Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan
USIP, Sep 08: Thwarting Afghanistan’s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation
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Summary
- Afghanistan is at a crucial stage of transition. The Taliban, with sanctuaries and a support base in the tribal areas, has grown stronger, relying on a wide network of foreign fighters and Pakistani extremists who operate freely across the Afghan-Pakistani border.
- Present trends raise serious doubts about whether military solutions alone can defeat the insurgency and stem the expansion of terrorism. In short, reconciliation must also be a key element of comprehensive stabilization in Afghanistan.
- A multitude of factors suggest that the time is ripe for a reconciliatory process.
- The Taliban and the Hekmatyar Group will be key challenges to any reconciliation process as long as they enjoy sanctuaries and support outside of Afghanistan.
- An examination of past attempts at reconciliation with the Taliban reveals that the process has lacked consistency. The Afghan government and its international partners have offered conflicting messages, and there has been no consensual policy framework through which to pursue reconciliation in a cohesive manner.
- The goal of reconciliation in Afghanistan must be to achieve peace and long-term stability under the Afghan Constitution with full respect for the rule of law, social justice, and human rights. To successfully meet this goal, Afghanistan’s reconciliation program must be carefully targeted and guided by a clear set of principles.
- A comprehensive and coordinated political reconciliation process must be started. At the same time, significant progress must be made on the security front and on the international (regional) front. Without security and stability or cooperation from Afghanistan’s neighbors, reconciliation will not occur.
Clarification through Cluttered thoughts
If the overall guidance is to convert or coopt whomever you can without regard to their historic practices, than not sure I agree.
If however we're talking about using those you have found those within the larger society who's opinions you can trust, then use them to determine which leaders were Tali just because the Taliban were in control and thus When the Roman's are here be Roman; Thats where I think you find the good side switches that could last.
If someone learns to play the system they are in well enough to be able to protect themselves and the interests of those who depend on them I'm not sure that's such a bad thing. Means their Adaptable. Key would seem to be figuring out how to know which is which.
Is the fix top down or bottom up
Help me out here, we went into Afghanistan to kill those who perpretrated 9/11 and numerous other acts of war against the West and even their own people.
In the process of doing so we accidentlly acquired care taker status of a nation-state was that was a non-functioning nation in most respects. We quickly established a central government of meager means to exert control over its domain, and since then we have with some success expanded the central government's capability to exert it authority throughout Afghanistan (obviously a long ways from mission success). You can argue our mission to kill those who attacked us on 9/11 has been derailed to a large extent by the efforts to build a nation, but we won't go down that path, if the stated strategy is to build an effective nation are we on the right track?
If your you're stated goal is to empower the government of Afghanistan to reject deny terrorists safehaven (along with numerous other objectives related to economics, security, etc.), the clear intent then is to empower the central government to do this.
As stated by others, the concern about the Sons of Iraq, is that organizations are being empowered by the coalition, not the government, and these organizations in some cases challenge State authority. This is a bottom up approach, which is counter productive to a top down approach (working through the HN central government, regardless of how flaky it may be).
While all COIN is local (to a point), we should empower the government to empower these local organizations to defend and govern themselves. With this approach these local entities become an extension of government power, which is what our objective is, unless we're supporting the insurgents.
If the government of Afghanistan is reaching out and faciitating reconciliation more power to them, but if it is the coalition I think we need to take a step back and reassess.
Karzai seeks Saudi aid in peace talks with Taiban
"September 30, 2008
Associated Press
KABUL, Afghanistan - Afghan President Hamid Karzai said today he has asked the king of Saudi Arabia to help facilitate peace talks with the Taliban in order to bring an end to the Afghan conflict.
Karzai said there has not yet been any negotiations, only requests for help. But he said that Afghan officials have traveled to both Saudi Arabia and to Pakistan in hopes of ending the conflict.
"For the last two years, I've sent letters to the king of Saudi Arabia, and I've sent messages, and I requested from him as the leader of the Islamic world, for the security and prosperity of Afghanistan and for reconciliation in Afghanistan ... he should help us," Karzai said."
Interesting. For more -
http://www.military.com/news/article...tml?ESRC=eb.nl
Update on Saudi Taliban Conference
Here are two articles from the Telegraph and Financial Times.
Quote:
Afghan president offers Taliban a role in governing country
President Hamid Karzai has offered Taliban leaders the possibility of positions in his government if they agree to a peace deal which could bring fighting to an end.
By Nick Meo in Kabul
Last Updated: 7:03PM BST 11 Oct 2008
The offer was made through his brother Qayoun at a secret meeting in Saudi Arabia of which Britain was aware.
Britain has been encouraging the Kabul government to talk to its Taliban enemies for more than two years and the Americans are thought to be coming round to the idea of a deal which would end the costly war in Afghanistan.
But The Sunday Telegraph has learned that the allies would insist that the Taliban would have to split with al-Qaeda and provide information on international terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan as the price of a deal.
Under the Saudi Arabian initiative more than a dozen former senior Taliban figures travelled to the kingdom with the approval of President Hamid Karzai's government. ....
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...g-country.html
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US open to Taliban peace talks
By James Blitz in London
Published: October 10 2008 03:00 | Last updated: October 10 2008 03:00
Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, said last night that Washington could "ultimately" contemplate the idea of negotiating with the Taliban to secure a political settlement in Afghanistan, if the Afghan government were to pursue such talks.
In comments that add to the growing sense across Nato that the alliance will never achieve a comprehensive military victory in Afghanistan, Mr Gates said a political settlement with the Taliban was conceivable.
However, he insisted the US would never negotiate with al-Qaeda forces, who are also seeking to destabilise Hamid Karzai's Afghan government.
"There has to be ultimately, and I'll underscore ultimately, reconciliation as part of a political outcome to this," Mr Gates told reporters at a summit of Nato defence ministers in Budapest. "That's ultimately the exit strategy for all of us."
But when listing conditions for reconciliation, he said: "We have to be sure that we're not talking about any al-Qaeda."
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/66faed7a-9...077b07658.html
One wonders how much events - the economic problems - are now driving foreign policy decisions.
Of course, these talks may come to nothing. After looking at the Taliban's history a bit extensively today and tonite, I find it hard to see why anyone would want them in a government. Despiration, I suppose.
It would be kinda funny it it weren't so serious
how media tend to try to fit anything they hear into their own boxes.
With perhaps the exception of the Brit General whom I have know idea what he was thinking:confused:; most everyone else is simply talking about nothing more than what we already try to do.
Differentiate between the really bad guys and those who simply took on an affiliation in order to survive and/or protect their own. Much like Iraq just because someone belonged to the Bath party did not necessarily mean they were evil, but rather in many cases they had little choice should they want to at least be able to have some say in the lives of their families/Tribes/ etc.
How about we look at the number of Lawyers who belong to an organization because of its status in the legal world, or Holly/Bollywooders who join org's for what it represents status symbol wise, or people who join the HOA so that they can at least try to fight for their right to put a sign in their yard:wry:
Long and short: This ain't rocket science and Its probably about time some stop trying to make it so:(
Although I get where your coming from
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Originally Posted by
reed11b
True, but this isolation has been of the entire country, I am asking if the region where the strongest TB and AQ support comes from can be isolated by military force to allow the rest of the country a chance to recover.
Reed
P.S. I like the rest of the suggestions, just wanted to clarify my question.
Consider that in order for that to happen there would have to be sufficient capability to force all trafic through given checkpoints.
(Probably not possible, but if it were)
By isolating those areas you are isolating their populations from economic interaction with the rest of the markets.
1- How much of the agricultural production is found in those areas
a: What effect does this have on the rest of the country
2- If you cut off their ability to sell/buy you have just given them incentive to take a job the one place thats left. IE AQ/TB/Etc.
3- They have a loooottt of family outside of their areas
a: How will their families react towards the government.
(I might like living in a safe gated community with all the amenities but if my family couldn't come visit me, or stay with me because their house got flooded I might not be to happy with the community)
Just a couple of more definitive ramblings
I'd argue insightful ramblings...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ron Humphrey
1- How much of the agricultural production is found in those areas
a: What effect does this have on the rest of the country
2- If you cut off their ability to sell/buy you have just given them incentive to take a job the one place thats left. IE AQ/TB/Etc.
3- They have a loooottt of family outside of their areas
a: How will their families react towards the government.
(I might like living in a safe gated community with all the amenities but if my family couldn't come visit me, or stay with me because their house got flooded I might not be to happy with the community)
Just a couple of more definitive ramblings
Again, it is a very unstructured/wicked problem if you will.
To Further Afghan Reconciliation: Fight Harder
To Further Afghan Reconciliation
Fight Harder
by Joseph Collins, Small Wars Journal Op-Ed
To Further Afghan Reconciliation: Fight Harder (Full PDF Article)
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It’s official. Everyone from the Pentagon to Saudi Arabia thinks that reconciliation between the Taliban and the Karzai government is a good idea and a step toward settling the conflict in Afghanistan. A few deluded analysts even see dealing with the Taliban as the Afghan equivalent of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq. One wonders whether war weariness, success with reconciliation in Iraq, and a lack of familiarity with the Afghan context may not be pushing us toward a tactical error or worse, an endless round of talking with an illegitimate adversary that believes it has the upper hand.
Reconciliation in Afghanistan is fraught with complications. For one, there is no Taliban per se. In the south we have Mullah Omar’s “old” Taliban, but in the East, the toughest fighters come from the Haqqani network and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezbi Islami, both of which work closely with Al Qaeda. Complicating the issue even more, there is now a multi-branch Pakistani Taliban, some of whom operate in both countries. Ironically, the Afghan Taliban and its friends seem to be well tolerated by Pakistani authorities who are now in conflict with their own Taliban...
To Further Afghan Reconciliation: Fight Harder (Full PDF Article)
Negotiation Models vary...
From the Washington Post by Greg Bruno The Role of the 'Sons of Iraq' in Improving Security
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The decision to cut ties with AQI was dubbed the "Anbar Awakening" by Iraqi organizers, and has been hailed as a turning point in the U.S.-led war effort. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, told lawmakers in Washington the uprising has reduced U.S. casualties, increased security, and even saved U.S. taxpayers money. "The savings and vehicles not lost because of reduced violence," the general said in April 2008, "far outweighed the costs of their monthly contracts." Yet the future of the Awakening -- Sahwa in Arabic -- is a matter of increasing debate in foreign policy circles. Internal disputes within the predominantly Sunni groups have threatened the stability of the revolt, some experts say. Sunni groups have also complained about low pay and a lack of opportunities for employment within Iraq's army and police forces. CFR Senior Fellow Steven Simon writes in Foreign Affairs that while the Sahwa strategy may bring short-term stability to Iraq, the long-term effect could be runaway "tribalism, warlordism, and sectarianism."
Wikipedia's entry on Paramilitaries in Colombia
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Paramilitary groups, whether of private or public origin, having legal or illegal support, were originally organized during the Cold War proxy wars as small groups, being created as either a preemptive or reactive consequence to the real or perceived growing threat represented by the actions of guerrillas and militant political activists of Marxist-Leninist ideology.
I'm all for negotiations, but...
...what exactly do we have to offer?
In most cases where insurgents have been coopted or reconciled, they were enticed by either a share of political power, specific reforms that they had been fighting for, monetary rewards, or safety. I just don't see what we could offer the Taliban that would entice them to lay down their arms, or at least stop interfering with our nation-building efforts.
Would we be willing to let known Taliban have positions in the central government, or to run openly in elections? Would we be willing to accept a 'Swat solution' by allowing shari'a law to hold sway in certain areas of Afghanistan? Will bribery work? Are we dominant enough militarily to say (with a straight face) 'reconcile or die'?
I would be interested to hear what those espousing reconciliation think we could negotiate about; personally I don't believe we have a dominant enough position yet to enter in to talks with any hope of success, especially with a people who consider armed intransigence for its own sake a national virtue and part of their cultural identity.
Can someone please explain
Where this got so convoluted from the original intent?
"We should never fear to negotiate, but we should never negotiate from fear"
The Taliban(org) cannot and should not be negotiated with
1_ They have nothing to offer that is acceptable to a populace that seeks representative leadership
2_ They represent all that is oppressive and truly intolerant of self destination
Those who make up their ranks however are people and can be approached through their own self and societal interests.
I find myself completely perplexed by this apparent failure to connect those dots currectly in the public message
An indirect approach takes time...
From wikipedia Stakeholder Analysis
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Stakeholder analysis is a term used in project management and business administration to describe a process where all the individuals or groups that are likely to be affected by the activities of a project are identified and then sorted according to how much they can affect the project and how much the project can affect them. This information is used to assess how the interests of those stakeholders should be addressed in the project plan.
I'm playing Devil's Advocate here...
Hi Eden,
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Eden
I just don't see what we could offer the Taliban that would entice them to lay down their arms, or at least stop interfering with our nation-building efforts.
We had the same problem with some troublesome colonies the the late 18th century.:cool:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Eden
Would we be willing to let known Taliban have positions in the central government, or to run openly in elections? Would we be willing to accept a 'Swat solution' by allowing shari'a law to hold sway in certain areas of Afghanistan? Will bribery work? Are we dominant enough militarily to say (with a straight face) 'reconcile or die'?
I have to note an interesting point - why is this entire paragraph couched in terms of "would we"? I recognize the reality of the situation in Afghanistan vise vie the US forces, but you have the little problem of not claiming sovereignty there. This leads, inevitably, back to questioning about the "would we" statements since the only claims to political legitimacy in Afghanistan the US has are on force majeur.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Eden
I would be interested to hear what those espousing reconciliation think we could negotiate about; personally I don't believe we have a dominant enough position yet to enter in to talks with any hope of success, especially with a people who consider armed intransigence for its own sake a national virtue and part of their cultural identity.
I really don't think it is so much a case of having a dominant position so much as having political legitimacy. As far as dealing "with a people who consider armed intransigence for its own sake a national virtue and part of their cultural identity", I'll go back to those unruly colonists we had to deal with ;). Apparently, they had the gall to say that we (the British imperium) lacked the political legitimacy to engage in nation building and actually took up arms against us :eek:!
Moving out of the Devil's Advocate position...
One thing to keep in mind is that "the Taliban" don't exist as a single, unitary group; it has become a label of convenience for a multiplicity of groups and movements. The second thing to keep in mind is that the situation in Afghanistan is closer to a multi-party civil war with a lot of foreigners added to the mix. In some ways, there are parallels with the Russian civil war of 1917 - 21 and, politically, with the American Revolution and the establishment of the Tetrachy (~300 ce).
The position of negotiating with the Taliban is aimed at ending part of that civil war (i.e. part of the internal, Pashtun civil war), possibly as a prelude to getting some of the foreign fighters under control. Personally, I don't think the Karzai Gov't will be able to do so, but we'll have to wait and see what happens with the elections there.
Dorronsorro, Semple, Nathan, Exum
(Moderators note copied here from Strategic Intelligence thread, as appropriate).
Went to a Center for American Progress conference today.
Gilles Dorronsoro, Micheal Semple and Joanne Nathan (corrected), all non-US experts who have been in Afghanistan since before 2001.
Each had a presentation on their field. Most of you have heard some of this: Dorronsorro (secure the cities first, etc..), and Semple's work with the Taliban are pretty well known.
Nathan, an Australian, asked: What's this COIN thing about? I read the manual and it said Clear-Hold-Build, but all you ever do is Clear, Clear, Clear. No administrative purpose or capability. Why are you clearing unless you have civilian capacity to Hold and Build? Where has this strategy ever been applied?
Even Andrew Exum didn't take a stab at answering that.
The big question that all were asked to comment on: What do you think of these people who see one small part of the country, then try to exprapolte what they saw there to a bigger picture about the country? (Obviously, the Hoh question).
They were pretty devastating in explaining just a snippet of what they know about the whole country, and why that kind of speculation is not useful.
Like Exum said, DC is usually full of generalists, and it was a rare opportunity to have three leading specialists in one place.
Certainly worth hearing every word yourself to build or assess strategy.
http://www.americanprogress.org/even...streaming.html
Steve