Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency
My latest article excerpt:
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In Greek legend, Sisyphus was a king condemned by the gods to roll a huge rock up a hill only to have it roll down again for eternity. Students of counterinsurgency often feel like Sisyphus, as the United States Army continually resists institutionalizing counterinsurgency across the force, only to have to re-learn the lessons at a heavy price later before preparing to discard them again.
About a month ago, I was asked to deliver a short presentation to the Canadian Army on tactical counterinsurgency lessons learned over the past years in Iraq. What initially seemed like an easy task quickly became difficult as I synthesized the complex and varied experiences of US Army units into relevant and concise points transferrable to a foreign army. After a long night, I produced ten observations that reflect enduring lessons from Iraq that would resonate with military audiences. They are:
• Learn from the past.
• Learn to ask understanding questions.
• Data is not understanding.
• Mass all of your resources to achieve the objective.
• Security matters.
• Population control is critical for success.
• Build human infrastructure alongside the physical.
• Understand perceptions matter far more than truth.
• Communicate effectively.
None of these are new, nor are they all inclusive, as significant areas are not covered. They do represent a start point for discussion about counterinsurgency operations at the tactical level.
The rest is on the blog here.
Comments welcome.
Works everywhere in most COIN conditions, the problem
is adequate capability in both quantity and quality and, as always, being at the right place at the right time.
Lacking adequate capability, failure to be in time and selection of the wrong places can complicate the processes significantly. Lot of varied political inputs and impacts on those factors, many unfortunately outside military control...
Niel, thanks for a simple, effective and
hence useful piece.
best,
Mark
Having operated under conditions allied to all your positions
in several countries, I'm totally convinced that Position 2. is the most likely to lead to success and Position 3. is the worst possible choice with one caveat -- unless a viable operational reserve is maintained and used as stated below. Even then it offers what will appear to most observers as a very tentative and excessively cautious effort that can be an incentive to the bad guys to try harder...
In any of your positions, such a reserve is not a waste it can and should be used on economy of force and presence (read; saturation patrolling in random areas) missions throughout the region while avoiding decisive engagement to enable commitment to rapid reinforcing missions -- among other things, this can preclude excessive use of less than discriminating air power or artillery.
You will accrue higher casualty rates. You'll also enhance your chances of success in a shorter period.
You're correct in western terms, no question.
CavGuy:
For the ME and South Asia where cities and capitals are a recent phenomenon, the certainty is far less if it exists at all -- though there is no question that AQ, The Talib, et.al. are smart enough to use that parameter as a psyops tool even if they know better. Rural populations worldwide don't think nearly as highly of cities as urban dwellers do, nor do they care much for or have much respect for urban dwellers. That is particularly true among mountain folks.
Pakistan is indeed an example of the principle -- it has suffered such bombings in the cities since 1947. It's still there...
Added note: % of Population urban; Iraq > 70; Afghanistan ~ 24 , Pakistan ~ 34%
I can agree in many circumstances with McCuen.
Did in fact agree with him when I bought his book at the SF bookstore in 1966 -- until I tried apply that to Viet Nam and realized that a predominately rural nation with no particular concern for its cities doesn't react that way. Not at all. He is correct in this:
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"...he talks in depth about "uncovering your base" while chasing enemy into his sanctuaries, thus allowing him to destabilize your base.
but that presumes there is such a base in the cities; in Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, there is none. Nor was there one in Viet Nam and only when we finally realized that and worked the rural areas did we start achieving any success in the COIN fight there.
He also said this in that book:
""To protect oneself against the methodical, crushing body blows of the revolutionaries and to be able to strike them in their most vital parts, it is necessary to fight them on their own battlefields-in their own media. It is necessary to parry the revolutionary weapons, adopt them, and then turn them against the revolutionaries."" (Emphasis added / kw).
I suggest that is more germane to Afghanistan and that what worked in Iraq will have limited -- not none, just limited -- applicability in Afghanistan.
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Originally Posted by
Cavguy
No disagreement it's different, but the principle is the same - your urban centers, where the government is, have to be relatively stable. 100% security is never possible, but you have to avoid what is happening now, which is the growing roots of Taleban cells sprouting in Kabul and Kandahar.
They aren't sprouting in either city -- they never left. The Afghan intel and security guys can and will root 'em out (they're doing a pretty good job, BTW) but, unlike us, they aren't going to worry about the minor players, appearances, making a name for themselves or near term fixes; their concern is for long term stability and they'll get it in their own way. They will have to do it, we cannot (and should not even try, it'll merely set us up for failure) and they won't do it on our timetable -- nor should they.
Kabul and Kandahar have rarely been "relatively stable" over the centuries; the artificial domestic tranquility imposed by Saddam in Iraq or the Shah in Iran have never existed in Afghanistan and the cities have never had the pull they do in less harsh terrain. Add to that that mountain people would rather fight than eat and any attempt to concentrate effort on the cities in Afghanistan -- as was necessary in Iraq -- will create problems...
Questions for consideration
First Ken, reference your wisdom about the importance of the larger urban cities as far as the outer regions. I accept that what you say is true because it makes sense from a less western perspective and given the population dispersal.
That said, if we go with that then more efforts should be made to help establish stability in outer regions and of course the enemy should be kept on the defensive. In order to do this it would seem we would have to work towards greater development of infrastructure within those regions and thus hopefully bring them to at least more closely reflect the larger urban cities. Along with that comes the need for political and military ties between the parts in order to facilitate greater unity of effort and a stronger overall HN presence throughout the country.
If this all goes well wouldn't we still come back to the need for more stability in the largest centers since That is where the HN must project its power from. Also considering that the more the coalition does the less the ANA is actually doing so that would seem somewhat counter-productive.
Long and short-
Would it not be more effective in the end to use coalition forces to assist in securing the urban areas and select outer areas from which the ANA with the capabilities assistance we can offer go out and take the fight to those who oppose them. In the end if AQ and others get to fight us then we easily become the problem if on the other hand we work to make sure they lose to Afghans then the picture might change all together.
Thought's
Priorities are the issue; hot spots are more important than urban locales.
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Originally Posted by
Ron Humphrey
...In order to do this it would seem we would have to work towards greater development of infrastructure within those regions and thus hopefully bring them to at least more closely reflect the larger urban cities. Along with that comes the need for political and military ties between the parts in order to facilitate greater unity of effort and a stronger overall HN presence throughout the country.
Note I am not suggesting the cities be ignored, simply that they should not be a priority item. Cities in such nations are, at this stage, primarily a market location (thus the importance of roads -- to both the good and bad guys...), they do not serve as a base for much of anything.
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If this all goes well wouldn't we still come back to the need for more stability in the largest centers since That is where the HN must project its power from...
True; not more stability, just stability. I question the statement "that's where the host nation must project its power from." I don't think that's necessarily correct -- or desirable.
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Also considering that the more the coalition does the less the ANA is actually doing so that would seem somewhat counter-productive.
That does not track with what I'm hearing on one level yet I can acknowledge the logic -- and thus we need to be careful not to overdo our effort...
Quote:
Would it not be more effective in the end to use coalition forces to assist in securing the urban areas and select outer areas from which the ANA with the capabilities assistance we can offer go out and take the fight to those who oppose them. In the end if AQ and others get to fight us then we easily become the problem if on the other hand we work to make sure they lose to Afghans then the picture might change all together.
(emphasis added / kw)
I thought that's what we were doing? Though I doubt the picture will change much...
Sorry for the lack of clarity
Did not mean to infer that ANA is slacking in their efforts at all but rather was referring to possible issues of giving too much help so as to actually keep them from growing and gaining experience in the way they should.
From what I know they are getting it right. Just commenting in the overall approach context.
As to projection of power, although I think I understand the concern with this approach I question if it's not required given that even in countries where most of the outer areas are almost autonomous the central governing authority has to be able to tie in somehow be it through physical, military, political, or social.
So Power in the most general of definitions not necessarily kinetic;)
It's a way, no question and it does have merit.
Problem is that you do that; most of the bad guys in the cities just lay low and chill and chat with your patrols, smiling broadly and improving their English, while some of them move to the boonies -- and not as reluctantly or in as small numbers as in Iraq; the crowds in cities are a recent phenomenon in Afghanistan, they're basically country boys. They can climb those hills like mountain goats and a guy in armor isn't going to catch them.
When they get out of town, they'll join up with new hires from Pakistan and start rolling up the hinterlands; then you've got a full scale war on your hands. I'll guarantee you they will move faster than we do under current conditions...
The key to that is more Aviation; the key to more aviation is longer tours for the airplane units.
No easy solutions there... :(
I agree with him re: Pakistan but I think he's being a little unfair to a lot of people. Pakistan is trying, it's just devilishly difficult for them and it will take some years yet. We all can wish that weren't so but I suspect it will remain troublesome for another couple of years at least.
Understand, I'm not disagreeing with you or him, merely playing devil's advocate and pointing out minor things he elides.
He does make two very important points:
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"(And doing this would not take nearly as many extra troops as some people think, but rather a different focus of operations)."
Totally true but problematic due to this:
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"...partly because of poor coalition management, partly because of the strategic distraction and resource scarcity caused by Iraq, and partly because, to date, we have given only episodic attention to the war.
While the last two items are true, the first is the major problem and will remain so. Something about the "U" in MOOSEMUSS, I think. That, most unfortunately, is unlikely to improve. As I said, no easy solutions...
After smacking myself in the head for not
catching that, I called a neighbor who's a USAR CA guy who returned from Kandahar less than a year ago. He says that if The good Doctor is correct, the population of K-town has more than tripled in a year. He, too is dubious. I have another contact with fairly recent experience and current acquaintances there. I'll try to get hold of him this weekend.
This comment:
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"I'm frankly quite shocked Dr. Kilcullen would make such a huge error."
made me smile as I recalled making a similar comment years ago (when I was new to BIG staffs in high places) about a sharp young Action Officer's strange boo-boo to an old Colonel who smiled and pointed out that you can assign a guy a project he absolutely hates and after 90 days of working on it he'll defend it to the death; they, he said "...marry their programs and lose sight of how ugly the Bride was..."
ADDED: Sunday, 16 Nov 08. Around 2015 local, talked to the one who had also been to Kandahar on his last tour. He too is highly skeptical and really doubts that percentage of urban dwellers but will ask some who are there during the coming week for a current assessment.
Someone's reading me, Pt. II
It seems like the city strategy wins ...
http://feeds.reuters.com/~r/reuters/...4B601U20081207
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NEW YORK (Reuters) - Most of the additional U.S. troops heading to Afghanistan early next year will be deployed near Kabul, reflecting worries about the capital's vulnerability, The New York Times reported in Sunday editions.
Citing U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan, the Times said the plans for incoming brigades would result in fewer or no reinforcements being available, at least for the time being, for areas of Afghanistan where the insurgency is most acute.
The focus on the capital also meant most of the new troops would not be deployed with the main goal of containing the cross-border insurgent flow from their rear bases in Pakistan -- something U.S. commanders would like and Afghan President Hamid Karzai has also recommended, the Times said.
And the cost estimate is....
From the current issue of Foreign Affairs
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Afghanistan needs larger and more effective security forces, but it also needs to be able to sustain those security forces. A decree signed by President Karzai in December 2002 would have capped the Afghan National Army at 70,000 troops (it had reached 66,000 by mid-2008). U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has since announced a plan to increase that number to 122,000, as well as add 82,000 police, for a total of 204,000 in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Such increases, however, would require additional international trainers and mentors -- which are, quite simply, not available in the foreseeable future -- and maintaining such a force would far exceed the means of such a destitute country. Current estimates of the annual cost are around $2.5 billion for the army and $1 billion for the police. Last year, the Afghan government collected about 7 percent of a licit GDP estimated at $9.6 billion in revenue -- about $670 million. Thus, even if Afghanistan's economy experienced uninterrupted real growth of 9 percent per year, and if revenue extraction nearly doubled, to 12 percent (both unrealistic forecasts), in ten years the total domestic revenue of the Afghan government would be about $2.5 billion a year. Projected pipelines and mines might add $500 million toward the end of this period. In short, the army and the police alone would cost significantly more than Afghanistan's total revenue.
Many have therefore proposed long-term international financing of the ANSF; after all, even $5 billion a year is much less than the cost of an international force deployment. But sustaining, as opposed to training or equipping, security forces through foreign grants would pose political problems. It would be impossible to build Afghan institutions on the basis of U.S. supplemental appropriations, which is how the training and equipping of the ANSF are mostly funded. Sustaining a national army or national police force requires multiyear planning, impossible without a recurrent appropriation -- which would mean integrating ANSF planning into that of the United States' and other NATO members' budgets, even if the funds were disbursed through a single trust fund. And an ANSF funded from those budgets would have to meet international or other national, rather than Afghan, legal requirements. Decisions on funding would be taken by the U.S. Congress and other foreign bodies, not the Afghan National Assembly. The ANSF would take actions that foreign taxpayers might be reluctant to fund. Such long-term international involvement is simply not tenable.
Trust the guy on your left and right and give it what you got...
Bill,
I am glad to see that you let your inner bean-counter off of the leash now and then :wry:. These financial metrics that might be of interest to you as well.
Of late I have been spending some time considering America’s strengths: My thesis is that we are an idea, one which speaks to all of the inhabitants of the world, funded by the world’s strongest business community (13 trillion dollar USD at our peak), and protected by the best trained (real world ops baby) military in the world. Heady stuff to be a member of that team, but as we all know pride goeth before a fall.
We certainly have lost our way when it comes to humility however, and as a result of this our idea has been carelessly dropped in the mud, much of our business community is busy getting kicked in the head, and parts of our military are way overstretched. Fortunately, collectively, we are one tough sob and there is no doubt in my military mind that we will get back up and prevail. In the meantime it’s time to fight and we need to focus on the 25- meter target with everything (DIME) that we have.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
When we went into Afghanistan in 2001 we had a clear enough objective to neutralize AQ, but somehow that seems to have become a distant priority. Now it seems we're expermenting with various COIN TTPs and calling that a strategy, but to accomplish what? Deny safehaven to AQ? They already have safehaven in Pakistan and Somalia and I'm confident in other locations. Are we going to apply this strategy (surging more troops and building capable governments) worldwide? I'm finding myself leaning more and more towards some of Gian's opinions. It seems we're becoming a missionary Army of sorts, but we're not bringing Christianity, instead we're bringing dreams of (and in some cases hope) capitialism, free markets, and democracy, which will supposedly equate to security and prosperity for all.
Your military questions, if I may paraphrase, are: Is Afghanistan part of that 25-meter target and is COIN the method?
Short answer: I don’t know and yes.
Focusing exclusively upon Afghanistan, it has a high cost and in all of my reading I have yet to come across a compelling argument as to the benefit(s) that will offset this cost. Being a brother soldier however, I will salute the flag and move out smartly because America has never let me down.
When it comes to the TTP’s of accomplishing the Afghanistan mission, COIN is certainly raw and ugly (and some GPF’s would say it’s new and its not cricket baby) but it works most of the time. MDMP and EBO are planning/management answers born of the direct/indirect environment that we have/currently face and they will continue to evolve as our enemy evolves. On the flip side this endorsement of COIN does not mean that MCO TTP’s are dead. Like it or not we have to be prepared to win using more than one method.
GPF are the high dollar/high visibility military answer and SOF are the low dollar/low visibility military answer to different problem sets. When GPF are covering down on SOF mission sets and vice versa we need to take a hard look at what it is that we want, how we have resourced and allocated things, what our timelines are, and how applicable our solutions are to the problems we are facing.
Regards,
Steve
That was quite a ride....
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Originally Posted by
reed11b
Infrastructure does not in itself have much to do with insurgency other then how it is fought. What we saw in Iraq (I get to say we, I was there as well) was the lack of a previously existing infrastructure. That infrastructure has never existed in Afghanistan. Working on creating it is good because it is the right thing to do, not because it will win the "heart and minds". Defeating an insurgency is like defeating any enemy, restrict there freedom of movement, find there lines of communication and destroy them. This is why I prefer Wilf's principles of warfare to the Army ones, they apply across warfare spectrums. I hope my ramble makes sense.
Reed
Reed,
Iraq was like nothing that I have ever experienced and I am glad that you made it through as well. Some of my family raves about Alaska and one of these days I hope to make the trip. In the meantime I suspect that Wilf has some historical recommendations on Afghanistan that we can all learn and benefit from and hopefully he will share some.
With respect to Afghanistan I hope that our collective aim is true. A focus upon Population Security, Good Governance, and Government Services seems to be the West's answer in this fight. Iraq and Afghanistan are very different however, as you correctly note.
It seemed to me that a non-lethal infrastructure focus upon Electricity in Iraq would have paid dividends for a population centric strategy. A non-lethal infrastructure focus upon Water may be worth considering for a population centric strategy in Afghanistan. I'd like to throw out three brief late night thoughts and references:
In Rome (and Iraq from my observations) people were motivated to support the State by clean water and agricultural water connections (Renaissance Quarterly, LXI, 4, Winter 2008 - Hydraulic Engineering and the Study of Antiquity: Rome 1557-70, by Pamela O. Long). I suspect that this will apply in Afghanistan.
Effective use of Hydrology and Hydraulics Teams can help Commanders in accessing Water for their AO's (Hydrological Sciences Journal, Volume 53, Issue 6, December 2008 - Performance of MARS in Predicting Runoff in Mid-Himalayan Micro-Watersheds with Limited Data, by V.N. Sharda, et. al) This could be a tool used to influence the populace.
A USAID case study speaks to this idea.
Regards,
Steve
Infrastructure matters, because
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Infrastructure does not in itself have much to do with insurgency other then how it is fought.
posted by Reed
Infrastruture is a vague term, but assuming you're talking about economic infrastructure, it sure as heck matters, because perceptions matter. Iraq was a basket case in 2003, much worse than many of us thought. We allegedly promised to make it better, but failed to do for many years, thus we lost credibility with the populace we were trying to influence. It matters because expectation management matters. We're promising a better standard of living, but we're not delivering. People get angry, then they are more susceptable to insurgent propaganda.
Going back to Iraqi infrastructure, the educated Iraqis blamed their infrastructure problems on the sanctions the UN applied. One of the doctors I frequently spoke with said the sanctions had severe effects on the populace, but they impact Saddam at all (his opinion, but opinions matter). This doctor and his friends were hoping we would invade sooner, so we could fix the problems (expectations). The insurgents knew we were promising various carrots, one of which was fixing the electric grid, but that is a hard target set to defend and an easy one to attack. We think the Iraqis should get mad at the insurgents for the set backs, but instead they get angry at us, does it matter? Darn right it does.