This "Lie" is far bigger than the one regarding WMD in Iraq
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Originally Posted by
CWOT
I don't think the fear of being hunted will keep AQ attacks from occurring. They are seeking death as a way of fulfilling their ideology.
Persistent pursuit does alter AQ's operations and their security. Continued attacking of AQ's leadership shapes their ability to conduct further operations.
OK, quotes on "Lie" because I don't think either was a conscious lie to defraud the American people; but rather that the idea that AQ is about ideology is even more flawed than the idea that going into Iraq was about WMD. Or more analogous, that Soviet efforts to expand their influence during the Cold War were about Communism; or that U.S. efforts to expand its influence are about Democracy. We need to learn to be better at separating Causation from Motivation; and Material Facts from Relevant Facts.
AQ and Bin Laden are an organization and man for their times; much as the Nazi party and Hitler were for theirs. Different times in a different place, they don't occur. Given the time and place, if they did not exist some similar organization and leadership would have eventually emerged in response.
The seeds for WWII were planted at Versailles; or at least were not eradicated and were well fertilized there by the victors of WWI. Similarly the seeds for GWOT have been planted and nurtured over hundreds of years of Western Colonial and Post-Colonial manipulation of the politics and populaces of the Middle East. With the end of the Cold War rationale for such manipulations and the advent of the tools of globalization AQ and Bin Laden were inevitable.
The question is not what happens if we kill Bin Laden. Answer that and get a C+. The real question is what happens if we do not address Western foreign policies toward the Middle East? What happens if the West continues to enable some of the most despotic regimes on the planet to both remain in power and treat their own populaces with impunity? Kill bin Laden, but that is just step 1 in a 100-step process. Personal opinion? We've been way too focused on step 1, and it is distracting us from the hard policy work that is yet to be done on the other 99.
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Replacing "Containment" with "Empowerment"
A paper I have coming out soon will explore this in greater detail, but here is a snapshot side-by-side comparison of what we've been doing for 60+ years in "Containment" with what I propose is more appropriate for the emerging world with "Empowerment."
Empowerment is a word the President uses a great deal. It's in his intro to the National Security Strategy. But that is all it is, a word. A bold, encouraging word, with little to flesh out what he really means, what is his specific guidance to the government in this regard, how do we operationalize it, etc.
I don't know if this is the answer, but it is something I've been playing with at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies. This is just a snapshot, so may well spark more questions than answers, but any comments, pro or con are always welcome from my august peers here at the SWJ.
I think you have the idealist and the realist confused. Seriously.
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
A paper I have coming out soon will explore this in greater detail, but here is a snapshot side-by-side comparison of what we've been doing for 60+ years in "Containment" with what I propose is more appropriate for the emerging world with "Empowerment."
However, letting that alone for now, I have some questions on your "empowerment" column:
- Who or what establishes -- and enforces (as 'limits' implies constraint of some sort) -- those "clear limits" for 'empowerment?'
- Avoiding excessive partiality and excessive dislike are noble ideals. My suspicion is that US Policy makers may not themselves be idealist enough to adhere to the mantra but of more concern to me are those nations that will not reciprocate that ideal attitude and will endeavor to manipulate it. How do you propose to avoid the first cited possibility and obviate the second?
- Who or what establishes the "clear" limits on freedom and competition? Do we have a 'right' to establish such "limits" while still following our "core principles? If we do, who or what will insure they are followed?
- How do we promote self determination and principles, deny (or did you mean to not deny them...) unalienable rights while at the same time allowing freedom and competition?
- Will the encouragement of "positive behavior" entail bribes as to Egypt, Israel and many other nations over the last half century?
- Who determines what are in fact, not in hopes or personal opinions, "core U.S. principles?" How will we embed the accepted and agreed principles to the extent that political ideologies involved in changes of Administrations will not entail a major policy shift?
I'll also note in passing that yet again you evade a direct response. You wrote:
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What happens if the West continues to enable some of the most despotic regimes on the planet to both remain in power and treat their own populaces with impunity?
I then asked:
"Define 'enable.' Please provide examples, I'm old and slow..."
"Also, what is your suggestion to remediate that shortfall you perceive?"
If you meant your Chart as partial answer to my requests, I can accept that as your ideas on remediation (subject to my specific queries herein on that Chart ;) ). However, I really would like to know who in the West is enabling and how they are doing that.
As Dayuhan noted, those little details have to be considered... :wry:
Return of the Great White...
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Just providing food for thought, and it is good to see that the sharks are feeding.
Nibbles, no feeding frenzy...
Re: your cited States:
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In all we look the other way when they suppress the dissent of their own internal populaces...
How do you propose we correct their tendency to do things of which you and some others disapprove? (emphasis purposefully added...)
Does not such corrective action interfere with your stated intent:
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We need to hold true to our own stated values, but we need to not demand them of others.
Dichotomy there, you seem to want to have it both ways. You've never really addressed that issue even though many surface it occasionally. Some of us seem to think it important to your hypothesis...
As several of us -- not just ol' moi -- have mentioned, you cannot correct their attitudes and 'not interfere' at the same time. You occasionally suggest that if we just talk to them, they'll fix it. Lot of skepticism about that...
I'm pretty well aware of what our core principles are supposed to be and from whence they spring. Tthat's not an issue, this is:
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...Many of these core principles are assessed differently over time, and those assessments are "values," a principle with judgment applied to it.
Exactly. The issue is how you persuade the American public, the Administration and Congress of the day to hew to those values. To say we should do so is easy. It is likely also futile UNLESS you can show a benefit to us for doing so and, thus far, you have failed to do that IMO.
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As to the common argument for never doing something new, even though most can agree that the current course is in need of change is "that would be hard, how would you do that."
I'm all for doing something new and have long had gripes with what we are doing -- but the issue isn't avoiding change, it is how to bring that change about. I agree with where you want to go and have long -- along with several others -- suggested that your goal is good -- what's your strategery to get there? :wry:
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But this is just a summary slide from a deck of slides that summarize a paper, that in turn summarizes a concept.
And my questions above were just a summary of the many more questions that slide raises.
Recall the old staffers dictum -- answer the question, answer the question that should have been asked and answer the questions your answer will generate...:cool:
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Anything worth doing is likely to be difficult. Anything new is likely to be incomplete. For most of us, it is the challenges of new and difficult things that get us out of bed in the morning.
Yeah. Howsomeever, it's been my observation that it is far less difficult if one provides consensually viable steps instead of just telling the boss he's stupid...;)
More thoughts on Post Bin Laden AQ
Here are some of my thoughts on a post Bin Laden AQ based on the poll I put together in this original post.
“Other AQ member in AF/Pak becomes new leader of AQ Central” ended up being my selection. This was a tough decision but here was my logic in relation to the other choices.
1. Zawahiri is 'no fun'
Zawahiri might make a good “#2”, but I’m not sure other AQ members, the Taliban or the Haqqani network will let him ascend. I’m uncertain why exactly. However, I get the feeling that Zawahiri is always trying to outshine Bin Laden, lacks Bin Laden's charisma, and finds it hard to make friends amongst other AQ members. Zawahiri is also from the North African (EIJ) strain of AQ. Despite his legacy with the group, I think AQ Central will turn to someone from the Gulf or Central/South Asia to take the reins. Zawahiri may be talented from a terrorist sense but he has a 1990’s Al Gore feel to him and thus I believe will never rise above #2. This poses another question, if Zawahiri were not to assume the top job post-Bin Laden, would this fracture AQ’s base of North African support? Would there be damaged relations between AQIM and AQ Central? Would love to hear opinions in this!
2. Haqqani protection won't extend forever to Zawahiri
My guess is the Haqqani network will not provide protection for a Zawahiri-led AQ post-Bin Laden. While the Pashtunwali code for protecting guests has served Bin Laden well, I suspect that his death will bring the end of what has been an amazing level of Haqqani support. I also estimate that the Haqqani’s would not like to see Zawahiri emerge as the new leader of AQ Central, instead preferring someone with local interests (AF/PAK) of equal or greater priority than global jihad. Will the Haqqani’s support an AQ led by Zawahiri? Would love to hear opinions on this!
3. New AQ leader needs to be AF/PAK capable
To maintain safe haven in Pakistan, AQ Central must maintain Haqqani support, placate ISI members, retain AQ group initiative, and sustain global funding. To accomplish these four things, a current AQ member from AF/PAK other than Zawahiri will emerge to lead AQ Central. I do not believe Zawahiri will be able to do these four things post-Bin Laden. A Gulf Arab or South Asian AQ leader will have an easier time gaining local support, sustaining resource flows from donors and illicit networks, and cooperating with the ISI.
4. AQ Central shifts focus
Sustaining local support for AQ in AF/PAK will require AQ Central to focus on ‘near enemies’ as much as ‘far enemies’. Bin Laden’s death and the emergence of an AF/PAK centric AQ leader will bring renewed focus on central/south Asian insurgencies. AQ Central will not forget the need to attack the far enemy, but their base of popular support and wealth of recruits post-Bin Laden will come from countries in the larger AF/PAK region more than abroad.
What am I missing?
CWOT
Defining the enemy & focus
Hi Ray,
Nice to see that you have resumed posting - providing us with content shaped by your Indian Army career.
As to your comment:
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from Ray
Hence, maybe the focus of the WOT should not only focus on the AQ, but also on the various other factions that are operating and the synergy that they created in tandem with the AQ operating in the background.
you are in good company. Our domestic legal mandate to use armed force against AQ is flexible enough to cover associated groups - as well as nations and persons.
The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), passed by Congress and signed by President Bush, provides in most pertinent part:
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...That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
At times, our focus has strayed from the AUMF.
We also have some times overemphased aspects of the ideology involved (Islam), and other times have underemphased that ideology. One might also question whether we have overemphasized some AQ associates (or alleged AQ associates) at the cost of underemphasing other groups.
Regards
Mike
A timely judicial comment
Judge Silberman's brief comment in Esmail v Obama (see Another brick in the wall for the entire court's findings) reinforces the suggestions made above by Ray and me;
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SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring:
......
First, to note that the government at oral argument agreed that even if petitioner could show he resolutely declined to “join” al Qaeda or the Taliban, and thus could not be said to be a part of either, so long as evidence showed he fought along side of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or with associated forces he would be covered by the Authorization for Use of Military Force. District courts, in that sort of case, need not strain to find a petitioner is “a part of al Qaeda.” See Hatim v. Gates, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 553273, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 9 n.1 (D.C Cir. 2010); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871-72 (D.C. Cir. 2010). [1]
[1] Of course, “the purely independent conduct of a freelancer” – one who does not fight alongside of, or actively support, al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated force – “is not enough” to justify detention. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
While this is "dicta" in this particular case, it does provide guidance for a plausible argument in a case where a loosely associated group is involved.
Regards
Mike
Crowdsourcing AQ's Strategy 2011-2012
I think the summer of 2011 through the end of 2012 will be the most important period for al Qaeda (AQ) and Western Counterterrorism (CT) efforts since 2002-2003.
I've been working on analysis for what AQ might do over the next year and been examining crowdsourcing as an alternative for anticipating terrorist group strategies. I've been a huge fan of Small Wars over the past few years since I started writing short articles here and I really appreciate the feedback and insights I get from readers. I'm trying to figure out a way to use these feedback systems to narrow down on key terrorism questions. If I am certain of anything, it's that I alone will not be able to anticipate all of AQ's actions correctly. So I ask for your help! I'd truly like to capture the perspective of those that read and visit Small Wars.
This week, I set up a crowdsourcing poll trying to answer the following question:
“What will be al Qaeda’s strategy from the summer of 2011 through the end of 2012?”
I set up a poll of 11 questions which I think will take less than 3 minutes to answer. If you can spare the time to vote, I would appreciate any and all insights.
Here is the link to the poll:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/selectedwisdomAQstrategy
And if you think the poll is a worthwhile effort, please forward to any and all that might be interested. Crowdsourcing takes a crowd, so all are welcome.
I'll hopefully start publishing the results in about ten days when I aggregate the data. And I'll make sure to post the results here as well. Goal is everyone gets the collective insights from the collective efforts of voters. Thanks in advance to those that take the time to vote and please let me know here if you think I can improve the survey/process in any way.
BTW, nothing in it for me. No money, hidden agenda, etc. My wife calls my poll the "Household Chore Avoidance Project", which is probably true and thus worth the effort.
Thanks.
CWOT
Thanks for the feedback in this thread
Folks, thanks for the feedback on this initial thread.
I've used it to help set up a crowdsourcing experiment on AQ's future strategy and just started a new thread on that concept in this folder called.
"Crowdsourcing AQ's Strategy 2011-2012"
Would like to get your feedback and thanks in advance for any and all thoughts.
Vote: What will terrorism be post Bin Laden?
All,
Thanks for your support on recent discussions with regards to Bin Laden.
In light of today's events, I'm returning to the questions. I asked here back in January.
What will be the consequences of Usama Bin Laden's death?
I've launched an automated survey and would very much enjoy any and all opinions. Here is the link to the survey:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/aqafterbinladen
Thanks in advance for any and all responses and I will make sure to cross post the polling results here in about a week.
RLTW,
Clint
Here's a preview of the first question on the poll:
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Overall theme of the poll:
If Usama Bin Laden were killed in 2011, would it matter to the global jihadi movement?
Question #1:
What will be the chief consequence of Usama Bin Laden’s death to the global jihadi movement? (Only pick One!)
-Status Quo- No substantial change in AQ activity
-AQ Central directed plots against U.S. and its Allies decrease substantially
-AQAP becomes new AQ Central
-Some other AQ member in AF/PAK becomes leader of AQ Central
-AQ Central loses its chief sponsor, the Haqqani network
-AQ fundraising increases substantially
-AQ fundraising diminishes substantially
-Taliban more reluctant to make peace with Karzai
-AQ-inspired recruitment slows substantially
-AQ-inspired recruitment accelerates substantially
-AQ Central directed plots against U.S. and its Allies increase substantially
-Taliban pursue a peace settlement with Karzai
-AQ Central shifts focus to pursue guerilla warfare in Central Asia
Here's more background on the first version of this poll.
Does Bin Laden Matter?
By Clint Watts on January 2, 2011
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Crowdsourcing on AQ and Analysis (new title)
Immediately following 9/11/2001, hopes were high that Bin Laden and his gang would quickly be caught. In early 2002, Bin Laden escaped the Tora Bora cave network slipping into Pakistan beginning the longest, most expensive and most exhaustive man hunt in world history.
In 2003, the Bin Laden mission lost focus; distracted by Iraq and the hunt for new villains. By 2004, the American public narrative changed and repeatedly stated that Bin Laden was hiding in a cave, sickened, weak, and irrelevant. By 2006-2007, this speculation was cemented into the minds of Western analysts, media pundits and the general public.
Looking back, this narrative hindered my analysis and I imagine the analysis of many others seeking the demise of Bin Laden. Analysts were seeking to confirm a narrative constructed on two brief periods in Bin Laden's Afghan existence: a hiding period in the so-called "Lion's Den" during the mid-1980's and the 2002 Tora Bora siege. This narrative, derived from an appealing perceived pattern of Bin Laden's behavior, drove many to look for things that weren't there: guys in a cave, living on bread and water, coordinating through sophisticated electronic communication. Instead, he was killed in a compound similar to others he resided in, surrounded by family and communicating by courier.
Resources were poured into detecting a pattern that suited our narrative more than the realities described throughout Bin Laden's life (See Patternicity for more on this). During the 1980's, he founded AQ in Peshawar guesthouses. In the 1990's, he occupied a Khartoum estate and later lived fairly openly in several different Afghan camps. This pattern of life, rather than the cave narrative we created, turned out to be consistent with where Bin Laden was discovered. His Khartoum residence looks strikingly similar to his Pakistani hideout. (See below)
In hindsight, Bin Laden hid not in caves but within people-social networks of loyalty sealed by ideology, bought with Gulf donations and maneuvered through political brokering. Bin Laden lasted ten years because he leveraged his financial pull to sustain operations, his political value to engender Pakistani supporters, and his ideological credibility to garner protection from the Haqqani network. People hid Bin Laden, not caves.
How was he identified and killed? Through the persistent work of dedicated analysts, investigators, military operatives and intelligence officers using human skills to turn interview results into a victory. In the end, it was pursuing good analysis on Bin Laden's human network, not adhering to narratives that brought mission completion.
Thank you to those analysts, investigators and officers that fought so long and hard to bring Bin Laden's demise. And, thanks to Small Wars for providing such a great platform to assist in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency over the years; helping to move past narratives and onto real analysis.
Clint Watts