Assessment of Effects Based Operations
Assessment of Effects Based Operations
14 August 2008
MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND
Subject: Assessment of Effects Based Operations
1. Attached are my thoughts and Commander’s guidance regarding Effects Based Operations (EBO). The paper is designed to provide the JFCOM staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and amongst our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.
2. Therefore, we must return to time honored principles and terminology that our forces have tested in the crucible of battle and are well grounded in the theory and nature of war. At the same time, we must retain and adopt those aspects of effect based thinking that are useful. We must stress the importance of mission type orders that contain clear Commander’s Intent, unambiguous tasks and purpose, and most importantly, links ways and means with achievable ends. To augment these tenets, we must leverage non-military capabilities and strive to better understand the different operating variables that make up today’s more complex operating environments.
3. My assessment is shaped by my own personal experiences and the experience of others in a variety of operational situations. I’m convinced we must keep the following in mind: First, operations in the future will require a balance of regular and irregular competencies. Second, the enemy is smart, and adaptive. Third, all operating environments are dynamic with an infinite number of variables; therefore, it is not scientifically possible to accurately predict the outcome of an action. To suggest otherwise runs contrary to historical experience and the nature of war. Fourth, we are in error when we think that what works (or does not work) in one theater is universally applicable to all theaters. Finally, to quote Sherman, “Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster.” History is replete with such examples and further denies us any confidence that the acute predictability promised by EBO’s long assessment cycle can strengthen our doctrine.
4. The joint force must act in uncertainty and thrive in chaos, sensing opportunity therein and not retreating into a need for more information. JFCOM’s purpose is to ensure that joint doctrine smoothes and simplifies joint operations while reducing friendly friction. My goal is to return clarity to our planning processes and operational concepts. Ultimately, my aim is to ensure leaders convey their intent in clearly understood terms and empower their subordinates to act decisively.
5. While NATO and many Partner Nations have adopted the EBO nomenclature, NATO’s policy focuses on the whole of government/Comprehensive Approach. In short, NATO’s Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) does not fully mirror U.S. EBO. NATO’s use of EBAO is left unaddressed in this USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance.
6. A pre-decisional working draft of this document was prematurely circulated and should be discarded. I regret any confusion resulting from the unintended early release of this draft document.
J. N. MATTIS
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commander’s Guidance Regarding Effects Based Operations - US Joint Forces Command (PDF)
Bad idea or bad process? Regardless it was bad
When I first heard of EBO, I admit I had high hopes for it, that was until I was actually trained in it, and saw the seriously flawed concepts of SoSA, ONA, and worse, much worse, MOE and MOP. Then I noted every one assumed their actions (unilaterally) we're creating these magical effects. At first I thought it was intended to flatten the organization and harmonize the interagency actors by arming everyone with the objectives and the associated effects, thus if you didn't have guidance from higher, you knew what needed to be done on the ground. However, after studying it and watching it in practice in the real world and during exercises it is clear that GEN Mattis's memo is spot on in most aspects.
I was a small bit player in one of the most successful interagency and multinational operations in recent history and that was JTF Liberia in 2003. Fortunately, it didn't receive much press outside of Africa, so we had considerable freedom of movement. During this operation the multinational forces and interagency were successfully harmonized with clear objectives that resulted in orders with clear cut task(s)/purpose(s). In this case leadership was decisive (both State Department and Military). I think we would have failed miserbly if we used EBO doctrine.
Unfortunately, this EBO like process has manifested itself in other ways, where U.S. forces inappropriately apply a CARVER matrix to terrorist and insurgent organizations, which resulted in the failed network approach where one attempts to destroy an insurgency by killing or capturing its so called key nodes (important individuals). In limited cases this method will work, and most cases it is a key supporting role, but not at the expense of failing to protect the population. What worked in Iraq was large scale population control measures that the surge enabled, where the focus was protecting the populace. I'm confident history will show that the much bragged about approach "it's the network stupid" was actually a failure or at most a minor enabler. Like EBO this was based on faulty assumptions that an insurgency is a simple system or simple system of systems like an electric power grid. It isn't, and surgical actions won't when the fight anymore than surgical bombings. That brings me to the key question, is EBO entirely flawed or is our practice (based on faulty assumptions) of it flawed? I think the answer is both, and if we focused on the objective of defeating the insurgency, vice all the sub effects, we would have realized from day one we needed more forces (Iraqi or otherwise) to get control initially.
Prior to EBO, I think the most damaging concept to our military was the force protection bureaucracy which was an off shoot of GEN Downey's investigation of the Khobar Towers incident. Force protection was always an inherit responsibility, and there were several anti-terrorism courses long before force protection level I thru IV training. This resulted in an another cottage industry of contractors, wasted military manpower and in too many cases operational paralysis. Force protection is important, it has always been our second priority, which in order are the mission, the men, then yourself. Prior to 9/11 we let force protection (the men) trump accomplishing the mission as a priority. I would like to see GEN Mattis tackle this one, and while he is at it take a hard look at Information Operations. I'm not anti-IO, but it would be helpful for all to see some clarity here also.
EBO is not the only practice in our military that lacks common sense.
True on both counts, I think....
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Hajduk
Some people are born to be warriors some are not. I think EB(A)O was thought to be the holy grail, or at least the road to it, of conducting war where anyone could just open the book and follow it full circle to ultimate success on the battlefield.
The former is absolutely correct and the EBO thing is simply the latest in a long line of attempts to allow anyone to successfully fight a battle or a war.
That's deemed necessary due to DOPMA and the US insistence that all _______(Insert rank and specialty of choice) are absolutely equal in skills and attributes. That's patently nonsensical. Better training would help but even that will not make a cautious metric lover into an intuitive commander. :rolleyes:
Cav Guy was right in his comment above; the systems guys will be back. I've seen about four or five iterations along the same line in an attempt to force decision codification over the past 60 years. None of 'em worked, the next one won't either. :mad:
It's an art, not a science...
The same way you already do it
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Slap mate. I want to believe! - the religious side of me! ;)
..but can you give me an example? How does thinking of the IRA or a Soviet Style Motor Rifle Regiment, as "a system" help me defeat him?
I totally get that deep understanding of how something mechanical, cybernetic or even chemical allows me to use the minimum force to sabotage it, but how do I apply that to real world enemies and threats? - which are endlessly "open" systems, are they not?
They must eat, sleep, work, watch their back, find support, find the good guys, create alliances, establish boundaries, conquer ground, address the populous, etc.
If that ain't a system of some sort not sure what is. :D
That doesn't mean there's not some difference in how one is to approach said systems. It is simply to identify that their still the same just trying to use a little tech to help think about them.
Whats the difference between a tape or CD, how about VHS or DVD,
Standard res / HD Its about clarity of perception and understanding not different answers. Hopefully better answers to the same questions.
I'm sure that didn't help:wry: but Oh well I tried
Without answering your first part
;)
Quote:
Originally Posted by
wm
Systems thinking usually seems to arise when one is feeling resource constrained. In other words, if you can't rain down tons of steel on your opponent in a rather indiscriminate fashion, you have to be selective about what you target. Since you have to be selective, you want to make every shot count. Rome'e enemies tried to capture the legions' eagles as a way of breaking the legionnaires' will to fight. Modern systems thinking looks at what might achieve the equivalent "biggest" bang for the buck. That, at least, is the theory. But I am not sure that the theory has ever been mapped successfully to practice (in modern warfare at least). From what I've read, "surgical" strikes against Iraqi C2 facilities, e.g., didn't really break the will of the Iraqi Army in OIF I.
Of course some smart guy will tell me that this is not a failure of the systems approach. Rather, we failed to correctly identify the right or critical node in the system which was the Iraqi Armed Forces, Al-Qaeda in Iraq or whomever. I hope this reminds you of the kinds of responses you hear from conspiracy theorists when they are presented with evidence that is meant to disprove their hypotheses about the world takeover conspiracies of the Illuminati, the KGB, the Knights Templar, etc. ;)
I don't think it takes all that smart a guy to figure out that if your right hand doesn't know what your left hands doing and your feet have decided to sit it out things might not go very well. CO-CO-COmmunication
That might also help to explain
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
I suspect that this is a reasonable assumption. The AF is seriously tech-centric, and EBO is focused almost totally on technology. EBO can also be packaged as conflict on the cheap, which is something the AF has been pushing since the end of World War II. I'd also think that it channels a great deal of Warden's thinking.
Not saying that this was planned, but more a matter of like minds finding like theories and latching on.
Why the focus is so often on the nodes vs the paths between them:confused: