SWJ Small Wars Survey 2012
This one is up on the frontpage, but have at it down here in the trenches boys:D.
1. Great powers (and the US is certainly one) tend to privilege stability or order over justice or just relations. To maintain order and stability the US has supported dictators and regimes that if we had privileged justice we would not have supported. We know the argument that one does what is possible. But justice deferred becomes a festering sore and source of instability eventually. So rather than having to choose between inappropriately interfering in the life of another country or being isolationist and concentrating only on ourselves, how do we creatively engage the larger world so as to increase justice?
2. What can the United States actually do to restore order to the world without having to engage in either global policing or nation-building?
3. Are their gaps and disconnects between what the United States says and what it does, how it wants to be perceived, and how it is perceived?
4. What should be the United States military role in foreign policy?
5. Outside of the United States mlitary, what other institutions MUST be fixed in order for the United States foreign policy to be successful?
6. What reforms are needed within the United States military?
Probably repeating things said by others, but...
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Originally Posted by
MikeF
1. Great powers (and the US is certainly one) tend to privilege stability or order over justice or just relations. To maintain order and stability the US has supported dictators and regimes that if we had privileged justice we would not have supported. We know the argument that one does what is possible. But justice deferred becomes a festering sore and source of instability eventually. So rather than having to choose between inappropriately interfering in the life of another country or being isolationist and concentrating only on ourselves, how do we creatively engage the larger world so as to increase justice?
I think it's a mistake to assume, as we often do, that order and stability are the same thing. A stable social system often has to allow for a certain amount oi disorder, with citizens allowed open dissent and the opportunity to press for change. Order may cover up dangerous pent-up tensions. Where these tensions have been pent up for extended periods, for example when a long-term dictatorship falls, a period of disorder may be necessary to vent that tension and restore a viable equilibrium. Trying to restore order too quickly may actually endanger long-term stability.
I'm not sure that increasing or defining "justice" anywhere outside our borders is something we should try to do.
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Originally Posted by
MikeF
2. What can the United States actually do to restore order to the world without having to engage in either global policing or nation-building?
How do we restore order to a world that has never been orderly? Again, order isn't necessarily desirable in all environments. We might better ask how necessary change and disorder can be managed to minimize and contain harmful effects. This is not something we should be trying to do ourselves.
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Originally Posted by
MikeF
3. Are their gaps and disconnects between what the United States says and what it does, how it wants to be perceived, and how it is perceived?
Yes. Big gaps.
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Originally Posted by
MikeF
4. What should be the United States military role in foreign policy?
Among others... when no actual conflict exists, to provide honest and straightforward counsel to policymakers on what military force can and cannot reasonably be expected to accomplish accomplish.
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Originally Posted by
MikeF
5. Outside of the United States mlitary, what other institutions MUST be fixed in order for the United States foreign policy to be successful?
It's tempting to say DoS, and certainly changes there are needed... but ultimately DoS is an implementer of policy, not a maker of policy, and what most needs fixing is the process of selecting and defining policy objectives, which takes place at the executive and legislative levels. Screw that up and everything else goes wrong.
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Originally Posted by
MikeF
6. What reforms are needed within the United States military?
I'm not in a position to comment on that.
Cross posted from the Blog with some modifications - and one addition.
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"1. ...how do we creatively engage the larger world so as to increase justice?"
That's a dangerous and leading question. How do we American xenophobes, insulated as we are, determine or even have the right to talk about increasing justice? Moot question. Our political system will provide answers (multiple) that not every one will like...US domestic political concerns rule and the players change constantly. That is by design and it generally works acceptably if not well for us. It almost never works well for the others in the world.
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'Justice' elsewhere as envisioned by the question posed depends thus totally on US domestic politics and there will be no constantcy. All things considered, our mixed record on this score will continue and we will probably continue to do a bit more good than harm -- hopefully recalling that when we decide to do harm, we often get carried away. We just need to develop a bit of restraint...
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"2. What can the United States actually do to restore order to the world without having to engage in either global policing or nation-building?"
Aside from the raw arrogance of the question, from the fact that it is NOT our job to 'restore' such order -- I question that it has ever existed... -- and from the naivete disclosed by the question, it serves as an exemplar of why the answer to question 1 and particularly to question 3 are resigned chuckles. Unfortunately, that naivete is shared by far too many in the domestic political arena and in the Foreign Policy establishment -- not to mention the Armed Forces. That naivete combined with overlarge egos and arrogance in those establishments are the factors that drive us to inconsistency in many things, to dumb interventions we did not need to undertake and fuel resistance to changes in the budgeting system which cause us to stay off balance much of the time.
Who defines "order?" What are the parameters; what happens if it is achieved to the satisfaction of 'A' then 'B' dies and the system tilts to unstable...
A better question is 'What can the United States actually do to adapt to and mesh with the world without engaging in either global policing or nation-building?'
We can best adapt to the world if we get ourselves squared away -- for a variety of reasons, we need some changes in a good many respects and areas of endeavor. We can improve our capabilities and our image if we do that. We are perceived as hypocritical because we advocate sweetness and light and yet launch assaults here and there. We can do better. we can stop trying -- and trying is appropriate -- we do not do nation building or global policing, we do selective things along those lines that suit us and those not well...
We are big, we are powerful and we are truly our own worst enemy.Those are two things we do not do at all well, do not need to do and with which we continue to play even though both are proven inimical to our interests almost always. Again, that naivete and the budget process are along with egos the culprits.
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"3. Are their (sic) gaps and disconnects between what the United States says and what it does, how it wants to be perceived, and how it is perceived?"
Fuchs and Dayuhan have it right. We're a joke in the eyes of many...
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That said, as noted in the comment on question 1, above, our political system is inimical to world norms today. I would not change it so I believe we have to accept we will always be perceived as reactionary, slow off the mark, prone to indecision and, as reality does not accord with the soaring rhetoric of our Politicians who tailor their speeches to the domestic audience and forget -- or ignore -- the potential misunderstanding of foreign audiences. I might add that I've had a number of foreign acquaintances over the years comment that our domestic media and entertainment industry are part of the problem. The portrayals and the media do not sit well with many and tend to make us look like a collection of clowns. There's a lot of misperception due to all those things and there's little we can do to fix it -- short of draconian political fixes and those are not going to happen.
We'll just have to keep plugging along and try to more good than harm -- most in the world will grudgingly admit we do that...
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"4. What should be the United States military role in foreign policy?"
To advise the NCA and DoS (and it incumbent upon those folks to listen to that advice. As an aside, they might be more prone to do so if we'd slow down our rotation of key personnel a bit).
Get the CoComs out of the arena. They are overly involved in foreign policy because Goldwater-Nichols gave them the ability to do that and our totally dysfunctional budgeting system so beloved of Congress to buy votes force feeds them more money than they need and it is to their advantage to enhance that flow. There's a bit of hyperbole in that but just a tiny bit.
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"5. Outside of the United States mlitary (sic), what other institutions MUST be fixed in order for the United States foreign policy to be successful?
The US electorate.
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6. What reforms are needed within the United States military?
That they can control: More selectivity in accessions for fewer but better quality people; Improve initial entry training, Officer and Enlisted, all services; work with Congress to improve the personnel system, reduce grade creep, refine pay, stop allowances, vest retirement earlier, encourage active and reserve crossover service, slow the rotation cycles; reduce the stifling bureaucracy; relearn how to trust and delegate -- we seem to have forgotten how to do those things...
The Armed Forces of the US basically know everything I just wrote. The question should be why aren't they doing something to correct the wrongs of which they are generally aware...
ADDED for this post on the Council:
I strongly disagree with American Pride's responses to questions 5/6. National Service is a terrible idea. Aside from the questions of involuntary servitude and 'addressing problems' that are generally transitory, the complexity and cost of administering such a program in peacetime and with lack of an existential threat is monumental. The Armed Forces need to be smaller, not larger...
How timely a comic is today's Dilbert.
http://dilbert.com/dyn/str_strip/000...7745.strip.gif
As others have noted, the underlying assumptions of the survey exemplify overweening pride, aka hubris. Dilbert's pointy-haired boss has a lot in common with what seems to undergird the subject survey's questions.
I'd also like to remark on the following:
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Originally Posted by
AmericanPride
National service is a part of the American tradition; from the original colonies into the 20th century. It should not be the right or obligation of a tiny minority to contribute to this nation's defense and prosperity.
The idea of national service as a duty of citizenship is fundamentally at odds with the principles that led to the formation of America, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence. That document identified rights as fundamental, not duties. If the nation's principle value set is based on rights, which logically implies that one is free (not obliged), then obligatory national service is fundamentally unfair and unjust. I make this last assertion because 1. an obligation limits one's rights to life, liberty, and pursuing happiness, and 2. justice and fairness define each other.
Fortunately for the US of A, enough of its residents seem to believe and act on the the concept that "freedom isn't free," that sometimes obligations are more important than permissions. I fear that the pool of folks who hold this belief may be shrinking too quickly, fueled by the rise in entitlements that started with the spoils system of Andrew Jackson's administration, built up a massive head of steam with the New Deal, and has continued to mushroom since the Kennedy administration.
Pardon the intrusion. My military antennae were touched...
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Originally Posted by
AmericanPride
... By most measures, the military failed in this regard in both Afghanistan and Iraq, precipitating the emergence of a durable resistance and the blunting of American goals.
That's true
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If there is confusion in the ranks, it's not because the political leadership did not communicate it properly to the military leadership. It's because the military leadership did not effectively translate the political mandate into an understandable and workable military strategy.
That is not true.
The political mandate was and is unachievable, the military responded as they always do with 'Yes, Sir' and moved out; the American tradition of trying to make it work took over and the services merely did what they could given state of training and overall capabilities provided -- and directed -- by the political establishment. There's plenty of egg for everyone's face in these debacles. The Armed Forces are not blame or error free admittedly but neither is the political establishment -- and they are the ones who committed to those very specious 'missions.''
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I frequently hear how the US military is the best in the world...
It isn't, it's just big, not totally incompetent, is good at some things and has a bunch of stuff and, fortunately, a few really good people. :wry:
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It is certainly the best equipped, best funded, and best trained...
None of that is totally true. We have a lot of stuff but it isn't always the best of class; even the "best funded" is a trifle suspect given the tremendous waste and terrible inefficiencies in allocation by DoD and an overly prescriptive Congress; We have aspects of training that are quite good and aspects that are marginal to poor. Our initial entry training in the basics of the trade (it's a trade, not a profession) for Officers and Enlisted persons is quite poor in comparison to almost all the Commonwealth nations and to others.
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so how exactly are the objectives stated by Bush, Rumsfeld, and CENTCOM, "unachievable"? The military was admittedly unprepared for the initial requirements in Afghanistan, and to some extent Iraq, but that was ten years ago. Ignorance of the goals and an inability to meet them are not excuses that last ten years.
Sclerosis in the training bureaucracy; A flawed personnel system design that is not able to cope with long duration operations due to politically dictated rotation polices; total authorized end strength was and is inadequate to missions assigned; political determination to enter a second 'war' over the objections of the forces before finishing the first. All those are only slightly the fault of the services who would change many things if they could but all are absolutely politically directed by the Congress -- even DoD and the various SecDefs have had little effect on those issues. Congress ignores the Constitution unless it suits them, it suits them to cite the fact that they and they alone 'raise Armies...'
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Are you claiming that such spending is not an indicator of a national security priorities?
Dayuhan can answer that but I'll say it is not. Much of that spending is due to a profligate Congress forcing money on certain expenditures that generally benefit the Congroids more than they benefit the nation. The Defense budget is an overflowing trough for them (as is DHS...), both parties. We have developed a 'system' that requires military effort and adventurism or a 'threat' of some sort in order for the economy to not sputter too badly. That is totally, absolutely, blatantly political -- and wrong.
You're correct that the Armed Forces aren't as competent as they could or should be -- but they are not solely to blame. Not by a long shot, far from it, in fact... :mad:
It's the 'system' that produces senior leaders...
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Originally Posted by
AmericanPride
I agree with you that the military is not solely to blame. I should clarify that I mean senior military leadership since they have a foot in both the political and military worlds and are ultimately responsible for the maintenance of military capabilities and the development and execution of strategy.
Yes, the senior military leadership has been and is remiss, no question. The important thing is that everyone realize that while they have not done some things at all well, they are captives of a system that is both civilian politically and societally induced. They have significant impediments to better performance only some of which they perpetuate themselves...
Society will effectively fix itself or not, not too much one can do about that. The civilian political problem will not fix itself unless it is forced to do so -- that can be achieved by continually voting out incumbents until it penetrates that things need changing. The senior leadership will not change their ways, they're on short final; the only hope is that new leaders rise and find ways to circumvent the systemic problems.
Key to that is a radical revamp of the archaic Personnel System and disestablishment of HRC -- it is a major contributor to the systemic problems and it takes its cues almost equally from the senior leadership and the Congress (much by Statutory requirement, much by barely concealed and not too subtle fund sequestration and blackmail). Second most important is replacement of the terribly flawed BTMS Task, Condition and Standard foolishness with outcome based training and evaluation. We must improve initial entry training, Officer and Enlisted and that will be difficult as both the system and Congress are ill disposed toward more competent Soldiery and Junior Officers, they tend to be too much trouble,
A better and more practically educated public could and would fix all of that but we are not likely to see that in my lifetime. With a little luck, perhaps in yours that can be realized. Basically, I'm not optimistic barring a major existential problem...
Are you comparing apples to apples?
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Originally Posted by
AmericanPride
That reveals a large part of the problem. WWII engaged the better part of America's manpower and industrial output but still only was about half the cost of the GWOT. WWII was fought against two major industrial powers whereas Iraq and Afghanistan are considered "small" wars. WWII set the foundations for a post-war economic boom. Yet the GWOT has significantly contributed to the financial emergency facing this country. This is because of the gross inefficiencies of the defense economy; particularly the high financial inputs and the low acquisition and mission outputs. This trend is not sustainable, which is why the SECDEF has already acknowledged the downgrade of America's military capabilities to now be only able to fight one major theater war at a time. We could barely sustain two "small" wars. The continued reduction in military capabilities is a direct result of poor financial management.
I think you are still missing my point. Your numbers are absolute rather than comparative. GWOT may have cost more than WWII in terms of total dollars spent, but I doubt the the same can be said in terms of percentage of dollars available to be spent.
BTW, both GWOT campaigns were/are fought in a theater farther from the US than either of the two major WWII theaters. Thus, cost to get stuff to the fight is higher due to the distances involved. I submit that the maintenance support needs of the GWOT forces are significantly greater due to the more advanced sophistication of the weapons systems currently in use compared to those in use during WWII--chewing gum and a piece of aluminum foil might be able to patch the bullet holes in a P51 that had rolled off the assembly line 6 months prior--not so easy to maintain an F16 that has been flying for 10 years or more already. I don't know how much of the GWOT costs are due to little more than fair wear and tear on an aging fleet of equipment, but I bet it is rather significant.
High OPTEMPO also has a big impact on the stuff one uses. I doubt the WWII OPTEMPO was ever anything close to that of our GWOT forces (with the possible exception of transportation used to move supplies forward across Western Europe from July 44-Dec 44, at which point the advanced slowed again, allowing time for rest and refit of much of the support infrastructure while the Bulge was reduced and Allied forces figured out how to slug through the West Wall and get across the Rhine).
America today could sustain a much larger war effort, given the political will to do so. WWII saw that will manifested. GWOT, not so much--letting troops in uniform board planes ahead ogf the everyday vaction traveler doesn't come close to accepting rationing of sugar and gasoline by the folks at home. Cutting payroll taxes while increasing the amount of time one can draw unemployment compensation is rather at odds with sustaining any kind of increase in spending by the federal government on other than entitlement-like programs.
The Armed Force are a reflection of the Society from which they come...
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Originally Posted by
AmericanPride
Americans were quite content with friendly relationships with illiberal and non-democratic regimes for the sixty years prior and to this day. So I very much doubt the assertion that "American politics" somehow requires any new government to be "recognizable" as democratic.
Not totally correct. There have always been objections that 'friendliness,' they've just grown more voluble, strident and prevalent in the last decade or two to the point where the government of the day now has to pay more attention to those objections. The Mom-ization of America continues...:wry:
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That certainly smacks of Orientalism. What features of North African, Arab, and Central Asian societies make them "not amenable to centralized control by anything but main force"?
As one who has spent almost an equal amount of time in the near east and the far east -- the Orient -- the features that most impact are the Tribal nature of most ME populations and, even more so, the deeply embedded habit of Taarof in the region. :eek:
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...I'm not concerned with their necessity; though once committed to action, achieving a favorable outcome regardless of the original cause(s) becomes a necessity.
Perhaps. However if the action to which the force is committed is based on unattainable goals due to the ignorance of the civilian policy makers who ordered that commitment success is improbable, necessary or not...
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...The political leadership made such preparations, including the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the facilitation of Iraqi government working groups. But the military did not provide the necessary security measures to assist the political process. Why?
Why? Inadequate troop strength due to decisions by the political leadership (not to mention really serious infighting among said 'leaders'); inadequate training of the force for the mission assigned. There's more but there's plenty of egg for a whole lot of faces and as many or more were senior civilian AND military leaders over several administrations.
Recall that the CPA was an afterthought, an Ad-hoc thing conjured up in May 2003 (LINK) (when, I believe, George W. Bush realized he'd been sold a bill of goods and had an attack of Christian conscience...) and that replaced the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), itself almost an afterthought as it was born in January of 2003. The civilian policy establishment was guilty of as many or more errors than the Army.:rolleyes:
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And this in turn pressures cuts in personnel and training, reducing combat power all around. Not to mention competition with other domestic agendas and social programs.
Not necessarily so on what those pressures dictate. You may be correct on what happens and likely are but it does not have to be that way, we have choices...
As for competition with domestic agendas and social programs, your are correct and that's reality -- but that also does not have to be that way. We have choices...
We continue to make bad choices -- and that is Political, period.
Misdirection may be an explanation but it is not an excuse
It is depressing to read posts on this thread that seem resigned to the inevitability of more small wars destined to end in failure. Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed ?
The US military is known to generally stress a need for obedience, and also subordination of the armed forces to the political administration of the day. Both those may be all well and good but an essential role for senior military officers is to provide pertinent and objective advice without fear or favour. If unable to do that or if such advice is routinely rejected or ignored, then one alternative is to resign. That course of action is rarely followed even though every senior officer knows that another responsibility is to develop able subordinates and hence potential successors as opposed to fairly competent or even incompetent placeholders.
An alternative but less acceptable action is to go public. The last US senior officer to semi-effectively condemn and repudiate political direction as impractical and mis-directed was General Stanley McChrystal. But his reaction lacked impact because it was informal and could be depreciated because it was fuelled in part by alcohol. It would have been more effective to have resigned and later when out of uniform to announce and elaborate on the reasons for resignation at a public forum such as a press conference.
So repeating the initial question: Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed (with an all-volunteer force) ?
And secondly: At what level are US officers required to provide forthright confidential advice direct to the political administration?
And thirdly: What is the tipping point for resignation as opposed to acquiescence or possibly brown nosing ?
Compost, Good commentary, but
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Originally Posted by
Compost
So repeating the initial question: Why not only small wars that can be structured and resourced to succeed (with an all-volunteer force) ?
Why are you limiting your question to pre-determine a U.S. military solution to solving other states problems?
What evidence do you have to suggest that a better war theory or better resourced military could in fact provide the solution that you are seeking?
In my mind, the question itself is inherently lacking sophistication or any sense of creativity.
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An alternative but less acceptable action is to go public. The last US senior officer to semi-effectively condemn and repudiate political direction as impractical and mis-directed was General Stanley McChrystal. But his reaction lacked impact because it was informal and could be depreciated because it was fuelled in part by alcohol. It would have been more effective to have resigned and later when out of uniform to announce and elaborate on the reasons for resignation at a public forum such as a press conference.
Really? Is this an early attempt at historical revisionism? McChrystal is currently on speaking tours getting paid handsomely for his thoughts.
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And thirdly: What is the tipping point for resignation as opposed to acquiescence or possibly brown nosing ?
General Officers have a duty to tell the truth.