Strategic Compression

I am working on a project that is exploring a concept that we ware calling, at least for the time being, 'strategic compression'. Thought I'd run by a brief narrative of what we are looking at and ask the Council to comment - expand on the following:

Strategic compression is a nascent term with widely used ideas such as the ‘strategic corporal’ and ‘CNN effect’ intermixed in it. Both attest to the realization that in today’s security environment, tactical actions can have operational and strategic consequences.

While both phrases are necessary for an understanding of strategic compression, neither suffices as an explanation. The former is essentially an implication of a new security environment—how soldiers will need to act under new circumstances—and the latter is a mechanism of how the environment has changed. Neither provides a complete definition or full understanding to what strategic compression is.

Our project cautiously defines strategic compression as the overlapping or merging of the three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. As a result, the past distinctions between the levels have become less clear. More specifically, the role of the operational level as an intermediary and “buffer” between the strategic and tactical levels may be reduced. There are two major directions of strategic compression: strategic to tactical compression and tactical to strategic compression.

The first is that the strategic level of war—specifically strategic level actors—increasingly have the ability to directly control and manage the tactical level of war in real-time. From the perspective of history, attempts by strategic level actors to directly control the tactical level are not a new phenomenon. Only recently through C4ISR capabilities has this ability been realized. C4ISR capabilities allow strategic level actors to control and impact the tactical level of war in unprecedented ways.

The second is that at the tactical level of war units and individual soldiers have the ability through tactical actions to affect the strategic level of war through what is commonly referred to as the ‘CNN Effect’. However, a situation where the tactical level directly affects the strategic level is not an entirely new phenomenon. In fact, the tactical level of war affecting the strategic level has been a common aspect of small wars for a while. Lately the concept has been largely reintroduced as a facet of war fighting and through a relatively new mechanism—the 24 hour news-cycle. Another aspect is that tactical units have increasing mobility and firepower. Directed by the previously mentioned C4ISR, small units can have an incredible effect on the battlespace and accomplish operational or even strategic level goals.

Furthermore, it should be noted that strategic compression isn’t a term limited specifically to small wars or major combat operations. Strategic compression can occur under either context though it has many specific implications for small wars (i.e. strategic corporal) and the current security environment.

Does the compression factor have something to do with changes in the war fighting environment? Is it an increasing variable due to increased communication capability? For example the unit members being interviewed on CNN disclose information that creates changes in the tactical mission or strategic objectives of leaders. Is the out of band (or in band even) discussions and granularity of communication creating non-hierarchical “compression” of the chain of command? Sorry if I’m off base here and picture included.


http://www.selil.com/images/possible...sonFactors.jpg

To me you are talking about time.
Strategic compression = Faster actions, against defined targets, to achieve faster results.
But!!! it is relative to your opponent. Fast may be very slow, but faster than your opponent.

Reminds me of a joke I heard. 2 guys are running away from a bear. The first guy stops to put on his running shoes. The second guy says why are you putting on your running shoes you can't out run a bear. The first guy says I don't have to out run the bear, I only have to out run you!!

I think President Johnson's selection of bombing targets in Vietnam is a 40+ year old example of strategic interference with tactical decisions.

As for the media, the real problem is that at best our forces on the strategic defensive, being reactive and about six or seven news cycles behind most stories that shape the media battle space. The fact is there is no media strategy, beyond telling reporters that we will get back to them in a few days when we find out what happened. By the time that happens the mdia has moved on to a new story and the old one is forgotten.

A more proactive strategy would be to at least point out the enemy's media strategy and its various victimization offensives that turn out to be frauds. We should be actively discrediting the enemy media strategy and remind the media when they are following the enemy playbook.

One of the reasons none of this happens is that no one is in charge of shaping this non kinetic battlespace. It is entirely reactive.

I think what you see with strategic compression is a percieved (or actual) desire on the part of higher commanders or echelons to control all aspects of warfare down to the tactical level. As was pointed out, tactical decisions and events have had an impact on higher levels of warfare for some time, especially when the war is viewed as more political (historical small wars, for example) than military in basic nature, and of course the reverse has also been true.

The basic problem to me occurs when higher levels attempt to inject their opinions and desires at levels where it is not appropriate. "Leadership by Charlie-Charlie bird" as seen in Vietnam has been replaced by the video conference, but the results are the same. Undermining the confidence of tactical leaders does not contribute to them making good decisions, and increases the possibility of a tactical decision that will have negative strategic impacts. Higher level commanders are frequently not aware of the realities on the ground. This does not mean that tactical commanders have a superior knowledge of the strategic situation, but that this sort of compression makes it easier for such interfearence to occur.

Strategic compression is to me a matter of timelines. Where previously one could count on a delay with press matters, now it's a matter of hours or minutes. Fear of reacting badly delays a response on the part of strategic leaders, or leads to a hasty response. In either case you have a compression that forces leaders onto the defensive and gives those who make hasty or sensational accusations an advantage in the media cycle.

Compliments to your efforts to define an very relevant concept. It seems to me that strategic compression is in some ways the antithesis to what we try to instill in our warfighters on the battlefield that being the idea of tactical patience. Strategic compression often pushes leaders at many levels to "do something, anything" rather than appear hesitant or worse impotent.

Tactical patience is of course the art of judging when conditions for sucess are set and when acting takes the initiative from the opponent.

Personally I have seen or been involved in ops at once both strategic and tactical. My favorite example of such was the "Goma baby clothes" airdrop driven exclusively by that "do something, anything impulse" and "do it on CNN." Near fiasco is the best face I can put on it and the "near" only applies because I did my best to convince the media that nothing was really going to happen and many of them left.

Keep chewing this bone...it is worth the effort!

Best
Tom

... but keep at it - looking for much more detail and discussion. Counting on you guys.

If I am not mistaken, strategic compression is the whole point of 4GW. The various non-state actors don't have the resources to have significantly effect the US or Israel at the operational or strategic level. All they are able to do is engage in various relatively small scale tactical actions which, in the absence of the media would be largely inconsequential. The enemy, however has learned to use I/O as a force multiplier. The use of the media and the proper application of rhetoric can lend a great deal of strategic weight to relatively small scale tactical actions. In the West the enemy seems to be aided somewhat by the rabid partisanship on both sides of the aisle and by the fact that many do not have a proper frame of reference to understand what is going on. At least that is the way I understand it.

SFC W

It would seem that when considering compression of the strategic environment it would have more to do with the political, resources, and large world view rather than the tactical unit level. However, we know that strategic choices have incredible impact on the tactical capability at the unit level, and further that actions at the unit level have substantial consequence on the strategic choices. It would appear that with small world communications (global, ubiquitous, instantaneous, and broadband) and the ability to have instant access from anywhere that strategic compression is a communications control issue.

The good side of strategic compression is that operational commanders would seem to have a better understanding of the current operational environment. The bad thing is that operational commanders can see set pieces and not realize the actual situation with a dirt in the teeth world view. This would seem to create an environmental disconnect between capability/sustainability and realization. I would think that constant inputs on current missions by commanders to the unit level would create feed back loops of indecision and overload commanders with requests for further direction while halting unit operations.

Unlike historical conflicts the ability to move information around the battlefield is only controlled in limited ways. Any cell phone, DVD Camera, or other transmission device in the environment is going to dispense with operational superiority in information operations. The way that information is viewed is contextual and when the context is not made apparent the message can be skewed and changed substantially. Whereas we can talk about “yellow journalism” and “bias” it is much harder to apply that to the selectivity of the images presented by either side of a conflict. Never mind the veracity and legitimacy of the information. This might suggest that strategic compression factors affecting command decisions might be infested with inappropriate information and create command error in assessment.

Inherent in the idea of compression is the concept that it is finite, and more importantly with compression comes inflexibility. You can only compress a command structure, tactical environment, or communications conduit so far. When compressing the structure a certain amount of loss occurs (common concept in communications and communication compression technology). The loss partially would appear to be in the flexibility of the operational entity. The flexibility that could be considered lost is the creative capability of the field commander to overcome issues through creative measures. We might not want field commanders becoming “artistic” in the field, but we most assuredly want them using higher order thinking skills to accomplish their objectives. Slightly inconsistent with the above analogy strategic compression suggest that more information is available since the single lines of communications loose some information through compression, more information is provided to the strategic commander as an overall broader understanding.

Just some simple thoughts early on a Sunday…

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/johnson_cognetics.pdf

Strategic compression as articulated here sounds like the result of cognetic effects on military decision making and operations. AF MAJ Bruce Johnson wrote a great piece about the effect of the democratization of communications technology (nod one to Friedman) on public perception of world events, ie the Cognetic Effect. Due to rapid world wide comms, people can get their message out worldwide, real-time The article is posted on Chet Richards' DNI site.

As a result of Cognetic Effect, the levels of war that we are comfortable with are truly compressing. The levels of command that we use to exercise C2 are becoming redundant and may hinder rather facilitate effective battle command. A by-product of strategic compression is the need to flatten our hierarchies (nod 2 to Friedman). We have integrated technolgy into our structure without questioning whether the structure itself may need to be modified for more effective C2.

Just trying to expand on the thoughts I put in my first post. Hopefully it may stir some discussion and/or debate as well.

I think that strategic compression is a result of 3GW methods being combined with modern media capability (sorry, but I'm becoming more and more convinced that “4GW” is just a more advanced form of 3GW and not something new and different). As operations become more and more “real time” in terms of their impact within reporting circles (witness the level of instant feed both in speed and scope we had with the WTC, for just one example, and then compare that to the lag with Pearl Harbor – even Tet '68 pales in comparison), the decision-making process struggles to keep up. And since this is really an OODA loop, strategic compression is just another way to get inside the OODA loop. What happens is that the time pressure created by media attention shrinks the envelope available to higher commanders to make decisions.

Having said that, I think that certain cultural trends within the US armed forces make the process worse than perhaps it needs to be. Since World War II, centralized control has been the unspoken goal of most military leaders, as demonstrated by actions and not words. In my earlier post I mentioned the “Charlie-Charlie bird” syndrome in Vietnam and its replacement by the video conference in more recent conflicts. We may talk and write a great deal about empowering and enabling our lower-level commanders to make their own decisions, but in practice it seems that the higher command levels (the Army in particular, although centralized command is really a way of life with the Air Force) like to take any chance they can to try to reclaim control of the battlefield and decisions made there. Sean Naylor's book about Operation Anaconda explores this in some detail, but commentary on it can be found throughout the literature on Vietnam and some of the writings about Somalia. Some crucial decisions regarding force structure were made for what could be called cosmetic reasons, ignoring the needs of the commanders on the ground. Of course, we've seen this before. But strategic compression (as defined as the pressure of instant media attention shrinking the time available to make what could be called standoff decisions) seems to increase the reluctance on the part of higher commanders to allow their subordinates to actually command and lead.

How do you deal with strategic compression? Frankly, I think one of the starting points is to trust your commanders in the field to make correct decisions and then support them. I/O campaigns are nice, but the reality is that we cannot conduct one properly because the U.S. mainstream media isn't disposed to play along. We can force out information, but that doesn't mean anyone will listen. I think the important part is to develop I/O campaigns that target local populations and not so much the home front. Higher level commanders need to recognize that their impact on local operations is naturally limited and that meddling simply because you have the technology to do so is counterproductive. Total situation awareness is a myth, and strategic compression (defined as time compression) makes this myth even more damaging.

Just some Monday morning thoughts.

Would appreciate comments on the following and any additional thoughts on the implications of strategic compression...

Since strategic compression is largely technology driven new technologies will likely exacerbate the effects of strategic compression and further blur the lines between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Advanced systems like the Land Warrior will give guidance and integrate the individual soldier into an increasingly complex command and control network. Improvements to ISR capabilities through better and more UAVs, satellites, and other means will give commanders on all levels of war a greater ability to see the battlefield and destroy targets through precision guided munitions and increased maneuverability. These examples show how units will be more prone to direct control by strategic actors.

The CNN effect is also unlikely to diminish. Inexpensive, ubiquitous cameras and the ability to post images and video on the internet by amateur reporters will increasingly contribute to this phenomenon. Sources of news will likely proliferate and instances of media responding to tactical mistakes are likely to grow. This will place greater emphasis on General Krulak’s strategic corporal idea as tactical actions should be expected to receive hyper-scrutiny in the future. The CNN effect will play an increasingly important role in small wars relative to major combat operations (MCO), because unlike the enemy in MCO, the two major centers of gravity in small wars—the occupied population and the American public—depend upon news media to gain information and formulate opinions about military actions. Ensuring that tactical actions are well understood by both audiences is essential. Small wars are also likely to be increasingly fought in urban environments. The likelihood that collateral damage will occur during operations and be documented by international media is dramatically increased. As such, the CNN effect is additionally exacerbated when American forces are operating amongst urban civilian population centers.

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Having said that, I think that certain cultural trends within the US armed forces make the process worse than perhaps it needs to be. Since World War II, centralized control has been the unspoken goal of most military leaders, as demonstrated by actions and not words. In my earlier post I mentioned the “Charlie-Charlie bird” syndrome in Vietnam and its replacement by the video conference in more recent conflicts. We may talk and write a great deal about empowering and enabling our lower-level commanders to make their own decisions, but in practice it seems that the higher command levels (the Army in particular, although centralized command is really a way of life with the Air Force) like to take any chance they can to try to reclaim control of the battlefield and decisions made there. Sean Naylor's book about Operation Anaconda explores this in some detail, but commentary on it can be found throughout the literature on Vietnam and some of the writings about Somalia. Some crucial decisions regarding force structure were made for what could be called cosmetic reasons, ignoring the needs of the commanders on the ground. Of course, we've seen this before. But strategic compression (as defined as the pressure of instant media attention shrinking the time available to make what could be called standoff decisions) seems to increase the reluctance on the part of higher commanders to allow their subordinates to actually command and lead.

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Would appreciate comments on the following and any additional thoughts on the implications of strategic compression...

Since strategic compression is largely technology driven new technologies will likely exacerbate the effects of strategic compression and further blur the lines between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Advanced systems like the Land Warrior will give guidance and integrate the individual soldier into an increasingly complex command and control network. Improvements to ISR capabilities through better and more UAVs, satellites, and other means will give commanders on all levels of war a greater ability to see the battlefield and destroy targets through precision guided munitions and increased maneuverability. These examples show how units will be more prone to direct control by strategic actors.

The CNN effect is also unlikely to diminish. Inexpensive, ubiquitous cameras and the ability to post images and video on the internet by amateur reporters will increasingly contribute to this phenomenon. Sources of news will likely proliferate and instances of media responding to tactical mistakes are likely to grow. This will place greater emphasis on General Krulak’s strategic corporal idea as tactical actions should be expected to receive hyper-scrutiny in the future. The CNN effect will play an increasingly important role in small wars relative to major combat operations (MCO), because unlike the enemy in MCO, the two major centers of gravity in small wars—the occupied population and the American public—depend upon news media to gain information and formulate opinions about military actions. Ensuring that tactical actions are well understood by both audiences is essential. Small wars are also likely to be increasingly fought in urban environments. The likelihood that collateral damage will occur during operations and be documented by international media is dramatically increased. As such, the CNN effect is additionally exacerbated when American forces are operating amongst urban civilian population centers.

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As much as talk of 4GW makes me grind my teeth, all the responses are on the mark. As a former battle captain of a task force, I can confirm that the C4I networks available can at times drive an unrealistic "pull" of information from higher headquarters. Something along the lines of compression is occuring, because there is a never-ending need to "feed the machine", so to speak. Until we recognized the downside, the reporting requirements to higher drove us to request a sitrep from 1) the wrong Marine on the ground (a radio operator) 2) too soon after the contact for a clear picture of exactly what happened (just the facts). The outcome was that the RTO would embellish raw information, or someone other than the commander on the ground (but still in a leadership role) would pass what he thought was a complete report. We learned that this was not the way, and adjusted accordingly. Telling higher that they are advised to do the same isn't usually an option.

We can expect longer, and more detailed lists of CCIRs, almost to the point that subsets of the larger CCIR list will have to be managed by individual watch standers, because the senior guy won't be able to do it alone. I've read the Naylor book, and if accurate, it is a warning of the potential mess that we can get into as a result of strategic compression. I know a MGySgt who can tell horror stories of the shenanigans at the CENTCOM COC, so I believe Naylor's accounts to be credible.

To counter the negative effects of compression, branches will need to maintain an aggressive embed program, and perhaps become more transparent, almost to the point of exposing OPSEC risks.

The Sago Mine and Haditha incidents are closely related, considering the repercussions that stemmed from inaccurate initial reports, and I think they typify "strategic compression" if I'm getting the concept right. How does Haditha, and Abu Ghraib for that matter, reconcile with compression if the model presumes small incidents have strategic implcations? Is it merely force of leadership and will from the POTUS that has prevented these and similar incidents from crippling our friendly center of gravity (American public)? Is the degree of the "CNN effect" a measurable variable? Can actors only hope to mitigate, but never completely control, this variable?

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Originally Posted by jcustis

As much as talk of 4GW makes me grind my teeth, all the responses are on the mark. As a former battle captain of a task force, I can confirm that the C4I networks available can at times drive an unrealistic "pull" of information from higher headquarters. Something along the lines of compression is occuring, because there is a never-ending need to "feed the machine", so to speak.

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I think part of this can be traced to the fact that as commanders progress through the ranks to higher levels of repsonsibility, they do not receive corresponding training and education in how to exercise tactical patience and implement directive control over operations. You can read all you want about Leonhard's theories of maneuver warfare, or the decentralized handling of Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam at the Command and Staff or War Colleges, but if in your practical experiences handling small units you have succeeded through being a hands-on, "I make the decisions" kind of leader (which is the type of personality I have seen succeed more often than not in my career) you will continue to command like that as you advance. The stress of having units in contact and not knowing the situation can exacerbate a feeling of not being in control, thus leading higher to demand info NOW.

Imbedding is a partial answer, but I think the biggest factor to consider with strategic compression is getting higher command levels to *not* use all their communication methods and let the lower level commanders do their jobs. Over control leads to paralysis on both the strategic and tactical levels. One reason that our advanced 3GW opponents can exploit this compression is that they have *no* higher command levels to report to in the traditional sense. They are acting as independent cells or strike units following a very general commander's intent statement. This lack of higher level accountability gives them a huge edge over us, because as the methods of control become more instant and more sophisticated, it's almost guaranteed that higher levels will use them to "help" lower level commanders.

I would like to keep the discussion going - any additional thoughts on the earlier posts and discussions would be most appreciated.

We have identified several historical examples (just the beginning of our research) of strategic compression - the overlapping or merging of the three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. Please comment on these and feel free to suggest additional case studies / areas to explore....

Strategic compression has been a common aspect of warfighting throughout the past. It is not that strategic compression is a new reality to warfighting. Rather, it is the mechanisms in place in the current security environment (C4ISR, CNN effect) that are new and that exacerbate the problem. The examples below are intended to give a historical perspective of strategic compression and show how the levels of war moved closer together or further apart, as well as well as some of the historical mechanisms that brought strategic compression about.

Warrior-Kings of Antiquity

As previously mentioned, strategic compression is not new to warfare. In fact, at times, all three levels were represented in the form of single actors such as Alexander the Great or Genghis Khan. These leaders would initiate wars at the strategic level, plan campaigns, and sometimes even fight at the front. In these instances, the main mechanism that allowed for strategic compression to take place was the charismatic warrior-king who decided to follow his soldiers into battle rather than delegate that authority to an inferior. The later rise of the nation-state, the levee en masse, and the resulting approaches to administering large forces through delegation had strong effect in delineating the levels of war.

Lawrence of Arabia (1916-1918)

Lawrence of Arabia is one of the most recent pre-WWII examples of tactical level actors making strategic decisions. Away from lines of communication and under a broad mandate, T.E. Lawrence took his own initiative to seek peace between the Arab tribes and then the operational and tactical decisions needed to wage a guerilla campaign against the Ottoman Empire. Until recently, tactical actors in remote locations regularly made strategic decisions due to the inability to effectively communicate with strategic or operational actors. With the development of technologies such as the wireless field radio, tactical units in the preceding years were rarely left to make strategic or operational decisions without higher guidance. The lone tactical commander granted a broad mandate or even plenipotentiary powers such as T.E. Lawrence had largely become an anachronism by World War II.

World War II and the Cold War (1939-1945, 1947-1991)

During World War II through the Cold War, the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war became quite distinct and had minimal overlap. World War II provides an interesting example. Strategic level actors such as President Roosevelt or Truman could direct the war effort by determining war objectives and setting domestic priorities. Operational level actors such as General Eisenhower could plan and direct theater wide campaigns. Tactical commanders and units were responsible for the actual organization and fighting of individual battles. The accomplishment or failure of specific tactical actions did not necessarily determine the operational outcome of the war. Individual tactical actions rarely (if ever) had an effect on the strategic level war. Conversely, strategic level actors, while responsible for giving general guidance to operational level commanders, usually had limited or no interface with tactical level commanders or units. The state of World War II era communications technology and situational awareness made effective strategic level micro-management of the tactical level unlikely and was the mechanism for not having much strategic compression.

Highway of Death (1991)

While media coverage played a significant role in America’s eventual departure from Vietnam and the Beirut barracks bombing in 1983. The Persian Gulf War’s ‘Highway of Death’ incident stands out as a clear instance of strategic compression according to the model. American units destroyed retreating Iraqi Armor so that Saddam Hussein would be deprived of his military assets including his Hammurabi division of the Iraqi Republican Guard. Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, wary of the fallout of targeting retreating soldiers and how it would play in the international media, stopped the air war before all original objectives were complete. The CNN effect or the fear of the CNN effect played a role in forcing changes to strategic objectives.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003)

More recently during Operation Iraqi Freedom, C4ISR had become a mechanism driving strategic compression. There was an instance during the war where American units that had previously made a quick advance toward Baghdad slowed and even stopped. CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks was upset that “on the CENTCOM computer screens, the blue icons that represented the Army had not been moving north” what the screens didn’t show was that Army units were stalled because they were engaged in heavy fighting against Saddam’s Fedayeen units. The CFLCC Lieutenant General David McKiernan was at odds with Franks for not seeming to grasp the tactical situation and insisting that the units continue to advance. A telling statement showing how C4ISR technology allows higher level actors to potentially micro-manage the tactical level of war was captured by reporter Michael Gordon who quoted McKiernan as saying that the “Blue Force Tracker drives the CINC.”

Here is another area for comment if there are any takers - again - remember we have just started to explore strategic compression and I thought I'd get Council member input before we really drill down into this subject.

The list below is not intended to be exhaustive or definitive but rather a incomplete snapshot of a few key implications from the perspective of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war as well as another aspect that does not fit neatly into the levels of war construct, training.

Strategic Level

With current and future C4ISR capabilities, strategic level actors such as the president or the secretary of defense could theoretically bypass normal operational channels and issue direct orders to field commanders in real time while watching (and possibly directing) the action from C4ISR platforms. This ability can alter (even undermine) the traditional chain-of-command concept and compress the operational sphere of war.

Increased C4ISR can also create a temptation amongst strategic or operational level actors to micro-manage the operational or even tactical level of war. The lure of micromanagement can grow especially if tactical or operational objectives aren’t met or met in a timely fashion or if domestic public opinion changes rapidly. Similarly, operational level actors may be tempted to micro-manage the tactical level if pressure is exerted from the strategic level. [Example: Refer to the earlier Highway of Death paragraph]

Operational Level

Amount of units needed to achieve desired strategic and operational effects is decreasing. This aspect results in 1) a smaller logistical supply line infrastructure 2) smaller units can achieve goals that formerly only larger units could and 3) faster attainment of objectives.

In order to combat the CNN effect, increased information flow to the lower ranks is essential. Clear mission objectives, effectively and rapidly disseminated are crucial. Making sure all soldiers understand the strategic situation and how mission objectives fit within the strategic picture is a must. Changes and/or updates to commander’s intent need to be relayed immediately to all ranks.

Tactical Level

Because of the CNN effect soldiers are now on the frontlines of American foreign policy. Every tactical action or result of a tactical action has the potential to receive close scrutiny. This means that every soldier has increased performance expectations and needs to fully understand the strategic context and goals in which their tactical objectives operate under. Soldiers will increasingly be held accountable for their actions. Therefore it is crucial that at all times they act in accordance with strategic level intent.

Training

There are a variety of aspects of how training needs to adjust to accommodate the reality of strategic compression.

1. Training how to operate independently/decision making
2. Cultural training/awareness
3. When to take act/take initiative and when to show restraint
4. Media/public affairs training: every soldier is a potential spokesperson for the military, training of how to conduct oneself when interacting with the media is necessary to properly explain tactical actions.

What about a systemic consideration of factors that exert a countervailing effect ("strategic de-compression") to disaggergate war into levels ? They could be man-made or something natural like distance/time

I would hazard that these variables always exist to some extent in tension with the forces of compression. Perhaps a comparative taxonomy ?

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Originally Posted by zenpundit

What about a systemic consideration of factors that exert a countervailing effect ("strategic de-compression") to disaggergate war into levels ? They could be man-made or something natural like distance/time

I would hazard that these variables always exist to some extent in tension with the forces of compression. Perhaps a comparative taxonomy ?

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One school of thought is that there are no "man-made" factors that could contribute to de-compression. (Short of say an EMP attack or some other counterproductive and catastrophic device).

Seems that distance-time has been regulated to the back-waters when it comes to command, control and intelligence.

This brings us to yet another focus area - command and control can be instantaneous - yet bringing to bear "physical aspects" of warfare have not yet caught up - troops and logistics stand out here. Does this force us to rely on those physical aspects that are "timely" - airpower for example?

The school of thought that there is little or nothing we can do to control strategic compression seems to be pointing towards command awareness that it does indeed exist and providing the tools, training and education to enable timely mitigation when negative incidents of strategic compression occur.

This last item raises another question for the Council – are there positive aspects of strategic compression that we can use to our advantage?

What about cyber-warfare as a impetus to de-compression? If for example command and control has been over taken by the adversary and they can listen to and change the communications conduit (Hezbollah?) what happens to compression? Is compression necessarily bad or is it an asset when used appropriately?

Consider the scenario where commanders in the field are exerting up to the minute movement orders and those communications are subject to monitoring by the adversary. In that situation the adversary does not have to divine the intent of movement by a unit they can monitor changes in movement orders and be prepared.

1- I have written about this before but since you brought historic examples I will add some more. This is based upon his "War and Peace in the Space Age"written in 1958 and a personal interview at his winter home in Winter Park,Fl. in 1985. He no longer believed that Strategy at the military level existed! Here is why. He believed in 58 that once the earth was mapped with satellites and ICBMs came on line the whole world was now a tactical battlefield. Anyplace in the world could be hit with a missile. So all military functions of shooting-moving and communicating would be sent to a tactical battle command system, i.e. C4ISR. Strategy was now in the realm national policy only. Wars would become "Pushbutton" fast and furious with breaks in between for political solutions. This is why he fought so hard for a national missile defense system. My personal opinion is this is why he had a winter home in Florida near the Martin Co. which actually produced an operational missile defense system before Henry Kissinger gave it away in SALT treaty one.

I had more to post the first time but I hit a wrong button so the rest of my original post is lost in cyber space somewhere. However to continue. General Gavin also believed and never really understood why ICBMs could only be equipped with nuclear warheads, he would very much agree with the Navy's recent proposal to put conventional warheads on long range submarine launched missiles. Or land based missiles. He also thought ALL ships in the navy should be submersible.

He was highly upset over the military failure to understand the implications of the Falkland islands missile attacks on British ships. Besides being better than aircraft missiles are cheap.


Finally he thought good generals should know tactics. He literally believed that the only way military strategy could be defined was generalship. If a general had to have a strategy then he had failed to realize that he (the general himself was strategy) and good generals know tactics.

To me this makes a lot of sense. Example look at Iraq, if our strategy is clear, hold and build. That makes know sense. Clear,hold and build might be goals or objectives but they are not a strategy.The general must know (how) which tactics to use before anything happens. If you don't know clearing tactics and holding tactics you will not reach your objectives. How to do something is the hard part, what to do is easy.


We have talked a lot about the Strategic corporal maybe Strategic Compression is nothing more than how to be a "One Minute General"

From the Slapout, Alabama the cultural center of the universe, good night.

I intend to post some more on this subject, as it's very fascinating to me. I just want to go over the main points and get my own thoughts sorted and organized.

Here are a few more thoughts on strategic compression:

1)Your point about this not being a new phenomenon is well-taken and needs to be remembered. Many of the historical examples of Hitler meddling in the decisions of his subordinate commanders could be taken as examples of strategic compression (France in 1940, operations in Russia from the very beginning, and many more examples).

2)It's worth keeping in mind as well that while combat unit size/numbers may be decreasing, their supply and logistics “tail” often does not shrink at the same pace. Modern units may be more efficient, but they still consume large amounts of ammo and POL. There is also the base area syndrome to consider. By this I mean that the level of creature comforts “needed” by the troops (in many cases it's the supply line troops and higher command levels “needing” the goodies) tends to increase, putting a greater strain on the supply line.

3)In my mind, I see the biggest problem with strategic compression coming from the higher command levels. We DO need better training with regard to independent operations, decision making, cultural awareness, and so on, but it all goes out the window the exact second someone with more junk on his or her shoulders decides to “help” the tactical leaders. It's also worth remembering that strategic compression can make the results of that “help” more damaging than ever (it's hard to dismiss as outdated an order that arrives in real time), and the “helper” quite often escapes unscathed if something goes wrong. While I see much talk about improving lower-level training, there is a great silence regarding the training of higher-level commanders. It should be remembered that every time they “help,” micro-manage, or lead by video-conference or Charlie-Charlie bird, they are undercutting the authority and confidence of their subordinate leaders.

For the most part, I feel we have a well-trained basic force, one that understands the impact the CNN Effect can have on their operations – if for no other reason than they've seen it happen before they enlisted or during the early stages of their active duty time. With proper guidance, training, and above all moral support (meaning the freedom to make mistakes and learn from them), this force can adapt to strategic compression. What worries me is the response of higher command levels (battalion command and higher, especially above brigade command) to strategic compression. You cannot use fears of the CNN Effect to clamp down on lower level leaders and then turn around and complain that they do not show enough initiative. Of course they don't! They've been “educated” not to.
It should also be remembered that much of this real time information is going to be incomplete and even incorrect. The ability on the part of higher commanders to correctly evaluate what they're seeing and hearing will become even more important than it has in the past. Being able to put information in context, especially when it's pouring in from a number of sources (many of which are unreliable), may become THE key job for at least part of a commander's staff.
I used the example of Hitler earlier for a reason. He created his own strategic compression, reacting to his own vision of what was happening at the front and his own (often fuzzy) strategic goals. And he would interfere down to the battalion and even company level when it came to combat orders and postings. Given today's level of communication, ANY higher commander could take on the role of Hitler within his own chain of command, reacting to faulty intelligence and/or vision and giving operational or tactical orders that result in a poor outcome or possibly disaster, or at the very least gumming up the works.
One final observation: There is a flip side to strategic compression. Given the speed of operations, it is now more possible than it has ever been (perhaps) for a small unit (company sized) to have the impact of a much larger unit. This may come through combat power, or through a company commander's decision to not use his combat power in a particular way. This makes the ability of our senior NCOs, lieutenants, and captains to function independently more important than it has been since the days of the Frontier Army. If they are over-controlled they will not be able to make correct decisions. However, if they are trained to think for themselves and understand the impact their decisions may have on a higher level, we may gain an edge in time against our enemies. Being able to react while they are still pondering a response is invaluable, and we too often find ourselves on the receiving end of this situation.
Also, an increased reliance on communications makes us more vulnerable than we have ever been to some sort of attack on our communications systems. Commanders who are conditioned to wait for “help” from higher will not respond well when that “help” goes away. We can use the possibility of strategic compression to follow a training system similar to that used by the German army after World War I. Train each subordinate leader to think of and consider the problems of a commander one or two levels higher. That doesn't mean they're being prepared for such command positions, but that they become aware that their decisions in a village may have an impact on operations in the province, the situation in the country, and possibly throughout the world depending on the media presence. And then train the senior commanders to sit back and let their subordinates do their jobs with a minimum of “help.”

This is an interesting thread that is provoking some random thoughts, but nothing close to a conclusion.

First we need to separate micromanagers from what we’re currently calling the strategic compression syndrome. Several civilian and military leaders have opted to micromanage based on their personality, not necessarily in response to the media getting in their OODA loop. C4I technology empowers this personality trait, but doesn’t necessarily always create it.

I don’t think the phrase strategic compression accurately describes what we’re discussing, but it will do for now. As I understand it, it is simply a realization by traditionalists that there are not clear lines of delineation between the three layers of war in 4GW. Delineation of tactical, operational and strategic only applies in the arena of maneuver warfare where armies can engage in tactical fights as part of a larger operation. The negative second order effect of recognizing strategic compression exists is that civilian leaders and high ranking military bureaucrats feel compelled to micromanage the war and call the shots for the company commander. If they can’t call the shots, they impose stifling policies to restrict freedom of maneuver/ thought, resulting in operational / decisional paralysis and frustration, thus causing our C3 procedures to disable instead of enable.

Before I surface some ideas on how to counter this, I want to explore it a little more.

Who does strategic compression affect positively and negatively?

The asymmetry isn’t strictly in tactics, but in strategy. Our extremist enemy only views the fight from the perspective of strategic effects; he doesn’t visualize winning tactical battles. Their strategic corporal may be a 15 year old suicide bomber from Gaza Strip. We’re focused on tactics and operations, like the recent offensive in Afghanistan, or in the recent past: Fallujah and Tall Afar in Iraq. We think tactically and operationally while realizing we are creating strategic effects. The enemy thinks strategic all the time, and every terrorist attack in Baghdad has strategic effect, while a successful coalition raid is simply a successful raid. Instead of focusing on three layers of war, we need to think more like the enemy and focus on the three (or more) audiences: the enemy, the home front, and the global community. We know this, but our current doctrine doesn’t facilitate this. Pardon me, I know this sounds like a plug for effects based operations, but only on the conceptual level.

Other asymmetries need to be addressed and managed.

1. Managing bad news: The kids at Abu Ghrab we’re punks, the LT at My Lai lost temporarily lost his mind, the murder / rape cases in Iraq are inexcusable, and these incidents have managed to elevate to the strategic stage. We can’t defend these acts, but we can put them in perspective and counter attack. The perspective is these are aberrations and that they will be punished, which should make us the envy of every rate nation where it is the norm to have thugs for cops and soldiers. Second, while we’re putting our guys in jail, we need to point out where the enemy did much, much worse and awarded their guys for doing so. The contrast is white and black if it would only be depicted. When we have we forced the enemy to defend their incidents like they have forced us to defend our actions?

2. Media Access: We allow the media full access, warts and all. The enemy allows select access.

3. Will: Strategic compression rapidly depletes our national will power, yet seems to have little effect on villages supporting the Taleban in Afghanistan or Sunni insurgents in Iraq. Why?

4. Political Infighting: The enemy has their share of infighting, but it is not as vulnerable to strategic compression as a democracy. One party will exaggerate the effect of a problem to gain political currency, thus playing into the hands of the enemy, yet not challenge the other party hinders our democratic process.

5. Further political: The media influences the orientation of decision maker within the OODA loop, part of that dance is in response to enemy actions and propaganda and part is in response to opposing political parties. Thus resulting decisions may not be the best militarily.

How do we counter the negative effects of strategic compression? Just some very rough thoughts:

1. Create another story, a bigger story “wag the dog”. This is somewhat of a joke, but if we can make the enemy atrocities a bigger story?
2. Current doctrine still supports cold war maneuver fight, and new technology creates more hierarchical organizations. We need new doctrine that will develop ways to mitigate the negative impacts of C4I technology and accentuate the positive.

More to follow, I need to clear these thoughts up, but thought getting them out in rough draft may prompt some new ideas.

I think a key point to remember is that this entire discussion centers around time and...well...time, really.

Communications revolutions make it possible for commanders to "help" in real time. It also makes it possible for an opponent to spread propaganda and exploit situations through the media in real time (or damned close to it). I'm still not totally convinced that this is a 4GW thing. It may rather be the logical extension of the 3GW OODA loop run at a higher speed because new technology allows it to do so.

I don't know that I'd necessarily call your reply a call for effects based operations, Bill. Personally I tend to consider some of the points you mentioned (public opinion, home front, and so on) as centers of gravity in a more pure, non-monolithic sense. To me a center of gravity is not a fixed location or thing, but rather a number of shifting priorities that change based on your opponent. I also don't think the intent of maneuver warfare was necessarily cold war in focus (at least as the Marine Corps originally discussed it...what it turned into is something else again). But I digress...:)

With the media, that requires a much more aggressive stance than we seem prepared to take. As mentioned in another thread, I feel very strongly that we should be VERY aggressive when it comes to IO. Things like our opponents routinely beheadding captives, committing atrocities, and the like, should be pushed forward vigorously. I know there are some out there who dislike this approach for a number of reasons, but it is the best way of seperating us from them in simple IO terms. It also has a handy internal focus of explaining "why we're fighting," something that the leadership has been reluctant to deal with since the end of World War II if you want to get really picky about it.

Pardon the double post, but I wanted to comment on some of Bill's great remarks.

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

1. Managing bad news: The kids at Abu Ghrab we’re punks, the LT at My Lai lost temporarily lost his mind, the murder / rape cases in Iraq are inexcusable, and these incidents have managed to elevate to the strategic stage. We can’t defend these acts, but we can put them in perspective and counter attack. The perspective is these are aberrations and that they will be punished, which should make us the envy of every rate nation where it is the norm to have thugs for cops and soldiers. Second, while we’re putting our guys in jail, we need to point out where the enemy did much, much worse and awarded their guys for doing so. The contrast is white and black if it would only be depicted. When we have we forced the enemy to defend their incidents like they have forced us to defend our actions?

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One reason we don't do this is I think there is a great reluctance on the part of political leaders in general in this country to do anything that might get the masses stirred up. There's also the lack of will when it comes to exposing enemy atrocities, and a distinct media reluctance to report on those same atrocities. They're all too afraid of being accused of being racist to report the truth.

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

2. Media Access: We allow the media full access, warts and all. The enemy allows select access.

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This ties into #1 very well.

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

3. Will: Strategic compression rapidly depletes our national will power, yet seems to have little effect on villages supporting the Taleban in Afghanistan or Sunni insurgents in Iraq. Why?

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I think our national will is a very fluid thing, influenced the reluctance of our leaders to actually rally the national will and the over-reliance on polls conducted with the same 200 people in the greater New York/LA metro area...:) Seriously...there has been little effort made to rally the national will, and politicians show little interest in doing so. I don't think anyone really knows what the national will of the people of the United States can take.

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

4. Political Infighting: The enemy has their share of infighting, but it is not as vulnerable to strategic compression as a democracy. One party will exaggerate the effect of a problem to gain political currency, thus playing into the hands of the enemy, yet not challenge the other party hinders our democratic process.

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This sadly will not change soon, not without a major demonstration of the national will mentioned above.

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

5. Further political: The media influences the orientation of decision maker within the OODA loop, part of that dance is in response to enemy actions and propaganda and part is in response to opposing political parties. Thus resulting decisions may not be the best militarily.

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This ties into a number of failures. We have the failure of the major media outlets to present a balanced picture of events (on average...there are exceptions), the failure of senior military leaders to present balanced advice and actually speak up when the need is there, and a constant effort to keep the public confused and passive so that they do not question the actions of leaders in either political party. Also, our current government officials (of both parties) tend to be ignorant of military affairs, and almost as ignorant of the realities of the world and diplomacy. This makes them especially vulnerable to strategic compression. Couple this with the reluctance to mount an aggressive IO campaign as mentioned in another thread, and you have the makings of what we see today.

Steve

If strategic compression is only time, then I assume it is the flash to strategic impact time? If it is impossible to fix our IO (another phrase I can't stand, because it means everything), and we're the only ones that are adversely affected by strategic impact, then our center of gravity will rapidly, in comparision to our foe, reach a culminating point.

I think strategic compression is more than time, it is perception, and perception changes over time. Regardless, I still stand by my comments in other threads that we to limit our military ventures to the rapidly achievable based on the reality of strategic compression within a democracy.

Occupations are out of the question. I listened to Secretary Rice on 60 minutes last night and she made some strong arguments based on her childhood experiences why we should push the democracy line of operation in the Middle East, but moral imperatives without means and ways are empty words that send us down endless circular roads where we expend assets and acheive no ends.

Successful small wars strategy requires more than tried and true COIN TTP. If we did everything right at the tactical level, we still wouldn't be victorious without a sound (acheivable) umbrella strategy.

I agree with just about everything said above. This has been a great discussion on a subject that needs addressing.

My entire career, save for about 6 months, has been in small tactical units at the Troop level and below. Without boring you all with the details of a biography, I can safely say that I have a pretty decent handle on tactical matters within the COIN environment. Having said that, there is a tremendous strain on tactical units placed upon them by higher leadership who do not understand the cause and effect cycle of COIN operations. As has been said before (though maybe not this way and for lack of better terms) we are 4GW Army being lead by people with a 3GW mindset. Let's break this down:

COIN is a tactical endeavor. Small units working in conjunction with each other towards a common endstate spell success. Due to the nature of 4GW there is a much greater importance of placing small unit leaders who "get it" in positions of greater responsibility at the tactical level than having crack staff officers at BDE and above. Staff officers hate this concept, as they feel it deligitimizes their role. While it is important to have competent people in staff jobs at higher levels, their interaction with local populaces is almost nonexistant, thus, their effects on the COIN environment is less perceptible.

Unfortunately, for those at the pointy tip of the spear, much of their success (ie. projects, funding, etc.) is merried to the capacity or ability for higher level staff officers to get them what they need for success.

I'm not saying that higher headquarters have no place in COIN; quite the contrary. However, their inability to understand the implications of their decisions at the tactical level has repeatedly lead to frustration at the tactical level. Hypothetically, having a water project turned down due to a "lack of necessity" within my AO will be nothing more than a penstroke to a higher level staff officer. For me, it means I've got to find a way for the townspeople to access water, usually by truck, which will enhance my force protection posture as I now have a greater accessibility to the population of trucks with a high explosive capacity.

The bottom line is that 2nd and 3rd order effects, however much we're talking about them in the Army today, are felt most heavily at the tactical levels. What this means to me, in laymans terms, is that if some idiot above me makes a decision without ever leaving the friendly confines of the FOB he has no idea what reprocussion are felt by my soldiers (ie. a skeptical populace within my AO, increased attacks along my LOCs, etc). This is bad.

In 3GW, battles are often won or lost by the decisions a BDE or BN commander makes regarding the tactical employment of his forces. Where he positions his reserve, where he breaches a situational obstacle belt, or where he defends are all decisions that often must be dictated from higher. Once the plan is in place, it's the responsibility of tactical units to take the guidance and form it into the most feasible COA (ie. can't breach at Point A, as the plan states, due to terrain restrictions. It's better to breach at Point B, etc.). In the COIN environment, due to most actionable intelligence being generated at the team, squad, and platoon level, the inverse of 3GW mindset takes place. Tactical units then must take the bull by the horns and develop and act upon the information given.

This presents an issue to those with the 3GW mindset; they feel deligitimized as decision makers and (potentially) commanders because they aren't as necessary within the tactical OODA loop as they once were. In attempting to rectify the situation, or, perhaps to feel a bit more relevent, they start poking their fingers into areas they want more progress. In the end, this becomes counterproductive. Luckily, I was in an organization where this didn't happen, but I've seen much more units with this problem than those who didn't.

In the end, what does this all mean? It means, as has been stated countless times before, that the action a platoon or troop on the ground takes has implications far above the tactical level. Whether I decide to improve SWEAT-MS commodity areas within my AO means that I have to run the traps through my command all the way to the MNF-I level. Getting a water project in my area will take a water project away from another. Smart tactical units found a way around this by outsourcing at the lowest level, which, in turn, increased employment in their area through security, construction, or other jobs. Still, someone at a higher level needs to turn on the faucet of economic relief to pay these people, thus strategic compression.

When you look at combative action, surely the firefight 1st platoon enters into in the Sarai District of Tal Afar will most likely be presented in Western and Arab media outlets. Depending on the tactical unit's situational understanding of what media is in the area can mitigate what effects a slanted story may have in the international media community. By keeping reporters and camaramen at close hold, explaining to them the situation, and granting them access to part of the tactical OODA loop (ie. Why am I conducting a cordon and search? Because ISF gained a source saying this block is where the terror cell is making IEDs) I can begin to spin the story at my level as conducting a combined operation based off Iraqi intelligence with Iraqi soldiers as the main effort and Americans in a support role to enhance and provide security to the people of Tal Afar. We're getting better at this.

In the end, tactical leaders need to understand that their actions (and inactions) will impact the larger strategic objective. What guys at the bottom end are owed is what the desired endstate is. Once this is established and dictated, trusting the lower echelon leaders to get the job done and resourcing them for success becomes the main job of those at the Operational and Strategic levels.

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Steve

If strategic compression is only time, then I assume it is the flash to strategic impact time? If it is impossible to fix our IO (another phrase I can't stand, because it means everything), and we're the only ones that are adversely affected by strategic impact, then our center of gravity will rapidly, in comparision to our foe, reach a culminating point.

I think strategic compression is more than time, it is perception, and perception changes over time. Regardless, I still stand by my comments in other threads that we to limit our military ventures to the rapidly achievable based on the reality of strategic compression within a democracy.

Occupations are out of the question. I listened to Secretary Rice on 60 minutes last night and she made some strong arguments based on her childhood experiences why we should push the democracy line of operation in the Middle East, but moral imperatives without means and ways are empty words that send us down endless circular roads where we expend assets and acheive no ends.

Successful small wars strategy requires more than tried and true COIN TTP. If we did everything right at the tactical level, we still wouldn't be victorious without a sound (acheivable) umbrella strategy.

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Bill,

I don't think it's only time, but I do feel that time plays perhaps the most important role in its creation and thus management. Perception plays an important role to be sure, but perception is also created to an extent and certainly molded by time. By that I mean a person forms certain perceptions based on information seen and heard. If that information is arriving sooner and in greater volume, perceptions will be formed faster than they were in the past.

I've been doing a bit of thinking about this, and I think that one thing that may accelerate strategic compression (at least with the US) is our two-year maximum outlook. By that I mean that there is always some sort of election going on in the US every two years (be it House, Senate, or Presidential). This means that the majority of our decision makers are looking inward (at poll results, attack ads, spin factories, you name it) and not outward at developing situations. If you look back at Vietnam, for example, you see that many critical decisions were made more with election politics in mind (the Flaming Dart attacks, the pace of Rolling Thunder, bombing halts, and so on) and not necessarily the reality faced on the ground in Vietnam. Later on, decisions regarding equipment in Somalia and the level of forces used in Operation Anaconda were made with internal political goals in mind (in my view, at least) and not necessarily with a longer-term goal. Most of our political leaders are trained or conditioned to think in short-range terms (a handful of years at the most) and not take the long view. One could also argue that our constantly rotating personnel system creates a similar mindset in our career officers.

How this may impact the strategic compression discussion I don't know, but it was something that came out of my own thoughts on the subject.

First and foremost – thanks much for the input so far. It is helping us focus our efforts and shape further discussion and research…

Our (USMC) Canadian Army LNO dropped off an article (not online) titled Military Command: The Compression of Levels of Command by Henning Frantzen. This article appeared in a 2004 edition of Challenge and Change for the Military – New Missions, Old Problems. This journal is published by the School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University and the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute. While much of the article addresses the items discussed above on this thread – it does break down the reasons for compression into five distinct categories – Multinational nature of operations, limited commitment, media, the nature of conflicts (internal, irregular), and technology. I can’t break copyright nor desire to “retype" the entire article – so here is a bulletized summary:

• Military doctrines, for the most part, separate the levels of war between strategic, operational and tactical. Of these, only the strategic level is explicitly concerned with politics. The operational and tactical level is concerned with fighting.
  
• While most recognize the Clausewitzian thesis that war is a continuation of policy… it is often taken for granted that the political issues are concerned with the decision to wage war, the objectives and resources necessary for war and the constraints and limitations facing military commanders.
  
• Compression of levels of war blurs this traditional understanding – the levels are being merged.
  
• The result is that commanders seem to spend less time on actual command (formal definition) and more time and energy struggling with political affairs.
  
• The best that commanders can now hope for is that they contribute to a political success rather than military victory.
  
• The first reason for compression of the levels is the multinational character of current military operations. This results in a reduction of military commanders’ authority due to national restrictions and limitations. Issues that under other circumstances are strictly military are transformed into complex issues of international affairs and traditional levels of command seemingly do not apply.
  
• The second reason for compression (merger of politics and military) is the limited commitment with which we engage in contemporary conflicts and war. They tend to rank lower on the security agenda and the issues of risk and casualties develop a high priority.
  
• The third reason contributing to compression is media scrutiny and the speed by which information is broadcast and then has an effect on public opinion and political decision-makers. Military operations cannot be conducted separately from the world of civilians. Military judgments and reasoning are increasingly questioned by civil society and military commanders cannot exercise their profession in a vacuum.
  
• All that said, the more important source of compression is the nature of current conflicts – internal wars of various sorts… Because these wars are fought within civil society it is much harder to separate military aspects from political aspects… The objective of the intervention – situation conducive to peace – demands more than a military victory.
  
• The decentralized character of these conflicts drives operations down to the company and battalion level rather than corps and division. While operations are not just political all tactical decisions cannot be made without considering their potential political effect.
  
• The fifth source of compression refers to new ideas on how to organize and command military power for future conflicts. The Strategic Corporal is one example… Experiments with strategic corporals and network-centric warfare are ways of dealing with new technological opportunities… Technology offers the opportunity of micro-management.
  
• Concepts for command should be adjusted to reflect the changes caused by compression and to deal with the associated issue.

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Originally Posted by SWJED

The CNN effect is also unlikely to diminish. Inexpensive, ubiquitous cameras and the ability to post images and video on the internet by amateur reporters will increasingly contribute to this phenomenon. Sources of news will likely proliferate and instances of media responding to tactical mistakes are likely to grow. This will place greater emphasis on General Krulak’s strategic corporal idea as tactical actions should be expected to receive hyper-scrutiny in the future. The CNN effect will play an increasingly important role in small wars relative to major combat operations (MCO), because unlike the enemy in MCO, the two major centers of gravity in small wars—the occupied population and the American public—depend upon news media to gain information and formulate opinions about military actions. Ensuring that tactical actions are well understood by both audiences is essential. Small wars are also likely to be increasingly fought in urban environments. The likelihood that collateral damage will occur during operations and be documented by international media is dramatically increased. As such, the CNN effect is additionally exacerbated when American forces are operating amongst urban civilian population centers.

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I think that your analysis in this paragraph is spot on. There is some diversion from the key issue in this discussion with some prefering to comment on the micromanagement by senior officers rather than look at the central issue - the easily available images which are then transmitted to large audiences in a matter of hours and can have a massive impact in terms of the ability to achieve the strategic goal. Actions by a small number of very junior soldiers can prejudice the whole mission.

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Other asymmetries need to be addressed and managed.

1. Managing bad news: The kids at Abu Ghrab we’re punks, the LT at My Lai lost temporarily lost his mind, the murder / rape cases in Iraq are inexcusable, and these incidents have managed to elevate to the strategic stage. We can’t defend these acts, but we can put them in perspective and counter attack. The perspective is these are aberrations and that they will be punished, which should make us the envy of every rate nation where it is the norm to have thugs for cops and soldiers. Second, while we’re putting our guys in jail, we need to point out where the enemy did much, much worse and awarded their guys for doing so. The contrast is white and black if it would only be depicted. When we have we forced the enemy to defend their incidents like they have forced us to defend our actions?

2. Media Access: We allow the media full access, warts and all. The enemy allows select access.

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Managing bad news is a central aspect of modern warfare, in particular for the US and its allies. The military supremacy leads to a different kind of challenge. However, countering the bad news is easier said than done. As Abu Ghraib was discovered, there was a very active campaign to try and put into perspective, but it failed. This might be because higher standards are expected from the US forces than they are from the insurgents and other thugs, but the fact is that enemy does not need to defend its actions because its core audience approves of them. The contrast might be black and white (I doubt that it is...) but in reality US and allied forces are held to a different standard, and it makes great TV news to show their failures to maintain that standard.

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Originally Posted by Bill Moore

How do we counter the negative effects of strategic compression? Just some very rough thoughts:

1. Create another story, a bigger story “wag the dog”. This is somewhat of a joke, but if we can make the enemy atrocities a bigger story?

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I don't think you can make the enemy atrocities a bigger story. It is not a story at all as far as the media is concerned apart from when it really goes overboard, but then again we all knew these guys were bad.