FID or COIN? does it matter
I'm looking for discussion and/or guidance (to references).
I just got back from working with COM ISAF on the 60-day assessment. One of the basic theological questions that we never really discussed, but rather took as a foregone conclusion was whether we should be using the lens, vocabulary, taxonomies, and metrics of a COIN operation or a FID mission.
This is theological and existential for me because in the former paradigm "we" (the US, the international community; external interested parties) are the center-of-effort and -gravity with respect to changing the situation on the ground. It's "our" strategies, our resources, our initiatives, etc. In the latter case (FID), it's very explicitly ~not~ the externals who are on the hook to win the thing.
I do know - first hand - that COIN preaches as a central tenent the primacy of host nation interests, actors, and governance. But that's like sex ed from a priest; it's not really as believable as the 'real deal,' which I think a FID model would better emulate.
If this has been written about, I'd like to know. And if there are opinions I'd love to hear them. I've been short with text here in respect for your (and my) time. I'm happy to wax more eloquent if this is a discussion that has legs.
Cheers all and thanks,
LS
A further "clarification"
Or maybe "complication," is a better word...
Is one reason I'm looking for justifications to use FID lenses for looking at AFG the fact that FID is (usually) conducted in support of IDAD, and IDAD is really what GIROA so desperately needs?
While FID explicitly recognizes this larger, civil context for "the fight," COIN gives it a more rhetorical nod...
Mayhap I'm being more dense than usual but I don't
understand the problem. LS and others posted definitions, all of which I agree with. So IMO, we are now performing FID. Period. We are not performing COIN because the US has no insurgents to fight (That is not just a semantic quibble; whose insurgents are they?).
We are using COIN TTP to assist the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) with their COIN operation. We are also assisting them in the control of smuggling and other criminal operations. Well, that's mostly what we say, anyway...
LS said:
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"we" (the US, the international community; external interested parties) are the center-of-effort and -gravity with respect to changing the situation on the ground. It's "our" strategies, our resources, our initiatives, etc. In the latter case (FID), it's very explicitly ~not~ the externals who are on the hook to win the thing.
'Win' is a very bad word to use with respect to either FID or COIN because the almost certain best end will be an acceptable outcome. One cannot win other than at a tactical level. So there's not going to be a win and that word needs to disappear. Neither will there be a defeat -- so that word should never appear.
Regarding the point in the quoted statement, perhaps a part of the problem is just that: It is "our" strategies, our resources, our initiatives, etc. and maybe a little less of that would let everyone know that what we're doing there is FID. As you say:
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I don't think we're doing FID in AFG (we're not "doing both." We're fighting a COIN fight...). Our efforts to build ANSF are really in support of our own COIN (and other) objectives; not, as would be the case in a true FID-driven mission, IOT give GIROA the capacity to win this fight. Data points? The POI for ANSF are ours, not theirs. Less decisive, but still important (to my mind), the standards for training are ours; artificially high, especially in areas of human rights and other western constructs.(emphasis added /kw)
I believe that makes my point. As we all know, artificially high levels will fall precipitously absent an enforcer. So will most western constructs (not to mention that it takes more time to 'train' people when you try to change what they think...).
We went from MCO against an organized (more or less...) State force (also more or less...) to controlling the chaos of toppled governments to conducting military operations against bandits and insurgents (insurging against another government we helped establish) in support of nascent governments to the conduct of FID. Well, that's where we should be -- but we haven't quite arrived and the sooner we do the better off everyone will be. ADDED: That includes the meeting of our other objectives...
What's required is FID. We are NOT doing COIN but we using COIN TTP where appropriate to assist the host nation. 'Host Nation' is important -- it is NOT our nation.
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What follows is esoteric background from open sources to remind everyone how we got where we are; those who know all that obviously should ignore it.
What all the above amounts to is that MarcT was pretty well correct in the first response on the thread. We are doing FID and we were forced into it by several factors and we have been slow to adapt. While that's simplistic to some, it's accurate. We went to Afghanistan with no coherent plan because none of the active planners knew enough to do it properly and / or they were not listened to by senior people. We went to Iraq and walked into Saddam's little hornets nest that he told us he was preparing -- letting prisoners out of jails, weapons everywhere, medals to Russian Generals and again planning was flawed and good things were ignored. Not picking on anyone; those are just facts. Realize that in the case of both nations we were doing something no one had any experience with, no one in command had been in combat command at the echelon in which they were serving -- and in no combat at all with rare exceptions for ten years. Few had been trained to expect or do the things that would confront us. In both cases, some good plans were tossed aside by direction of...
All things considered we did it pretty well and -- this is important; what it was was not what it became and that is not what it now is.
Seems to me the 'problem' arose due to our method of entry and a lack of proper guidance from our Political Masters. None of them know enough to say 'FID' OR 'COIN' and frankly, the Army as an institution * -- and thus CentCom and DoD -- could not provide better guidance so everything just sort of happened. Our Personnel system and its rotational processes meant that about the time someone really learned the job; they moved. We compounded that by shifting the wrong units to Iraq and never placing units back in an AO or on a mission they had previously performed or were even suited for in some caes. Our doctrinal and training failure during the 90s * led to a learning curve exacerbated by the distraction of Iraq -- which was a different war on several levels but also latterly was a case of FID and Assistance to the Host Nation in the conduct of COIN operations.
Note in both cases, we overthrew the existing government and thus were not conducting FID but instead were conducting PreNatal Development which should have transmuted into today's FID once we had designed and installed a government which immediately began it's own transmutation into a new sovereign government. We just need to back off a bit.
We do not do FID well because we have to be in charge, we're impatient and anyone who doesn't do it our way is wrong. Thus we get to be overbearing and while we're tolerated for the 'help' we offer, we build up a lot of resentment. Trying to make the 'assisted[' nation an image of the US in some respects does not help. This thread is indicative of that dichotomy; we run around the world and get invovled in FID but all to often, overdo it and must run everything, therefor the Troops are confused; "Am I doing COIN or FID?" Answer is neither or both (depending on who one asks). Or it's 'c.' Both of the above. Or one today, the other tomorrow... :rolleyes:
Not smart. Not at all.
* There were people in the services that knew what needed to be done in 2001-3 but they were not in positions to adequately influence planning. There were people in the services in the 1975-2000 period who strongly advised against dismissing nation building, COIN TTP and FID among other things. They were ignored.
I think what we want to do has bumped into what we ought to do...
If this is correct:
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Our goal is an AFG that can police it's territory. That requires a "State," not a "Nation" (though I will certainly concede that some form of national identity or social contract is essential for a State to be seen as credible...).
That's achievable. If anyone wants to add to that goal words implying democratic in the western sense and / or at least slightly corruption free, it can become unachievable. Your UK Police Trainer has it exactly right and we are highly unlikely to change that; the focus on the Police was an error in wishful thinking by some and was caused by too many people reading too much theory and not watching what occurred on the ground.
Your HN Agency to manage the hold is the ANA -- and if that continues on its current track, there is an excellent chance that a crossover effect in ten or a few more years from today might improve the ANP. Might.
On your points:
1. True. That's why we don't do it at all well, we generally walk in too late. In Afghanistan and Iraq, we made the corpse. Mouth to mouth is not pleasant and it may or may not be successful. Still, we have to try for several reasons...
2. FID may or may not require military forces. If they are committed, support of the HN COIN operation is generally expected. Why else would the Military force be committed.
3. True.
4. Not correct, a host of stuff appeared in the 1961-70 period and some has appeared after that. The problem is no one wanted to think about it so it was ignored. Old Eagle is correct, check the CORDS stuff; better yet, tell the other Agencies to check their CORDS stuff. The problem now is that many agencies are being drug to the altar kicking and screaming and Papa Eichenberry needs to spank 'em. The senior US 'civilian' needs to be seen by some of those folks to be in charge; they'll resist military-in-charge just to be contrary. There'll be a minor problem in that Eichenberry is a military retiree but he speaks Manadarin so that'll help with some. :rolleyes:
The civil side can and probably will get there but it's worse than pulling teeth... :(
5. True and unlikely to change.
6. True but his mission was and always is combat, call it COIN and be wrong, call it whatever you wish but combat is the reason the US Commander is there. FID is NOT a combat unit mission, it is a national undertaking using various US agencies for their normal mission parameter purposes to assist the host nation. Support of COIN operations of the host nation is a combat unit mission -- and so is mentoring and pairing with host nation units to impart skills (and values...).
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I think, on a scale of 1-to-10, where 1 is virtually no interagency or combined civ-mil collaboration and 10 is fully-integrated, we're about a 3. And happy, because we used to be at a 2; so we've improved our performance by 30%. But, IOT succeed, we really need to be at about a 7; and that would require a "revolution in civ-mil affairs." Radical things!
I don't think you can get US agencies to an 8, much less a 10. :D
FWIW, in Viet Nam, we never really got above about a 5 or so -- so you're over halfway there... :wry:
Appropriate article in today's
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NYT:TALLIL AIR BASE, Iraq — In this desert brush land where the occupiers and occupied are moving into an uneasy new partnership, American and Iraqi commanders sat side by side earlier this week and described their biggest problems to Robert M. Gates, the visiting defense secretary.
For Staff Maj. Gen. Habib al-Hussani, the commander of the 10th Iraqi Army Division, the trouble was not enough equipment for patrols on the border with Iran. For Col. Peter A. Newell, the commander of the first American advisory brigade to Iraqi troops, it was something else.
“The hardest thing to do sometimes,” he told Mr. Gates, “is step back and not be in charge.”
(LINK).
Therein lies the 'problem' that we have created. If it's FID, we can't be in charge; if it's COIN we have to be in charge. Thus we are :confused:...
What we're SUPPOSED to be doing is FID and helping the Host Nation with THEIR COIN effort since we cannot do COIN because they aren't our insurgents and isn't in our country. The capabilities and qualities of their government are irrelevant -- it is still not ours. By over controlling, we're confusing everyone -- except the bad guys who are taking advantage of it...:rolleyes:
That will be dismissed by some as simplistic. It is not. Having lived and fought under that dichotomy in three other Nations under perhaps more violent circumstances and with the exact same 'problem' a while ago, let me assure you that I learned the hard way over a few years that is not a good plan.
Hi Ken; yes, it matters, legally
A couple of weeks ago, we had a brief (non-fires) exchange re: a quote from JP 3-07.1 (JTTP FID), here and here.
The quote from the manual was this (my concern focused on the last sentence, bolded by me):
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(3) In all cases, the strategic initiative and responsibility lie with the HN. To preserve its legitimacy and ensure a lasting solution to the problem, the host government must bear this responsibility. A decision for US forces to take the strategic initiative amounts to a transition to war.
You advised:
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You should be concerned with the legal aspects because that is the intent of the paragraph you quote.
and that I have done - thought about it.
But, first, another point you raised (which I should have answered) - the dictionary and legal definition of "war" (the dictionary from you, with JMM bolding):
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war (wôr)
n.
1.
a. A state of open, armed, often prolonged conflict carried on between nations, states, or parties...
That is the basic Geneva definition (an "armed conflict"), which expanded the Hague definition of "war" - slightly with respect to state on state conflicts; but substantially by bringing in non-state parties ("Powers") to armed conflicts via Common Articles 2 and 3.
Moving back to FID (Foreign Internal Defense, where "internal" and "defense" are key words), that can occur in the context with no armed conflict or in the context of an armed conflict (subject to Geneva). Both situations are covered in JP 3-07.1.
Far be from me to interpret definitively what the CJCS meant by "A decision for US forces to take the strategic initiative amounts to a transition to war", but here is what I think.
Where the US "takes charge" (takes the "strategic initiative"), we transition our status from being an "assister" to being a "belligerent". In the case of Iraq, a co-belligerent with them against their insugencies, I suppose. That would be a tricky position legally, given the executive agreement (whether a SOFA or SA is not particularly material) in effect. As you pointed out, 50 USC 33 (War Powers Resolution) could well come into play.
Astan is different. There, we are engaged in FID and assisting them (usually taking the primary role in personnel and materiel) in their COIN efforts. Add the UN-NATO mandate to that, which is peace enforcement (not peacekeeping). But, we are also carrying on a separate war (armed conflict) against AQ-Taliban pursuant to the 2001 AUMF, as a belligerent - which spills over into Pstan and, as to which, Astan is not a co-belligerent. That is a complex situation legally, and from all appearances militarily.
Vietnam was different still, but that is another thread.
The issues raised above are really a mix of legal and military, where the right and left hands have to co-ordinate via a common brain. In that respect, COL Newell seems a good choice for Iraq since he researched and wrote a very intelligent thesis on a related area where legal and military concerns have to be met. I've lauded that elsewhere.
Jon, you are not alone ...
in your wonderment ...
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I'm beginning to wonder (as I always do when considering the 2nd and 3rd order of kinetic effects) about what would happen in Afghanistan if we weren't there...if we simply picked up and left and spent our resources mitigating terrorism the old fashioned way.
I also wonder if any change in policy would result if we were today or tomorrow to kill UBL and Zawahiri ?
Best not to stay and what to say
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(from Jon Custis)what would happen in Afghanistan if we weren't there...if we simply picked up and left and spent our resources mitigating terrorism the old fashioned way.
Jon and JMM,
Look back at Imperial British history, with three Afghan Wars and regular cross-border issues (even during WW2, NWFP was fully manned). The British Empire learnt, very painfully, notably in 1845, that it was best not to stay, just visit; visiting with a very large "stick" and some "carrots". Ironically I suspect many said this about the Soviet intervention and upon their exit.
What would we say to all Afghans if we were to leave? "Don't allow 'X' or we will be back", "We tried to change you and failed. Please forgive us and we will pay you" and more. I do not assume there is such a common nationality shared by all Afghans.
davidbfpo
"The urge to edit" apparently does not disappear with age...
That is a really good slide; seriously.
However, given that urge... :wry:
And the charts multiply in truly lapin fashion ....
especially where a number of "assisting" nations are involved. But, let's take just the simple case of HN and one AN - looking at it from a legal standpoint.
You would have to have two charts (one HN and one AN) since the relative civil and military efforts in each of the little boxes are not necessarily the same and are probably going to be different (HN vice AN).
Then, for each of those boxes, we have to ask what law (whose law) applies in each situation. That is positing that the civil effort in each box is ruled by the Rule of Law (but whose, HN or AN ?) and the military effort is ruled by the Laws of War (LOAC), which may differ (again a HN or AN issue).
Pile on a few more nations, Status of Forces and Security Assistance agreements, plus a few different (and possibly conflicting) international and collective charters and mandates, and then we are approaching reality.
Legally, all of this "stuff" is complex.
PS: and now we have a new COIN, Combat Operations In support of another Nation. That definition does translate readily into LOAC terms.
I don't think it's that complex operationally.
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
Legally, all of this "stuff" is complex.
Legally, yes, it is indeed -- but it's only complex operationally if you try to do more than is necessary for operations appropriate to the place and time out of your lane. When we start weaving in and out of lanes or take advantage of no lane markings to hog the road then life always becomes more complex. Unduly so... ;)
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PS: and now we have a new COIN, Combat Operations In support of another Nation. That definition does translate readily into LOAC terms.
Yep. Also far more accurate for most cases than the other meaning which has become stigprostioverregulized.