I'm not sure that's true.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Anthony Hoh
Gen McChrystal is smarter than me
On this one:
Quote:
I will really be watching with interest on how this gets implemented/enforced.
Me, too. I'll give it a month or two before it quietly disappears. Not a smart move on several levels...
Ok get the drawbacks everyone sees right off
What I haven't necessarily seen is anyone talk about the Afghan piece of this puzzle. What yall are sayin seems pretty ISAF centric. How would you see that piece:confused:
Adding to what Blackjack said and with which I agree, I suspect the civilians
who are nominally innocent will get more visitation by various bad guys and said civilians will not really appreciate the extra attention (nor will they be happy that a small source of income, claiming non-existent casualties, has been removed).
Aside from the impacts on own forces, the net result is most likely to be more, not fewer, civilian casualties and the Afghans will figure that out fairly quickly. How long it will take us to figure it out is the issue because the number of added casualties will be difficult to determine. Plus, it's been my observation that when a US General reinvents a wheel; usually by simply modifying the existing model by making it hexagonal or octagonal -- and then it doesn't work -- reversion to the old, round variety is done slowly, quietly and below everyone's radar. :rolleyes:
Good thing about that technique is the reinventor then gets credit for being 'innovative' while everyone forgets that the innovation didn't work.
We need to get over the idea that "COIN" is something new. All this stuff has been done before. From us in Viet Nam, to the French in their colonies, the British in theirs, the poor Federal commanders tasked to hunt down Morgan and Mosby -- the Hittites, for that matter. Or, to put it in the right location; Alexander...
Trying to think of a legal rule ....
that would require this open-source ROE (positing that the article is accurate ?) - and I am stumped.
Possibly it is an application of Additional Protocals I and II (the best and highest use of Lawfare against the US, so far), which in general shift the burden of civilian protection from the defending force to the attacking force - even though the defending force is hiding amidst the civilians.[*]
On the other hand, it could be a pure and simple political move - or some misguided view of COIN. If fully implemented, this rule would logically result in giving up built-up areas.
But, the article says:
Quote:
Smith said McChrystal will address in the coming months how U.S. and NATO forces are deployed around the country, and forces could be withdrawn from remote regions in order to concentrate troops around population centers.
So, we remove troops from the boondocks (where they can shoot) to built-up areas (where they can't) ? None of this hangs together.
The Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, which announced support for the rule, has a Wiki and official webpage. See its "change the rules" page.
Placing the burden on the warring parties is cute - where the AQ-Taliban are not complying with the laws of war as they now exist. So, the burden (as with AP I & II) will only fall on those nations who will follow the rules (no matter how stupid they be).
Looks like a lawfare example to this old buzzard. Maybe some of you younger, more sophisticated folks can talk me down.
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[*] AP I & II are not accepted by the US (or by either Astan or Pstan, for that matter). They are accepted by most NATO countries.
Well the source is AP -- with all the credibility that implies
Could be conjecture; could be a ploy, could be a misstatement of intent (accidental or deliberate). We'll have to wait and see...
Every new Boss is good for three or four wild rumors. :wry:
Its' find, fix, finish. Not find, fix, flee
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"But if there is a compound they're taking fire from and they can remove themselves from the area safely, without any undue danger to the forces, then that's the option they should take," Smith said. "Because in these compounds we know there are often civilians kept captive by the Taliban."
For those who have expressed concern over the issue of being all to quick to call in airtrikes for everything, we are in 100% agreement. The idea of containment of an enemy may work at times, situation will dictate. We had CAS on mission at times, but the FAMAS works just as well for what the Legion does. Now maybe the intent was to keep every commander from calling in a JDAM strikes and hellfires every time a mortar tube goes off, but if so that should be covered in a seperate CAS ROE.
If you can run away from the fight go ahead and do it? Gentlemen, none of us wish to harm any non-combatants, but the top down order to flee from the fight because there may be civilians in the compound, and they may be hostages of the insurgents is not a good plan. Loitering around waiting for them to come out and surrendur may not be all that bright either, you would risk your men to any rienforcements jihad joe could call up. One thign we must ask ourselves here in regards to civilian casualties is this. Were they really civilians, how do we know? If they were hostages and we cannot engage these compounds how can we reasonbly expect to clear, hold, or build anything? Do we really think that the civillian that got held hostage for three days and was tormented by the Taliban will somehow respect us more because we ran away and left him to the mercy of such men?
ISAF will likely come out of such situations looking like base cowards to the locals in many of these situations. They may see it as westerners making excuses for ISAF forces not to fight the Taliban. Putting myself in the enemy mindset for a moment; I can see already hear the jokes in the villages about Americans putting both SAPI plates in the backs of their IBAs in my mind. I know if I were a Mujahideen Commander I would order video cameras to be present for any long term occupation of civil compounds. That way I could get video of the kuffr running away and turn it into some good propaganda. I could also remind the locals of how when the Mujahideen came, the Americans and ISAF crusaders ran away.
Find, fix and finish is the simple and effective answer here. Not find, fix and flee. Having said that mouthful above I will say that I have a great deal of respect for the General, and I know I am being unfair to him by bieng so critical when I do not have the burdens of command placed on me any longer. I also know that regardless of the outcome, he has the best intentions in mind here.
Little guardian lawyer angels ...
Well, we went pretty quick from a change in the ROEs to prosecuting officers for war crimes - ready, shoot, aim.
Suppose every soldier had a little guardian lawyer angel (let's call him JMM), who will whisper the best legal advice (angel JMM doesn't whisper military advice). Angel JMM might whisper something like this. Niel Smith and Tom Odom, two officers that JMM happens to highly respect, accept the new ROEs; and believe that, if civilians (defined as friendlies) are killed, you my soldier ward could (not necessarily will) be prosecuted for war crimes. So, I'm telling you, scoot & don't shoot. You won't be prosecuted, none of your men will be killed (at least not here), and no civilians will be killed (at least by you).
QED (any lawyer angel who advised otherwise should be given a spaded tail & exiled).
Here is another legal opinion on the same topic. Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (2001; he rose in the world since):
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(p.5)
As Reisman and Antoniou indicate, the mere perception of LOAC violations can significantly impact operations. The Gulf War provides two examples of situations where LOAC was not violated yet the perception that it may have been had clear military consequences. The first concerned the attack on the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad that was believed by the allies to be a command and control node. Some experts concluded that the post-attack pictures of the bodies of family members of high Iraqi officials (who evidently used the bunker as a bomb shelter) being excavated from the wreckage achieved politically what the Iraqi air defenses could not do militarily: rendering downtown Baghdad immune from attack.[22]
Worried coalition leaders put the city virtually off-limits to avoid a repetition of like scenes reaching their peoples. Similarly, fears about the impact on coalition constituencies of the images of hundreds of burnt out vehicles along the so-called “Highway of Death” following an air attack on retreating Iraqi forces was a significant factor in the early termination of hostilities.[23] That result left the Republican Guard intact to slaughter Kurds and to help keep Saddam Hussein in power to this day.
22 See Michael Gordon and Bernard E, Trainor, The Generals’ War (1995), at 324-326.
23 Id., at 476-477. See also Colin Powell, My American Journey (Random House, 1995), at 520 (“The television coverage… was starting to make it look as if we were engaged in slaughter for slaughter’s sake.”).
This is a short 27 page article, worth reading in full by everyone.
End legal advice by little guardian lawyer angel.
No smiles or other icons - this is a difficult topic (as another officer I respect just posted - hi, jcustis).