The Arab Spring (a partial collection)
Non-Proliferation, the Arab Spring, and Bin Laden: Why Nuclear Weapons may be a Good Idea for Dictators
Entry Excerpt:
Non-Proliferation, the Arab Spring, and Bin Laden: Why Nuclear Weapons may be a Good Idea for Dictators
by Mark Munson
The events of 2011, including the rapid spread of democratic social movements in the Middle East and the dramatic death of Osama bin Laden in a US special operations raid, provide insight into the state of global non-proliferation efforts and why possessing the nuclear option may seem even more rational today for the world’s dictators than in the past. The continued security relevance of nuclear weapons to states has been identified by figures as varied as AQ Khan, the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear program, and Bing West, former Reagan administration Defense Department official and author, who both recently argued that there would have been no military intervention against a nuclear-armed Libya (Khan presented his views in a May Newsweek column, West at a Center for New American Security conference in June).
Lieutenant Commander Mark Munson currently serves as the Intelligence Officer for Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR. He has previously served onboard USS ESSEX (LHD 2) and at the Office of Naval Intelligence.
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The Arab Spring: Notes on Nation-Building
The Arab Spring: Notes on Nation-Building
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Books to Read on the 2011 Arab Spring
Books to Read on the 2011 Arab Spring
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Wrapping Your Mind Around the Arab Spring: Recommended Reads
Wrapping Your Mind Around the Arab Spring: Recommended Reads
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Five Questions for America to Answer about Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, and Nation B
The Iranian View of Stage Two of the Arab Spring
The Iranian View of Stage Two of the Arab Spring
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I don't disagree with a general pattern ... but
Bob,
Don't disagree with the general pattern. I would say that you could compare it to the revolutions of 1848 in Europe. Even though things were changing they had not reached a tipping point toward republican rule. There were still powerful forces trying to hang onto the dynastic monarchies. Likewise, there are forces trying to maintain the power of religion in the Arab world. This may seem like BS to some (or most) but it seems pretty obvious to me.
In any case, the question isn't who is going to win, the question is, "why is it happening now?" I would argue that it has to do with a growing middle class ala Schumpeter (Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy). What that would mean is that force has little direct roll in the transition. It has to happen on its own.
Kind of off topic, but...
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Originally Posted by
TheCurmudgeon
In places like Afghanistan, where we cannot even succeed in meeting basic needs, you will never activate the need for autonomy on a wholesale level. Survival will be the predominant need and survival needs produce a different set of values - values based in collective survival.
An example of my argument from a non-Arab country. In the current Kenyan elections
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NAIROBI, Kenya — Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kenyan politician who has been charged by the International Criminal Court with crimes against humanity, was leading by a wide margin in the Kenya election on Tuesday, with nearly half the votes counted.
Mr. Kenyatta, who comes from one of the richest, most powerful families in Africa and has been accused of bankrolling death squads that killed women and children during the chaos of Kenya’s election five years ago, was leading 54 percent to 42 percent over the second-place candidate, Raila Odinga, Kenya’s prime minister.
He is preferred over candidates that are actually running on issues.
Quote:
But in the end, the presidential candidates who tried to gain momentum on issues-based campaigns, like Peter Kenneth and Martha Karua, got almost no votes. It seemed that most voters still felt the leader from their ethnic group was the best one to protect them — especially in an edgy environment where many fear a replay of post-election violence.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/wo...s&emc=rss&_r=0
In the end, what the people want is security and stuff. It is a patron-client system that does not have the economic stability - Kenyan per capita GDP in 2011 was $808 US according to the World Bank - to activate autonomy needs. They are not interested in knowing what their government does, they just want their government to provide them what they need to survive ... and they think they are more likely to get that if a member of their ethnic group is in charge.
1 Attachment(s)
Slap - Something to chew on
Slap,
Here is something I have been working on. I apologize for my inneptitude at inserting images.
[IMG]C:\Documents and Settings\s.wiechnik\My Documents\My Pictures\Governance Chart - Small[/IMG]
The three dimensions are economic capability on the left, nature of the source of legitimacy along the top, and category of value system along the bottom. Sources of legitimacy are based on either a centralized figure, like a king or dictator (essentially a client patron relationship); and decentralized meaning that the source of legitimacy is the population itself, as in a republican government. Along the bottom are the value systems: primarily communal or collective and individualistic or liberal. The result in the middle is the most probable stable government. Of course, where there is not consensus among the population on a value system or form of legitimacy you will have instability.
One of the problems Westerners have created is the modern State - particularly since many state borders were arbitrarily established. Many parts of the world like the Middle East and Africa have borders that don't make sense when compared with the functioning political systems. We perpetuate this mistake in places like Iraq, which probably should be three separate states.
Also we feel the need to replace any system that is not like ours. That is not the only way. South Africa still has many Chiefs. The state pays them but does not attempt to remove them. Many liberal minded people don't like this - yet South Africa is still considered a democracy. I think using traditional systems that still make sense where the economic and political conditions on the ground still support (demand) them is the best way to go. It is the only way to play the game if your goal is stability. We were wrong to try to replace a "warlord" system in Afghanistan with a central government when the economic conditions on the ground could not support it. The common joke is that Karzai is the mayor of Kabul and that is all he is. We would have been better off supporting the traditional loya jirga system that already existed, a form or fledgling republic. But, alas, our political objective is not always stability.
Anyway, enjoy
You know it is not going to be short when it starts with "The short answer is ..."
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Assuming this model is correct, and while I'm generally critical of social models that claim one size fits all situations regardless of cultural differences, I have to admit that your hypothesis about the underlying economic changes needed to facilitate social (and then political) change tend to ring true based off my observations and studies.
Assuming it is true, then it seems to me that our COIN doctrine is deeply flawed because we fail to recognize this evolution from economic, to social, and then to political change. In fact we attempt to reverse this evolution by first imposing political change (installing a democratic government), then attempting to build the economy, and then hope the social change follows.
That doesn't seem like a recipe for success to me.
If your model is generally correct and my critic of our COIN doctrine is generally correct, then what is the right the end for our military involvement and how do we achieve it?
The short answer is, I don't know.
The model was designed to explain why things were not going as I thought they should in Afghanistan. I was a firm believer in the liberal COIN model. After about five years I have come to this.
You are completely accurate in that my model says that economic changes facilitate social changes that result in political changes. This is a general pattern based on human needs and therefore should be applicable despite cultural differences. That is not to say that cultural differences don't matter. When there is a stable agricultural economy with some trading AND there is a communal value system the model predicts that any one of several communal systems can be stable - anything from a theocracy to a monarchy - even communism can work. The model is built on the idea of political legitimacy being associated with societal values. But, on occasion, legitimacy can be built on personality - Weber's Charisma - which throws a wild card into the mix. I can only guess at the probability of stability, I cannot guarantee it.
The model is more helpful in predicting instability based on a mismatch of economic and social factors than it is on saying which side will win out. For example, under that same scenario (stable agriculture with some trading but limited manufacturing and a communal value system) both a monarchy and a communist system could be stable. In a fight between the two the model is generally silent on which one will win out. It cannot predict which one of two monarchs are likely to win under the same conditions if there is an internal power struggle between factions. Likewise, in a separatist situation where both sides have the same economic and social conditions it is just as unhelpful. What it can do is predict that the odds of installing a functional democracy in a society that is barely living above subsistence level with strong collectivist (tribal) values is next to nil.
As for our current doctrine, you are also completely accurate when you say it has things backwards. This is its fatal flaw. Further, the FM 5-34 also only allows for one form of legitimacy, one built on individualistic values. That won't work in a collectivist society. You have to build a network of client/patron relationships. You have to support what westerners see as corruption and human rights violations. A difficult sell politically. Arreguin-Toft's model of strong/weak state and direct/indirect conflict is accurate in that the only way to suppress a weak state counterinsurgency is through barbarism. I would argue that this is not because the state is weak, it is because the weak state tend to have a different value system. The same economic conditions that make them weak predict that they have communal values that respond better to a show of brute strength than a helping hand. That said, I do not believe you have to resort to barbarism to keep order, but I don't know what mix of tactics best supports stability and does not run afoul of Western societal sentiments.
It is really not the economic conditions that matter, although that has been the best proxy I can come up with. It is more quality of life which would include things like security in all its forms (food, peace and stability, the belief in a better future, that my children will live to adulthood, that I will not be killed or have my property taken from me, and a job that pays my bills and then some). That is the catalyst that causes the people to transition from worrying about security to caring about autonomy and ultimately demanding more freedoms. As long as you keep the people scared and hungry (Ala North Korea) they will embrace dictatorship. So, if we are promoting democracy, we need to promote economic security and then wait, perhaps a generation or two, for the society to change. We must also realize that by doing this we are going to create instability. We have to learn to help control that instability and assist the society in it's transition. We can't do it for them.
Back to the question, I really don't know how much help this theory, which I shall dub my theory of conditional values, can be to COIN strategy. :wry:
I would add one comment. It is clear that this is a social, not a military, theory. That does not mean the Army is off the hook. Do to the conditions in regions where there is instability the Army is probably the only element that can function in that environment. We are the Land Forces Combatant Commander - which I translate into the Army being the occupying authority. We don't like that. We prefer big tank fights. But big tank fights are probably not in our future. The world is going to vacillate between communal and individualistic values for some time to come. I believe that we had better figure out how to manage the instability that is part and parcel to those transitions.
Ramblings And A Questions?
Marx believed all real change was based upon economics, part of his idea of of Creative Destruction which was a great deal different than Schumpeter's. It is also part of the reason he believed so much in focusing on Economic Targets as opposed to others, which seems to have been lost when he is talked about in the modern senses.
Now for the question. The model appears to be a way to analyze a country before you invade or commit to military action was that your intention? Proper understanding of the country/problem you are dealing with before jumping to a solution?
South Africa is an angry nation on the brink
Admittedly this is a link to South Africa, but I think it provides some insight into a country riven with problems, a high level of personal violence through crime, occasionally civil disorder and a political establishment seen by many as remote, corrupt and ineffective. Ah, not to overlook the role of the police service.
For this lady, Nelson Mandela's wife, Gracia Machel, to say this is not a good sign:
Quote:
South Africa is an angry nation..We are on the precipice of something very dangerous with the potential of not being able to stop the fall. The level of anger and aggression is rising. This is an expression of deeper trouble from the past that has not been addressed. We have to be more cautious about how we deal with a society that is bleeding and breathing pain.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...elas-wife.html
Predicting Nonviolent Revolt: Agency vs. Struture
Curmudgy, does this help? I think you could get access to some this guys Data.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GN5P5cmBFJA
Sayyid Qutb’s “Milestones” and Its Impact on the Arab Spring
Sayyid Qutb’s “Milestones” and Its Impact on the Arab Spring
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The Middle East's changing landscape
A strategic assessment of the Middle East's changing landscape by the London-based counter-extremism think tank and advocacy group, the Quilliam Foundation.
Introduction:
Quote:
At the end of 2010 a series of demonstrations started which shook the Arab world from Iraq to Morocco – a phenomenon commonly known as the “Arab Spring”. Beginning as a series of desperate protests against sudden escalations in food and energy prices, by the beginning of 2011, the uprisings had transformed into shows of frustration against and rejection of the autocratic governments in power over much of the Middle East region. The protesters taking part in the Arab Uprisings called for dignity, respect and democracy in place of the repression and intolerance which had for so long characterised the region in which they lived, often with covert support from the Western world. They succeeded in overthrowing several of the Middle East’s long-time autocrats in the hope for a democratic future. But what the rest of the world did not anticipate was that the efforts of these protesters could result in the rise in power of mainstream Islamist groups across the region.
Two years since the start of the Arab Uprisings, we now face a Middle East where politics have been dramatically transformed. Much to the surprise of the rest of the world, democracy has brought about the transition of mainstream Islamist groups from their historic position of opposition to that of official power. Tunisia and Egypt – the first countries to overthrow their autocratic governments in the Arab Uprisings - are now governed by Hizb al-Nahda and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, both of which despite being Islamist groups have been elected into power democratically. With such an unforeseeable political shift emerging and the fates of many post “Arab Spring” countries yet to be decided, it is important to ask how this transition in Tunisia and Egypt transpired in the first place and whether it is likely to have negative implications on the rest of the world.
Quilliam’s first strategic assessment, “The Middle East’s Changing Political Landscape”, provides an insight into Hizb al-Nahda and the Muslim Brotherhood so that we can begin to understand how and why they were able to gain public support and come into power democratically and more importantly, what this shift in power implies for the Middle East’s relations with the international community.
Noman Benotman, President of Quilliam (ex-LIFG), says:
'With many other Middle Eastern countries still undergoing their transition to democracy, it is critical that we are able to comprehend the reasons for the increase in popularity of mainstream Islamist groups as legitimate political powers. This strategic assessment provides such understanding of Hizb al-Nahda and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and serves as a critical analysis of how both these groups may steer their future relations with the international community.
Link to paper:http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp...-landscape.pdf