numbers, Congress appreciates their help...:mad:Quote:
Most in Congress do not really court the military vote because it is pretty evenly distributed (all ranks) between R, D, Independent and totally uninterested and the absentee ballots often do not get counted (another thread, that). Those factors account for Congress basically wanting fewer people in the Armed forces as a general rule.Totally agree with that, only pointing out that one tends to lead to the other. That is not terribly significant in a multi-party democracy, it is quite a different thing in a two party state where politics tend to be polar and not diffuse.Quote:
I think it is important for the purposes of this conversation to differentiate "political" and "partisan".
P.S
Old Eagle came in while I was doing my hunt and peck routine. He says he always voted -- so did I -- but two of those votes were for Kennedy and Carter, another was for Goldwater. That proves my voting in what I thought was my interest was a crap shoot. Not a very good one at that...
He also says:True and hopefully we'll avoid that disaster.Quote:
"Trust me, we are not a political military."
Apolitical military in the mythical past: GEN winfield Scott, while on active duty, ran for POTUS as a Whig in 1852. MG George B. McClellan was actively opposing his commander-in-chief, A. Lincoln while in command of the Army of the Potomac and ran for Pres in 1864 (after he'd been fired).
Do we give up our rights as US citizens because we put on the uniform? some yes but mainly no. there is also a difference between the active and reserve components. Sen Lindsay Graham is a USAFR Colonel. there are still a few states that elect their Adjutant Generals and a significant number where the position is a purely political appointment. Note that a RC officer writing for publication does not have to get a security review of what he writes before it is published if he is (1) not on active duty and (2) not required to do so because of his civilian DOD (or OGA) job.
Strategy: I know one of the AWC faculty members quoted by Kohn here. But his complaint was based not on the issue of national strategy but rather on the strategies that officers produce by law and policy. Remember that the Goldwater-Nichols Act charged the CJCS to produce the National Military Strategy. Every unified command is required to produce its strategy by policy. Unless officers at the war colleges are required to learn to do strategy, how can they meet their legal obligations. (BTW I ran the SOUTHCOM Policy & Strategy shop in 1988 and 89 and was resposible for GEN Woerner's last strategy as well as GEN Thurman's.) In addition, the process of developing the National Security Strategy (NSS) - called for in the GNA - and the Defense Strategy (instituted by SECDEF Rumsfeld) requires military input.
Cheers
JohnT
Professor Kohn’s essay is an interesting piece, and captures a valid sentiment: America needs a cost effective strategy in order to meet the demands of our Nations range of desires and responsibilities. I’ll state the obvious assumption: the Department of Defense was created in order to conduct a large part of our Nations strategy and it is allocated a large part of our Nations resources in order to do so. Professor Kohn is of the opinion, however, that DOD is not providing an adequate return on the Nations investment.
Fair enough, he is a fellow taxpayer, and I applaud him for taking the time and effort to try and identify areas where we can improve.
My education, training, and experience have helped me to understand that in order to identify, define, and solve a problem one must understand the context of the problem and solution as well as have the appropriate skills to respond. Professor Kohn correctly identifies the importance of education, training, and experience for DOD personnel, however like Goesh I keyed in on the glaringly apparent failure to internalize the power of teamwork:
My drill sergeant taught me a valuable lesson very early in my career. A team is stronger than an individual…after 48 hours an individual needs sleep, an individual cannot watch all avenues of approach at once, etc. etc. Professor Kohn appears to subscribe to the mistaken idea that mathematics, science, engineering, and humanities can’t successfully team up to solve national strategy issues.Quote:
This may require further de-emphasis of mathematics, science, and engineering at the academies, on the grounds that war is first and foremost a human phenomenon, not a technical or engineering problem.
Contrary to Professor Kohn’s assertions the history of our nuclear forces to include Strategic Air Command and the Navy’s Submarine force, among others, are an example of the successes of this multidisciplinary approach. Proof positive are all of the free standing American and Russian populations.
Iraq 2003-06 (pre-surge) is a recent example of a failure to successfully create and employ an integrated mathematics, science, engineering, and humanities approach to warfare. Proof positive is our failure to consistently recognize the importance of the Iraqi population with the resultant exacerbation of the conflict. Afghanistan appears to follow this same pattern.
With respect to assertions of a political officer-corps, any one who would like to make these mostly baseless assertions needs to simply join and serve. My observation is that politically active officers are outliers in the general population and are dealt with appropriately. The assertion of a political officer corps is a red herring, which does not serve to identify, define, and solve our national strategy problems.
Fortunately the pace and requirements of the conflicts we have chosen to engage in are purging the force of dead weight and forcing the re-examination of faulty assumptions concerning American strategy, operations, and tactics. Professor Kohn would benefit from some more time spent in the field with USMC and US Army forces and we would benefit from his observations after this experience.
I think there are several pendulums in play.Quote:
Originally Posted by Eden
The intellectual aspect is closely tied to the failure to integrate contemplative and active values as has been discussed in a couple of other threads. This can get challenging as academics will never accept that the military is intellectual enough. On the other hand, the demands of protracted small wars (2001 -present, over seven years and counting) have nudged this pendulum in the intellectual direction to what may be an unprecedented degree.
Micromanagement is a common vice in the types of folks who have the capacity and will to become military leaders, but in peacetime, micromanagement gets more commonplace as there are fewer opportunities to excel. Come wartime, the value of Auftragstaktik comes to the front again. And the military is not homogenous, commander's intent may be the byword of one organization while a unit supporting them is closely micromanaged.
The moral exemplar... I think this is tied to the respect or contempt paid the military by the population. This is also a chicken and egg issue. Contempt from the population leads to seedier people seeking the military as a career, leading to a more contemptible military. Respect from the population inspires the military to raise and enforce standards, and a positive spiral. Again, that pendulum swings.
Seamlessly integrating tactics, operations, and strategy; We're not perfect, but we may be approaching the limits of what can be done based on influences and limitations imposed from outside the military. As long as the military remains subordinate to civil leadership, the military is sharply limited in what influence it has over strategy. Strategy drives operational art, which the military is pretty good at, achieving the goals handed down from civil leadership. Tactics are based on timeless principles, but shaped by technology. There is certainly room for improvement in the integration of emerging technologies into tactics and doctrine. I believe that the military has acknowledged that the young warriors in all branches have the creativity to identify new tools and TTPs. The services have begun to leverage the technological savvy of the young folks to bring new tools into use and provided them, the smart young folks, with tools to share and disseminate their ideas.
Apolitical... I've been thinking long and hard on this one. The first thing that was left hanging in the article is "By whose scale?" The American officer corps is deep into the apolitical end of the spectrum when compared to all the militaries of the world. Within our own spectrum, from least politically oriented to most, the pendulum may be swinging towards the more politically oriented and active end of the scale. But this still has us way over to the apolitical end of the spectrum in the broader sense. This may be a reflection of the intense polarization of the American political spectrum right now, which in turn, is a consequence of the 24 hr news cycle and the business of entertainment masquerading as televised journalism. When the extreme of one end of the political spectrum is aggressive and vocal in their contempt of the military, it is only natural that members of the military migrate to the other end of the spectrum. It is equally natural that when the military is attacked unceasingly and viciously, that the military members want to defend themselves. Given some of the criticisms and attacks, the military members should be commended on their restraint.
[RANT]This arrogant and intellectually slovenly article should inspire SWC members in academia to take this moral coward to task. The single most important question for him is 'why focus on the military with these out-dated and ill-considered accusations?' The answer is obvious, but I suspect that Kohn would lack the integrity to admit that the military is an easy and popular target, and attacking the media, academia, and the civil government for their responsibilities in the issues he brings up wouldn't get him the attention he obviously craves.[/RANT]
He's got some errors of the past pegged but he's off on much else, including his fixes. At first, I dismissed it as another Air force ploy to depict the Army as unworthy and intellectually deficient -- then I recalled Hanlon's Razor...:wry:Quote:
Originally Posted by Van