The Iraqization of Africa?
The Iraqization of Africa?
Looking at AFRICOM from a South African Perspective
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The South African government has openly expressed its opposition towards the creation of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM).1 What’s more, South Africa presents its position on AFRICOM as representative of the country as a whole, but particularly on behalf of a group of African countries—the Southern African Development Community (SADC)— which holds an aversive stance towards US plans in this regard.2 This does not represent a radical change in South Africa’s ruling African National Congress’s (ANC) general policy stance towards the United States over the last 10 or more years. While this is not the place to dissect South Africa’s policy towards the United States in general, it is important to ask critical questions
about the legitimacy of the South African government’s position—and that of some other African countries—towards AFRICOM. The discussion is an effort to examine some of the considerations that underpin this scepticism about US motives towards Africa.
AFRICOM and the perception mess
This issue has popped up on a number of threads, and I think it deserves its own discussion.
Moderator's Note
Thread closed on 3rd November 2012 as the main AFRICOM thread also has posts on perceptions.The main AFRICOM thread is:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6167
A post by KingJaja on a Nigeria thread is a good place to start...
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That's not the point, perception is reality. All the "Als" - Al Qaeda, Al Jazeera and Al Sharpton realise that. That this simple fact is lost on the USG is tragic and difficult to understand.
A textbook case of "how not to do it" was the clumsy announcement of Africom's formation in 2008 and the equally more clumsy search for basing rights in Africa. These two events created a buzz in the local media and generated a lot of negative publicity. Today, the Africom brand is toxic.
An example of this brand toxicity....
http://concernedafricascholars.org/b.../78/abegunrin/
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AFRICOM is an example of U.S. military expansion in the name of the war on terrorism, when it is in fact designed to secure Africa’s resources and ensure American interests on the continent. AFRICOM represents a policy of U.S. military-driven expansionism that will only enhance political instability, conflict, and the deterioration of state security in Africa.
Again KingJaja raises a legitimate point:
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This is why the USG's misreading of the complex factors that shape public opinion here and its failure to sell its Africa policy to the African public is baffling. There are so many crazy stories flying up and down about America's intentions in SS Africa. If they are not countered, they could do real damage.
It is the job of the US State Department and Africom to contribute to informed opinion on Africom. If you cannot "encourage" prominent columnists / bloggers to write favourable stories, then you shouldn't be in the business of public diplomacy.
The problem here, again, is not reality, it's perception. Most people here realize that AFRICOM is little more than an administrative repackaging of programs that were already existing. Anyone who looks at the resources actually committed to AFRICOM can see that it can't even dream of trying to "secure Africa’s resources and ensure American interests". If anything the actual structure, location and resources of AFRICOM are a compelling testimony to American disinterest. That reality, though, is not the issue: the issue is the perception.
The question is how we managed to turn a minor administrative reshuffle into a public relations debacle, and how we can avoid doing it again.
Thoughts?
*Answer the question that was asked...*
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Originally Posted by
Misifus
One begs the question...does the US Army require one to have experience in Africa before one is appointed commander of AFRICOM?
No.
Answer the question that should have been asked: Should the US Army require one to have experience in Africa before one is appointed commander of AFRICOM? No, not necessarily because the number of persons senior enough to hold that Command who can have, much less will have, experience of Africa is microscopic if it exists at all.
Answer the question my answer will generate: To achieve an end state of Africom commanders possessing local experience would require two things; extensive and long US involvement with the Continent and / or promotion of African experienced FAOs to General Officers in sufficient quantities to provide a pool large enough for a constant stream of 4 Buttons. Neither of those is likely.
A remedy that is available is to better educate General Officers in the Army (or US Flag Officers in general) to pay more heed to their area specialists instead of relying on their ego centric determinations and to insure that African FAOs are heavily represented on the Africom staff instead of being placed in totally non-germane assignments. Does an African FAO need to be a Training Battlion XO? Almost certainly not. Nor will one do much good in PacCom, FORSCOM, TRADOC or US Northern Command.
In the design of Africom IIRC, they put an Ambassador nominally with African experience on the TDA, that too is necessary but someone needs to insure he's (a) not an incompetent; and (b) is listened to...
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In other words, do job specific skills matter, or do we just determine that we can put any "smart" guy in any position and therefore be assured of a good outcome. Would you drive your M-1 tank over a bridge that was designed by a cardiologist?
Excellent point. There are cases where certain skills matter a great deal, no question. There are others where they matter little. The US Army's problem is that it has been forced by Congress to take the position that rank is generic and not skill specific. That is, people must be selected for rank as fairly and objectively as possible and the system must cater to that by providing the skills and knowledges to allow the marginal person to perform at a minimum level of effectiveness.
Unfortunately, that's what the system manages to do -- head for that minimum level of effectiveness. No question that many, even most, in the Army transcend that and can do far more than hit that minimum level but too many can do little or no better yet they must be tolerated due to the 'fairness' stricture. :mad:
The fact that warfare isn't fair seems to have escaped notice...
Thus my answer to that problem is that the Army must do a better job of identifying what skills wil best contribute to war fighting and articulate a need for Congress to change OPM 21 and allied laws to allow the Personnel system (which needs to lose it's 1917 mindset...) to adapt, place needed skill where they are required and stop wasting money trying to make everyone equal in 'qualifications.' They will never be equal and we waste gallons of money trying fruitlessly to change that. The waste is a problem, a larger problem is the decrease in combat capability and effectiveness that waste produces...:rolleyes:
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How do we opine on the level of in-country or in-region experience needed at this level of command?
I opine that level of Command shouldn't exist -- but no one asked me. If it does exist as it obviously does, then the requirement for Staffers should insist on the maximum degree of local or area expertise and knowledge that is available.
The requirement that knowledge be employed is harder to enforce... :rolleyes:
I know most are aware of all that, just wanted to write it down... ;)