Australians in Afghanistan
Nice article looking at debunking the myth that Aussies are naturally gifted at COIN. That's not to say their not good, but that perhaps we have been resting when we should have been busy adapting, learning and changing the way we operate.
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/our-so...l.html?page=-1
Aussies are not "natural" COIN fighters
Noble Industries,
A good catch this article and perhaps a sign that some are thinking harder. I doubt the writer came to this without dialogue with the Defence Forces. Here in the UK it has taken years for those close to officialdom to openly say "we are in a mess".
davidbfpo
Excellent Australian analysis re Afghan Theater
Cynthia Bynum, diplomatic correspondent out of Sydney, Australia, in her article which Noble Industries posted the link for, writes a masterful piece which I hope the Australian pols and top brass will read and seek to implement.
Complacent "this is how we have always done it, nothing really new under the sun" is a dangerous attitude for any of us in today's world.
The terrorist Taliban and al Qaida are irregular guerilla fighters whose patterns are changing frequently, simply said. We must do likewise and perpetually keep them off guard until they are KIA.
Likewise, the Pakhtun "code or constitution" which is unwritten creates havoc as locals are brainwashed culturally to more often than not help the terrorists not the allies nor even the national forces of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. This cultural problem needs immediate heavy focus via psyops, Voice of America, the BBC, et al, as the backwoods civilian Pakhtun population are in many instances 100% dependent on TV and radio for all their news and information...*excluding the enemies use of low beam FM radio broadcasts to guide their troops in the field...we need a better "interrupter" fix for enemy FM, too.
In Afghanistan specifically a huge number of Pakhtuns, and other ethnic groups of smaller numbers, are totally and literally illiterate. Similiar problems in Pakistan in FATA, N. & S. Waziristan, and parts of the NWFP, into Pak Occupied Kashmir. Swat formerly had a pretty good public education system which the Taliban and al Qaida have targeted and physically destroyed as much of as they could until now.
No one in the West is that good at it, nor will they likely be in the future.
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Originally Posted by
Noble Industries
...that perhaps we have been resting when we should have been busy adapting, learning and changing the way we operate.
Davidfbpo
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Here in the UK it has taken years for those close to officialdom to openly say "we are in a mess"
George L. Singleton
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irregular guerilla fighters whose patterns are changing frequently, simply said. We must do likewise and perpetually keep them off guard until they are KIA.
Western bureaucracies are contraindicated as coping mechanisms for insurgencies not nipped in the early stages by smart and aggressive intelligence, diplomatic and very low key, specially trained military element efforts. Major Western forces will always have a rotation and personnel turbulence problem plus other detrimental factors with which to cope. Those factors almost make the opposition an annoyance -- until it's too late.
The first two comments quoted above are true and the same can be said of the US; we aren't doing this very well. The reasons lie in George's very valid point. Western Armies, lacking an existential threat, will never produce general purpose forces trained, equipped, organized, trusted and risked to properly prosecute a war against a very flexible, highly motivated, aggressive and ruthless enemy who uses our own laws, mores and media as a weapon. Simply, we are unlikely to do what he correctly says is necessary.
All three of our nations and some others are in a constant learning mode due to legal, moral, training and personnel policies. Those policies also impose severe constraints on action. That is unlikely to change and thus we must accept that mediocre performance is the best we're going to get from most of our general purpose forces in such conflicts barring a major change in public and governmental attitudes -- which seems unlikely at this time.
Excerpt from THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL
Taiko's link to THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL curren issue provides the partial quote below, and is much appreciated by this old trooper, even if I am Air Force. I did much work with US Special Operations Command as with FORSCOM as a "purple suit" and have some appreciation of what you land guys and gals are up against.
Only wish the Pakistani Army would pay more attention to land operations, at least special ops, in N. and S. Waziristan, which they cannot subdue, overcome, and occupy without land forces vs. just air and artillery ops.
I have quoted only part of the lead in Editorial to the current issue of THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY JOURNAL which attempts to jump start an ongoing future articles dialogue over counterinsurgency strategy and tactics as applied in Afghanistan today.
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Although we had developed considerable proficiency in operating against classical Maoist guerrilla movements in the jungles of South-East Asia, the character of insurgency has undergone significant change since the end of the Cold War. This point is emphasised by Major General Jim Molan in his article in this special edition. He dismisses the hoary myth that our army—or any army—is naturally adept at counterinsurgency. And he stresses the importance of fully grasping the lethality and motivation of the modern jihadist insurgent.
Nor is past success a guarantee of current competence. The Australian Army Journal has consistently advocated the careful study of military history by members of the profession of arms. But, as Professor Jeffrey Grey reminds us, every war is sui generis, and caution must be exercised in seeking to glean lessons from past campaigns.
The pressing importance of understanding counterinsurgency led the Chief of Army to direct the urgent rewriting of Australian Army doctrine for counterinsurgency.
In February this year he convened a two-day seminar to frame an authors’ brief to inform the doctrine writing team. This task is now being undertaken against a tight schedule. That is the reason that this edition of the Australian Army Journal is a thematic special edition. It also explains why we have expedited its production, in an effort to stimulate thinking across the Army about this important issue.
Accordingly, a number of qualifications need to be expressed. This issue is built around a significant number of articles expressly reprinted from foreign military journals. This does not reflect a want of confidence in the calibre of our own officers and soldiers. Nor will it become the standard practice of the Australian Army Journal, which is committed to maintaining its authentic Australian voice.
We hope that Australian readers will read these articles with a critical attitude and ponder their validity in the light of their own experiences of current operations, before writing their own opinions for this Journal.
It would, however, be parochial in the extreme not to acknowledge the vast experience that our allies have accumulated over the past few years. For that reason we have sought the views of some of the leading experts in this field from other nations. We are honoured to publish the views of General David Petraeus and Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszley, whose contributions in this area are without peer. Likewise, the expertise of Ian Beckett and Stephen Metz—highly esteemed scholars both—are valuable additions to this Journal.
Furthermore, there is a distinct land bias in this edition. As Major General Molan emphasises, successful counterinsurgency demands seamless orchestration of joint effects. And the Chief of Army stresses that the multi-agency, comprehensive approach is vital to counterinsurgency, which requires more intimate coordination of political effects than other forms of warfare.
The absence of RAN, RAAF, AFP or NGO perspectives from this edition does not imply a lack of recognition of their fundamental importance to effective counterinsurgency operations.
However, this Australian Army Journal • Volume V, Number 2 • page 7 Editorial edition has been compiled within the serious time constraints applicable to the doctrine writers. In the interests of publishing this contribution in time to be of any relevance to the Army, we necessarily focused on our primary audience.
I am hopeful that contributing Aussie field officers, NCOs, and related Australian government civilians will be addressing psyops and how you deal with essentially illiterate populations whose unwritten variably interpreted by oral tradition Islamic teachings at present enable our enemies in being provided shelter and hiding places vs. the populations having a better awareness that the terrorists are the enemies of Islam and hence their enemies, too. My two cents here, of course.
'Diggers' see the "light"
A BBC News report:
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Prime Minister Julia Gillard says Australia will withdraw its troops from Afghanistan earlier than planned... troops would begin pulling out this year and most would be home by the end of 2013 - an election year in Australia...Australia has some 1,550 troops serving in Afghanistan, mainly in the Uruzgan region....withdrawal would begin once Afghans took on responsibility for security in Uruzgan province...
Ms Gillard's minority administration has been slipping in popularity and some observers say Labor could be heading for defeat at the polls.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17737592
If Australia one of the US's leading allies decides to exit a year early, one wonders what the impact will be on other ISAF contributors.
I await the observations of the one Australian think tank I monitor, the Lowy Institute.
Oops... all is not well it seems
From the Kings of War blog we get this article:
The (Colour Sergeant) Bourne Legacy: Soldierly Discipline
Starts with:
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An excerpt from one Australian officer’s end of tour report as the CO of a Mentoring Task Force in Afghanistan laments what he sees as a pitiful level of ill-discipline amongst soldiers, their NCOs, and junior officers. The document, of course, is based on one person’s observations and opinions, but it is revealing nevertheless. And while it focuses on the current state of Australian soldiery, it would not be too far off the mark in describing the behaviour and mindset from other ABCA nations.
Australians in Afghanistan
PM says Australia's longest war ending
A quick summary, with an interesting, possibly unique political point:
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Prime Minister Tony Abbott has declared a symbolic end to 'Australia's longest war', even though about 400 troops will remain in Afghanistan next year and perhaps beyond...Accompanied by Opposition Leader Bill Shorten in the first ever bipartisan visit....
The Diggers next role, including SOF:
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However, some 400 will remain in a variety of non-combat roles including mentoring of the Afghan National Army (ANA) 205 Corps headquarters in Kandahar and of instructors at the ANA Officer Academy in Kabul. A small group of 18 special forces soldiers will remain in an advisory role in Kabul.
Link:http://www.skynews.com.au/topstories...aspx?id=919542
Australians in Afghanistan
'Land, Kill and Leave': How Australian Special Forces Helped Lose the War in Afghanistan
This article is one of series released by ABC today; on a quick review some of the allegations have been in the Australian public domain before, now they have documents to support the series.
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
Standing up, not shooting: the 'compassionate psychopaths' of the SAS
An article from the Sydney Morning Herald and reflective on what happened to the Australian SAS. Here are two short passages:
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A traditional role of applying and gathering intelligence had been displaced by a lust for kill counts....A traditional role of applying and gathering intelligence had been displaced by a lust for kill counts.
Link:https://www.smh.com.au/politics/fede...01-p4zux2.html