SFA capability is rooted in Individual Talent (part 1)
The research JCISFA conducts with respect to identifying best practices and the planning and exercise activities that JCISFA supports indicates that the cornerstone for SFA capability resides in individual talent. In some ways this may seem self-evident - in training for any mission essential task we identify what are the individual requirements such as marksmanship, driver skills, etc. which must be covered as prerequisites in our training strategy. Where SFA differs is that because the object is to develop sustainable capability and capacity in somebody else’s security forces, the individual ability to employ his subject matter expertise, experiential skills, and overall knowledge is the critical capability, e.g. the one that directly impacts the objective, vs. the collective capability in which it is packaged, and which enables it. Make no mistake, the collective capability is often the capability which enables, sustains and supports the individual capability, but the individual capability of being able to use your own individual skills, attributes and experiences to support someone else’s developmental requirements is the capability that influences the FSF opposite. Why is influence the critical piece? Because ultimately the goal is a degree of self sustainment in the FSF which achieves our policy objective(s), and that requires they (the FSF being supported) see where your efforts are beneficial or critical to them.
Within the debate on how best we should insitituionalize SFA as a capability there has been a great deal of discussion about organizational solutions. These include the capability of existing force structure to meet requirements, and the need for specialized force structure to meet these requirements. The discussion while generating friction does not really move the issue forward. It does not really address the fact that SFA capabilities are rooted in individual talent, and that any organizational solution in and of itself will not meet the range of operational requirements required by policy, but in fact will leave us with a limited capability that will often put the burden on the operational commander to either wedge it into an operational need, or to break it apart and reform it to meet that need as well as possible – both are current practice, and both are full of risk.
While it is incumbent upon the services and JFCOM to consider the risks to the institution with any course of action with regard to institutionalizing and generating SFA capabilities, it should first consider the risks to the policy objective, e.g. putting the “right” capabilities into the hands of the operational commanders. One comment on a large commitment to specialized force structure is the issue of it being an “unsustainable” option. This does not tell the civilian chain of command anything except that given the other things we think we must do, we cannot support that as a course of action. To this I suspect a response could be the directed elimination of other capabilities in order to make specialized force structure available and sustainable (either within a service or in DoD writ large). It does not show the civilian leadership the services can adapt their processes to generate capabilities required to enable a preferred operational course of action, rather it postulates that conditions and policy should be adjusted to support the capabilities it prefers to generate. Further, such rationale creates a false bottom as ultimately it will still have to generate those SFA capabilities in the same ad hock fashion as it has, which may in fact protract conflict by not putting the right capabilities on the ground, risk the policy objective, and create more stress on the force then if it had adapted its programs, policies and processes to be able to generate the right capabilities initially. Organizational solutions may be easier to program, but they are not necessarily effective.
There are in fact several good reasons why force structure (specialized in organization or by mission) is not an optimal solution to generating SFA capabilities.
1) Specialized force structures ultimately become special – that is they lose part of their utility, and develop safeguards to protect what they perceive as their mission. These walls not only keep things out, they also keep them in. No matter how much structure is allocated, it is likely that at some point the need to interoperate on fundamental levels with non specialized force structure will occur. At that point any lessons available to the non-specialized “rest of the force” will be hard to incorporate to increase the capacity of any capability. This issue is not so different the one we see between Special Operating Forces and General Purpose Forces (consider all the debate on SOF/GPF integration) . If it is true that we must be prepared to wage both conventional and irregular warfare (a useful bifurcation of warfare in terms of thinking about capabilities) to achieve our policy objectives, then it makes sense to take those steps which develop our total force to meet those challenges. SFA individual skills are fungible across the spectrum of warfare (they are ultimately about people and people wage war), and as such should be developed across the force – creating specialized force structure does not support this.
2) The subject matter expertise and skills required to conduct SFA come from being developed in various capacities and experiences throughout a career. – e.g. if someone is going to advise a foreign security force armor brigade commander on how to be an armor brigade commander, the range of developmental experiences accrued by the advisor need to be relevant. Having someone who at some point lived that developmental process rather than just studying it lends itself to credibility and legitimacy. The additional “advisor” skills can be trained in a relatively short time (relative to the time required for experiential development), provided there is both a well developed process for doing so (doctrine, training, leader development and education) and that the right people can be identified based n the mission (personnel policies).
3) This type of capability, rooted in individual talent, lends itself to tailored solutions. Specialized force structure is not too much different then saying a brigade sized unit is the answer to every set of conditions and objectives. Individual capability that is trained, developed and educated, which can refer to descriptive doctrine, and that can be tracked and identified to meet specific conditions provides for capabilities which can be assembled effectively and efficiently to meet a requirement. It does require organizational flexibility on a number of levels, and it does require acknowledgment that problems can be unique and have unique tolerances, but this approach ultimately generates less risk to the policy objective and less stress on the force by extension. In this case, while the assemblage of capabilities from the “talent pool” seems ad hoc in appearance, the processes which support it support a capability that is well developed and tailored to the requirements, e.g., it is a form of deliberate task organization.
4) The scope of SFA requirements are such that the breadth includes the range of possible security services that exist in a partner, or may be required of the partner, and the depth includes the individual patrolman, minister, soldier, etc all the way up to the institutions which sustain them. This requires us to be able to leverage the total force which includes the Active Component and the Reserve Component, SOF and GPF, the Generating Force and the Operating Force, the individual and the collective based on requirements that are defined by closely considering the objectives in light of the conditions (not I did not even account for those things which may be better done by another USG agency). This means that there is no standard answer and that any attempt to standardize an answer creates risk to the objective. We know by our current and historical experience that conditions change both in terms of geography, and evolve over time. When we try and deliver a standard package for SFA developmental capability without consideration of conditions and objectives it is akin to saying that saying that for all we are going to teach is 10th grade High School literature course regardless whether what you really need is an elementary level course, or a university level one and regardless of that you really may already be fine with literature and wanted math, science or history.
5) Finally, this approach supports maintaining our overall adaptability. Allowing leaders to move between the “controlled” environs of our CTCs and other events when eventually we return to a more normal set of conditions, and the “uncontrolled” environments associated with security force assistance (and other activities which take us out into the real world) supports a perspective that helps to prevent our building DOTMLPF practices which support war as we’d prefer it vs. as it is. We currently adapt well inside the operational environment because we face enemies and other adversaries who are trying to gain and retain the initiative, as such we must adapt of die. In the controlled environments the adversaries are often our faithfulness to practices and as such there are penalties for adaptation. We’ve fought hard for our gains in these areas which manifest themselves in the type of subordinate/superior tension in dialogue where disagreement is often healthy.
cont. below
1 Attachment(s)
SFA capability is rooted in indivudal Talent (Part 2)
cont. from above
The way forward is to recognize that these capabilities are rooted in individual talent, and that we should consider our DOTMLPF practices and policies to support better individual development in these areas. The areas should include a review of what we really require in terms of individual capabilities at every level (E1/W1/01 and up), and then with that knowledge change our leader development and education programs from the time we recruit and assess all the way through our senior education programs. Further we should look at the developmental assignment path with foster and promote these experiences so they are inculcated into leaders at every level. There is work to do in the other DOTMLPF categories to support this as well. I’ve attached a one slide overview of how we might better address developing SFA capabilities if done so as part of a broader human resources strategy vs. trying to generate these capabilities in mid flight.
Best, Rob
"Guns don't kill people, People kill people"
Seems to me, Rob, that a lot of what you are saying here goes back to a really simple observation - people do things while structures condition what people may or may not do (in the sense of rewards and punishments). Actually, I think I tend to agree with your general argument but, only, if your forces get rid of that insane Up or Out policy. The only way you can nurture talents is allow them to be used but, if your HR policies require different talents at different levels (which they do), then you have a serious problem.
Time to step back and contextualize...
(sheesh! I'm sounding like an academic!... O, yeah, I am one...)
One of the things I've noticed is that the military tends to use the same words as academics (or vice versa, take your pick ;)), but with different meanings. This is clearly the case when we look at "education" and "training" (I commented on this and pulled it apart in Ch. 4 of the Mosul Case Study), and I think it also applies in the case of "skill" and "talent".
For me, I define "talent" as an inborn, hardwired (aka genetic) propensity to find performing some action or operation more easily than other people. I use the term "skill" to refer, regardless of any talent, to the ability of an individual to perform the actions and operations associated with that skill. Now, these definitions have some implications that are both a) pretty obvious to anyone with two neurons to rub together, and b) anathema to the PC crowd, since they assume an innate, genetic difference between people.
Sometimes (rare, but it exists), we find people whose talent is so pronounced that they really do not need to "study" or "learn" how to perform the skill - they already "know". Mozart is an example of this type of talent (in musical composition), but there are others. Most of the time, however, a talent is only shown by a person finding some type of training a) easy and b) enjoyable, at least in the sense that the performance of the actions and operations bring that individual pleasure (the training may, in their view, suck the galactic muffin!).
When it comes time for someone to teach the actions and operations associated with a skill set, someone who has a truly great talent for that skill set is often the worst person to teach it - at least to teach the basics of it. This is because they have never actually had to learn it the hard way, so they don't actually "know", in step by step form, how they learned - they take way too much for granted and, as a result, tend to be poor teachers.
Now, this isn't to say that someone with a talent in any area cannot teach that area - they can. It's just that they have to spend a lot of time learning how to pull their own actions and thought processes apart which, is a separate skill set that, I believe, Reed was referring to as "thinking" in an earlier post.
Which brings me to another, related point: skill sets are culturally and sub-culturally defined in addition to any technical boundary conditions. If you achieve a desired result using a skill set in a non-culturally approved manner, you may well end up being punished for it.
This is a very fair comment.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Cavguy
Sir,
Great post highlighting the challenges in training and mindset, and the failure of the AC/RC guys to build rapport and advise.
I think we are saying the same thing, except from my view the last few years, I have not seen SF actively seeking to shape the GPF advisory mission. We were forced to assign GPF soldiers as advisers in OIF and OEF because there aren't enough specifically trained and selected guys in your branch to do so.
So the Army's first attempt was "Well, let's deploy the USAR Training Divisions as advisers, since it's a training mission." That was a disaster, as these great individuals were prepared to run basic training for US kids, not mentor Iraqi battalions. Then we created Ft. Riley, taking an Armored BDE (!) to run advisory training. Where was SWC? Hell if I know. It would seem a no brainer that if SF couldn't fill the adviser demand, they should have at least run the training, since it's been the core competency of SF for the last three decades or so. But we didn't for whatever reasons. Same story for recent doctrine.
In the two years I have worked at CAC as the ops officer for COIN, I have seen little interest from the US Army SF community in GPF efforts to get better at this. I can count on one hand the number of times anyone working for USASOC (excepting COL Maxwell/USASOC G3) has contacted the COIN center here about anything we are doing. Sure they attend the occasional conference, but mostly I have received the impression that most in SF just wished we would go away, usually muttering comments about "amateurs". People are doing the best they can with imperfect resources and less background to make this work. As a very personal observation, SF seems to have schadenfreude over the whole GPF circus with building TT's. My perception is that they haven't been a big part of the solution.
SOCOM is a different story though, so is JSOU. They have been actively plugged into what has been developing. Just interesting to me.
There's a big study coming up about SOF/GPF integration. I hope it produces something.
So in a way, the SF have failed to advise/influence the GPF. Kind of reverse of what happened with your AC/RC experience.
You are spot-on that USSOCOM has not shaped the development of the conventional force as it has ventured into what has traditionally been SF territory. SOCOM is not the Executive Agent for COIN, as an example, and as a rather small HQ with a rather large mission, has been reasonably reluctant to take on full proponency for several DOD-wide programs with strong SOF roots. We should have taken on a tailored level of proponency, and shaped the portion of the doctrine that defined the context and spirit of these operations, allowing the conventional force to pick up from there.
Similarly, after being "burdened" with a couple of rotations of raising and training the Afghan National Army, SF escaped that mission and SOF forces in theater all headed out to focus on sexier roles. In retrospect, the mission essential tasks in Afghanistan were not on the border with Pakistan, they were in mentoring the development of the governance of the country. There should have been a more appropriate balancing between what was important, and what was sexy. No one wants to be back at a school house or Gov't office when his brothers are out running combat operations.
Point being, that SOCOM absolutely does not have a corner on "smart" and has made as many mistakes in approaching this conflict as any other HQ.
But we start this war from where we are right now. How we got here is interesting, but not worth agonizing over. We need to, in my opinion, have two main priorities in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
1. Enhance HN governance legitimacy in the eyes of the populace, and work equally hard to stop any activity or policy that tends to create a perception of US legitimacy over the same.
2. Focus on enabling "goodness" of governance over creating "effectiveness" of governance. (the first being rooted in the perception of the populace, the latter being something measured by us outsiders).
This new focus would drive a very different perspective for the employment of all elements of US power in both AORs. A return of true and full authority to the HN (I.e., We only do what they ask us to do or approve, all detainees are HN detainees, and if asked to leave we leave); no US unilateral operations; etc.
Bottom-line: In order to achieve true and positive change, we must first relinquish control. The problem is that Cold War strategy was rooted in controlling others, so it has become our paradigm. Time to move on.
Wanted to highlight Marc's post
Marc -
Quote:
Quote:
For me, I define "talent" as an inborn, hardwired (aka genetic) propensity to find performing some action or operation more easily than other people.
Quote:
I use the term "skill" to refer, regardless of any talent, to the ability of an individual to perform the actions and operations associated with that skill.
Now, these definitions have some implications that are both a) pretty obvious to anyone with two neurons to rub together, and b) anathema to the PC crowd, since they assume an innate, genetic difference between people.
I think this is an important observation and others have made this with respect to command. Interestingly there is a move afoot to see how some of this can be modeled. Could you for example take the 5 block model and make some qualifications about what education, experience and training constitute them? Could you then quantify this in a mathematical expression? Could you then use that to compare probability of success of one individual with a given combination over another dependent upon conditions and objectives?
It seems that until you can put these capabilities into a model and simulate it in a way which provides justification for making programmatic decisions, relevant anecdotal information by itself will not move the ball forward (much). *Note - this says allot about our bureaucratic culture that we are far more comfortable with a false reality of mean time between failure (MTBF) and probability of kill (PK) ratios (which are themselves based on observation and historical averages) then we are with trusting our senses and intuition (based on our own experiences) simply because we've found a way to mathematically express one and not the other. The equation of how you know a tank BN of X will destroy a tank BDE of Y does not match perfectly to the anecdote of sometimes you are the bug and sometimes you are the windshield.
Again, I'd refer anyone interested in the issue of how our perception of reality influences our judgment to Marc T's excellent website.
Best, Rob
If I may, while I very much agree with Marc's categories and their definitions,
I think there's a skill set (and / or a talent... ;)) block missing; Five blocks are cool but I think the third one might be shown as a hopefully existing and embedded set of skills that may need slight -- and only slight, very slight -- remodeling to be move on to the fourth block and be effective as an advisor.
All Officers and NCOs are responsible for leading and training subordinates and use -- or should use -- the skills I placed in Block 3 below, translating those skills to an advisory rather than a command or leadership position will take some adjustment but that should be slight. No need to make it more difficult than it is...
Herewith is plan B:
Rob, must you come up with this
when I have to grade finals?!!!!! Wish I'd seen this thread sooner.
Couple of comments:
A lot of wisdom form all you guys who contributed.
In the ideal world, we would not need to use GPF for SFA. but the world is not ideal and to top it off we have SF guys getting "huffy" about the amateurs and GPF guys thinking the SF are prima donnas. SFA really requires SOF/GPF integration - especially SF, CA, and to a slightly lesser extent, PSYOP skill sets. Detailing some of these SOF guys to SFA teams made up largely of GPF might serve us well.
A basic issue here is the institutional military attitude that we can train an officer or NCO to be an effective leader. There really is no institutional recognition that leadership is a talent - and a talent that an individual may have in some circumstances but not in others. IMO we can teach the skills necessary to good leadership and many individuals can take the talent they have and use those skills to enhance it but some leaders are naturally leaders and others are not. Some leaders have talent to lead small units but not GCC; others may be great at leading echelons above reality but only adequate at leading small units. Well SFA and advising are similar. Generally, a good advisor has empathy for other cultures and often that extends from one culture to the next. I recall an Army COL - the ARMA in Peru - who was by training a Vietnamese FAO. He had the empathy to be outstanding in a totally different culture, Peru. My own experience has seen some success as an advisor in Latin America but I would have had trouble adjusting to and being successful in the Haitian culture (based on the research we did there for a study of Operation Uphold Democracy).
My point is, then, Rob's - SFA is mostly the individual. The challenge that we, the USG, face is how to make the most of the individuals, organizations, etc. that we have and how to train and educate for the skills and understandings (the education v. the training component) that will bring out the talents of the individuals available to us. To pick up on Bob's theme, how do we adapt the principles of SF Assessment and Selection to the task at hand for GPF based SFA teams? One of those principles is that soldiers who are not cut out for SF are de-selected without hurting their careers in other branches. Thus, de-selection is an important element.
Enough rambling. This is an important thread and it really shoudl be read extensively in the military and outside.
Cheers
JohnT
John, Talented people have...
Attitudes !
I googled it and low and behold: Managing Talented People With Bad Attitudes :rolleyes:
Quote:
It would be nice if all talented people had great attitudes. But unfortunately, sometimes our most skilled people can be arrogant, narcissistic, dramatic or negative.
I don't actually fit into any of the aforementioned as they left out Pain in the Alpha :D
Regards, Stan
Quote:
Originally Posted by
John T. Fishel
has inspired me.:wry: If I ever have to go back to Haiti, I will find a way to make it work.:cool: In the meantime, I'll leave it to former Pres Bubba to "feel their pain."
BTW, the motto of the Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) is, "Normal is a cycle on the washing machine." Courtesy of COL Bob Shaw.
Cheers
JohnT