Is Globalization the Answer or Culprit?

This could go in the Tunisia thread, but is a little broader than that, so I've placed it here.

An interesting piece on the implications of Tunisia in the struggle over the identity of Islam by Thomas P.M. Barnett over at World Politics Review.

For those not familiar with his books, Dr. Barnett's theory is that globalization's connectivity reduces conflict. Conflict tends to originate in the periphery where states are not connected or do not have adequate rules.

In this case, he posits that adherence to religion and making a buck don't have to conflict, and that folks in the Middle East and Africa want to be connected to the global economy more than they want to be a part of Al-Qaeda's world. The gist is that capitalism can beat fundamentalism just like it beat communism- economically, with democracy (politics) coming later. Once people are worried about buying a nicer TV/car/cell phone, they tend to worry less about hating their neighbors... you could argue that Iraq shows a positive correlation here as well.

While I'm inclined to agree with him, I think this line of reasoning also opens up another question- is it possible that a systemic shock (like the Great Depression or another state vs. state war) could discredit globalization so thoroughly that the majority of people would actually reject it? Could the current Chinese bubble popping lead to that large of consequences?

Unlikely I know, although there are precedents... Several earlier periods of globalization fell by the wayside for similar reasons, although the fact that we're back where we are seems to indicate that there's something to the phenomenon.

Looking forward to hearing your thoughts.

V/R,

Cliff

To quote the article:

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But recent events in Tunisia and Algeria remind us that the vast bulk of history's revolutions are fueled by economics, not politics. In this, the struggle for Islam's soul is no different than that of any other civilization in this age of globalization's rapid expansion...

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Rubbish. I cannot take that seriously.

I find Globalisation is an imprecise term of almost no actual utility.
Additionally I submit it has little or no relevance to conflict.
Wars are caused by Politics. Globalisation is irrelevant.

Basically, when people say "Globalisation" they are strongly indicating they are confused by things they see, but do not understand. Everything people state as being or as being a product of "Globalisation" has a better and more useful explanation else where.

Cliff,

Elsewhere on SWC I have posted links to work on this theme, notably by Paul Rogers and Mary Kaldor, see this thread's opening post:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=12224

I do think that rushing to explain what happened in Tunisia as proving theory 'Global' is a mistake, plus media reporting on a "tidal wave" of protest sweeping through North Africa and beyond.

History in Africa notably has ample evidence of global interconnections leading to grim times, so I see no reason why PRC should be exempt - although I do not foresee the IMF and others arriving with a stabilisation programme.

I think about this a great deal. Frankly, there is very little evidence that "revolutions are caused by economics." For every situation you find a populace in poor or declining economic situations, far more are politically stable than unstable. It's like arguing that poverty causes spousal abuse or alcoholism. Some things are "equal opportunity" for rich and poor alike, and these dynamics that are rooted in human nature and group dynamics fit with in that category.

As Wilf says, insurgency is politics. He's absolutely right on that score. So we'll agree on those first two mile markers as we head down this path. 1. insurgency is not about economics (though certainly once the conditions of insurgency exist, economics come into play); and that insurgency is politics (Note, this means that political upheaval that is created by individuals seeking power or money with their small gang; such as drug cartels in Mexico, range wars between ranchers in the old American West, and perhaps even Diamond gangs in Sierra Leone are not true "insurgencies."

Our trails begin to diverge, and ahead is the fork in the road of "war" vs "civil emergency." Our doctrine tells us it is war, and our doctrines on war tells us war is politics. This is the majority path taken in looking at insurgencies. This is where I diverge. I could make a case for either one, but historically when one looks at situations where insurgency is approached as war and warfare is waged against the insurgent (often by an external power conducting counter guerrilla operations) it tends to ignore the root political causes and focus on re-establishing the status quo while suppressing the challengers. That model has proven to be temporarily effective many times and places. It is the base model captured in US COIN doctrine derived from the European Colonial experience, shaped during our own colonial experience (to which we added TTPS learned in defeating the native American populaces); and then colored again by our post WWII and post Cold War intervention experiences. All approached as war, with the goal of sustaining in power some government that is committed to supporting our interests in a particular region/populace deemed critical to US national interests.

I see insurgency as simply "illegal politics" that sometimes rise to very war-like levels of violence. I also believe that degree of violence is not an effective way to categorize such activities, but that one does a better job when they do it by the nature and relationship of the parties, and the basis of causation for the conflict (be it violent or non-violent).

Now to "Globalization" and does it help or hurt. Short answer is "YES, it does both"

Consider how the development of Roman roads facilitated the rise of Romes ability to subdue and manage an unprecedented empire; and similarly how such roads facilitated the rise of effective challengers from those subdued populaces that ultimately brought Rome down.

Consider how the development of the printing press facilitated the rise of the populaces of Western Europe to break the strangle hold of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church and their monopoly on education and religion.

Consider how British laid a vast network of telegraph wires and employed a steam powered navy and commercial fleet to expand and control an empire that rivaled Rome; and how populaces within those suppressed and divergent locations employed the same world-shrinking tools to encourage and sustain a ever expanding resistance that ultimately made sustaining such an empire cost-prohibitive, rolling back the overt controls to allow greater self-determination and legitimacy of government locally and a far less controlling role by Britain.

Now consider the American experience. Exerting our own brand of controlling influence across the globe on the backs of our own tremendous naval and commercial fleets; first in the name of "containing" existential threats of Soviet expansion into Europe; then evolving to a much broader and looser containment of the ideology of communism that was being embraced by so many post-colonial countries to facilitate their continued march to independence. Then there is the Middle East, a critical Cold War "battlefield" of resources, sea lanes, and choke points that had to be denied to the Soviets at any costs, and the governmental relationships that were nurtured and then protected against all enemies, foreign and domestic, to secure.

Then the Cold War ends and so does our express rationale for much of this engagement. Control measures are visibly rolled back in the West and Far East; but in the Middle East the Status Quo endured. The governments weren't complaining there (who complains about being insanely rich and powerful?), and the populace there has no voice (conversely poor and powerless), so their cries were muted. But along comes the information tools of "globalization." They lit the fuse that allowed the Eastern European populaces to free themselves from Soviet dominion. They also enabled bin Laden to turn AQ into a UW headquarters that could employ networked operations to extend a global reach without the benefit (or vulnerable burden) of a state to operate from. Like with the British experience before us, formerly isolated and disconnected populace groups rallied off of each others experiences to find courage and encouragement to stand up and resist illegitimate governments at home. It also empowered AQ's ability to recruit across a broad base of supportive populaces to converge energy against the West in an effort to break our support to these governments they were seeking to challenge at home. No more a "global insurgency" than the Cold War was; but rather a set of nationalist insurgencies with a common religion and common opponent that are leveraged by AQ as the UW hub to support their own political agenda as well.

So, yes, globalization is an important aspect of the current upheavals of Sunni Muslim populaces. Just as it was for the suppressed populaces of every previous empire as well.

But if you go down the "warpath" you begin to lose objectivity. If you don't look at history, you lose perspective. If you can't look at your own actions and contributions to the political conditions that are being challenged through illegal politics, you lose your empire...

On the subject of insurgency and its causes: Ted Robert Gurr, back in 1970, published what is still the best explanation in Why Men Revolt. In its essence, Gurr's argument was that revolutions take place when after a period of economic growth there is a sudden and sharp decline and the perception of the populace (or significant members thereof) that this is the fault of the venal and unjust government. He calls this "perceived relative deprivation." As a political scientist, I agree that this is politics, but economics is both relavant and the trigger mechanism expolited for political purposes.

Cheers

JohnT

John,

You just described the United States. But though we have all of these "classic symptoms" there is no real danger of insurgency. I would offer that Gurr's position is sound, but that if he would have dug a little deeper he would have gotten closer to the true roots of causation.

As we discussed, you bundle the four primary causal factors that I look to under the single umbrella of "Legitimacy." That is one of those words that carries far too many meanings, I think it is critical to break it down into four more focused bundles when assessing insurgency:

Legitimacy: The populace must recognize the right of the government to govern.

Justice: The populace must perceive that the rule of law as applied to them is just.

Respect: No significant segment of the society can perceive that they are excluded from participation in governance and opportunity as a matter of status.

Hope: The populace must perceive that they have a trusted, effective and legal means of changing governance, when they believe such change to be necessary.

When these conditions exist and hope is absent, conditions of insurgency will grow. Certainly economic hardship adds fuel to this mix, but it is a mix rooted in domestic policies and politics assesssed through the eyes of "the populace" (which is never a monolith). At point all it takes is a spark. Some internal or external leader armed with an effective ideology; or some event (as in Tunisia). Whether it then goes violent or non-violent is a choice of tactics, with little bearing on the nature of the problem.

Hope is codified and preserved in our Constitution. This is the role of a Constitution. Any constitution that creates such hope in a populace is the kind of effective COIN tool our founding fathers intended and designed our own constitution to be.

Cheers!

Bob

Bob,

Let me add to John's comment with some thoughts on the progress of revolution from The Anatomy of Revolution by Crane Brinton:

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financial breakdown, [to] organization of the discontented to remedy this breakdown ... revolutionary demands on the part of these organized discontented, demands which if granted would mean the virtual abdication of those governing, attempted use of force by the government, its failure, and the attainment of power by the revolutionists. These revolutionists have hitherto been acting as an organized and nearly unanimous group, but with the attainment of power it is clear that they are not united. The group which dominates these first stages we call the moderates .... power passes by violent ... methods from Right to Left.

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Brinton's book was used in the class I took as a companion to Gurr. (As an aside, and it's been a long time since I read it, as I recall Gurr does dig pretty deep and addresses the issues you raise.)

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Originally Posted by John T. Fishel

On the subject of insurgency and its causes: Ted Robert Gurr, back in 1970, published what is still the best explanation in Why Men Revolt. In its essence, Gurr's argument was that revolutions take place when after a period of economic growth there is a sudden and sharp decline and the perception of the populace (or significant members thereof) that this is the fault of the venal and unjust government. He calls this "perceived relative deprivation." As a political scientist, I agree that this is politics, but economics is both relavant and the trigger mechanism expolited for political purposes.

Cheers

JohnT

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Ding....Ding....Ding we have a winner IMO. Watch Egypt!!!! and then the world. People are getting fed up with welfare for the rich and suffering for the rest.

Legitimacy: If you win, you are legitimate. Power creates support.

Justice: Rule of Law. When you control the population, you say what is legal and what is not. All Governments exercise legitimate power via the rule of law.

Respect: If you have a monopoly on lethal force, you get respect, because folks fear you.

Hope: Deny the enemy hope and they'll give up!

Saddam Hussein was the Legitimate ruler of Iraq. The Taliban were the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. The people who thought otherwise were their political opponents. Legitimacy and legality are an entirely political and thus subjective construct.

Anyone want to say that the regime in Saudi Arabia is not legitimate or legal?

Wilf, you confuse "official" with "legitimate."

A strongman can deem himself to be "official;"

A puppet can be deemed "official" by some strong external power;

But only a governed populace can bestow "legitimacy" upon their government.

Vast sweeps of the populace of Saddam's Iraq did not recognize his legitimacy, they only feared his offical power. Same is true in Saudi Arabia today, and that number is growing as the gulf between the people and the Royals continues to expand and pleas of the people for change are not merely ignored, but attacked.

Do indeed look at Egypt as Slap suggests, but if one cannot see past the poverty to the factors of governance that I lay out, then all one is going to see is the surface issues. The people have always been poor in Egypt, even when the kingdom was rich. But as I recall, Pharaohs placed and sustained in power by Greek and Roman armies were far more susceptible to popular uprisings. They were inherently illegitimate in the eyes of the populace.

When Egypt explodes it will not be because the people are poor or because many are Muslim. It will be because they do not recognize the right of Mubarak to govern. By his own selfish actions he has robbed his office of legitimacy. It will be because many feel that they are excluded from full participation in economic and governmental opportunity as a matter of status. It will be because many feel that the rule of law as applied to them is unjust. It will be because hope has been removed from the political process there.

It will not be because they are poor.

Paul Rogers on Tunisia and the world, presenting a viewpoint that meshes in with the thread:http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-ro...ots-of-turmoil

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Wilf, you confuse "official" with "legitimate."

A strongman can deem himself to be "official;"

A puppet can be deemed "official" by some strong external power;

But only a governed populace can bestow "legitimacy" upon their government.

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Legitimacy is a political opinion. Hitler died democratically elected by 19 million Germans. Saddam was supported by a vast sector of his population, so were the Taliban.

What you see as legitimate is the political opinion of who you are, and would therefore carry no weight or relevance on the majority of the worlds surface. Your concept of legitimacy is merely a US political idea.

...and if the US President tells you to assist in crushing an armed-rebellion, against a pro-US Regime, you'll do it.

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Is Globalization the Answer or Culprit?

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Must it be one or the other? Or a little of both, a little of neither, and a lot in between.

Connectivity and interdependence among states certainly reduces the threat of state-on-state violence. On the other hand, economic and social change often generates friction and violence, both within and among states. These dynamics play out at the same time with varying effects.

I don't see "globalization" (as Wilf says, a very general term) as something that we chose to start and can choose to reject. It simply is; we have to learn to manage it but the genie ain't going back in the bottle. Likely to be rough at some parts and smooth at others, but the question is not "to globalize or not to globalize". That's already decided. The question is how to maximize the advantages and neutralize the disadvantages.

Why use the word "globalization" at all? It is neither an accurate or useful description. It has no set definition and means many mostly useless things to many mostly no so reflective people who don't tend to hold such ideas to rigour.

I agree it "is," but again, so what?

Globalization is like steroids. Now one can argue if the use of steroids in baseball favors pitchers or hitters more, but they're still playing baseball.

Same with insurgency and terrorism. The game is faster, some players are stronger or recover more quickly, but the game itself has not changed. Governments are about status quo and insurgents are about change, so I suspect this favors the party seeking change.

Wilf: I completely understand your position, and it is a reasonable one. It just isn't very helpful (in fact, it is quite harmful) for understanding insurgency. If one sees war as war and insurgency as a form of war, then seeing the de jure legitimacy of officialness as the only kind that matters makes sense. But such thinking is, IMO, a hindrance to resolving insurgency on terms that are acceptable for both the populace and the government.

I recommend that one should:
1. Separates insurgency from warfare (which I realize you won't do, not trying to convince you, just stating my perspective);

2. Recognize that causation radiates out from the "official" government and falls upon a diverse populace, many of whom may well question the "legitimacy" of said government;

3. Understand that "control" of the populace is not a security operation to be waged against them, but rather describes the general state of a populace that is satisfied with its form and nature of governance;

4. Realize that COIN is really the day to day efforts of the HN government to create or preserve perceptions of their legitimacy among the populace, and thereby establish a state of control; and

5. Appreciate that the efforts of an external intervening power that comes to the assistance of a government faced with insurgency with a focus of establishing security through defeat of the insurgent is neither conducting COIN nor helping the HN conduct COIN. In fact, such operations serve primarily to enable the HN to avoid conducting COIN and sustain a state of forced, illegitimate officialness.

This approach in point 5 was the model throughout the age of colonialism, and it is a model that largely survives and dominates our COIN doctrine today. It's not COIN at all though, and it probably is actually closer to being warfare as we currently implement it. We believe that if we sustain the current government, defeat the insurgent and establish security we have "won." The only group that "wins" in that situation is the puppet regime we have propped up through our intervention. Certainly the populace as a whole does not win, and when members of that populace are recruited by AQ to wage terrorist attacks against the homeland of the intervening party, it is that populace that suffers as well. The steroids of globalization enhance that last part.

So I remain convinced that it is time to retire the Colonial Intervention (COIN) playbook for foreign interventions. Just as Steam travel and telegraph technology facilitated both the rise and fall of the British Empire; so too has the latest generations of information and transportation technologies facilitated the rise and potential fall of the American age of control as well.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

So I remain convinced that it is time to retire the Colonial Intervention (COIN) playbook for foreign interventions. Just as Steam travel and telegraph technology facilitated both the rise and fall of the British Empire; so too has the latest generations of information and transportation technologies facilitated the rise and potential fall of the American age.

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I remain convinced that it's time to retire foreign interventions, except where absolutely necessary... and in those cases the intervention should be at the lowest possible level and the shortest possible duration, and multilateral where possible. Occupying territory, changing regimes, installing governments, telling others how they should be governed, meddling in the internal affairs of other nations... these are problems, not solutions.

The British needed an empire to prosper. We do not.

Ahh, but empire-like controls help corporations to prosper. Prosperous corporations have powerful lobbies, as do the governments that prosper from these same corporations.

Capital may well be a coward, but it loves a good dictatorship.

But I agree that we do not need an empire to prosper, and in fact, our nation as a whole is far more secure and prosperous if we retire such approaches and simply get out there and compete.

An important thing to note when using the concept of globalisation (indeed a bit of a confused concept) is not something that happened overnight or in the last twenty years, the concept of "globalisation" as in the greater interconnectivity between geographical and/or cultural areas in fields of communication, (political) ideas, connection between economical markets..etc (not necessarily a fixed definition) can be regarded as something that continuously occured troughout history.

You can see this on a local scale in the middle ages, where previously isolated rural markets were connected through among other things improvement in transport capablilities and allowed for specialisation and the formation of cities and later industrialisation. You can see this in the colonialisation and later in the imperialism by certain states, and then back to decolonization.

This way i dont find much revolutionary ideas in the "new" concept of globalisation, the economic markets were already connected and the ideas were already spreading. In other words the steamship was way more important then the internet might ever be.

Also the presence of an globally connected free-market economy doesnt necessarily mean an increase in the economical prosperity or peace, it could mean poverty for the people and one of the causes cited for the start of world war 1 is the imperialism of European countries (lenin even said that imperialism was the highest form of capitalism and that it was to blame for world war 1)

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Wilf: I completely understand your position, and it is a reasonable one. It just isn't very helpful (in fact, it is quite harmful) for understanding insurgency.

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Bob, I'm not confused as to how to defeat a rebellion. I understand how its done. I am just staggered at the line of thinking that prevents others seeing it. For example, why do you keep saying "Insurgency" instead of "armed rebellion."

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I recommend that one should:
1. Separates insurgency from warfare (which I realize you won't do, not trying to convince you, just stating my perspective);

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An insurgency is an armed rebellion. Warfare is the conduct of war. Rebellion requires warfare. How is it useful to engage in separation?

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2. Recognize that causation radiates out from the "official" government and falls upon a diverse populace, many of whom may well question the "legitimacy" of said government;

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Politics is the cause of all war. Not governments.

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3. Understand that "control" of the populace is not a security operation to be waged against them, but rather describes the general state of a populace that is satisfied with its form and nature of governance;

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Power is control. The populaces acquiescence just alters to degree of control needed.

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4. Realize that COIN is really the day to day efforts of the HN government to create or preserve perceptions of their legitimacy among the populace, and thereby establish a state of control;

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When you defeat an armed rebellion, you do so by re-imposing control via the rule of law.

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So I remain convinced that it is time to retire the Colonial Intervention (COIN) playbook for foreign interventions. Just as Steam travel and telegraph technology facilitated both the rise and fall of the British Empire; so too has the latest generations of information and transportation technologies facilitated the rise and potential fall of the American age of control as well.

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So basically you are saying that technology drives politics? I can't agree with that.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

So basically you are saying that technology drives politics? I can't agree with that.

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I don't think he's saying that at all, Wilf. I think you may be over-simplifying what he's saying to make your own point, though.

Technology often acts as an accelerator or enabling device for political moves or trends. This can be traced throughout recorded history, with examples ranging from the development of better navigation techniques and rigging enabling the Portuguese and later Spanish imperial drives to improved rail transport networks and their impact on US western expansion (to toss out just two examples...there are many more out there). As certain things became either possible or easier, the political ambitions of governments can often accelerate. Technology can also shape the directions such ambitions and expansions take.

Wilf,

Fair question as to why I distinguish between "armed rebellion" and "insurgency"

Several reasons go into this, and I will attempt to lay some of that out here (in no particular order as I think of them):

1. An insurgency may well manifest as an armed rebellion, and likewise an armed rebellion may well be an insurgency: But neither is necessarily the other.

2. As you say, insurgency is politics. Agreed. But not all armed rebellions are politics. Some are for power, some are for money; both of which will affect politics, but neither of which are politically driven.

3. Insurgencies require a popular base. Many armed rebellions, particularly those of the type described in #2 above, do not require and typically do not possess such a base. To lump these all together leads to inappropriate responses.

4. I strongly believe that the presence or absence of violence is a poor way to define a conflict. It is not unlike employing the presence or absence of sex to define a relationship. It is a good indicator, but it is in no way definitive.

5. knowing if the rebels are armed and violent is important for the design of my "counter-rebel" operations; but offers no clues as to what conditions must be addressed, or how those undefined conditions might best be addressed to resolve the causation for the rebellion. To simply defeat the rebels is to simply suppress the symptoms. The problem lies unaddressed and will re-emerge once the suppressive efforts relax.

6. Insurgency is internal politics rather than external politics. That is a very important distinction. If my own child is acting out improperly it is far different than if it is my neighbor's son or some stranger. Each requires unique approaches and each carries unique consequences. To ignore such distinctions is to apply a "one size fits all" solution that will likely not fit any of the three very well.

7. Western thinking on insurgency is muddied considerably by the colonial experience. Most of our COIN doctrine is based on such experiences. The US does not have COIN doctrine based on lessons learned from the founding fathers decision to scrap the Articles of Confederation in favor for our current constitution; or on the governmental strategy for resolving the growing civil rights rebellion. I suspect Great Britain does not have much COIN doctrine that is derived from her inner turmoils either (and Ireland does not count, as it was treated as a colonial operation). Instead we focus on what we learned from our efforts overseas to build and sustain colonial enterprises. That is simply not COIN at all. Dealing with an "armed rebellion" in some colonial enterprise is completely different than dealing with an "armed rebellion" at home. The stakes at home are much higher; and the residual consequences of tactical choices, win or lose, are both much higher at home.

8. Insurgency does not "just happen," nor is it the work of some "malign actor" or "ideology". Similarly insurgencies are not caused by poverty. Well governed populaces do not rise up against their governments because they are evil or because they are temporarily insane, or because they are poor. This is governmental propaganda. This is why I look at "conditions of insurgency" on a continuum from "good governance" with a satisfied populace and very low conditions of insurgency; rising up to an insurgent populace, experiencing poor governance with very high conditions of insurgency. Even a populace with high conditions of insurgency may be suppressed into inaction through governmental oppression. Such a populace may choose either violent or non-violent tactics when they do act out. Such a populace may organize and be led by internal actors, or they may be incited and supported by external actors conducting UW.

None of this can be fairly described by such a broad and inartful distinction as "armed rebellion."

Copied this from John Robb's Global Guerrillas site. Black Globalization is the transnational criminalization of global markets.



http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.03/view.html?pg=4

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

John,

You just described the United States. But though we have all of these "classic symptoms" there is no real danger of insurgency. I would offer that Gurr's position is sound, but that if he would have dug a little deeper he would have gotten closer to the true roots of causation.

As we discussed, you bundle the four primary causal factors that I look to under the single umbrella of "Legitimacy." That is one of those words that carries far too many meanings, I think it is critical to break it down into four more focused bundles when assessing insurgency:

Legitimacy: The populace must recognize the right of the government to govern.

Justice: The populace must perceive that the rule of law as applied to them is just.

Respect: No significant segment of the society can perceive that they are excluded from participation in governance and opportunity as a matter of status.

Hope: The populace must perceive that they have a trusted, effective and legal means of changing governance, when they believe such change to be necessary.

When these conditions exist and hope is absent, conditions of insurgency will grow. Certainly economic hardship adds fuel to this mix, but it is a mix rooted in domestic policies and politics assesssed through the eyes of "the populace" (which is never a monolith). At point all it takes is a spark. Some internal or external leader armed with an effective ideology; or some event (as in Tunisia). Whether it then goes violent or non-violent is a choice of tactics, with little bearing on the nature of the problem.

Hope is codified and preserved in our Constitution. This is the role of a Constitution. Any constitution that creates such hope in a populace is the kind of effective COIN tool our founding fathers intended and designed our own constitution to be.

Cheers!

Bob

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Bob-

I think you could make an arguement that the Tea Party represents an insurgency, and I think economics are the prime driver of this movement. Comparing the US economic "woes" to those in some of these other countries is comparing apples and oranges, however- we're not that bad off (not that that's good, mind you!). We simply have a robust system that can process insurgencies - IE, the elections!

As for the other posts (sorry I am behind so mass replying) - I am closer to JohnT's opinion I think.

I agree that war is politics by other means, and insurgency is warfare by and for politics more so than most other types of war.

That said, I think you ignore economic causes at your peril. Certainly they are expressed politically, but economics have been at the root of numerous revolutions/insurgencies - like our own (taxes due to the British debt) or the French Revolution (debt from numerous wars against the Brits). In many cases where this doesn't hold true I would argue that a few self-interested folks hijacked the populace's economic dissatisfaction (Lenin, Mao)...

I am not arguing that all insurgencies/revolutions are caused by economics. But I am arguing that these will become more common than ever before. Globalization means that our economic interests are more integrated than ever before. While globalization has occured before, the integration of supply chains across nations has never occured to the level we see today. Likewise, the competition in almost every area of the economy has never been as widespread as it is now. This round of globalization is different as a result- it's not trade in raw materials or finished products but technology enabled flat supply chains operating on just-in-time principles.

Due to the system of liberalized international trade and finance set up by the victors of World War II, states tend to compete in the economic realm rather than in the military one, and we haven't seen a great power war since World War II. Let's be honest - as long as your average middle class person has a job and can take care of their family and improve their life, they don't have as much to be dissatisfied about. That's why China hasn't seen massive countrywide protests- as long as the CCP can deliver reasonable growth, the folks will stay reasonably happy. In places where this is not the case, you see upheaval.

Again, I am not saying that politics or legitimacy do not matter. They most certainly do. But I am saying that economic issues will become even more important than ever before. As countries develop this will tend to be more the case, while in lesser developed countries it will be less so. Is the development the cause? It seems that you could make an arguement that people at the low end (very poor, little economic activity) tend to dislike their government, and people at the high end of development (more economic activity, developed economy) also tend to get there. South Korea is a good example - not much democracy until their economy took off - then massive protests and upheaval.

In summary, I think that economic causes are a major part of many insurgencies. Getting bogged down on semantics or trying to separate economic and political causes (It's only about the legitimacy - in four parts!) disregards important aspects of the problem. I think part of the reason for this tendency is the centrality of the military to dealing with insurgencies in the West - which is exactly why Dr. Barnett and others argue for a "department of everything else" or Goldwater Nichols for the interagency - to give the USG non-military tools to deal with these issues.

V/R,

Cliff

PS - good to see you Prof Fishel! Hoping I can be a poster and not just a lurker, at least for a few more months!

Cliff,

The Tea Party absolutely is not an insurgency for the simple reason that it is within the rule of law. The Tea party is legal politics.

However, in many, perhaps most countries around the world the Tea Party absolutely would be an insurgency because it would be illegal politics.

This is why I add "Hope" and describe it as the great off ramp from insurgency. Imagine a U.S. where the populace lost their faith and confidence in the Constitution? An America where there was no trusted, certain, and legal means to address conditions of poor governance?

Take that away from the segment of America that comprises or supports the Tea Party and option would they have besides insurgency? This is the situation the African American populace found themselves in; as they were excluded as a matter of status from inclusion in the good governance of the United States. Lyndon Johnson threw his own political future under the bus, a far more significant bus than the one "Ms Parks was on. He had the moral courage to pass three landmark laws that brought the African American populace within the circle of "good governance" and also with the voters rights act insured they had Hope.

Many Americans today are in denial over the civil rights situation that exploded post WWII in much the same way many Germans are about the Holocaust. Somethings are so horrible, so hard to imagine in the context of modern times that they are discounted as to how bad they were.

So, in Afghanistan, building equity and justice will take time, though we could get started on the laws and infrastructure required for both. Hope can come much more quickly; but begins with a new constitution. The current constitution robs virtually the entire populace of Afghanistan of hope; and discriminates against half as a matter of status. Does anyone think the Northern Alliance would stand for the current Constitution if Mullah Omar was sitting in the presidency with the power to pick a 1/3 of the senate, a new Supreme Court, every District and Provincial Governor and Police Chief; plus many more??

As to economics, I don't ignore them, they are a critical part of the equation. But people will tolerate crushing poverty if they believe that it is fair. But even the wealthy rise up in rebellion when the conditions of insurgency reach a certain point.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

I don't ignore them, they are a critical part of the equation. But people will tolerate crushing poverty if they believe that it is fair. But even the wealthy rise up in rebellion when the conditions of insurgency reach a certain point.

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Bob-

You make my point for me.

Globalization means that people everywhere know more about other people. So the folks who are in dire economic straights KNOW that they are there... and once most people know that they don't think it's fair anymore, because they see that the Jones (or the next tribe, next country, other ethnic group, etc.) have more than they do.

This is why economic issues will become increasingly important- like you said, it is hope! As long as you have "hope" in the form of increased wealth through your life and better position for your kids, you can be placated because you see yourself as moving up the ladder. You can picture yourself in the fat cat's place, if only you work harder. If you suddenly lose that opportunity... well then we have a problem.

Once you've given people a taste of this, you can't really take it away... especially if their neighbors have opportunity!!

V/R,

Cliff

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

2. As you say, insurgency is politics. Agreed. But not all armed rebellions are politics. Some are for power, some are for money; both of which will affect politics, but neither of which are politically driven.

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How is the pursuit of power anything but politics?

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Ahh, but empire-like controls help corporations to prosper. Prosperous corporations have powerful lobbies, as do the governments that prosper from these same corporations.

Capital may well be a coward, but it loves a good dictatorship.

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True enough in the 60s and 70s, far less true today. The corporate side has evolved a good deal, though it would be most un-American to give them credit for it. Certainly they'll work with dictators where they must, but the illusion that dictatorship = stability is long gone. You see this often in oil-producing dictatorships, where western companies prefer to work on service contracts rather than owning resources or physical plant, even where that means lower profits. Basic risk mitigation: everyone now knows that dictatorships are a risk and you have to consider what happens when some colonel decides that Allah desires that the dictator meet with a bullet or the population rises in the streets.

If the government and the corporation are both prospering, that sounds pretty much win-win and a desirable situation. Of course the government may elect to stash its prosperity in the Cayman Islands, but that's hardly something the corporation can control.

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As to economics, I don't ignore them, they are a critical part of the equation. But people will tolerate crushing poverty if they believe that it is fair. But even the wealthy rise up in rebellion when the conditions of insurgency reach a certain point.

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Varies from case to case, but it is possible to buy off a populace. We see it today: both China and Saudi Arabia could be considered ripe for insurgency, but I doubt you'll see either hit critical mass unless there's a serious economic upheaval.

We also can't forget fear as a motivating factor pressing populaces to reject insurgency. The Chinese, for example, have a quite vivid national memory of what happened when a nominally progressive movement toppled a fading government in 1911, but lacked the capacity to govern themselves. The result was devastating. They also have memories of what happened when Chiang Kai-Shek's fading effort at despotism was toppled by a group who did have the capacity to govern. They look at current conditions and know they aren't great, but they know too well what the alternative can be. In Saudi Arabia desire for change is balanced against an acute awareness that they sit on something lots of people want, and an overwhelming fear that if change brings weakness and division they may simply be swallowed up by some larger outside force. I can't count how many time I've been told, in the Gulf, that "America wants us to be democratic and tolerate opposition so the CIA can rig our elections and manipulate the opposition and take over". Conspiracy theory perhaps, but powerful nonetheless.

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Originally Posted by slapout9

Copied this from John Robb's Global Guerrillas site. Black Globalization is the transnational criminalization of global markets.

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I wouldn't read too much into the fake merchandise markets. It's all over, but it doesn't really hurt the corporations that much. Everyone knows the difference and if anything the spread of fakes has only increased the status symbol value of the real thing... maybe not such an issue in the US but huge in the developing world. The rising classes in China wouldn't be caught dead in Chinese-made counterfeits, and they know at a glance which is which.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

But not all armed rebellions are politics. Some are for power, some are for money; both of which will affect politics, but neither of which are politically driven.

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If its for power, then it is political. Politics is power over people. It is not just what politicians do. All conflict is driven by politics, because all conflict seeks to alter political power. Populations rebel for that reason.

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3. Insurgencies require a popular base. Many armed rebellions, particularly those of the type described in #2 above, do not require and typically do not possess such a base. To lump these all together leads to inappropriate responses.

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Example? All the definitions of insurgency I know of, make no such distinction. The appropriateness of the response is defined by the policy, not the conflict.

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I strongly believe that the presence or absence of violence is a poor way to define a conflict.

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Well no violance, no conflict.

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5. knowing if the rebels are armed and violent is important for the design of my "counter-rebel" operations; but offers no clues as to what conditions must be addressed, or how those undefined conditions might best be addressed to resolve the causation for the rebellion.

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It is not the job of the Army to resolve the problem. Defeat the rebels, then the government can do what it wants.

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Dealing with an "armed rebellion" in some colonial enterprise is completely different than dealing with an "armed rebellion" at home. The stakes at home are much higher; and the residual consequences of tactical choices, win or lose, are both much higher at home.

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Well the logic of that is infantry tactics in a civil war are different from that of a war with another nation. The only difference between foreign and domestic is the policy.

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None of this can be fairly described by such a broad and inartful distinction as "armed rebellion."

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Broad and inartful? Those words have sufficed for 5,000 years. I see no reason to change.

Gents-

Perhaps it might be useful to delineate our terminology a bit.

An armed group who seeks purely economical ends is a criminal gang, cartel, mafia, or something similar. They are not insurgents, nor are they rebels.

Insurgency is always political, as Mr. Owen states. If it is not political, it is not warfare and must be something else. War always has political ends.

The insurgent or rebel always seek a political objective. These objectives fall into two broad categories: Those who wish to overthrow a government and replace it with another (usually the insurgent/rebel leadership), or, those who wish to force a government to change a policy/policies, but do not wish to overthrow that government.

I'm not an expert, but my sense of it is that the definitions of these terms depends on who you ask - therefore arguing semantics probably isn't useful. However, my general sense is that insurgency is a sub-category of rebellion in which the insurgent group seeks the overthrow of a government. Rebellions may or may not be insurgencies. Rebels may simply demand a change in policy, or perhaps, secession from a nation-state, without being an insurgency.

Wilf,

Exactly my point when you mention the state of current definitions of insurgency and COIN. They are all derived from and colored by the colonial intervention experience. For one to argue that other perspectives are flawed because they challenge time-honored perspectives puts one in a large, but not necessarily good company with those who:

1. Ignored the need for cleanliness and separation of the sick to avoid infection and transmission of diseases. After all, centuries of medical journals "Prove" that the development of illness is the will of god.

2. Laughed at Columbus' proposal to sail west to reach the east, though there was much evidence that this was true, all of the official works declared it impossible.

3. Same for those who suggested the earth rotated around the sun, etc.

Bottom line, is that centuries of a particular influence and history will shape thinking on timeless concepts that man really has little or no influence over. The colonial experience shapes how those who's culture derives from Western Europe think about insurgency. How could it not?

But to throw out trite lines like "politics is power" is kind of like holding your breath until you turn blue and stomping your feet until I agree with you. So let's look at some of those definitions, ok??

FM3-24:

"insurgency: (joint) An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)."

Ok, I would argue that that is the military shaping a definition to fit their paradigm (and that virtually all joint definitions are a compromise between service positions on a topic and usually suffer from that process). Two aspects that have little to do with causation and everything to do with how it actually manifests in a manner that makes it a military problem to solve are the phrases "constituted government" and "and armed conflict." Is it any less an insurgency if this occur in some culture that does not "constitute" it's governments? No, but such "non-state" problems are too messy, so the military excludes them from being their problem to deal with. "..and armed conflict." Well, the military claims that COIN is a form of warfare, so therefore insurgency must only be where "armed conflict" exists right? There is a "chicken and the egg" dynamic at work here as well as strong shades of our colonial roots. After all, if we go to some foreign land, and constitute a government to rule over them, and then the populace challenges that government with armed conflict, we have an insurgency on our hands and need to wage warfare to reestablish our foreign mandated status quo, right??

Galula (page 1 and 2 of "Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice) takes a more exploratory approach:

"a revolutionary war is primarily an internal conflict...the strategically important fact that they were challenging a local ruling power controlling the existing administration, police and armed forces."

"the conflict results from the action of the insurgent aiming to seize political power..."

"Paraphrasing Clausewitz, we might say that 'Insurgency is the pursuit of of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means.' It is not like an ordinary war - a 'continuation of the policy by other means' - because an insurgency can start long before the insurgent resorts to the use of force."

I think Galula is correct in this insight, and as noted above, the U.S. Army abandoned this perspective for one that better fits their paradigm. Insurgency does indeed start long before the insurgent resorts to violence. Where Galua and I will quibble a bit is on his definitions of COIN. He contends that:

"only one - the insurgent- can initiate a revolutionary war, for counterinsurgency is only an effect of insurgency."

Ok, come on Dave, really? This is that tendency of governments refusing to take responsibility for the effects of their actions, and begs the question "what is insurgency the effect of"?? I contend that all governance is essentially "COIN" but that prior to the growth of subversion and violence it is primarily pre-insurgent and preventative in nature. But as the "goodness" of governance degrades in critical areas (the ones I find most important are legitimacy, justice, equity and hope) that governance becomes less preventative of insurgency and more responsive to insurgency as the populace begins to act out in illegal ways.

ML

I see three broad categories of insurgency (all three of which exist in Iraq, btw and each requires a unique approach to resolve)

1. Revolutionary: To overthrow or change the policies of an existing nationalist government through illegal means.

2. Separatist: To break some part of a sovereign nation (or tribal territory) off and bring it under new and distinct governance through illegal means.

3. Resistance: Efforts of a populace to overthrow a foreign presence that is controlling their national governance. Again, these efforts are through illegal means.

Both of your options fall under option 1 here. These can come in a variety of blends.

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Originally Posted by M.L.

Gents-

Perhaps it might be useful to delineate our terminology a bit.

An armed group who seeks purely economical ends is a criminal gang, cartel, mafia, or something similar. They are not insurgents, nor are they rebels.

Insurgency is always political, as Mr. Owen states. If it is not political, it is not warfare and must be something else. War always has political ends.

The insurgent or rebel always seek a political objective. These objectives fall into two broad categories: Those who wish to overthrow a government and replace it with another (usually the insurgent/rebel leadership), or, those who wish to force a government to change a policy/policies, but do not wish to overthrow that government.

I'm not an expert, but my sense of it is that the definitions of these terms depends on who you ask - therefore arguing semantics probably isn't useful. However, my general sense is that insurgency is a sub-category of rebellion in which the insurgent group seeks the overthrow of a government. Rebellions may or may not be insurgencies. Rebels may simply demand a change in policy, or perhaps, secession from a nation-state, without being an insurgency.

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M.L. separating the two is a western idea that is generally not shared by the rest of the world which is why Marx said "You can't separate Politics from Economics." IMO this is the source of every problem we have inside America and Outside America.

Or, when one wants to shut down an opponent without offering any real substance to do so, they can go to a range of "shut-down phrases", such as:

1. "That's tactical, I'm talking strategic here..."

2. "That's a Western perspective..."

3. " That can't be true because Dave Kilcullen said..."

4. "Well, according to Clausewitz..."

5. "When I was in Iraq..."

6. "That is an idealist position..."

7. (or conversely) "When one takes a pragmatic, realist approach..."

8. And most conclusively: "Don't make me bring Ken White in on this!" :D

(Bonus points for combining two or more in a single sentence!)

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Originally Posted by slapout9

M.L. separating the two is a western idea that is generally not shared by the rest of the world which is why Marx said "You can't separate Politics from Economics." IMO this is the source of every problem we have inside America and Outside America.

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I wasn't separating the two. I was simply stating that any armed group that has economic ends without political ends that operates outside the law is a criminal, not insurgent group.

This does not mean that economics is not part of insurgency, rebellion, etc...

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

ML

I see three broad categories of insurgency (all three of which exist in Iraq, btw and each requires a unique approach to resolve)

1. Revolutionary: To overthrow or change the policies of an existing nationalist government through illegal means.

2. Separatist: To break some part of a sovereign nation (or tribal territory) off and bring it under new and distinct governance through illegal means.

3. Resistance: Efforts of a populace to overthrow a foreign presence that is controlling their national governance. Again, these efforts are through illegal means.

Both of your options fall under option 1 here. These can come in a variety of blends.

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I think your construct provides an interesting way to look at the problem, however, in the end all of these either

A: Want to overthrow the existing government
-or-
B: Want to change a policy, but do not want to overthrow the existing government.

Your three categories are all variations on these two basic themes - the member groups are just different.

For example, separatist is category B. The Anystan government policy is that all districts will remain a part of Anystan. The North District wants to become Northstan. They don't want to overthrow the Gov't of Anystan - they simply want to change the Anystan policy vis a vis Northstan.

Distillations are valuable up to the point that they lead to over generalizations that hinder clear thinking.

I stop at the three categories I settled at because I believe that to combine those together I begin to lose distinctions that are essential to COIN process. Now, if I am merely a "counterinsurgent" or conducting "counter guerrilla" operations, it does not matter if I lump these three distinct categories of causal motivation together, as all I want to do is destroy those who dare to challenge the government with illegal violence.

It is this type of thinking that leads to combining the rural, largely apolitical, resistance insurgency in Afghanistan along with the highly political revolutionary insurgency of the Taliban leadership in Pakistan. We then go on to engage one in hopes of curing the other; conflate them as a monolith; and generally end up applying the wrong solutions to the problems, or applying a potentially workable solution to one end of the problem, while addressing the other end in a manner that neutralizes the good effects and makes the entire problem worse.

If you consider the real success behind the surge was that Gen Petraeus essentially recognized these three distinct segments and tailored his approach to each. He left the Kurds alone and did not press the issue of the central Iraqi government exerting its sovereignty over them. Satisfied, this largely took them out of the fight. For the Sunni it was largely a resistance. They had held power, and were now excluded and in danger of being dominated by a Shia/Kurd government. By reaching out to the Sunni and addressing their concerns at being excluded he began to take them out of the fight as well. For the Shia it was a mix of resistance and revolutionary; wanting the foreigners to leave and to exert their own dominion over the government. (AQ really was not part of this. They were never "insurgents," they were foreign fighters who traveled to Iraq to inflict pain on the West and advance their own political agenda. The majority of those foreign fighters being members of nationalist insurgent movements (revolutionary) in the various Arab states they came from (Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, etc). AQ was conducting UW with the Iraqi populace as well.

If we would have continued to apply a "one size fits all" approach we would still be mired in high level combat there. Surging troops and pop-centric tactics are all ancillary to the larger strategic understanding of the problem. As is so often the case in insurgencies and interventions, often the greatest aspect of the cure receives the least credit.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

2. "That's a Western perspective..."

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That is very often a huge problem. Democracy and legitimacy for example.

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3. " That can't be true because Dave Kilcullen said..."

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Well when I next meet Dave, I'm going to point out to him that his two book and numerous articles have done far more harm than good, in my opinion.

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4. "Well, according to Clausewitz..."

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If he said it, it was probably right and no one better has come along.

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"Don't make me bring Ken White in on this!" :D

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I think of Ken as a Intellectual Reserve. Thus have simple ideas, that Ken White agrees with.... :D

The accrediting agencies for my university program at the program, state, and regional levels all require me to teach globalization. My curriculum must reflect the principles of globalization. At a recent academic conference I asked one of the architects of this requirement, "What is globalization?" His response was a pedantic, "You don't know?" Leaving me breathless and struggling to keep my inner Marine at peace I said, "No, I want to know if you do?"

To whit, globalization is when my students have to compete for jobs with any student anywhere else on the planet for a job. This is true, and they do, quite well. Globalization is the effect on the local market when cheap Turkish steel is dumped in America and results in 30K steel workers getting laid off. That then turns into a political incident and causes perturbations in domestic politics. Globalization is the fact that over the last thirty years the number of American born professors in STEM higher education has radically dwindled towards a minority. A trend followed by declining STEM education for American students and simply circular. Globalization is the perturbation in the corn market caused when a harvest half a world away fails and my local farmers in Indiana get a little fatter pay-check. Globalization is the fact a flood in Brazil results in an increase sales return on computer equipment designed in Texas, built in China, and delivered by Korean shipping through a Chillean company.

A mild mistake made by the Barnetts of the world and most arm-chair strategists is laying globalization at the foot of the Internet and basing everything on communications. Those are symptoms of globalizations. From the view of an Indiana farmer globalization isn't about networks it is about peering. Instead of hierarchical relationships or even networked relationships it is about peering relationships. The farmer sells directly to the consumer half a world away. We see this system breaking down in the music industry as artists sell directly to the consumer. iTunes from Apple is an example of the retailer removing the distributor, but now we have the distributor being yanked out of the picture too. NetFlix, iTunes, and even Amazon are retailers who are direct to market. Now technologies are allowing them to be lept and producer to consumer is possible. That should scare most governments because in the seams of the previous nationalized systems is where regulation and taxation fit. Now those seams are closing.

If you apply these concepts to the military an entire new venue of conflicts arise and become possible. The simple assumptions of state power become limited when it is falsely assumed the state has "power". Similarly there are issues with assumption that the "corporation" has power too. When the market place shifts from provider/user to produce/consumer an entire new set of paradigms rise. This is both unprecedented and continues economic models that have long existed in non-monetary systems. Assuming that the nation-state with what are now entirely minuscule armies (in comparison to population densities) are going to pacify large swaths of the population is simplistic. When the need for the state as primacy of control is replaced by localized relationships there simply will be break downs. Corporations realized this changing venue of power matrixes a long time ago and companies like WalMart grew from not just being "providers" but convenience providers and relationship builders.

Most military members are missing other elements of globalization even as they use it to their advantage. The soldier in Afghanistan web-cam chatting with his spouse and children in America is engaged in a peering relationship. So, are the fifth graders talking with the Imam in Iran while sitting in Colorado. Same for the college sophomores who are working on a project with Chinese college on a project. Projections of nationalism to those domestic populations are eroded by the consistent peering relationships. Domestic attempts by political forces of the nation state are buffered by personal contacts with foreign nationals. This leads to a disconnection of populace support for foreign aggression and in a democracy leadership challenges. The attempt by politicians and military members to say "This is true" is met with a sigh and "not from my experience". The adage that the military went to war and American went to the mall is a truism. Fed in part by the disconnection of the Military and political process from the populace and the rapidly escalation of a growing divide caused by globalization.

Less than 1 percent of the United States population serves in the United States military and it costs more than the next five militaries on the planet combined. The money spent effects relatively few Americans in a very small swath of cities and regions (and dwindling with base closures). Consider the civil/military relationship and then consider the globalization relationships. Would we expect a government or military that doesn't understand the former to have any clue about the latter?

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Originally Posted by selil

If you apply these concepts to the military an entire new venue of conflicts arise and become possible. The simple assumptions of state power become limited when it is falsely assumed the state has "power". Similarly there are issues with assumption that the "corporation" has power too. When the market place shifts from provider/user to produce/consumer an entire new set of paradigms rise. This is both unprecedented and continues economic models that have long existed in non-monetary systems. Assuming that the nation-state with what are now entirely minuscule armies (in comparison to population densities) are going to pacify large swaths of the population is simplistic. When the need for the state as primacy of control is replaced by localized relationships there simply will be break downs. Corporations realized this changing venue of power matrixes a long time ago and companies like WalMart grew from not just being "providers" but convenience providers and relationship builders.

Most military members are missing other elements of globalization even as they use it to their advantage. The soldier in Afghanistan web-cam chatting with his spouse and children in America is engaged in a peering relationship. So, are the fifth graders talking with the Imam in Iran while sitting in Colorado. Same for the college sophomores who are working on a project with Chinese college on a project. Projections of nationalism to those domestic populations are eroded by the consistent peering relationships. Domestic attempts by political forces of the nation state are buffered by personal contacts with foreign nationals. This leads to a disconnection of populace support for foreign aggression and in a democracy leadership challenges. The attempt by politicians and military members to say "This is true" is met with a sigh and "not from my experience". The adage that the military went to war and American went to the mall is a truism. Fed in part by the disconnection of the Military and political process from the populace and the rapidly escalation of a growing divide caused by globalization.

Less than 1 percent of the United States population serves in the United States military and it costs more than the next five militaries on the planet combined. The money spent effects relatively few Americans in a very small swath of cities and regions (and dwindling with base closures). Consider the civil/military relationship and then consider the globalization relationships. Would we expect a government or military that doesn't understand the former to have any clue about the latter?

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Selil-

I think that Barnett's point mirrors yours- by "connectivity" he doesn't mean the internet, he means the ability of folks in one place to do business/interact with others. The internet is obviously the biggest enabler of that, but it is an enabler - not the effect. This is why I think the economic factor is becoming more important- it results in the "peering" process as you call it. It's tough to get someone to go to war with somebody they work with every day - and even tougher to convince them that that person is the "enemy". One reason you see so much hatred in places like Pakistan is that disconnectedness.

One of my big concerns though is the strength of military might. You mention it, and several others have alluded to it. Certainly even our military has a hard time "pacifying large swaths of the population"... but this is because we choose to follow the Western norms for warfare. Raw, naked force still has the ability to subjugate, and it could disrupt globalization and cause regression. It would take a massive amount of force, true- but the lesson of WWI and WWII is that at some point even the most fanatical organizations/governments will surrender if they are faced with annihilation- and afterwards, there are significant psychological and social consequences. I'm not arguing that this is a good idea, or right in any way- but if an actor with sufficient power chooses to use it in this way... well, it would probably work. We need to make sure we don't assume that the rules we use will always apply to everyone else.

V/R,

Cliff

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Originally Posted by Cliff

Bob-

You make my point for me.

Globalization means that people everywhere know more about other people. So the folks who are in dire economic straights KNOW that they are there... and once most people know that they don't think it's fair anymore, because they see that the Jones (or the next tribe, next country, other ethnic group, etc.) have more than they do.

This is why economic issues will become increasingly important- like you said, it is hope! As long as you have "hope" in the form of increased wealth through your life and better position for your kids, you can be placated because you see yourself as moving up the ladder. You can picture yourself in the fat cat's place, if only you work harder. If you suddenly lose that opportunity... well then we have a problem.

Once you've given people a taste of this, you can't really take it away... especially if their neighbors have opportunity!!

V/R,

Cliff

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Cliff,

You may (or may not) be surprised to learn that those who live in abject poverty in so many places around the globe cannot empathize with the wealth of America any more than Americans can empathise with their poverty. Somethings are beyond comprehension.

I got my first dose of this as a young Captain standing in the Saudi desert attempting to describe my home in SW Oregon to the Egyptian soldiers and officers I worked with. Even when I finally got a tourist brochure and showed them pictures of the coast, the forests, the farms, Crater Lake, etc their eyes went wide with wonder, but they still could not truly comprehend something so far from the only reality they had ever known.

Fast forward to today. The size of bounties placed on HVTs in the Southern Philippines was (and likely is) a big problem. The amounts were too large. Tell someone you will pay them $6 Million for a guy and they don't get it. Tell them you'll pay them $6,000 and suddenly you have their attention. Like an inverse scene from Austin Powers. The first amount is too large to comprehend, the second is wealth beyond belief, but within understanding. Heck, we'd probably have rounded up all the AQ senior leaders world wide long ago if we had reduced the largest reward to about $25,000 for bin Ladin. It's not like we are attempting to lure western bounty hunters to go after them.

But that too points out how we have hindered our own efforts by not being able to epathize with the affected populaces where the base of support for such movements exists. Much smaller rewards and DA raids on senior leaders in Pakistan would have likely been seen as quite reasonable by the Pashtun populace that harbored them.

Instead we created this elaborate and intrusive construct that takes us farther from the prize every day. Crazy.

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

2. "That's a Western perspective..."

6. "That is an idealist position..."

8. And most conclusively: "Don't make me bring Ken White in on this!" :D

(Bonus points for combining two or more in a single sentence!)

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He is here...

Bonus claiming sentence:

The western perspectives on globalization, economic matters in general (but in particular as it relates to Taarof, Hong Bao and their relatives) and even on most aspects of warfare are essentially idealistic and are thus often incorrect and perceived as arrogance and / or ignorance in the eyes of many in the East.

Followed by:

As Samuel Huntington said: "...Asian societies and Muslim societies are increasingly resentful of our efforts to induce them to adopt our values.” Anyone who fails to comprehend that reality is doomed to state that it is but a strawman, to be ignored -- and they will. They'll ultimately pay for it, too...

You know this, Bob. Witness:

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Fast forward to today. The size of bounties placed on HVTs in the Southern Philippines was (and likely is) a big problem. The amounts were too large. Tell someone you will pay them $6 Million for a guy and they don't get it. Tell them you'll pay them $6,000 and suddenly you have their attention. Like an inverse scene from Austin Powers.

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Yep, you know it -- you just like to ignore it in some of your posts as it complicates your argument... :D

I generally agree with Selil. However, this from him:

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The adage that the military went to war and American went to the mall is a truism. Fed in part by the disconnection of the Military and political process from the populace and the rapidly escalation of a growing divide caused by globalization.

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Merits a quibble. Except that he adroitly corrects or at least adjusts it later:

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... Consider the civil/military relationship and then consider the globalization relationships. Would we expect a government or military that doesn't understand the former to have any clue about the latter?

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Good question. I'd only add that the lack of understanding of the civil/military relationship is a two way street, that both sides tacitly encourage that lack and that -- as Selil knows -- misundertanding or misperceptions on that relationship and both parties to it in the Academic world exacerbate the problem. That, BTW is not an attack, merely an observation. It is also an observation that agendas drive understanding or an apparent lack thereof and that even pure intentions can legitimately diverge among communities.

Which is what makes globalization complex. And drives western and eastern mutual failures to comprehend...;)

Ken,

Its not that my arguments are complicated, but the world, people, and the US's perceived role vs it's necessary role certainly is.

We have interests, we have requirements, and we are (by a considerable margin) the big dog on the block. We also have a tremendous (though short) evolving history as a nation. Most fascinating parts being the formation of the nation and then the emergence post WWII to lead the Western portion of the Cold War.

With all of that in the rearview mirror we have come to realize in recent years that we have no entitlement to such a role, and that if we are careless in our approaches to that role it can likely speed our come uppence.

So while we do still need to manage our interests around the globe, I recommend that we recognize our Cold War experience for the anomaly that it was and get a little bit closer to the perspectives that we originally built this nation upon. Part of that perspective is recognizing the power of the populace and the liability of governance when such relationships go bad. We're older and far more like our parents these days than we were back in our idealistic youth, but that's ok. We do still enjoy a good windmill to tilt at every now and then though.

So while there may appear to be some inconsistencies between what we should do and what we probably must do, I'm ok with that. Besides, no one has the answer, I'm just trying to break through the good old boys group think to add a fresh perspective.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

So while we do still need to manage our interests around the globe, I recommend that we recognize our Cold War experience for the anomaly that it was and get a little bit closer to the perspectives that we originally built this nation upon. Part of that perspective is recognizing the power of the populace and the liability of governance when such relationships go bad.

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I agree. I also think we have to recognize the constraints on our ability to restructure governance/populace and populace/populace relations in other countries, and the enormous potential for unintended consequences associated with such attempts. We can't "fix" other countries, and we're likely to step in something nasty if we try.

That's not saying we should be trying to preserve an unsustainable status quo, but trying to initiate or direct changes to that status quo is as bad. We are not anyone's saviour or champion and we cannot appoint ourselves to those roles.

Sometimes it is merely the perception that we are behind sustaining some very unsustainable status quos that is enough to give organizations such as AQ rich fodder for their propaganda machine for waging UW against us through nationalist insurgent organizations and disgruntled individuals.

We need to create some new perceptions.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Bob's World

Sometimes it is merely the perception that we are behind sustaining some very unsustainable status quos that is enough to give organizations such as AQ rich fodder for their propaganda machine for waging UW against us through nationalist insurgent organizations and disgruntled individuals.

We need to create some new perceptions.

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Certainly perceptions are important, but challenging a perceived situation is very different from challenging an actual situation, and we have to recognize from the start which we are doing. Perceptions get complicated, because they are in no way universal: what we are dealing with in many cases is not, for example, the actual perceptions that different components of the Saudi populace have of our role in their governance, but our perception of that perception. That's pretty messy and pretty uncertain. Certainly AQ tries to peddle a certain perception, but that doesn't mean that perception is universally or even widely accepted.

Wrapping ourselves around a dizzying galaxy of varying perceptions and trying to change them all is a good way to trip over our own feet. Over time, a straightforward, sensible foreign policy that does not involve messing around in the internal affairs of others - either to advance our own interests or to advance our perception of their interests - will drive its own set of perceptions.

We have meddled all to often on the wrong side of the political spectrum in other countries, ultimately advancing the interests of nobody but some governing elites. We cannot correct that by trying to meddle on the "right" side, because there's no universal agreement on wrong and right in these cases, and because the populaces involved don't trust us and don't want us in their business even on the sides they support. We can correct our previous mistakes, over time (trust is more easily broken than built) not by counter-meddling, but by a whole lot less meddling.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

We cannot correct that by trying to meddle on the "right" side, because there's no universal agreement on wrong and right in these cases, and because the populaces involved don't trust us and don't want us in their business even on the sides they support. We can correct our previous mistakes, over time (trust is more easily broken than built) not by counter-meddling, but by a whole lot less meddling.

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I can add nothing to that.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Dayuhan

Certainly perceptions are important, but challenging a perceived situation is very different from challenging an actual situation, and we have to recognize from the start which we are doing. Perceptions get complicated, because they are in no way universal: what we are dealing with in many cases is not, for example, the actual perceptions that different components of the Saudi populace have of our role in their governance, but our perception of that perception. That's pretty messy and pretty uncertain. Certainly AQ tries to peddle a certain perception, but that doesn't mean that perception is universally or even widely accepted.

Wrapping ourselves around a dizzying galaxy of varying perceptions and trying to change them all is a good way to trip over our own feet. Over time, a straightforward, sensible foreign policy that does not involve messing around in the internal affairs of others - either to advance our own interests or to advance our perception of their interests - will drive its own set of perceptions.

We have meddled all to often on the wrong side of the political spectrum in other countries, ultimately advancing the interests of nobody but some governing elites. We cannot correct that by trying to meddle on the "right" side, because there's no universal agreement on wrong and right in these cases, and because the populaces involved don't trust us and don't want us in their business even on the sides they support. We can correct our previous mistakes, over time (trust is more easily broken than built) not by counter-meddling, but by a whole lot less meddling.

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I agree strongly with Dayuhan... regardless of our actions, some folks (like Al Qaeda) will find reasons to criticize and demonize us simply because we stand in their way. No amount of cajoling or "changing our message" or encouraging democracy will change this. One only need look at how politicians of all stripes are demonized by their opposition in our own country - and many folks believe everything they are told by the folks on both extremes of the spectrum!

I agree that we should support freedom where we can, but that doesn't mean we can't still work with governments that aren't free. Do you think the world would have been better off if Ronald Reagan had never talked to the USSR in order to support democracy proponents? How about if Nixon had never talked to China?

Folks who read the SWJ discussion board know that I am an idealist at heart... but strategy must temper ideology with pragmatism at times. Balance, as in most things, is the best... and I still argue that improving people's economic status is the fastest (and safest!) way to make them free.

V/R,

Cliff

Noam Chomsky on what is Globalization.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RdYwA...eature=related

This thread seems to be paralleling the Tunisia thread.

My most recent post there has a link to an opinion article talking about the "The 'bin Laden' of marginalisation", or how being economically marginalized combined with repression is the root cause of the current wave of protests sweeping North Africa and the Arab world. (link to the article on Al Jazeera) Interesting times we are living, that is for sure. John Stewart also had a hilarious bit on folks in the US taking credit for the protests.

Anyway, enjoying the discussions!

V/R,

Cliff