The McCrystal collection (catch all)

Gen. McChrystal’s "Strategic Assessment Group"

Col. Chris Kolenda - Director/coordinator, Strategic Assessment Group
Col. Daniel Pick- Assistant coordinator, <http://www.faoam.elnonio.net/bios/Pick.doc> .

• Sarah Chayes, the NPR reporter turned Kandahar-based humanitarian
• Fred Kagan - American Enterprise Institute – Former military historian at USMA
• Kimberly Kagan, President of the Institute for the Study of War http://www.understandingwar.org/people
• Anthony Cordesman - Center for Strategic and International Studies
• Stephen Biddle - Council on Foreign Relations
• Andrew Exum, a former Army Ranger, counterinsurgency expert, and blogger <http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama> at the Center for a New American Security
• Jeremy Shapiro, a civil-military relations analyst at the Brookings Institution
• Terry Kelly, a senior researcher at the Rand Corporation
• Catherine Dale of the Congressional Research Service
• Etienne de Durand of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales in Paris
• Luis Peral of the European Union's Institute for Strategic Studies
• Whitney Kassel of the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense
• Lt. Col. Aaron Prupas, a U.S. Air Force officer at Centcom

Source: http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/po...stals_advisors

Moderator's Note

I have merged ten threads on General McChrystal today and re-titled the thread 'The McCrystal collection (catch all)'. Also moved to this theme, although the content covers many subjects.(ends)


I don't know enough about the British media to say how reliable the Telegrpah is. But if it is accurate, I can't imagine this is good news.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html

Both of them are old enough to have worked with dozens of people they didn't like and / or who said things they disliked. No big thing; mostly political foolishness and some mid level staffers trying to foment something. Journalists are gullible and need bad news to survive.

Oblong,

I too noticed The Daily Telegraph report on presidential anger. The author is a Washington DC based correspondent and I would suggest he has taken the bait from a local briefing. In the past year the same newspaper has accepted remarkable stories from US sources and months later are accepted as truthful, if uncomfortable (CIA & FBI active - maybe spying - in the UK).

Has the story been echoed in the US press?

davidbfpo

Gates Stresses Privacy in Chain of Command

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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates appeared to subtly rebuke America’s top commander in Afghanistan on Monday for publicly speaking out against calls for scaling back the war effort there.

“I believe the decisions that the president will make for the next stage of the Afghanistan campaign will be among the most important of his presidency, so it is important that we take our time to do all we can to get this right,” Mr. Gates said at a gathering here.

“And in this process,” Mr. Gates went on, “it is imperative that all of us taking part in these deliberations — civilians and military alike — provide our best advice to the president candidly but privately.”

“And speaking for the Department of Defense,” Mr. Gates said, “once the commander in chief makes his decisions, we will salute and execute those decisions faithfully and to the best of our ability.”

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I think the leak of the original McChrystal report was the real target here, and not really the general's London speech. That leak was a far more egregious breach, IMO.

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Originally Posted by tequila

I think the leak of the original McChrystal report was the real target here, and not really the general's London speech. That leak was a far more egregious breach, IMO.

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Who -- which side of the 'debate' (if there really is one) -- leaked it? And for what purpose? :wry:

that speeches like McChrystal's are supposed to be cleared by DOD for security issues AND for policy - that is, they must state policy correctly. So, if the speech was submitted for clearance and cleared - most probably - nobody has a legitimate gripe.

Cheers

JohnT

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Originally Posted by John T. Fishel

I would add that speeches like McChrystal's are supposed to be cleared by DOD for security issues AND for policy - that is, they must state policy correctly. So, if the speech was submitted for clearance and cleared - most probably - nobody has a legitimate gripe.

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That's kind of why I asked earlier...

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This is shaping up to be an odd debate. It seems that the ISAF Commander advocates one thing and the administration wants another. Did McChyrstal hold his press conference on his own accord, or was this something that the administration told him to do?

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... seems odd that a commander would do this - hold a press conference in which he rejects a suggestion from a VP that is, apparently, still being considered by the President. What if the President accepts the plan? That will be awkward. I wonder if, when faced with a question about Biden's strategy, that he felt the duty to reject it - or if it was his plan to speak out against such a plan from the start, and thus the motivation for the conference.

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Here we go again?

Will this evolve into an ignorant press, pressing guess's and playing the personality assination card to support a sliverin support structure?

A president who doesn't maintain much of a contact with his top general and staffers who have no idea about militiary moves and a rudimentary understanding of politics providing the interaction direction between the Commander in Chief and the Troops.

I maybe premature, but I'm not happy with the way this is drifting.

Well, at the end of the day, the military must shape its operations to achieve the political objectives of our civil leadership. Period.

We certainly have a duty to provide our professional opinions as to what we think will work best to achieve that guidance, and what we believe will not work as well.

Personal opinion, the Administration gave DoD a policy equivalent of a "Column Right" command several months ago, and so far has received a fairly reluctant "Column half-right" in return in terms of execution. The Boss knows what he wants, but his advisers don't know how to produce it apparently, so it is really incumbent upon those who understand the problem the best to derive and produce solutions that meet the commander's express intent. I don't think we have provided that yet to the Boss.

And in this business, "half-right" just isn't good enough.


(As to the leak, Bob Woodward presented at SOCOM the day after he released that. He named no source obviously, but took great pains to brag about how he essentially blackmailed the senior leadership ["I have this and am going to publish it, so either work with me to redact what is really dangerous, or I will publish it whole"]; and took great pains to ensure we all had his email address so that we could send him more classified material. He also spent a great deal of time justifying his actions, as how important it is for the public to have insights to such internal security communications as soon as possible in order to avoid drifting off track like we did in Vietnam, etc. He may have made some valid points, but it was a sleazy bit of business all the same).

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Personal opinion, the Administration gave DoD a policy equivalent of a "Column Right" command several months ago, and so far has received a fairly reluctant "Column half-right" in return in terms of execution. The Boss knows what he wants, but his advisers don't know how to produce it apparently, so it is really incumbent upon those who understand the problem the best to derive and produce solutions that meet the commander's express intent. I don't think we have provided that yet to the Boss.

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Could you expand on this? It seems to me that there has been little, if any, policy guidance on A-stan at all, and what little there has been changes (seemingly by the day). The previous administration was misguided (IMHO, A-stan is not a functional nation, never has been, never will be, much less a functional democratic nation- the best we can hope for is a functional, probalby semi-feudal, state that controls internal activity by buying off local power brokers), but the current administration doesn't seem to know what it wants. A-stan was the good war, but certain elements (may or may not include the POTUS, I can't tell) don't want any war. They CHOSE GEN McChrystal, implemented a "new strategy" (which, again IMHO, was NOT a strategy) and then immediately began to shift the playing field. No way in hell would I want GEN McChrystal's job.

Any thoughts about the London speech from the perspective of it also being from the NATO perspective - e.g. trying to articulate why NATO countries should continue or increase their level of support to ISAF as opposed to wavering while the U.S. decides its role?

Combined commands have more than their share of problems operationally, however, it would also seem the business of keeping the coalition's will from flagging is a monumental task in itself.

I'm trying to imagine if I were one of the other "partners"/allies (leader, pundit or citizen) who I might prefer to hear why we should continue to support the current ends/ways/means lineup - the folks in D.C., geographically twice as distant as myself, and politically in pursuit of things that either may not be terribly important to me, or may in fact go in other directions, or the guy on the ground to who my forces and those of little Johhny get their orders from?

Best, Rob

Rob Thornton's query:

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Any thoughts about the London speech from the perspective of it also being from the NATO perspective - e.g. trying to articulate why NATO countries should continue or increase their level of support to ISAF as opposed to wavering while the U.S. decides its role?

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The venue, IISS is well known for attracting a variety of members and observers. Many embassies etc are members. I was not there, but on past attendance some NATO nations would be there - notably the Czechs and Germans. I'd expect some Central Asian states to be there too and Indian diplomats.

By using the IISS will ensure other audiences will notice, even without the press being in attendance.

davidbfpo

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Well, at the end of the day, the military must shape its operations to achieve the political objectives of our civil leadership. Period.

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Agreed.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

We certainly have a duty to provide our professional opinions as to what we think will work best to achieve that guidance, and what we believe will not work as well.

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Agreed.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Personal opinion, the Administration gave DoD a policy equivalent of a "Column Right" command several months ago, and so far has received a fairly reluctant "Column half-right" in return in terms of execution. The Boss knows what he wants, but his advisers don't know how to produce it apparently, so it is really incumbent upon those who understand the problem the best to derive and produce solutions that meet the commander's express intent. I don't think we have provided that yet to the Boss.

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Here's where I disagree. Gen. McCrystal was asked to develop a strategy for Afghanistan. He did (see your second point). The problem now is that his strategy isn't politically expedient in terms of the current administration's domestic agenda. In terms of your analogy, Gen. McCrystal was asked "what's the next command?" In his professional judgment, "Column Right" marched us off a cliff.

The current administration, and many of its supporters, criticized the previous administration ‘for not listening to the generals.’ They apparently do not want to listen to McCrystal because, quite simply, he didn’t give them the message they wanted to hear.

This controversy, and the discussion surrounding it, is currently being manipulated for political goals. The General gave a speech to IISS. He was asked questions regarding his statements about strategy and tactics for dealing with his current situation. If people want to disagree with his take on what kind of war we have in Afghanistan, and how best to fight it, well and good. That’s one of the things we do at SWC.

On the other hand, attacking him because the recommendation based on his best military judgment doesn’t support the goals of the administration’s base voters is wrong.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

And in this business, "half-right" just isn't good enough.

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Agreed. It gets good people killed.

WSJ
Gen. McChrystal needs more troops now precisely so Afghans can take over the war effort later.
By MARK MOYAR

'We're at a point in Afghanistan right now in our overall campaign," the U.S. general says, "where increasingly security can best be delivered by the extension of good governance, justice, economic reconstruction." Afghan security forces "fight side by side with us" more and more frequently, he adds, and American troops are working hard to develop the Afghan security forces. Coalition forces are focusing on securing the population, because "the key terrain is the human terrain."

This all sounds like Gen. Stanley McChrystal's proposed strategy for victory. But those words were spoken in May 2006 by Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, then the top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan.

Should we be concerned that the McChrystal strategy advocates the same counterinsurgency approach that has failed to achieve success in years past? Not necessarily. The easy part of any counterinsurgency is formulating the strategy and tactics. The hard part is implementing them.


(Snip)

Mr. Moyar is a professor at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Va., and the author of three books on counterinsurgency, including "A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq," published this month by Yale University Press.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Well, at the end of the day, the military must shape its operations to achieve the political objectives of our civil leadership. Period.

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Not that -- I agree with that statement.

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Personal opinion, the Administration gave DoD a policy equivalent of a "Column Right" command several months ago, and so far has received a fairly reluctant "Column half-right" in return in terms of execution. The Boss knows what he wants, but his advisers don't know how to produce it apparently, so it is really incumbent upon those who understand the problem the best to derive and produce solutions that meet the commander's express intent. I don't think we have provided that yet to the Boss.

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However, in that paragraph, you seem to lose the bubble.

There may have been a 'column right' but the comment above about cloumn right heading off a cliff applies -- more pointedly, if the command heard was 'colummmm ralghep, hoor' then the guidance might be flawed.

However, if the command was sensible and understood and the effort is only half way there, is that a deliberate failure to comply or due to the sheer complexity of trying to turn the large blind elephant that is the DoD (not Army, DoD -- specifically including thy portion...) bureaucracy onto a new azimuth?

It isn't too distressing when the ignorant media or almost as ignorant politicians do not understand the problem, that's to be expected. It is distressing that many who should know better parrot the media position or something akin to it. Equally distressing is the tendency on the part of some who apparently do not understand how this government really works to attribute to it a speed, agility and sense of continuity that it has never had and never will have -- it was specifically designed NOT to have those attributes -- and efforts by Congress and various Administrations to ignore the Constitution continually run afoul of that reality. We're ponderous, that simple.

Senators Levin and McCain visited last month and actually talked to McChrystal -- they understand the issue. (LINK).

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Not that -- I agree with that statement.However, in that paragraph, you seem to lose the bubble.

There may have been a 'column right' but the comment above about cloumn right heading off a cliff applies -- more pointedly, if the command heard was 'colummmm ralghep, hoor' then the guidance might be flawed.

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I agree with civil control of the military. I also agree that clear communication is critical, both to the civil control, and to any mission.

I actually take this to be a promising sign. In the past, generals have just gone along and then only when they got out spoken up about what they thought was wrong. Assuming that they had legitimate complaints, and weren't just cynically seeking political advantage, I think that is the wrong way to do things. After all, if it is important, you should be brave enough to stick your neck out when you have some influence.

I agree with Sec. Gates that talking should occur within the command structure, as well. However, realistically, Generals are at least partly politicians. That means that if he can only get 25min of the CO's time in over 9 Months, then his appeal to the higher commands "open door policy" might legitimately be through a leak or a speech. At least he is having the courage to say what he thinks before a decision is made, and a portentious policy is enacted. However, GEN McCrystal must also be realistic and understand, that when you play political games, there will be political repercussions.

I don't think it's been posted elsewhere. It can be found at this link: http://www.iiss.org/EasySiteWeb/Gate...spx?alId=31537 or on this page at IISS.

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That means that if he can only get 25min of the CO's time in over 9 Months, then his appeal to the higher commands "open door policy" might legitimately be through a leak or a speech.

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Doesn't the chain of command factor in here? McChrystal is a sub-theater commander. Do GEN Petraeus and Adm. McMullen still count for something? How about SecDef Gates?

POTUS - SECDEF - COMCENT (Petraeus) - McChrystal. Admiral Mullen, the CJCS, is in the chain of communication but NOT in the chain of command. In practice, however, (and discussed on another thread) when you put another 4 star as commander in a theater then you have said that that theater is as important or more important than the GCC AOR. In that case, the theater commander really often has direct communication with the SECDEF and POTUS. Korea predates the modern command structure but even there the theater commander - MacArthur and Ridgeway - communicated directly with the SECDEF and POTUS. Same in Vietnam for COMUSMACV and there was a lot of tension with PACOM. In the post G-N era we have put 4 star commanders in Iraq and now Afghanistan. If you recall, Admiral Fallon, COMCENT, tried to bring Petraeus to heel and was fired for his efforts. The point is that our current C2 system is not well designed for this situation. Neither McChrystal nor Odierno should work for Petraeus; indeed, Petreaus should be supporting them. In C2 terms, McChrystal is the supported commander while Petraeus and Stavridis and all the other unified command commanders are supporting commanders. All de facto.

Cheers

JohnT

Thanks Dr. Fishel.

Sounds like a rather jumbled system we have without clear lines of control. Thanks for reminding about the whole Admiral Fallon debacle.

You forgot the additional problem of the relationship w/SACEUR.

ISAF is C2 hell.

You did mention SACEUR by name. My bad.

"Develop and Resource Strategies to Succeed in Current Conflicts
•Afghanistan: The President’s new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan will ensure that all elements of national power are engaged and integrated in an effort to defeat al Qaeda to prevent attacks on the homeland and on our Allies and partners. We are asking our friends and allies to join us with a renewed commitment. We also will regularly assess the progress of our efforts and those of the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan through clear measurements to ensure ongoing informed accountability."

Ok, just an example: the task here is "Defeat AQ," the purpose is "to prevent attacks on our homeland."

Now, nowhere does it say to create effective government in Afghanistan or to expand the conflict to defeating the Taliban either. It seems to me we owe the boss some smart COAs as to how we could do what he asked us to do without taking on these additional, very dangerous, time/labor/cost intensive additive missions.

Also from the White house website:

"President Obama has committed himself and his Administration from the beginning of his presidency to a foreign policy that ensures the safety of the American people. But he also refuses the false division between our values and our security; the United States can be true to our values and ideals while also protecting the American people."

(The first quote from the "Defense" section, the second from "foreign policy")

This is an interesting statement that I think is so profound that DOD should should be going to the boss and making sure we understand exactly what he means, and then making the required fixes. Now, perhaps he is just talking about decisions made by his predecessor; but if he is talking about how we are pursuing current operations to secure the homeland, we need to understand and address this charge.

Do not mistake Political blather for policy.

Rule 2. Ask Politicians to clarify their policy, receive a 25 minute dissertation that says nothing, then be told to implement what you think is an approximation of what the political blather said.

Rule 3. When the game changes due to changes in the domestic political landscape as it is prone to do, be prepared to offer or be sacrificial lambs.

Believe it or not, that's no joke -- aside from Rules 2 and 3 as historically correct constructions based on this nation's military commitments since 1945, there is a pointed response to your post Bob's World. That would be Rule 1, above.

Very seriously, what is said by the WH for public consumption rarely is the real policy or goal. :(

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Now, nowhere does it say to create effective government in Afghanistan or to expand the conflict to defeating the Taliban either. It seems to me we owe the boss some smart COAs as to how we could do what he asked us to do without taking on these additional, very dangerous, time/labor/cost intensive additive missions.

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I happen to agree with Ken's comment about political blather. But supposing the WH web site posting is not blather, your statement above does not follow. Mission analysis usually discloses a bunch of embedded task or lesser/included missions that must be accomplished as well. And, depending on how you sort out America's "Allies and partners" who are also supposed to have attacks against them by Al Queda prevented (your mission analysis truncated the conjunctive purpose of the stated mission), effective government in AF and/or defeating the Taliban may be required to accomplish the mission.

You are right about the staff owing the boss some smart COAs to accomplish his mission. But I think the boss also owes the staff an unambiguous statement of mission and his intent. Good luck getting that for the reasons listed as Rule 3 in Ken's post.

Someday I may be as cynical as Ken, but I'm not there yet (yes, I feel his arms wrapped around my legs and pulling hard :)).

Now, to get to how we in the military start down our own slippery slope.

Every operation begins with an execute order that lists specific authorities. The task is AQ, and the authorities are likewise for AQ.

This means one must:

A. Limit their engagement to AQ, or

B. Have the Intel guys apply their "7 degrees of separation to bin Laden" methodology to expand AQ status to a whole lot of individuals and organizations that were never intended objectives in the first place.

This is very dangerous, and leads to a family of engagement that, if not careful could serve the purpose of AQ far more than the purpose of the US if it is done in such a way as to validate the AQ strategic communications, and enflame Muslim populaces in a wide range of sovereign states where there are ongoing subversive and insurgent movements that are associated with the AQ unconventional warfare campaign.

We must understand that there are three distinct and separate aspects to this:

There is AQSL; or essentially their UW corporate HQ. This is what we were tasked to "defeat" in my opinion.

Then there is their UW network (called far too simply "AQN"), that is a self-healing, nodal network to facilitate finance, ideology, leadership, logistics, weapons, etc. for the many nationalist movements that are being incited and leveraged by AQSL from their UW corporate HQ. This is something that we must understand, and then, operating within the rule of law of the many sovereign nations in which these nodes lie, identify and disrupt the critical nodes so as to render this effort as ineffective as possible. HOW we approach this effort is very critical (see President's comments on our values above) so as to not actually make the movement stronger through our efforts to disrupt it.

Then there are the many distinct, disparate nationalist movements that affiliate with AQ for support. Each of these is unique and has a primary nationalist purpose and a supporting secondary larger purpose that links them to AQ. To simply brand these groups, or just as bad, acknowledge their efforts to brand themselves, as "AQ" so that our authorities apply and allow military engagement probably does more to expand the efforts to build a "Caliphate" than anything AQSL could do themselves. To me this is a "DETER" task. Here we should be working with the governments of the nations experiencing these insurgencies to not simply build their security capacity, but also to help them understand and address the failures of governance that made their populace susceptible to this movement; and also to do so in a manner that is consistent with our values (without demanding that others adopt the same), and is very conscious of avoiding and mitigating any perceptions that the US is somehow protecting this government from its own populace or is somehow the source of its legitimacy, as this is what enables AQ to direct them to target the US in the pursuit of their nationalist aims.

All of this really adds up to what could best be described as a "Counter-Unconventional Warfare Campaign." The problem being, of course, that there is no such thing as counter unconventional warfare. We have FID, COIN, CT; not enough? so we add SFA and IW. Still confusing? We have the "war is war, just defeat the militant arms of all these movements" guys as well. Perhaps the answer is there somewhere. Personally, I think the key lies in recognizing this as a regional UW campaign by a non-state actor, and then designing a counter UW campaign that understands and address appropriately the three broad categories I lay out. Afghanistan is not a war, it is just one of many places where we are working part of this problem set. To call it a "war" gives our operations there far more importance to the overall mission than they deserve, and tie us to terrain in a campagin where terrain in of itself has little strategic relevance.

I know it is easy to focus on terrorist tactics and conflate all groups that employ them.

I know it is easy to focus on ideology and religion and conflate all groups that adhere to similar beliefs

I know it is easy to label everyone who disagrees with the establishment as an "extremist" and to then convert that to a derogatory term intended to conflate and dehumanize ones opponents.

I also know that it is hard to step-back, see the big picture, and overcome 65 years of Cold War engagement and perspective, and 8 years of GWOT.

But we must.

Japan attacked us at Pearl Harbor, therefor World War II was in error as we allotted greater priority to Germany (who declared War on us but did not directly attack). That doesn't even address the Italians...

I think there's a forest and tree problem with that 'analysis' on what our job happens to be.

P.S.

No need to be as cynical as I am, I'm older than you are by a generation -- your turn will come, don't rush it. :D

That doesn't mean you shouldn't pay attention to what's going on or ignore the FACT that much that is said in DC publicly does not equal US policy... ;)

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Every operation begins with an execute order that lists specific authorities.

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I thought every American military operation began with planning which would be implemented with an execute order. And, of course, the planning is the response to the perception that something may well be a threat against which protections must be devised. (Please note that I did not try to identify whose perceptions are the source of the impetus to respond with a plan--t'ain't always the NCA that gets our planners running around with their hair on fire.)

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

The task is AQ, and the authorities are likewise for AQ.
This means one must:

A. Limit their engagement to AQ, or

B. Have the Intel guys apply their "7 degrees of separation to bin Laden" methodology to expand AQ status to a whole lot of individuals and organizations that were never intended objectives in the first place.

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Not clear to me that these are two different categories. I'm not sure that we have adequately distinguished the target AQ, as the subsequent 3 level categorization in your post shows. Saying AQ is the target opens us up to a operational mission creep just as much as saying "I need a Future Combat System" opens us up to acqusition cost and schedule overrruns due to requirements creep. Thus I agree that the your point about the dangerousness of getting off into a family of engagements. The only way to preclude that happening is to have a "bright line" test for what is and isn't within the mission. And the likelihood of that "bright line" staying constant during the course of the operation is pretty remote. (But that is mission realignment rather than mission creep.) Who'da thunk the US military would be worried about cleaning up German death/concentration camps in 1941 when it entered into WWII?

The problem, as best as I can tell, is that we are trying to decide into which round hole--COIN, CT, FID, SASO, UW, IW, etc.-- to force the square peg problem of crime fighting and economic development while establishing what might be considered a functional Western form of governance in a militarily unsecure environment.

Maybe planners ought to go back and read their Homer and Herodotus. The nature of Afghanistan seems much more like that of the ancient Greeks than anything in more modern memory. The West seems to have a lot of Achilles sulking their tents right now. And the "city-state" tribal peoples of the region dubbed Afghanistan are once again coalescing in odd ways to repel the Persian represented in this latest invasion by the US/NATO.

Just like he did with 60 minutes he allowed access and didnt much care what was reported because he was being set up as the general who failed in afghanistan. With ridiculous orders from washington, etc. I believe he thought the article would prompt more public support for the afghan war or he would simply go out saying what he thought.

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Speaking in the Rose Garden, Obama said the biting comments the U.S.'s top commander in Afghanistan made about the president and his aides in a Rolling Stone magazine article did not meet the standards of conduct for a commanding general.
Source: CBC.ca

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You know, I read the article in Rolling Stone and didn't think it was very high on the "biting comments" scale.

Is this the Sean Hannidy show?

Seems like it would have been much easier just to come out of the closet and get separated via DADT. :D

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Originally Posted by MikeF

Is this the Sean Hannidy show?

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No but Glenn Beck was talking about all the Communist hiding in America today.:D

He probably did do it on purpose, one article that was highlighted an opinion piece that what was said was basically common knowledge just not openly spoken off..

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Originally Posted by slapout9

No but Glenn Beck was talking about all the Communist hiding in America today.:D

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I had most of the day off today. After getting my super duper high-speed haircut, spending some time with the chaplain, and talking to Bill Nagle about how we could take over the world, I simultaneously listened the the radio broadcast of Sean and Glenn while watching Fox News coverage of the ISAF abrubt change of command.

Sean Hannidy decided today that he's an expert in small wars. I almost punched a hole in the wall of my apartment.

He did it on purpose last year. While the strategic screwup in Afghanistan was still up for grabs, he went public, and demanded that it be done his way. He believed that the military was running the show, which doesn't square with the reality we pretend to believe in.

Good riddance. Now we have a theatre commander who stated last year that AQ was not operating in Afghanistan. More comedy in the offing.

Gary Faulkner
The man has a plan as well as the resources and intestinal fortitude needed to execute it. But Obama is too much of a pinko liberal, pansy, academic type, closet muslim, foreign national who hates the military, country music, eagles and apple pies to pick such a qualified candidate. This is all part of his secret plan to win (I meant steal) the 2016 election. That's right... 2012 is already in the bag.

Did it on purpose?

He is too savvy an operator to have done it by accident. As I mentioned in a rare blog entry.

Yes, I really saw that. About the President who is waging vigorous war in a Muslim nation.

I apologize for my initial impression that this board did not contain Fox News guzzling jackoffs.

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Originally Posted by SWCAdmin

Did it on purpose?

He is too savvy an operator to have done it by accident. As I mentioned in a rare blog entry.

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Everyone makes mistakes and is he the kind of guy that would throw his staff under the bus like that? I'm not buying it.

This war is costing America more and more in terms of not just actual casualties but in disgracing good sharp operational commanders' careers for the sake of appearances. Given the ubiquity and near real time effect of media coverage, candor and frankness amongst inner circles is getting blown out of proportion. These idiotic comparisons between GEN MacArthur / President Truman and GEN McChrystal / President Obama are apples and oranges comparisons. GEN MacArthur outright defied President Truman on the strategy of the Korean war. What occurred with GEN McChrystal was an inner circle bantor of personal opinion and dialogue that is a normal part of organizational behavoir. We all talk behind close doors on who's a "clown" and who's not. If you doubt me ask Vice President Biden. And yes I screen calls and proclaim, "oh god, it's my mother; should I answer this call". Truth be told, these "embeds" are result of the first Gulf war and the media's complaints of being excluded by GEN Schwarzkopf and his staff. Ask him what he said about President George H.W. Bush and then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. Recently (2001 or there abouts ) the DOD changed policy to try and accommodate the press and their insatiable thirst for information. GEN McChrystal in effect is a victim of that irony and its a waste because he is a true warrior and a superb operational commander. Technology is not what it was thirty or forty years ago, its in your face and any slip up or sincere insider candor is pounced upon and exploited. People could get away with a lot more back in the day of Korea and Vietnam. The media was just shut out unless you did something like outright challenge the authority of the chief executive officer of a nation. Georges Clemenceau the Prime Minister of France during WWI said, "war is too important to be left to the generals". In this day and age given the pandering and duplicity of our elected officials, war is too important to be left to the politicians.

Definitely the dumbest thread I've ever read on SWJ.

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Originally Posted by tequila

Definitely the dumbest thread I've ever read on SWJ.

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Let's get this thread back on track.

This action was heart over mind, ego over mission. Every charismatic and successful leader is tempted by it.

The seduction of powerful men.

Honestly, when I read the RS article, I was reminded of the loneliness that one feels in a patrol base- the world is on your shoulders, no one back in the big FOB cares, and you're the only one that really understands the fight.

After seven years of continious fighting, I think LTG McC fell into the trap. Period.

1. What Gen McChrystal & staff said/did
2. How that was reported
3. How the report was reported by other reporters before it came out

What I've seen in #3 leaves no doubt that verily, we were on the threshold of a great crisis. Most of it is also a bit blown out of proportion (/use of understatement), but that makes for a good story.

What I've seen in #2 - concur with Schmedlap's "show me" request (comments on at least one of the various blog posts here), not quite as much "there" there. Guys joking about how to dismiss reporters asking about the VP? Ironic - they were discussing avoiding a repeat of last fall's press fiasco... As for the rest, comments re: civ counterparts, I guess I'm not shocked by truth, which is what much of the rest of the seemingly shocking statements were... (I acknowledge that in light of Gen McChystal's immediate apology all defense is moot. And bottom line, the CinC needs no excuse to change commanders.)

Number one I can only imagine. I do know that after spending a month with the subjects, #2 was all the reporter got.

All that leaves me truly puzzled, though I'm not offering conspiracy theory explanations or accepting that Gen McChrystal is an inexperienced, babe-in-the-woods gullible bumpkin when it comes to media/reporters. Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar, but smoky as the whole thing seems I'm not seeing a cigar here.

Ok, I'll stick my neck in this noose and look around.

1. The Product of Frustration on McC's part: Done With It, Send Me Home If You Don't Like It, whether subliminal or not: Gary Hart--Bimbos? What Bimbos? Follow Me If You Like...

2. When I read the article, I was sort of shocked by the lack of anything shocking in the quotes, but riveted by the War-related content taht I knew would have huge resonance in the US as one of the first big Afghan "news" things that US readers have paid attention to in a while. You guessed it: Karzai Corruption, IEDs, Body Counts and Ulcers no longer make it one the first, second or third pages in the US (sad to say).

3. The US war funding bills cannot tolerate any more turbulence, so the affair had to be ended fast and completely. Ditto for Britain, Germany, France, anon. Support is very thin, and diminishing further every day. The program needs a serious jump start of genuine successes (not just ones paid for through bribes).

4. The talking heads are starting to focus (for the brief half-life this thing might have) on the real issues---Karzais, corruption, and lack of civilian effectiveness. Maybe a little sustained attention to the real issues undermining strategy will be worth McC's jumping into the volcano? (Maybe)

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Originally Posted by MikeF

Every charismatic and successful leader is tempted by it.

The seduction of powerful men.

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IMO, McChrystal and his staff thought Rolling Stone would make them look cool. Why else? Rolling Stone is POP-culture. Nothing to do with men with guns stuff.
It was pure ego and vanity and it blew up in their faces. - Wow! Who saw that coming.

I do not know if Mc Chrystal did it on purpose or not but it was not the first time.
In France, he publicly insulted the French government and acted as a child.
When you believe you are a god of war: they you go in the wall as Wilf just said.
It looks cool to let your staff say what you think... Yes in private but not with externals. that's all.
No one can afford to have a right hand that does not listen to the brain, what ever it agree with or not.

I have to admit to a great deal of confusion over this story. The bit I find most strange is - Why Rolling Stone?
As others have commented you do not get to his rank without acquiring a great deal of experience in dealing with the press and you must know the difference between on the record/off the record, attributable/unattributable, back ground etc. In addition this was not one interview on a 'bad' day with one person it was over an extended period with quotes from various sources in his chain of command.
How can it not have been coordinated? If press protocol was this lax then it would have occurred before.
Why Rolling Stone? If the plan was to 'go out' - while showing that things were not working because his political masters would not endorse a plan more to his liking - then Rolling Stone is a very odd choice. If the thinking was 'it's only Rolling Stone' therefore I can get away with a shot across the bow that would be unacceptable in WaPo that is also worryingly naive.
All-in-all for someone who is meant to be a specialist in devising and executing plans - and foreseeing their consequences - the logic behind this one is beyond me.

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Originally Posted by JJackson

As others have commented you do not get to his rank without acquiring a great deal of experience in dealing with the press and you must know the difference between on the record/off the record, attributable/unattributable, back ground etc.

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Actually, as concerns dealing with the press, the General and his staff had clearly never dealt with, or even thought about the conditions they apparently encountered. I heard the Journalist talking on the BBC and he says that no one McChrystal's staff set any ground rules at all! - and look what happened.