... by Charlie at the OPFOR blog.
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... by Charlie at the OPFOR blog.
18 September Associated Press - Army's Newest Stryker Vehicle Boasts More Firepower.
Quote:
Soldiers at Fort Lewis have begun training on the Army's 10th and final version of the Stryker armored vehicle.
Five years in the making, the Mobile Gun System looks a lot like its predecessors but has a 105 mm cannon, and Army officials say it packs more power than other versions armed with a heavy machine gun, a grenade launcher or anti-tank missiles...
The MGS, as the Army calls the new vehicle, is designed to back up infantry with a gun that can blast through walls, knock out fortified sniper nests, stop other armored vehicles and clear streets of enemy fighters...
The 49,000-pound MGS is operated by a three-man crew: a driver, a gunner and a vehicle commander, said Thomas Crooks, the company's service leader at Fort Lewis. The gunner and commander track targets on computer screens inside their hatches in the turret.
The vehicle can carry up to 18 rounds, and the gun is loaded by an automated hydraulic handler. Its computerized fire-control system is virtually identical to the one in the M1 Abrams, the Army's main battle tank.
The MGS will carry four types of ammunition: a depleted-uranium armor-piercing round, a high-explosive anti-tank round, a high-explosive plastic round for blowing through walls and barricades, and a canister round filled with 2,300 tungsten ball bearings for firing on enemy fighters.
The MGS packs "exactly the same, if not a little more enhanced" firepower as the much heavier 70-ton Abrams tank, but is not as sturdy defensively, Cooper said...
The MGS also does not need as much logistical support as the Abrams, gets better gas mileage and is built on the same basic chassis as other Stryker vehicles.
Dumb statement. An Abrams' armor is an OFFENSIVE tool because it provides mobility under fire. Too many folks tend to look at Strykers as tanks already and this sort of PR encourages that line of thought. A Stryker (MGS or otherwise) is a troop carrier. Period.Quote:
the MGS packs "exactly the same, if not a little more enhanced" firepower as the much heavier 70-ton Abrams tank, but is not as sturdy defensively, Cooper said...
For the risks of such thinking see: No. 12: Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II, Dr. Christopher R. Gabel. (PDF)
at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/downlo...ubs/gabel2.pdf
Best
Tom
As an Armored Cavalry officer, I have some issues with all this.
105mm v. 120mm: You've got to be kidding me that it has as much, if not more, than an Abrams.
It carries less than half the UBL of an Abrams. After the ready rack is expended, you have to expose a soldier to reload the bloody thing.
This is not a replacement to the MBT. It's an enhancement for Stryker units. Comparing the MGS to an Abrams is mixing apples and oranges.
Ok, obviously SFC Cooper made a bit of a stretch comparing the firepower of this vehicle to an M1A, but don't you guys think this is a great thing to provide more infantry units in Iraq with better fire power? Also, the lighter weight, mobility, and logistics footprint makes MGS a good platform to support future expeditionary ops.
Tanks are great, but we only have so many of them and they are a difficult to transport anywhere in a hurry and support them once we get there.
The mobile gun system isn't exactly easy to ship overseas in a hurry either - unless they've fixed the problem where you have to lift the turret off with a crane before the thing'll fit inside the airplane . . . .
Still, the MGS will probably perform fine in the field - or at any rate it's problems will be more or less manageable. Systems aren't the most important issue here, it's doctrine and soldier training. If the army spent half the money that went into Stryker on counter insurgency training for the current (heavy) force, we'd have gotten a lot father a lot faster in Iraq.
And no, the thing is not a tank. However, it won't be employed that way. Stryker doctrine calls for two mobile gun systems in each company to support infantry operations with direct fire. While the lessons of the Tank Destroyer Corps are important to keep in mind, the Army has (at least doctrinally) produced a micro-scale combined arms force in the Stryker company - direct fire, indirect fire, anti-tank weapons and infantry under a single command which will train together regularly. They should be vastly more effective thank Tank Destroyer battalions.
I agree. However, I have a hard time believing that the Stryker is giving the Army the keys to the kingdom in the respect of force modernization. We're contracting the maintenance of the Strykers, meaning that while a tank or Bradley crewman can change track in his sleep, Stryker crewmen have to take their vehicle to Jiffy Lube to change their oil. -10 level maintenance tasks are few and far between and Joe isn't allowed to perform maintenance to the extent that he can on a tracked vehicle yet.
Sound an awful lot like armored cavalry to me. I revisit your early statement in that we need to improve doctrine and soldier training. We're making these Stryker units infantry heavy but requiring them to essentially perform a scout mission. There either needs to be a shift in MOS specific skills or a relooking at MTOEs as far as 19D billets in these areas. It is not as easy to teach an infantryman to be a scout as one would think. There's a mindset. Not saying that taddletales and cowards make the best scouts, but our job is to report PIR and avoid contact, especially with the way reconnaissance units are being restructured.
The Stryker is performing (in Infantry units) the same mission that M113s were performing long ago. They aren't that much better equipped as far as firepower than an M1114. Most are equipped with .50 CALs with a thermal sight system. They do offer better force protection than a HMMWV, but they're not going to be able to be decisively engaged with a mechanized force. I would hazard to guess that none of you would make a Stryker unit your main effort in a frontal assault against an enemy tank brigade of T72s and T82s.
Much has been talked about the lack of mobility of heavy armor in the MOUT fight. I disagree, as someone who was on both tanks and bradleys in Fallujah, Ramadi, Khalidiyah, and Al Qaim. Mobility is often not restricted as much by the capabilites of the platform as they are the competency of the crew. I've taken tanks on hills and mountain trails that motorized forces said they could not traverse with little difficulty. It goes back to the training piece Mr. Jones alluded to.
In the end, I agree that the Stryker improves mobility to the fight. The MGS will improve lethality for Stryker units. It is not a replacement for heavy armor. It's just one more tool for the Army to use to get troopies into the fight.
I think most references to heavy armor's lack of mobility refer to its lack of strategic mobility, ie, it's great once it gets there, but it's tough to bring to the fight. The Bradley's and M1As you rode in Iraq took a long time and a lot of manpower to get there via MPF ships and trucks from Kuwait.
I think the traditional concern has been tactical mobility. See battle reports on Grozny, for example. The preconception is that urban terrain forces the tanks to move in predictable paths, while exposing the vulnerable roofs, flanks and rears to enemy anti-tank gunners. In fact, the difficulties suffered by tanks in urban warfare are most often compounded by poor training and employment.
In fact, I believe that armor which is properly supported by infantry and properly employed (i.e. by well trained crews, with adequate maintenance) is extremely effective in a streetfight. The key factor remains training - both by tankers and supporting infantry, however sound employment and numerical superiority can make up for deficits in individual abililty (at the expense of materiel and personnel casualties, increased time and increased collateral damage).
What do we make then, of the USMC LAV? Troop carrier? Wanna-be IFV? Consider the way in which they have been employed the past 20 years.Quote:
Dumb statement. An Abrams' armor is an OFFENSIVE tool because it provides mobility under fire. Too many folks tend to look at Strykers as tanks already and this sort of PR encourages that line of thought. A Stryker (MGS or otherwise) is a troop carrier. Period.
A combination of both and then different as well. As an Army guy, I look at LAVs as fighting vehicles but with a recon role. We (the Army) don't have them; the MGS Stryker is changing that I guess. In regard to LAVs as recon armor, they are exactly like the light tanks (the Stuart for example) that we entered WWII with. In the case of the Stuart, mobility was confused with speed. No tank was/is fast enough to outrun a German 88. The same held true with tank destroyer doctrine; that heavier gunned, but lighter armored (no covered turrets) TDs could move rapidly across the battlefield, mass at the correct place and time, and slaughter massed armor. The reality was they could NOT move because they did not have the necessary armor to move under fire, especially with open turrets.
Other countries have played with this concept, notably the French, the South Africans, and the Soviets. The French Panhard series is seen all over Francophone Africa. They did well against the Libyans in the 1980s as the latter's armor (T55s and T62s I recall) was slower and the French literrally drove circles around them. The French used their light armor as the western screen for the US/Coalition assault in Desert Storm. That said, Panhards in the former Rwandan army were meat on the table for the rebel RPA, who had no armor and generally light AT systems (RPGS and some RRs).
But getting back to MGS Stryker and LAVs. The MGS is a support vehicle for a Stryker unit giving it more firepower in certain roles. LAVs fight as LAV battalions do they not? That means they can mass and move rapidly in roles suitable for light armor. Neither system, however, was built to attack and breach a defensive line as 1st ID did in 1991 or to hit Iraqi armor as 2ACR did at 73 Easting (with then Captain H.R. McMasters as the lead troop commander).
Best
Tom
Tom,Quote:
LAVs fight as LAV battalions do they not? That means they can mass and move rapidly in roles suitable for light armor. Neither system, however, was built to attack and breach a defensive line as 1st ID did in 1991 or to hit Iraqi armor as 2ACR did at 73 Easting (with then Captain H.R. McMasters as the lead troop commander).
Yes, the battalion is the primary tactical formation for ops. We in the USMC LAR community adhere to a hodgepodge of cav/recce and in-house doctrine, but (and I say this hesitantly) I think that as a community, we also believe that we would fight against anything in order to gain the information.
It's funny that you mention the 73 Easting and 1st ID's breach. I was assigned to be the breach force commander for the breach, marking, and improvements of lanes astride Hwy 80 into Safwan. Although 3d LAR was a supporting effort and I totally expect a DAG's worth of artillery to come raining down on us in the process, my company secured five breach lanes that were cut with, would you believe it, a commercial Caterpillar dozer.:D There wasn't much reconnaissance involved, just a plan for plain smashmouth tactics. Maybe it's the 25mm that provides the confidence to accomplish any task.
What's even more interesting is the background of Task Force Tripoli. LAR Bns were not employed in the Diyala crossing and Baghdad push in a very significant way, and most LAR guys believed because it simply wasn't our true role. Then came the tasker to ATK to SZ Tikrit. Three LAR Bns with an attached infantry force (can't remember if it was a Co or Bn(-)). Now that was interesting to say the least...We didn't face much resistance, and I shudder to think what would have happened if all the fighting positions, RPG cache sites, and Roland launchers had been manned. We still worked the planning process and looked at combat power, then launched forward.
I think a historian would have the guts of a good book if he were to look at all of the TF's actions as Phase III ops wound down.
That dozer operator was either very nervous or nerveless. Light armor does great things when used correctly and I suspect the same will hold true with MGS and Stryker. Too often, units get misused because their role is not understood or the fickle finger of fate means they are available when a more suitable unit is not. That is of course not just limited to light armor; it is a recurrent problem in all specialty units, especially SOF.
A long time ago (in a galaxy nearby) I was a young 1LT S2 and just retired BG Jim Warner was the 1LT S3Air in 2-505. Jim and I were RANGER buddies and had ended up in the same battalion. Anyway we were the chief planners for the Airborne Anti-Armor Defense (AAAD); every battalion got a 10km by 10km square to establish an attrition-based anti armor defense. Jim and I did the grunt work in picking out kill zones and such. Our problem was our battalion commander; he saw TOW jeeps (not HMMWVs but M151A2s) as mobile gun platforms--just as they were when we had 106 RRs on the things. He insisted that such gun jeeps could survive a fight inside 500 meters with a T62 and forced us to plot kill zones that way. Naturally our TOW platoon leaders thought we were crazy until they learned the real score and just adjusted their kill zones accordingly. Still a TOW vehicle did look sort of like a 106 just like a LAV sorta looks like a tank...
Best
Tomo
RTK,
This statement is false. Unit mechanics can perform all the tasks necessary to maintain these; however, by design, the maintenance teams are much smaller, which then requires additional contracted support. The only exception to this is during the initial training and fielding, when the mechanics aren't qualified, and when the repair involves a part that is still under warranty - the warranty part is no different from any other vehicle that has a warranty on it (the unit mechanic could work on it, but it would void the warranty).
The RSTA squadron is made up of 19Ds. No change is needed since scouts are performing the scout missions.Quote:
Originally Posted by RTK
The Stryker concept is based on the infantry squad. It brings infantry units to an OBJ fresh to fight and allows them to be protected. Too much emphasis has been made on the false concept that Stryker Brigades were designed to fufill a similar role to mech units, which is not the case. They are meant to bridge the gap between the light and heavy force, and if augmented properly with ADA, MP, aviation (this problem will go away once aviation becomes organic to the SBCTs), can fight in major combat operations. SBCTs would have been the perfect force to follow 3ID, having the mobility to keep the LOCs open, the protection and firepower to destroy the Fedayeen threat, and the infantry to clear urban terrain.Quote:
Originally Posted by RTK
Then based on your last statement it is not a completely false statement. Once the warranties wear out on the vehicles, who is going to maintain those parts? After working with and talking to both 1/25ID and 172nd SBCT in Mosul, the units were having a more difficult time in this arena than they had anticipated.
The RSTA squadron is one battalion sized element in an SBCT. When you build the SBCT around ISR sensor platforms as we've done with the SBCT you become a reconnaissance organization. LRAS3 is a Scout Surveillance System, inherent in which is a reconnaissance mission. They're also pretty standard in even the infantry Stryker companies. I was attempting to highlight that if we're going to have this equipment in infantry units then perhaps we need to start training infantry soldiers on the fundamentals of reconnaissance and ISR planning. I have not seen a competency in this area among infantry units, save for LRS-C, yet.
Additionally, while we're on the Stryker subject, I'm not a big fan of generic mortar systems that have to be dismounted from the vehicle in order to employ. Any mobility gained by the flatform is lost when you have to dismount a 120mm system to fire it.
As for Strykers as a system for destroying the Fedayeen threat; Proper planning, foresight, and some COIN training beforehand would have helped that, whether the units were in tanks, Brads, strykers, M1114s, or dismounted. Prior to us going into OIF I our primary concern was not of insurgent groups but of wandering refugees and other dislocated civilians. That's where our focus before hitting the dirt berm was. 2ACR was responsible for the mission you spoke of following 3IDs push and they were wheeled as well.
As COL(ret) T.X . Hammes would readily tell you, firepower and maneuver won't necessarily win or negate the enemy's strengths in Gen 4 warfare. Knowing your threat and mitigating or neutralizing his effects on the local populace will.
RTK,
Whoever you are getting your information from is giving you bad information. The SBCT is not built around the RSTA or the LRAS3. Infantry rifle companies do not have LRAS3. As far as the warranties go, soldiers know how to maintain the items that are warrantied - the issue is that a contractor from the company that supplies the item must be the one working on it. For example, the engine in the Stryker is the exact same as the FMTV (minus the turbo). However, for a certain time period, we couldn't perform certain maintenance tasks on the engines in the Stryker even though the 63s were hanging parts on the FMTV engines.
Next, you don't need to ground mount your 120mm mortars anymore because the MC-B has been fielded.
Lastly, you are conflating COIN with asymmetrical threats/irregular threats or however you want to label the Fedayeen.
I was in the 2ACR shortly after they reformed as light cav (HMMWVs instead of Tanks and Bradlys). It was not a popular concept. Most of the guys in the unit hated it either because they were left over infantry from one of the units that formed the regiment and they distrusted vehicles, or because they were veterans from the regiments experiences in the Gulf War and patrolling the Fulda gap. The rumor was that after Gen. Sulivan retired the regiment would be disbanded or given back their armor. Back then they were trying to write the doctrine and it really seemed that no one had any idea what to do with light cav. They were far to light for the armor guys' tastes and far to big with too few dismounts for the infantry guys. The main focus for us back then was "expand the lodgment". That was where the 82nd would jump in and do an airfield seizure and then we would land on that airfield and roll right off into the fight and expand the area around the airfield. We practiced it a lot. At the time there were also rumors of new weapons systems that we might get. One of those was the Armored Gun System which was a sort of light tank and if I am not mistaken one of the progenitors of the MGS. I bring all this ancient history up because one of the saving graces for the light cav concept was the fact that they could be loaded onto a C130, landed anywhere that a C130 could land and then rolled off the aircraft and straight into the fight. I thought that that was the purpose of the Stryker, upgrade the armor protection and mobility of the HMMWV but maintain its rapid deployability. I was told that the reason that they went with .50 Cals and MK19s instead of retaining the 25MMs was to ensure that they could fit into the C130 and then roll into the fight like the HMMWVs. Then I learned that they in fact cannot just roll off the bird into the fight. Apparently there are a number of things that must done in order to fit it into the bird and the once it rolls off the bird before it can get into the fight. So if I am understanding this correctly then what we have in the Stryker is a vehicle that is neither as heavily armed and armored as the Bradly but not as rapidly deployable as the HMMWV. So my question is what is the point?
SFC W
Never said it was built aroudn the RSTA. I said ISR systems. Surely LRAS isn't the only ISR asset in the SBCT, as the sensor platforms in the SBCT were the highly touted and much celebrated additions that, at the risk of talking about systems we shouldn't talk about, we won't. I acknowledge your point about SBCTs formed around squad sized elements. A secondary focus, if you will, is the ISR platforms, particularly EW, SBCTs have that other BDE organizations either don't have or didn't have when the SBCTs first were established.
Whether we wanted to call Fedayeen asymmetric threats or insurgents; when little dudes pop out of the woodwork wearing civilian clothes (not many adhered to the black pajama uniform) it doesn't matter what you call them. They're still a problem that needs to be addressed whose effect on the battlefield will not be negated by a piece of equipment.
I agree with your what is the point comment, Strykers are ok for some things but they seem to have a lot of limitations especially when you consider all of the money we put into the program. We could have gotten a lot of the same capabilities at not even half the cost if we had just modernized some of our old M113.
SFC W,
A Stryker unit doesn't have a forced entry mission. It will airland on a secure airfield and then consolidate and organize for the follow-on mission. Bottomline, it was never intended to be a "fight from the ramp" organization. That being said, most of the vehicles in the Stryker organization are ready to fight with their full capability (minus any add-on RPG protection - which was never part of the requirement for airland missions) within two minutes of offloading a C130.
Cheers.
Shek
Stu,
The Stryker has a huge logistical advantage over the M113, which is one of the bigger reasons for the LAV platform getting picked. While it may seem like only a marginal change to add the logistics for M113 equipped BCT, that change adds up quite a bit such that the footprint detracts greatly from the deployability as well as makes sustainability of the unit via air suspect at best given the air fleet constraints.
Another huge advantage that has played out in Iraq is the relative stealth of the Stryker vs. a M113 platform as well as the degraded mobility capabilities of the Stryker. If you lose track on a M113 from an IED, you lose mobility. If some tires get blown by an IED, you still can limp out of the kill zone immediately and then take the appropriate remdial action (if it's even necessary) from a safe zone.
The RSTA is definitely built around ISR capabilities, with the appropriate MOS assigned to carry out the mission. Infantry companies are not built around organic ISR capabilities - it's the dissemination of the ISR "hits" via FBCB2 that increase the capability of these units.
Agreed that they were a threat and that we didn't focus on them properly. However, they were not an insurgent threat, but rather an irregular threat. An insurgent is a subcategory of an irregular threat. I'm not trying to slice and dice your argument, but do want to make sure that you understand that there is a difference. Also, I wasn't offering the Stryker as a panacea to COIN, but rather highlighting that a SBCT (if it had been ready and available for the march to Baghdad) would have been a great asset against the irregular threat that the Fedayeen presented.Quote:
Originally Posted by RTK
I don't think the M113 is some kind of super vehicle, or that it should have been the choice for the IBCT's, but I can't understand why Airborne units don't have some. It's got to be a better weapons platform for the Delta Companies than an uparmored hummer. What else out there can be airdropped that we've got right now?
Stu,
1. M113s would guzzle twice as much gas, and so you'd have to nearly double the number of fuelers. While only a small increase in the number of overall vehicles, on the margin it has a huge impact, as it is already a difficult task to resupply the SBCT under a scenario where there is only an aerial LOC.
2. The Stryker's engine is the same as the engine in the FMTV. Because of this, you have a smaller PLL and ASL (repair parts that are on-hand and hauled around by the unit) requirement than if you had a FMTV/M113 combo. Also, there is more commonality of parts across the Stryker variants than there would have been across the M113/M8 combo. You have the same effect here as with the engine story. In the end, the M113 equipped unit would require more vehicles to carry these additional parts
3. The Stryker has fewer maintenance requirements above and beyond the analysis in #2. So, if you had a M113 equipped IBCT, you'd have to add even more vehicles.
While the above three points aren't exhaustive, because the SBCT is designed to be very lean on logistics without much of a cushion, once you start adding on the margin, it has a huge impact on everything. Not only do you add vehicles, but you add the requirement for more gas to run these vehicles, soldiers to crew the vehicles, food to feed these vehicle crews, ammunition to arm these vehicle crews, etc.
Hopefully, the above gives you an idea on why the Stryker has the logistical advantage. As far as price goes, an extremely valid argument. Having spent my time in Iraq in a Stryker, I am certainly biased in favor of having spent the extra $$. The one thought that I would leave is that the cost advantage of M113 is not as great as some would claim, as you would have to do large upgrades to existing mothballed M113s to get them to the equivalent standard as a Stryker in terms of protection, lethality, commo platforms, etc. That being said, though, the M113 still would have been a cheaper option.
Tonights lead story on the local news in Slapout is that the Daleville,Al. (near Ft. Rucker)just had 1970's model M113 donated to the police department. Whoooo Doggies!! I have some buddies on the Daleville police department. It is police blue with lightning bolts on the side and the word "NEGOTIATOR" painted on the front. They made them take off the 50 cal., oh well. Anybody have an extra Stryker laying around?
The other advantage of Stryker of M-113 is armor. The Stryker is built to withstand heavy machine gun fire. It's supposed to have a ceramic overlay for RPG/shaped charge warheads - which ran into development problems - slat armor is the expedient replacement. M-113's have repeatedly proven to be too vulnerable without significant uparmoring. The IDF has completely redone theirs, but I doubt they fully trust even that level of protection any more given what happened in the recent fighting in Lebannon.
Really, I think the whole Stryker vs. M-113 debate is kind of besides the point. The current mucky mucks in charge of procuring/developing new systems are perfectly capable of turning in an M-113 based platform which has all the problems of a Stryker and spending just as much money while they're at it. I think better oversight by Congress, the Department of Defense and the Army could have brought either project in for a lot less money than was/is being spent.
When I started reading the Stryker debate I remembered a photograph from the Russian operations in Afghanistan. Three guys in a delapidated pick up had just taken out three Russian personel carriers with RPG's. The cost of troop carriers versus the beat up pick up must have been enormous.
The organic ceramic armor for the Stryker does not protect against RPGs. Even the M1A2 Abrams with all of its armor still doesn't offer complete passive protection against the standard RPG. The slat armor was redeveloped to serve as an interim solution since the ERA tile package hadn't been developed, tested, and fielded yet.
As far as costs, outside of the MGS, the Stryker program hasn't had significant cost overruns. The cost has gone up due to having feedback from combat experience that has driven condensed lifecycle upgrades; however, additional oversight by DoD or Congress would not have brought the program cost down much - IIRC, about 25-40% of the program's costs has been spent on infrastructure upgrades to allow installations designed to handle light/mech brigades to handle the increased size of a SBCT. This means better sim centers, ranges, combat vehicle trails to departure airfields, etc. These costs would have existed no matter what platform was chosen. In the end, the M113 option could have been cheaper up front, but you would have had the costs of more logistics and a more difficult footprint to support when deployed.
Selil,
That's what happens anytime you don't employ equipment properly and use poorly trained conscripts. The unwritten Soviet creed of death before dismount gave the initiative to the mujihadeen, allowing for their successful ambushes.
As far as the performance of the Stryker against the RPG in Iraq, the RPG has been ineffective. I'm aware of only one catastrophic kill, which was a fluke (the RPG hit some POL loaded on the exterior of the vehicle, started an exterior load fire, and the soldiers weren't able to put the fire out resulting in 0 injuries but one burned Stryker), and the slat has been nearly 100% effective in preventing penetration into the vehicle. For nearly three years of service across all of Iraq, that's a pretty substantial track record.
EDIT: Title should say "Performance"- didn't catch spelling and I can't edit it ....
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/...160981,00.html
Interesting Military.com article on the (lack of) success with the Stryker Mobile Gun System variant in Iraq. Interesting to assess how much is reporter spin of a few soldiers and how much is fact. Anyone been in an MGS?
Quote:
"I wish [the enemy] would just blow mine up so I could be done with it," said Spec. Kyle Handrahan, 22, of Anaheim, Calif., a tanker assigned to Alpha Company, 4/9’s MGS platoon.
"It’s a piece," another MGS platoon member chimed in. "Nothing works on it."
The gripes stem from a litany of problems, including a computer system that constantly locks up, extremely high heat in the crew compartment and a shortage of spare parts. In one case, a key part was held up in customs on its way to Iraq, a problem one Soldier recognizes is a result of a new system being pushed into service before it’s ready.
"The concept is good, but they still have a lot of issues to work out on it," said Sgt. 1st Class Nathan Teimeier, Alpha, 4/9’s MGS platoon sergeant and a tanker by trade.
According to a Jan. 28 report by Bloomberg News, the 2008 Pentagon Authorization bill included language limiting funds for the MGS pending an Army report on fixes to the vehicle’s growing list of problems. The Pentagon’s director of Operational Test and Evaluation said in his annual report the vehicle was "not operationally effective," Bloomberg reported.
I was there when 1-24 did the FDE (Force Development Exercise) up in YTC (back in early 2004). The platoons that executed it did so in some adverse conditions - there was about 2 feet of snow on the MPRC (Multi-Purpose Range Complex). It was a LFX (Live Fire Excercise) done multiple times, and I thought it went pretty well. Part of my perspective may be biased as to having had to live with the ATGM (Anti-Tank Guided Missile which fired a TOW (Tube Launched, Optically tracked, Wire Guided) variant as the ILOV vs. having a 105mm main gun with a M240 (7.62mm) coaxial MG (the ATGM did not have a COAX - but had a M2 on a ring mount above the TC hatch. The MGS allowed for the tactics I wanted to employ.
Now the things I did not like about the MGS - I'm 76" tall - it, more so then any other variant was not built for me! I also did not like the auto loader - but I don't like auto loaders period - but the construct for the variant they chose had one - vs. having a loader. I also did not like the alternative if the auto loader ever went down - supposedly it had an extremely low MBTF (Mean Time Between Failure) - but its still an auto loader - oh well - you give up something to get something, and that was not my decision.
So - I can see where 19Ks would have real issue with the MGS when compared with a M1. That taken into account with the PSGs observations of the stuff that you'd think we'd have worked through already, and the introduction of an end item with limited CL IX would be grounds for some legitimate complaints. I'd also point out that the MGS was not designed to do the range of tasks that a M1 is - the MGS is an Infantry Support vehicle - not sure why we manned it with 19Ks - combined arms politics I suppose. I'll say I liked having 19Ks in the company, even if they were not totally happy with being Infantryman - but eventually they became some of the most valued soldiers in the company - and I used them in a variety of ways. The AT (Anti-Tank) capability in the Rifle Company comes from the 1 x Javelin per rifle squad (9 per company), and the AT capability in the SBCT comes from the AT company that is equipped with the ATGM variant (plus the total number of javelins through out the SBCT - I think the EN CO has some by MTO&E and maybe the RSTA sqdn too - not sure.
Its interesting thing about expectations - they at least partly determine how soldiers will take to something. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle - hopefully - within reason - the things that can be corrected will be, but I think the first time a rifle squad on the ground gets fixed and is able to call forward an MGS to put a 105mm into a hardened enemy position, and then put very accurate and sustained suppressive fire on enemy supporting positions, it will have lived up to its intent - you could not do that with the ATGM in the same manner.
As with all equipment and organizations - they are not going to be a total fit in all conditions - and that may be some of the frustration as well.
Best, Rob
The biggest problem with MGS is the concept or the idea mated with some very marginal physics. It's not founded in any operational reality that I am aware of, and I guess came from sometime of "flow down" reasoning based on the idea that a SBCT had to have some type of "Big Gun", as an article of faith, rather than any OA that may have suggested otherwise.
The Aussies put a 76mm gun a an M-113 using the turret we had on the Saladin 6x6, and then there was the 90mm Cockerill eqipped CVR-T. Those worked, because they were comparatively simple and easy to do. MGS strikes me as the opposite.
Hi Will,
I think either of the two calibers you mentioned would have been adequate to provide me what I was after. When we had the ILOV ATGM I made a pitch to field us the CARL G as part of the package - based on what I'd seen it do it looked plenty adequate. I don't think it ever made it up too high:D
I've seen the MGS fire its 105 over the side (gun perpendicular to the hull) - there was no issue I could see. I'd heard there were issues prior to that, but when I saw it live fire - no issues. Maybe they'd fixed it by then - I don't know.
Ideally - what I'd like is a system that could be both mounted, fired and reloaded from inside, but.. could be dismounted when conditions made that more advantageous. I'd at least like a capability that I could dismount - there is just something about showing up somewhere with something the enemy did not anticipate and helped me achieve tactical surprise. While the AT-4 84mm is not a terrible thing, it does not have the variety of ammunition available to the Carl G, and as such is more limited. Having commonality in the CL V to be used in the vehicle mounted system and the one you could use on dismounted operations would be better. This is all pretty much OBE though - we got what we got, better to focus on the best ways to employ it.
best, Rob
It is extremely technically simple to fire Carl-Gustav 84mm from a remote weapons station, and to have an auto-slew that allows it to be re-loaded in the same way M2 reloads TOW.
What is more, thanks to the auto-stabilised fire control and range finder, the round can go 1,500m and even hit slow moving targets at 1,000m.
Javelin can be very easily fired from a remote weapons station, and would be cheap and easy to retro-fit on Stryker or similar vehicle.
This is why I believe MGS is a confusion of form over function.
Rob,
Re:-Quote:
MGS fire its 105 over the side (gun perpendicular to the hull) - there was no issue I could see. I'd heard there were issues prior to that
According to an eye witness, during the Saudi trials for LAV 105 system in the mid-90s, firing in this attitute caused the frame of the vehicle to warp.
As you say, they may have fixed the problem by now.
Doctrinally, the whole concept of 'tank destroyers', lighter armored vehicles with big guns, has always been problematic. The MGS was originally fielded in platoons of 3 vehicles, and an experienced armor NCO commented that all that arrangement was good for was TOC security, as the vehicles could not work in wing (two vehicle) teams. Given the intense 'infantry-centric" attitudes of the brains at work there at the IBCT (especially GEN Eaton), they may have envisioned tasking out single vehicles to support infantry companies or platoons, a concept that tankers choke on for good reason.
Actually, our language talking about this says a lot about the problem. The MGS is not a tank. But we don't have a clear designation for the folks who operate it. They'll either be disgruntled tankers who want a real tank or disgruntled infantry who want a real IFV (or to walk).
Software bugs are seemingly universal in modern military equipment - the extreme example being the AMRAAM, whose software spent the better part of 15 years in development. Things like software bugs and logistical issues like spare parts don't seem to me to be that big of a deal - as long as they get sorted out ASAP, and aren't putting people's lives in undue risk in the meantime.
I don't understand a great deal about the thinking behind the MGS concept - as Van says, the tank destroyer concept has long been problematic. It's as if the Army is hybridizing a vehicle without a truly separate niche to fill. It's analogous - at least to me - to the battlecruiser concept of the early 20th century - cheaper, lighter, faster than a battleship, but more capable (in theory) than a cruiser. Of course, without a true combat niche, commanders used them like battleships, with disastrous results (Jutland, HMS Hood, etc, etc).
If the idea is to get tank-like gun firepower into an SBCT's TO&E, wouldn't it eventually end up like the battlecruiser? That is, when they really need an M1, an MGS just won't be up to the task? After all, the point of the ATGM was to enable a lighter vehicle (or infantry) to kill a hard target, correct?
One final question. What's the difference between the MGS and the canceled M8 'Buford' air-dropped light armor concept? I think a lighter vehicle could have real benefit in stability ops - firepower without the intimidation and nuisance factor of the 68-ton tank, and the airmobile idea would give airborne capabilities more like the old Soviet airborne had - some of which proved effective on occasion in Afghanistan.
But if the MGS's role is truly substituting for tanks in the SBCT, I think there exists the dangerous possibility of using them like tanks, which they are not.
Matt
Van and Matt
Both good posts. Van you are at Leavenwoth and the US Army's historical expert on tank destroyers, Dr. Chris Gabel, is there with you.
Take a look at his LP if you have not already:
[QUOTE]No. 12: Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II, Dr. Christopher R. Gabel. (PDF)[/QUOTE]
Light armor (Stuart), tank destroyers (M18), or armored reconnaissance vehicles (Sheridan) are neither fish nor fowl. As soon as you hang a gun on an armored vehicle, it is inevitable someone is going to say it is a tank and try to use it as such. For that matter, I had a BC long ago who thought a TOW Jeep was a mobile gun platform.
There is an interesting parallel to this in the aerial community, fixed wing, rotary wing, manned and unmanned when it comes to the question of armed reconnaissance. When you arm a recce bird, the pilot starts acting like a fighter-bomber, regardless of true capabilities.
Tank destroyer doctrine hinged on this phenomenon. Consider these passages from Chris Gabel in LP
BestQuote:
FM 18-5 opened with a statement that established the specialist nature of the tank destroyer: “There is but one battle objective of tank destroyer units, this being plainly inferred by their designation. It is the destruction of hostile tanks. Throughout all phases of training and during preparation for combat, this objective will be kept in mind by all ranks."
FM 18-5: Tank destroyer units are employed offensively in large numbers, by rapid maneuver, and by surprise . . . . Offensive action allows the entire strength of a tank destroyer unit to be engaged against the enemy. For individual tank destroyers, offensive action consists of vigorous reconnaissance to locate hostile tanks and movement to advantageous positions from which to attack the enemy by fire. Tank destroyers avoid “slugging matches” with tanks, but compensate for their light armor and difficulty of concealment by exploitation of their mobility and superior observation.
Tom
I was the Chief of Concepts at Knox when we were developing the Stryker MGS (along with some other variants for the armor community).
The MGS was not in any way supposed to be a tank destroyer. It was envisioned to be an infantry support vehicle capable of delivering high explosives and/or antipersonnel rounds to enable infantry maneuver. It could fire anti-armor rounds, but these were only for the odd BTR or T-55 that might pop up on the mid-to-low intensity battlefields we would fight on. It did not need much armor because our greatly improved situational awareness (ta-daa!) would allow us to keep it out of harm's way. Remember, the MGS - like the SBCT - is not designed for high intensity warfare. Nor was the Stryker - or the SBCT - seen as final solutions. They were placeholders while we awaited the arrival of the FCS.
We recognized that the ignorant and the unwashed might mistake the MGS for a tank, and went to great lengths in preparing requirement statements and draft doctrine to ensure that this message got across.
The interbranch arguments that raged at the time were interesting. We selected the name Mobile Gun System over Armored Gun System or Assault Gun System to avoid making it sound like a tank or (gasp) allowing the infantry to gain control of it. Parenthetically, the WWII equivalent of the MGS is not a tank destroyer but an assault gun like the SGIII. It was decided that 19Ks should man these to allow Knox to maintain control of system development and because infantrymen would not be capable of running the type of gunnery training required or of grasping the subtleties of their tactical employment. For the same reason, we wanted MGS companies within the Stryker battalion, so that an armor officer could oversee their training and the professional development of the platoon leaders. No, I'm not making any of this up.
Finally, this system and its parent organization were definitely supposed to be transportable by air - C-130 to be exact. Our vision was that the Stryker battalions and brigades would be capable of 'operational maneuver' by air. In an Iraqi context, you could fly them from Mosul to Basra and they could basically fight within minutes of rolling off the ramps. Again, a WWII paralell might be the Air Landing units that did so well in Holland and Crete.
This was, oh, five years ago, so much water has passed under the bridge. I don't know if the Stryker air-transport capability is getting much of a workout in the war.
That is truly intriguing. So why was it given a 105mm gun? The 105 certainly implies the desire to have something much beyond a "just in case" anti-armour capability. 105mm requires a far larger danger close stand-off than say 76 or 90mm, which have historically proved more than adequate.
Yep, few things beat a HESH round for dealing with most targets short of an MBT, especially field fortifications. The infantry need an assault gun for Canister, Smoke, and HE-Frag - and especially a rifle at that, in order to make use of HESH. But a 105 (with a few Sabot and HEAT) is probably the way to go, even if bores in the 75-90 mm range have proved effective as assault guns, simply because they'll be used in an AT role anyway if Battalion and Company Commanders are given even a quarter of a chance to do so. But even the short 76 mm is probably sufficient for most assault gun tasks (the LAV-1 Cougar carried those).
As stated in other threads, I'm a LAV/Stryker skeptic, and was in an Army that has used three generations of the vehicle for some 30 years now. A few years of fighting in Afghanistan has led that same Army to try to wean itself off of it which, besides the modest fact that the Army had banked practically its entire future on the vehicle, is pretty hard to do when those same vehicles are built in the country's largest province and in a Parliamentary riding that has long been held by the "Natural Governing Party". Of course, it also helps that the Party in power at the moment does not hold said riding...
The Canadian Army cancelled the LAV-MGS program outright in 2006 in the wake of the Second Battle of Panjwai, and brought old Leopard 1 MBTs out of retirement (MBTs were completely removed from service by 2004) in order to provide close-support to Infantry; the Leopard 2 has now replaced the old Leo 1 in service (unfortunately resulting in the loss of HESH, though). The LAV-III with the 25 mm gun simply could not cross many obstacles (especially Soviet-style Taleban entrenchments), and was too vulnerable to AT fire (partly because someone in Canada decided not to fit them with slat armour:confused:). The LAV also proved very prone to getting stuck in mud during winter months, and hull cracks from cross-country ops also developed throughout the fleet. Rebuilt M-113 A3s (of all things:wry: - and a vehicle decidely inferior in most respects to the LAV/Stryker) are progessively replacing LAVs for cross-country ops.
That said, the LAV/Stryker is generally very good for COIN and internal security roles. A LAV-MGS with the 105 mm might be useful for an occasional and brief flare-up of heavy fighting, dealing efficiently with certain urban targets from a safer distance (and sparing the infantry the risk of having to assault in many cases) or with insurgent field fortifications, etc. But the sort of fighting that went on in many Iraqi cities required nothing less than the heavy stuff, not least MBTs. Even if any technical glitches in the LAV-MGs have been resolved, it is still lightly armoured (compared to an MBT), has a low main ammo load, and is not suitable for really rough cross-country ops. But the newer MBTs have the same complicated liquid-cooled suits that the LAV-MGS has, along with delicate and complex electronics (though so far the upgraded Leopard 2 doesn't have problems in particular there).
The MGS costs almost as much as an MBT; might as well put the money into the more capable vehicle, the MBT, except perhaps in limited quantities for certain units and formations.
I see Stryker - as it is used - in conflict with MRAPs, a protected motorized infantry vehicle. And the home for the MGS more in a cavalry that infantry unit.
The gun - are these L7s from old Pattons or new ones? Was there ever a competition for the gun system? The CMI CT-CV 105mm seems to be a better system, can even double as artillery.
On the Gavins: I think if they'd invested as many ressources into M113 as they did to convert the Piranha into the Stryker, the M113, esp in version A4 would have been a quite suitable vehicle.
After I last posted I went off and did a bit of note checking, and the only real advantage of 105mm is that you can get effective "payload" like AP, Flare, and Smoke, but that's about it. Flare isn't much good unless you have high trajectory, so all in all a 120mm mortar turret system seems to be optimum choice if you want something heavier than 90mm. - but I see the doctrinal conflict of having mortars in DIRECT support.
a.) MRAPs are probably what Stryker should have been, given a bit of lateral thinking.
B.) Correct me if I am wrong, but there is no such vehicle as the Gavin.
In response to:
(b) No, there is no vehicle ever officially christened the "Gavin," but it's been an off-and-on popular nickname for the M113 (which as far as I know has never had an official name) for some 40 years. . .
(a) Perhaps some wish the Stryker had become the MRAP, but I think a lot of the concerns voiced around here over the FOB-mentality in connection with the MRAP (all tied to the oft-stated COIN paradox about force protection not equaling security) are valid, and also if I'm not mistaken the MRAP is less deployable and multi-mission than the Stryker. Some may question the wisdom of basing several combat brigades around the Stryker - I'm sure a lot of people would be stunned if you were to outfit a few brigades entirely with MRAPs.
Matt
Wikipedia: The M113 has never received an official name, but has received a variety of nicknames over the years. The NLF called it the "Green Dragon"; the Swiss referred to it as the "Elefantenrollschuh" or elephants' roller-skate; the Germans called it the "Schweinewürfel" or pig cube.[7][8] U.S. troops tended to refer to the M113 simply as a "track". Some sources have referred to the M113 as the "Gavin" in an allusion to Gen. Gavin, but U.S. forces have never used the name.[7] The Israeli official name for the M113 is "Bardelas" (Cheetah) but the troops call it "Zelda" (another nickname is "Zippo" after the brand of lighters, as the M113 tends to combust when hit by anti-tank weapons). The Australian Army refers to its M113A1s as "Buckets", and the modified M113A1 fitted with 76mm turrets as "Beasts".
I wish I could say the decision to arm the Stryker with a 105mm was the result of the sort of close and careful analysis many on this site like to do in their spare time, but the fact is that the Army had a bunch of old 105 parts and 105mm ammo in warehouses, depots and industry were still tooled up for that caliber, etc. It was pretty much a question of cost and convenience. Also, to remind everyone, the Stryker was supposed to be an interim vehicle, off-the-shelf, to get us through to the FCS.
As for using variants of M113, the Army leadership early on - we're talking 1999 here - decided any new vehicle would be wheeled, not tracked.
Some of the requirements for the primary IAV, the infantry carrier, were the ability to carry a fully equipped infantry squad, commonality of parts across the IAV variants as well as with other vehicles within the IBCT, some baseline survivability requirements, and the capability for intra-theater air transport via C130.
While there are many MRAP variants, I suspect that the ones that can carry a full infantry squad would start to bust your logistics/transportability constraints for the organization.
A Stryker vs. MRAP evaluation would need to be completed at the organizational and operational concept level.
Okay, as someone who has had M113A3(+) in his MTOE (slat armor, cupolas, BFT, etc). They suck. They were okay in the 1960's. They're a pretty flexible vehicle. Spare parts are available.
But let's not overlook:
1) The ride absolutely sucks. The infantry hate it. The only thing I liked was the ability for the infantry to open the top hatches and scan.
2) The armor isn't that great, and the slat armor makes it just as unwieldly in urban terrain as the Stryker. Additionally, there's no top protection worth mentioning.
3) They're severely underpowered with all that armor added
4) They're slow, on a good day with all that armor you might reach a screaming 15-20 mph, if your engine doesn't overheat.
5) They break A LOT more than any other vehicle I had, including M1 tanks.
6) Funny thing happened on the way to the up-armoring plant. The ramp pump burned out on every one because it couldn't lift the troop door with that extra armor. so the soldiers had to often use the troop hatch to exit, not exactly rapid deployable infantry.
Now some of that could be resolved with R&D and upgrades, but the M113 is simply a product of the 1950's whose time is past.. Having had M113A3+'s in my MTOE and worked around Strykers, I'll take the stryker for the COIN/LIC mission. And a M2 Bradley was by far the most flexible and useful vehicle in my menu during OIF. Firepower, troop capacity (low, but enough), and armor.
I think there was a thread about the wingnut who was the M113 "Gavin" advocate and fanboy ....